AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 18759/91

                      by John Mitchell McLAUGHLIN

                      against the United Kingdom

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

9 May 1994, the following members being present:

           MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                 S. TRECHSEL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 H. DANELIUS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 Mrs. J. LIDDY

           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 G.B. REFFI

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

           Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 23 August 1991 by

John Mitchell McLAUGHLIN against the United Kingdom and registered on

21 September 1991 under file No. 18759/91;

      Having regard to :

-     reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the

      Commission;

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

      1 March 1993 and the observations in reply submitted by the

      applicant on 20 July 1993;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is an Irish citizen, born in 1945 and resident in

Derry, Northern Ireland. In the proceedings before the Commission he

is represented by Mr. P.J. Madden, a solicitor practising in Belfast.

      The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

(a)   The particular circumstances of the case

      The applicant is an active member of Sinn Fein, a political

party. In the 1985 local government elections in Northern Ireland he

was elected to Derry City Council. In 1987 he was elected chairman of

the Council's Finance and General Purposes Committee. He is a member

of several other committees of Derry City Council and his party's

spokesman on the economy. In 1989 he was reelected as a city

councillor.

      On 19 October 1988, the Secretary of State for the Home

Department issued two directives, one addressed to the British

Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the other to the Independent

Broadcasting Authority (IBA), in the following terms:

      "1. ... I hereby require [the BBC] [the IBA] to refrain at all

      times from sending any broadcast matter which consists of or

      includes -

           any words spoken, whether in the course of an interview or

           discussion or otherwise, by a person who appears or is

           heard on the programme in which the matter is broadcast

           where -

           (a) the person speaking the words represents or purports to

           represent an organisation specified in paragraph 2 below,

           or

           (b) the words support or solicit or invite support for such

           an organisation,

           other than any matter specified in paragraph 3 below.

      2.   The organisations referred to in paragraph 1 above are -

           (a) any organisation which is for the time being a

           proscribed organisation for the purposes of the Prevention

           of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 or the

           Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978; and

           (b) Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein and the Ulster Defence

           Association.

      3.   The matter excluded from paragraph 1 above is any words

      spoken -

           (a) in the course of proceedings in Parliament, or

           (b) by or in support of a candidate at a parliamentary,

           European Parliamentary or local election pending that

           election."

      The Home Secretary explained the reasons for the measure in a

statement to Parliament on 19 October 1988:

      "For some time broadcast coverage of events in Northern Ireland

      has included the occasional appearance of representatives of

      para-military organisations and their political wings, who have

      used these opportunities as an attempt to justify their criminal

      activities. Such appearances have caused widespread offence to

      viewers and listeners throughout the United Kingdom, particularly

      just after a terrorist outrage. The terrorists themselves draw

      support and sustenance from access to radio and television - from

      addressing their views more directly to the population at large

      than is possible through the press. The Government have decided

      that the time has come to deny this easy platform to those who

      use it to propagate terrorism. Accordingly, I have today issued

      to the chairmen of the B.B.C. and the I.B.A. a notice... The

      restrictions will not apply to the broadcast of proceedings in

      Parliament, and in order not to impair the obligation on the

      broadcasters to provide an impartial coverage of elections the

      notices will have a more limited effect during election

      periods... These restrictions follow very closely the lines of

      similar provisions which have been operating in the Republic of

      Ireland for some years... Broadcasters have a dangerous and

      unenviable task in reporting events in Northern Ireland. This

      step is no criticism of them. What concerns us is the use made

      of broadcasting facilities by supporters of terrorism. This is

      not a restriction on reporting. It is a restriction on direct

      appearances by those who use or support violence...".

      By way of an explanatory letter dated 24 October 1988 the Home

Office offered guidance to the BBC on the interpretation of the

notices. The letter, which was copied to the IBA, provided, inter alia,

as follows:

      "It was asked whether the notice applied only to direct

      statements by representatives of the organisations or their

      supporters or whether it applied also to reports of the words

      they had spoken.  We confirmed, as the Home Secretary has made

      clear in Parliament, that the correct interpretation (and that

      which was intended) is that it applies only to direct statements

      and not to reported speech, and that the person caught by the

      notice is the one whose words are reported and not the reporter

      or presenter who reports them.  Thus the notice permits the

      showing of a film or still picture of the initiator speaking the

      words together with a voice-over account of them, whether in

      paraphrase or verbatim.  We confirmed that programmes involving

      the reconstruction of actual events, where actors use the

      verbatim words which had been spoken in actuality, are similarly

      permitted.

      ...

      The BBC also asked whether a member of an organisation or one of

      its elected representatives could be considered as permanently

      representing that organisation so that all his words, whatever

      their character, were covered by the Notice.  We confirmed that

      the Home Office takes the view that this is too narrow an

      interpretation of the word "represents" in paragraph 1(a) of the

      text.  A member of an organisation cannot be held to represent

      that organisation in all his daily activities.  Whether at any

      particular instance he is representing the organisation concerned

      will depend upon the nature of the words spoken and the

      particular context.  Where he is speaking in a personal capacity

      or purely in his capacity as a member of an organisation which

      does not fall under the notice (for example, an elected Council),

      it follows, from that interpretation, that paragraph 1(a) will

      not apply.  Where it is clear, from the context and the words

      that he is speaking as a representative of an organisation

      falling under the notice, his words may not be broadcast

      directly, but (as mentioned above) can be reported.  (He may, of

      course, come within the scope of paragraph 1(b), if his words

      contain support for the organisation.)  Although there may be

      borderline occasions when this distinction will require a careful

      exercise of judgment, we believe that the great majority of

      broadcast material will fall clearly within one case or the

      other."

      On 2 November 1988 the Home Secretary's directions to the BBC and

the IBA were debated in the House of Commons, and approved by 243 votes

to 179.  The House of Lords, also after a debate, took note of the

directions on 8 December 1988.

      The applicant challenged the directives in judicial review

proceedings.  His application was dismissed by the High Court of

Justice in Northern Ireland on 7 September 1990.  Mr. Justice Carswell

noted that the case of Brind (R. v. Secretary of State for the Home

Department, ex parte Brind and others) had already been determined by

the Court of Appeal in London, and dealt with the other issue raised

by the applicant as follows:

      "The sole ground upon which the argument for the applicant was

      advanced in this court was that the directives were unlawful, in

      that they violated the provisions of Section 19 of the Northern

      Ireland Constitution Act 1973.  The material part of Section

      19(1) reads as follows:

           'It shall be unlawful for a Minister of the Crown ... to

           discriminate, or aid, induce or incite another to

           discriminate, in the discharge of functions relating to

           Northern Ireland against any person or class of persons on

           the ground of religious belief or political opinion.'

      "Discrimination" is defined in Section 23(2) in the following

      terms:

           'For those purposes [ie the purposes of Part III of the

           Act] a person discriminates against another person or a

           class of persons if he treats that other person or that

           class of persons less favourably in any circumstances than

           he treats or would treat other persons in those

           circumstances.'

      There must in my opinion be a purposive connotation in the words.

      'on the ground of' in Section 19(1).  Unfavourable treatment of

      other persons amounting to discrimination against them is not per

      se made unlawful by the subsection.  For A's unfavourable

      treatment of B to amount to unlawful discrimination, it must be

      established that it was carried out on the ground of B's

      religious belief or political opinion. ...

      ...

      The following issues accordingly arise in respect of each

      directive:

      ...

      3.   if [the Home Secretary] did treat them less favourably

      [than other persons], whether he did so on the ground of their

      political opinions...

      ...

      As they operate in the present case, the terms of the directives

      require the BBC and IBA to refrain from sending any broadcast

      matter which consists of or includes words where

           (a) the speaker represents Sinn Fein, or

           (b) the words support or solicit or invite support for Sinn

           Fein.  The courts in this jurisdiction have on several

           occasions taken judicial notice of the objects of Sinn

           Fein.  In re Curran and McCann's Application [1985] NI 261,

           263-4 Hutton J expressed his view in the following passage:

                 'Therefore I take judicial notice of the facts that

                 the policy and aims of Sinn Fein are to take power in

                 Northern Ireland with a ballot paper in one hand and

                 an Armalite in the other, that Sinn Fein gives

                 unambivalent support to the 'armed struggle', which is

                 the euphemism used by Sinn Fein to describe terrorist

                 murders and other violent crimes committed by the

                 Provisional IRA, and that when the elected

                 representatives of Sinn Fein take part in the normal

                 work of an elected council this is just one plank of

                 their policy, the other plank being the unambivalent

                 support of murder and other acts of terrorist violence

                 committe[d] to overthrow democratic government in

                 Northern Ireland.'

           ...

           The relevant characteristic of Sinn Fein, as in the case of

           the other organisations specified in the directives, is its

           support for violence, which cannot be classed as a

           legitimate political opinion.  That support is an intrinsic

           part of the policy of Sinn Fein.

           The ban does not operate upon the broadcaster because he is

           a member of Sinn Fein.  Indeed, it applies equally to

           persons who are not members, if the words which they say

           support or solicit or invite support for Sinn Fein.  It is

           not aimed at the opinions of the broadcaster, but at his

           representation of Sinn Fein or his support for it.

           It follows from this that the major objections made on

           behalf of the applicant are not well founded.  The first

           was that Sinn Fein has some legitimate political objectives

           and activities, and the width of the ban prevents its

           members from expressing views by means of radio and

           television on legitimate political topics.  Its effect

           therefore is to bring about the unlawful object of

           discriminating against Sinn Fein on the ground of political

           opinion.  I am satisfied on the evidence, however, that in

           issuing his directives the Home Secretary was aiming

           squarely at terrorism.  The first sentence of his statement

           to the House of Commons on 19 October 1988 referred to

           'representatives of paramilitary organisations and their

           political wings'.  He referred at several points to

           terrorism, and stated that the Government had decided that

           the time had now come 'to deny this easy platform who use

           it to propagate terrorism'.  He expressed concern about the

           use made of broadcasting facilities by 'supporters of

           terrorism', and described his directives as a 'restriction

           on direct appearances by those who use or support

           violence'.  The same tone was struck in the subsequent

           debates and statements made in Parliament and in the terms

           of the resolution passed by the House of Commons on

           2 November 1988.  If confirmation of this purpose is

           required, it may be found in the averments contained in the

           passages which I have quoted from Mr. Scoble's affidavit,

           which have not been controverted.  If the applicant is

           correct in his contention that the effect of the directives

           is to hinder members of Sinn Fein in carrying out

           legitimate political activities, that does not make the

           actions of the Home Secretary unlawful as discriminating

           against those members on the ground of political opinion.

           His object was to reduce the support for terrorism afforded

           by the participation of Sinn Fein representatives in

           television and radio broadcasts.  It is perfectly clear

           that the support of terrorist violence is an intrinsic part

           of Sinn Fein policy.  I accept the Home Secretary's

           contention that in issuing the directives he was attempting

           to take steps to reduce the publicity given to such

           support.  In my opinion this is not discrimination against

           the members or supporters of Sinn Fein on the ground of any

           legitimate political opinions which they hold.  The Home

           Secretary issued the directives on the ground of the

           support for terrorism which is an integral part of that

           party's policy.  As such it is not in my judgment unlawful

           under Section 19(1) of the Northern Ireland Constitution

           Act 1973.

           The applicant's second objection to the directives was

           based upon the fact that the applicant has signed a

           declaration pursuant to the Elected Authorities (Northern

           Ireland) Act 1989.  This is not the time and place for a

           detailed discussion of or ruling upon the scope and effect

           of the execution of such a declaration.  It is sufficient

           to say that the directives were not issued in order to

           prevent the broadcasting of programmes in which particular

           persons or classes of persons take part.  Their object was

           the prevention of matter of a particular kind being

           broadcast.  It is therefore immaterial that a particular

           speaker on a broadcast programme may have forsworn support

           for acts of terrorism, if he represents or expresses

           support for Sinn Fein, a party whose notorious policy is

           the support of terrorist violence."

      The House of Lords gave its judgments in the case of Brind on

7 February 1991.  On 4 March 1991 the applicant abandoned his appeal

in the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland, and it was duly dismissed.

(b)   The relevant domestic law

      The notices made in the present case were authorised under powers

conferred on the Home Secretary in a "Licence and Agreement" of

2 April 1981 in respect of the BBC and under Section 29 of the

Broadcasting Act 1981 in respect of the IBA.

      The BBC is a public corporation governed by a Royal Charter which

defines its objects, powers and obligations, its constitution and the

sources and uses of its revenues. The Licence and Agreement prescribes

the terms and conditions of the corporation's operations.

      Clause 13 (4) of the Licence and Agreement reads as follows:

      "The Secretary of State may from time to time by notice in

      writing require the Corporation to refrain at any specified time

      or at all times from sending any matter or matters of any class

      specified in such notice; and the Secretary of State may at any

      time or times vary or revoke any such notice..."

      Section 29 (3) of the Broadcasting Act 1981 provides that:

      "... the Secretary of State may at any time by notice in writing

      require the Authority to refrain from broadcasting any matter or

      classes of matter specified in the notice; and it shall be the

      duty of the Authority to comply with the notice."

      In the case of Brind, the House of Lords rejected the applicant's

challenge to the orders, finding that "it was impossible to say that

the Secretary of State, in concluding that the modest restrictions

imposed by the directives were justified by the important public

interest of combating terrorism, had exceeded the limits of his

discretion or acted unreasonably in making them" (R. v. Secretary of

State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind and others, [1991] 1 AC

696, quotation taken from the headnote).

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains that as a result of the directions he is

prevented from having direct access to the broadcast media: he can no

longer contribute to radio and television programmes, participate in

televised press conferences, and comment on economic and political

developments in the city; he is no longer interviewed on radio and

television, and an already scheduled radio interview was cancelled; as

a city councillor he has no access to the media on matters of concern

to his constituents.  The restrictions apply even to matters connected

with the affairs of the City Council, in spite of the fact that he is

a democratically elected member of the Council representing a lawful

political party. Invoking Article 10 of the Convention, he contends

that the orders constitute an unjustified interference with his right

to receive and impart information and ideas.

      Under Article 14 of the Convention the applicant complains that

he has been subject to discriminatory treatment as the directions apply

only to representatives of Sinn Fein and not to those of other

political parties.

      Finally, the applicant complains that he had no effective remedy

before a national authority for his Convention claims, contrary to

Article 13 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 23 August 1991 and registered

on 21 September 1991.

      On 31 August 1992 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government for observations on its

admissibility and merits.

      The Government submitted their observations on 1 March 1993 and

the applicant submitted his observations in reply on 20 July 1993.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant alleges a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the

Convention by virtue of the effect which the Home Secretary's orders

to the BBC and the IBA have on him.

      Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention provides, so far as

relevant, as follows.

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This

      right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and

      impart information and ideas without interference by public

      authority and regardless of frontiers. ...

      2.   The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it

      duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,

      conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law

      and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of

      national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for

      the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health

      or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of

      others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in

      confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of

      the judiciary."

      The Government accept that, for the purposes of Article 10

(Art. 10) of the Convention, there has been an interference with the

applicant's right to freedom of expression, but they point out that the

extent of the interference is less than the restrictions applicable in

Ireland when the Commission decided Purcell v. Ireland (Application No.

15404/89, Dec. 16.4.91), and in any event is mitigated by the fact that

the notices do not limit the words which can be spoken on radio and

television, but merely require (for statements falling within the ambit

of the notices) an actor's voice to be used.

      The applicant underlines that his position is not to be compared

with that of journalists, as he is a democratically elected local

councillor who is a member of a lawful political party.  He denies that

the restrictions are in fact as limited as the Government maintain, as

in practice he is not asked to give interviews on any matters at all

because of his membership of a lawful political party. He states that

the effect of the restrictions is to give an unfair advantage to his

political opponents who are not subject to the restrictions.

      The Commission recalls that Article 10 (Art. 10) rights can be

interfered with by restrictions on the manner of conveying information,

as well as on the content of the information (Nos. 11553/85 and

11658/85, Dec. 9.3.87, D.R. 51, p. 136, 144; Eur. Court H.R., Autronic

judgment of 22 May 1990, Series A no. 178, p. 23, para. 47).

      The Commission cannot establish whether the fact that the

applicant is not interviewed on specific or general political questions

is attributable to the directions given by the Home Secretary to

broadcasters, but accepts that the directions affect the way in which

he is able to impart information.  It also accepts that it is probable

that a councillor whose statements must be "voiced over" is less

likely, all else being equal, to be interviewed for television or radio

than one whose statements can be broadcast as they are made.

      The Commission finds that the applicant has been subjected to

interference with his Article 10 (Art. 10) rights.

      The interference entails a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of

the Convention if it does not fall within one of the exceptions

provided for in paragraph 2 (Art. 10-2).  The Commission must therefore

examine whether the interference was "prescribed by law", whether it

had an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under Article 10 para. 2

(Art. 10-2), and whether it was "necessary in a democratic society" to

achieve that aim or those aims.

      The Government submit that the Licence and Agreement of 1981 with

the BBC and the Broadcasting Act 1981 in the case of the IBA provide

the necessary regulatory background to the notices, and that, when

taken together with the explanatory letter from the Home Office, the

directions fall within the concept of "law" as defined by the European

Court of Human Rights in the Sunday Times case (Eur. Court H.R., Sunday

Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 31, para. 49).

The applicant points out that the notice made to the IBA in the present

case, unlike the Order in Application No. 15404/89, did not have to be

laid before Parliament, and that the notice to the BBC was made

pursuant to a licensing agreement, which is not of the nature of a

"law" within the meaning of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.

The applicant also considers that, if the notices had to be explained

by a letter from the Home Office, then they do not have the requisite

precision to comply with Article 10 (Art. 10).  He underlines that his

membership of the local council results from his membership of Sinn

Fein, and states that neither the notices nor the explanatory letter

addresses this problem.

      The Commission recalls that the European Court of Human Rights

has identified at least three requirements which flow from the phrase

"in accordance with the law" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2

(Art. 8-2) of the Convention.  The phrase "prescribed by law" in

Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention must be interpreted

in the same way as the phrase "in accordance with the law" in Article

8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., Silver

judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, p. 33, para. 85).  Thus a

norm must be formulated with sufficient precision; the phrase "in

accordance with the law", or the equivalent phrase "prescribed by law",

does not merely refer back to domestic law, but also relates to the

quality of the law, and a law conferring a discretion is not in itself

inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability provided that the

scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated

with sufficient clarity (Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March

1988, Series A no. 130, p. 30, para. 61 with further references).

      The Commission notes that there is no contention in the present

case that the interference was not in accordance with domestic law, as

the House of Lords in the case of Brind ultimately established.  As to

whether the "law" at issue in the present case has the required

"quality", the Commission notes that the authority to make notices is

of a general, blanket nature.  It sets no limits on the type of

directions the minister may give, and does not require the directions

to be made for any particular purpose.  The Commission must, however,

look not only to the source of the authority for the making of the

directions, but also to the directions themselves, as it is the

directions which laid down the restrictions which had, and have, to be

complied with by broadcasters and thereby affect the applicant.

      The Commission recalls that accessibility and foreseeability are

two of the requirements inherent in the phrase "prescribed by law" in

Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention (see, for example,

Eur. Court H.R., Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no

30, p. 31, para. 49).  The accessibility of the directions is not in

question in the present case: the source of the authority for the

respective notices is generally available, and the notices made by the

Home Secretary were announced in Parliament, debated in Parliament, and

the subject of widespread comment in the press.  As to foreseeability,

even if the original notices contained areas of uncertainty, such as

the impact on elected individuals speaking on matters unrelated to

terrorism, the Commission finds that the subsequent clarification by

the Home Office to the broadcasting authorities rendered the scope of

the interference apparent to all concerned.

      Accordingly, the Commission finds that the interference was

"prescribed by law" within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2

(Art. 10-2) of the Convention.

      The Commission must next consider whether the interference with

the applicant's rights pursued a "legitimate aim".  The Government

point to the address by the Home Secretary to the House of Commons on

19 October 1988, in which he referred to the restrictions as part of

the campaign against terrorism.  They recall that Lord Templeman in the

House of Lords also recognised this aim.  They see the aim of the

notices as principally the protection of "the interests of national

security" and "the prevention of disorder or crime".  The applicant

regards the test of the legitimacy of aims under Article 10 (Art. 10)

as an objective one.  He considers that the Government must show how

they expected the measure to protect national security or prevent

crime, and adds that there is no evidence that audiences are offended

by responsible journalism (and the Home Secretary expressly stated in

Parliament that there was no criticism of journalists); that Irish

"terrorists" have not been interviewed on British television since

1979; that there is no indication that or how the "standing" of

terrorists had been increased, and that "intimidating" statements had

been broadcast.

        The Commission notes that the restrictions in the present case

refer in terms to proscribed organisations and to named organisations

which, although not prohibited, are known to have connections with

unlawful organisations.  The Commission finds no indication that the

directions were anything other than part of the measures to combat

terrorism which were made in good faith. The Commission accepts that

the aim of the restrictions is legitimate.

      Finally, the Commission must consider the question of the

necessity for the interference with the applicant's Article 10

(Art. 10) rights.  The European Court of Human Rights has summarised

the major principles of its case-law on the "necessity" test in Article

10 (Art. 10) of the Convention as follows:

      "(a) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential

      foundations of a democratic society;  subject to paragraph 2 of

      Article 10 (Art. 10), it is applicable not only to 'information'

      or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as

      inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those

      that offend, shock or disturb.  Freedom of expression, as

      enshrined in Article 10 (Art. 10), is subject to a number of

      exceptions which, however, must be narrowly interpreted and the

      necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established.

      (b)  These principles are of particular importance as far as the

      press is concerned. While it must not overstep the bounds set,

      inter alia, in the `interests of national security' or for

      `maintaining the authority of the judiciary', it is nevertheless

      incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on matters of

      public interest. Not only does the press have the task of

      imparting such information and ideas: the  public also has a

      right to receive them. were it otherwise, the press would be

      unable to play its vital role of `public watchdog'.

      (c) The adjective 'necessary', within the meaning of Article 10

      para. 2 (Art. 10-2), implies the existence of a 'pressing social

      need'.  The Contracting States have a certain margin of

      appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes

      hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the law

      and the decisions applying it, even those given by independent

      courts.  The [Convention organs] are therefore empowered to give

      the final ruling on whether a 'restriction' is reconcilable with

      freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (Art. 10).

      (d)  The [Convention organs'] task, in exercising [their]

      supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the

      competent national authorities but rather to review under Article

      10 (Art. 10) the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power

      of appreciation.  This does not mean that [their] supervision is

      limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised

      its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what

      [they have] to do is to look at the interference complained of

      in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was

      'proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' and whether the

      reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are

      'relevant and sufficient'."

      (Eur. Court H.R., Sunday Times (No. 2) judgment of

      26 November 1991, Series A no. 217, p. 29, para. 50)

      The Government accept that the directions given to broadcasting

authorities will not directly reduce the number of terrorist acts in

Northern Ireland or in the United Kingdom, but state that they are

intended to reduce the impact and influence of the advocates and

supporters of such acts, and that they correspond to the need to

prevent the giving of overt support for certain organisations.  They

refer to the Purcell case, where the Commission found that the

restrictions were designed to "deny representatives of known terrorist

organisations and their political supporters a possibility of using the

broadcast media as a platform for advocating their cause, encouraging

support for their organisation and conveying the impression of their

legitimacy".  They consider that, notwithstanding the compliance by

broadcasters with their various statutory or contractual duties,

interviews were broadcast before the notices were issued which gave

terrorists and their apologists a spurious air of authority.

      The Government regard the extensive experience of the executive

and the legislature of terrorist matters as justifying a greater margin

of appreciation than might be the case in other spheres involving

restrictions on freedom of expression.  They nevertheless point out

that the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of expression are less

onerous than those in the Purcell case, in that they are very precisely

targeted and they do not apply during elections.

      The applicant underlines that he is impeded in his work as an

elected representative.  He refers in particular to the narrow margin

of appreciation required by the Court in Castells v. Spain (Eur. Court

H.R., Castells judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236), and again

refers to the fact that he is caught by the notices whenever he speaks

as a councillor, because he is a Sinn Fein councillor.  He also

emphasises that, pursuant to the Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland)

Act 1989 he declared that, if elected, he would not lend support to

violence.

      The Commission notes that the extent of the interference in the

present case is limited.  Whilst he may be affected by the directions

in the way he can broadcast his views on the airwaves, the directions

given on 19 October 1988 do not have any impact on the words that can

be spoken or the images that can be shown on television or the radio.

The Commission has accepted that journalists may be slower to interview

councillors who are subject to the restrictions (such as the applicant)

than others, but nevertheless finds that as it is the case that whilst

the actual words spoken by persons subject to the directions may be

broadcast, the directions cannot be seen as having a major impact on

the way in which the applicant fulfils his democratic functions.

      The Commission recalls that freedom of expression is especially

important for an elected representative of the people, and that freedom

of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering

and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of their political

leaders (Eur. Court H.R., Castells judgment referred to above, pp. 22

and 23, paras. 42 and 43).

      Although the Government do not contend that the interference with

the applicant's rights is a prime element in the struggle against

terrorism, it can be regarded as one aspect of a very important area

of domestic policy.  The European Court of Human Rights has referred

to the special problems involved in combating terrorism (Eur. Court

H.R., Brogan and others judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145,

p. 33, para. 61; p. 27, para. 48; Brannigan and McBride judgment of

26 May 1993, Series A no. 258, p. 50, para. 47, with further

references), and the Commission has no doubt as to the difficulties

involved in striking a fair balance between the requirements of

protecting freedom of information - especially the free flow of

information from the media - and the need to protect the State and the

public against armed conspiracies seeking to overthrow the democratic

order which guarantees this freedom and other human rights.

      Finally, the Commission notes the findings of the High Court in

the present case as to the role of Sinn Fein in the Northern Irish

political scene, where Mr. Justice Carswell found that Sinn Fein's

"support [for violence] is an intrinsic part of the policy of Sinn

Fein".  He was satisfied that the notices were aimed at terrorism, and

indeed considered that even if members of Sinn Fein were hindered in

carrying out political activities by the directions, the Home

Secretary's notices still were not unlawful.

      The Commission finds, in the circumstances of the present case

and bearing in mind the margin of appreciation permitted to States, the

limited extent of the interference with the applicant's rights and the

importance of measures against terrorism, that it cannot be said that

the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression was

disproportionate to the aim sought to be pursued.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    The applicant also alleges a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13)

of the Convention.  Article 13 (Art. 13) provides as follows.

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a

      national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been

      committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

      The Commission recalls Article 13 (Art. 13) cannot be interpreted

so as to require a remedy in domestic law in respect of any supposed

grievance under the Convention: the grievance must be an arguable one

in terms of the Convention.  Moreover, the European Court of Human

Rights has pointed to the link between the notion of "arguable claim"

in its own case-law and the notion of "manifestly ill-founded" in

Article 27 (Art. 27) of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice

judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, paras. 52 and 54).

The Commission has found the applicant's claims under Article 10

(Art. 10) to be manifestly ill-founded.  It also finds the claims under

Article 13 (Art. 13) to be not arguable.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    Finally, the applicant alleges a violation of Article 14 of the

Convention in conjunction with Article 10 (Art. 14+10) of the

Convention as the restrictions to which he is subject do not apply to

members of other political parties.  Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention provides as follows.

      "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

      such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other

      opinion, national or social origin, association with a national

      minority, property, birth or other status."

      The Commission recalls that the applicant abandoned his appeal

to the Northern Irish Court of Appeal against the decision of Mr.

Justice Carswell, so that the question arises whether the applicant has

complied with the requirement of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention

that he exhaust domestic remedies.  However, the Commission does not

find it necessary to address this question as the complaint is in any

event manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons.

      The Commission recalls that whether or not a difference in

treatment constitutes discrimination in the sense of Article 14

(Art. 14) depends on whether there exists an objective and reasonable

justification. The difference in treatment must pursue a legitimate aim

and there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between

the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see eg. Eur.

Court H.R., Inze judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, p. 18,

para. 41).

      Mr. Justice Carswell in the High Court in Northern Ireland

accepted that the directions to the broadcasting authorities were made

not in order to prevent the broadcasting of programmes in which

particular persons or classes of persons took part, but rather to

prevent matter of a particular kind being broadcast.  He also found it

to be immaterial that a particular speaker may have forsworn support

for acts of terrorism "if he represents or expresses support for Sinn

Fein, a party whose notorious policy is the support of terrorist

violence".

      The Commission has above found that the notices issued to the

broadcasting authorities pursued a legitimate aim as such.  It  also

finds that the reasons given by Mr. Justice Carswell in the High Court

for the application of the broadcasting restrictions to those

organisations specified in para. 2(b) of the notices (including Sinn

Fein), namely the support given by those organisations to terrorist

violence, justify the inclusion of those organisations in the notices.

      This part of the application is therefore also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For the these reasons, the Commission by a majority

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission                 President of the Commission

      (H.C. Krüger)                                (C.A. Nørgaard)