SZÜCS v. AUSTRIA
Doc ref: 20602/92 • ECHR ID: 001-1860
Document date: June 29, 1994
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 20602/92
by Zoltan SZÜCS
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 29 June 1994, the following members being present:
MM. A. WEITZEL, President
C.L. ROZAKIS
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
G.B. REFFI
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
E. KONSTANTINOV
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber.
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 24 August 1992 by
Zoltan Szücs against Austria and registered on 9 September 1992 under
file No. 20602/92;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the
applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is a Hungarian national, born in 1971 and residing
in Halaszetelek (Hungary). Before the Commission he is represented by
Mr. T. Schreiner, a lawyer practising in Eisenstadt (Austria).
A. The particular circumstances of the case
On 8 October 1990 the investigating judge of the Wiener Neustadt
Regional Court (Kreisgericht) opened preliminary investigations and
issued a warrant of arrest (Haftbefehl) against the applicant and 3
others for suspicion of aggravated professional fraud committed between
9 and 31 May 1990 in Austria. The investigating judge found that there
existed a danger of absconding as the suspects had no fixed abode in
Austria and had left Austria after having committed the offences they
were suspected of. He further found that there existed a danger of
collusion as it was unclear how the suspects had come into possession
of the credit card of Mrs. S.K. which was used in committing the
offences.
On 25 February 1991 the applicant was arrested upon his entry
into Austria at the Austrian-Hungarian border.
On 26 February 1991 an investigating judge at the Eisenstadt
Regional Court questioned the applicant, who stated that he had only
accompanied the other suspects on a trip to Italy as their driver and
never had been present when they went shopping. The investigating
judge ordered the applicant's detention on remand. Referring to the
warrant of arrest of 8 October 1990, he found that there was a
reasonable suspicion that the applicant together with other suspects
had committed aggravated fraud by buying goods for a value of some
200.000 AS in different shops in Austria with a stolen credit card
(issued to Mrs. S.K.). According to information received from
Interpol, the applicant together with three other suspects had been
arrested on 31 May 1990 in Italy on which occasion they had been found
in the possession of the stolen credit card. After an interrogation
by the Italian police the applicant had been expelled from Italy. The
investigating judge also considered that there was a danger of
collusion, a danger of the applicant's absconding and a danger of
repetition.
On 4 April 1991 the applicant was heard again by the
investigating judge.
On 12 April 1991 the public prosecutor requested that the expert
opinion of a graphologist be taken for ascertaining whether the
applicant had signed the credit card purchase receipts.
On 15 April 1991 the applicant requested that an ex officio
defence counsel be appointed and waived his right to a hearing with a
view to the examination of the lawfulness of his detention on remand
(Haftprüfungsverhandlung). On the same day the investigating judge
ordered that a defence counsel be appointed for the applicant, that a
graphologist prepare an expert report within 10 days and had samples
of the applicant's handwriting taken.
On 6 May 1991 the graphological expert stated that the signatures
on the purchase receipts were unlikely to have been made by the
applicant. On the same day, upon a request by the public prosecutor,
the investigating judge decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings
and ordered the applicant's release from detention on remand.
On the same day the applicant requested compensation for his
detention.
On 8 May 1991 the Judges' Chamber (Ratskammer) at the Wiener
Neustadt Regional Court dismissed the applicant's claim for
compensation under Section 2 para. 1 (b) of the Criminal Proceedings
Compensation Act (Strafrechtliches Entschädigungsgesetz). The Judges'
Chamber found that at the time of the applicant's arrest a serious
suspicion against him had existed. Criminal proceedings had been
discontinued against him because clear evidence could not be produced.
Nevertheless a serious suspicion against him continued to exist (Im
gegenständlichen Fall wurde das Verfahren gegen Zoltan Szücs gemäß
Paragraph 109 Abs. 1 StPO lediglich eingestellt, weil ein eindeutiger
Nachweis für sein strafbares Verhalten, trotz Weiterbestehen
gewichtiger Verdachtsgründe, nicht zu erbringen ist).
On 27 May 1991 the applicant appealed against this decision to
the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht). He submitted, inter
alia, that the Judges' Chamber's finding according to which serious
suspicion against him continued to exist violated the principle of
presumption of innocence. He also submitted that the length of his
detention had been unreasonable and requested compensation for unlawful
detention under Section 2 para. 1 (a) of the Criminal Proceedings
Compensation Act in this respect.
On 9 January 1992 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
appeal. It found that, as the other suspects could not be traced in
Austria, it had been necessary to establish whether the signatures on
the purchase receipts with the credit card had been made by the
applicant, who could have disguised himself as a woman on the occasion
of the purchases. The graphological expert had only indicated that
the signatures were unlikely to have been made by the applicant.
Furthermore, these was still the suspicion that he had aided and
abetted the other suspects. Therefore, the suspicion against the
applicant had not been dissipated.
On the same day, the Court of Appeal, in a separate decision,
dismissed the applicant's claim for compensation for unlawful detention
under Section 2 para. 1 (a) of the Criminal Proceedings Compensation
Act. It found that a serious suspicion against the applicant of having
committed the offences in question subsisted at the time of his arrest.
Furthermore, there had existed the danger of the applicant's absconding
as he had been travelling around and had no fixed residence, and the
danger of collusion because there were several suspects and there had
been the risk that they would agree on their statements. The Court of
Appeal also noted that on 2 November 1990 the Eisenstadt Regional Court
had convicted the applicant of handling stolen goods (Hehlerei).
Moreover, the continuation of the detention on remand until the
graphological expert submitted his report had not rendered the length
of the applicant's detention unreasonable. The length of the detention
on remand had further not been excessive with regard to the sanctions
applicable to the offences of which the applicant was suspected, nor
had the applicant himself in the meantime produced any exonerating
evidence which would have made the applicant's release obligatory.
Lastly, the applicant's detention could not have been substituted by
a more lenient measure.
B. Relevant domestic law
1. Detention on remand
Under S. 180 paras. 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Strafprozeßordnung), a person may be held in detention on remand -
where there are serious grounds for suspecting him of having committed
a criminal offence - if there is a risk of his absconding, of collusion
or of repetition of the offences.
2. Compensation regarding pecuniary damages resulting from detention
on remand
The Criminal Proceedings Compensation Act (Strafrechtliches
Entschädigungsgesetz) provides for compensation for pecuniary loss
resulting from detention on remand. The conditions to be met are laid
down in SS. 2 and 3. S. 2 para. 1 (a) relates to the case of unlawful
detention on remand. S. 2 para. 1 (b) specifies as conditions that the
accused has been acquitted, or that the proceedings against him have
been otherwise discontinued and that the suspicion that he has
committed the offence in question no longer subsists, or that there is
a bar to prosecution which already existed at the time of his
detention.
S. 6 para. 1 stipulates that when a court orders or prolongs
detention on remand, the superior court is competent to decide whether
the conditions of S. 2 para. 1 (a) and S. 3 are met. S. 6 para. 2
stipulates that where a person is acquitted or criminal proceedings
against him are discontinued by a court, the same court is competent
to decide whether the conditions of S. 2 para. 1 (b) and S. 3 are met.
In these proceedings the detained person has to be heard and, if
necessary, evidence has to be taken. The detained and the Prosecutor's
Office have a right to appeal to the superior court which can take, if
necessary, further evidence. The final decision in these proceedings
is binding on the civil courts.
If the said courts find that the conditions under S. 2 and 3 are
met, the person concerned has to file a request with the Department of
Finance (Finanzprokuratur) for acknowledgment of his claim. If there
is no decision upon his request within six months or if his claim is
partly or fully refused, the person concerned has to institute civil
court proceedings against the Republic of Austria (SS. 7 and 8).
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention
about the length of his detention on remand. He submits that the only
evidence taken during his detention was the expert opinion of a
graphologist. This expert opinion was of no relevance, as he was
suspected of having acted as driver for the transport of the loot.
2. He complains under Article 5 para. 5 of the Convention about the
refusal of compensation for his detention on remand as his detention
was in breach of Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention.
3. He complains under Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention that the
Austrian courts, in particular the Vienna Court of Appeal, disregarded
the presumption of innocence when refusing his claim for compensation
in that, despite the discontinuation of proceedings, the courts found
that a suspicion against him continued to exist.
4. He further complains under Article 6 para. 3 (d) of the
Convention that compensation proceedings in general did not comply with
this provision as persons claiming a compensation have no possibility
to question witnesses.
5. Lastly, the applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention that in the respective compensation proceedings, the courts'
decisions were not pronounced publicly as required by this provision.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the
Convention about the length of his detention on remand.
With reference to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the
Commission notes that the applicant during this period did not file any
request for release from detention on remand.
The Commission, even assuming compliance with the requirement of
exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention, notes that the applicant was arrested on 26 February 1991
and released from detention on remand on 6 May 1991. His detention
thus lasted for two months and one week.
The applicant submits that he was only suspected of having aided
and abetted other suspects in acting as driver for the transport of the
loot of a criminal offence and that therefore the preparation of an
opinion of a graphologist was an unnecessary step in the investigation.
The Commission observes, however, that according to the warrant of
arrest of 8 October 1990 and the decision to take the applicant into
detention on remand of 26 February 1991, it does not appear that the
suspicion against the applicant was limited to the issue whether he had
acted as driver for other persons, but that he was suspect of having
committed the offence in the company of the co-suspect.
The Commission, having regard to the relevant criteria
established in the Convention organs' case law, finds no indication
that the investigations were not handled with the necessary diligence
in this period (see Eur. Court H.R., Letellier judgment of
26 June 1991, Series A no. 207, p. 18, para. 35; W. v. Switzerland
judgment of 26 January 1993, Series A no. 254-A, p.15, para. 30). In
these circumstances, the Commission considers that the period of the
applicant's detention on remand did not exceed a reasonable time within
the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant further complains under Article 5 para. 5
(Art. 5-5) of the Convention about the refusal of compensation for his
detention on remand as his detention was in breach of Article 5 para.
3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.
The Commission recalls that Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the
Convention is only applicable if the Convention organs themselves or
a national authority have established that the detention of a person
constituted a violation of his rights under Article 5 paras. 1 to 4
(Art. 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4) (No. 7950/77, Dec. 4.3.80, D.R. 19 p. 213 at
p. 215; No. 10371/83, Dec. 6.3.85, D.R. 42 p. 128).
The Commission notes that two distinct proceedings on the
applicant's claims for compensation for his detention on remand took
place. The first set of proceedings concerned the applicant's claim
for compensation on grounds that the proceedings had been discontinued
(S. 2 para. 1 (b) of the Criminal Proceedings Compensation Act). This
claim was dismissed on 8 May 1991 by the Judges' Chamber of the Wiener
Neustadt Regional Court and on 9 January 1992 the Vienna Court of
Appeal confirmed this decision. Only the second set of proceedings
concerned his claim for compensation on the ground that his detention
was allegedly unlawful (S. 2 para. 1 (a) of the Criminal Proceedings
Compensation Act). This claim was dismissed by the Vienna Court of
Appeal on 9 January 1992. The applicant failed to appeal to the
Supreme Court.
However, even assuming compliance with the requirement of
exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention, the Commission, having regard to the domestic courts'
decisions, finds no indication of a violation of the applicant's rights
under paragraph 1 to 4 of Article 5 (Art. 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4) of the
Convention. Therefore, the Commission finds that the question of
compensation under Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention does
not arise, as neither the domestic courts nor the Commission itself
have established a violation of Article 5 paras. 1 to 4
(Art. 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4)as regards the applicant's detention on
remand.
It follows that also this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
3. He complains under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention
that the Austrian courts, in particular the Vienna Court of Appeal,
disregarded the presumption of innocence when refusing his claim for
compensation in that, despite the discontinuation of proceedings, they
found that a suspicion against him continued to exist.
The Commission, notes that on 6 May 1991 the criminal proceedings
against the applicant were discontinued and that the applicant filed
his requests for compensation regarding his detention on remand on 6
and 27 May 1991. The decisions of the Judges' Chamber of the Vienna
Regional Court and the Vienna Court of Appeal refusing this request
were a direct sequel to the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings
against the applicant. Consequently, Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) may
in principle be invoked with regard to the impugned decisions
(cf. Eur. Court H.R., Englert judgment of 25 August 1985, Series A no.
123, p. 54, para. 35; Nölkenbockhoff judgment of 25 August 1985, Series
A no. 123, p. 79, para. 35).
The Commission recalls that, following the discontinuation of
criminal proceedings, only statements which reflect the opinion that
the person concerned is guilty, and not statements which merely
describe a state of suspicion, infringe the presumption of innocence
(cf. Eur. Court H.R., Minelli judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A
no. 62, p. 18, para. 37; Lutz judgment of 25 August 1987, Series A
no. 123, pp. 24-26, paras. 58-64; Sekanina judgment of 25 August 1993,
Series A no. 266, p. 13-15, paras. 24-30).
In the present case, the Austrian courts concerned dismissed the
applicant's compensation claim on the ground that, though the
investigations against him had been discontinued, a suspicion
persisted. The applicant failed to show that the reasoning of the
Austrian courts amounted to any finding of criminal guilt.
The applicant's submissions in this respect do not, therefore,
disclose any appearance of a violation of the further rights invoked
by him.
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
4. The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 3 (d)
(Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention that compensation proceedings in general
did not comply with this provision as persons claiming a compensation
have no possibility to question witnesses.
The Commission, assuming that Article 6 (Art. 6) applies to the
proceedings in question, recalls that it is not the function of the
Convention organs to rule in abstracto on the compatibility with the
Convention of certain legal rules (see Eur. Court H.R., Marckx judgment
of 13 June 1979, Series A no 31, p.13, para. 27).
In the present case, the applicant only generally complains on
a feature of the compensation proceedings under the Criminal
Proceedings Compensation Act without specifying which witnesses the
Austrian Courts failed to hear and that he requested the hearing of any
witness. There is no indication of unfairness in the proceedings
concerned.
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
5. Lastly, the applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention that in the respective compensation
proceedings, the courts' decisions were not pronounced publicly as
required by this provision.
The Commission considers it cannot, on the basis of the file,
determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore
necessary, in accordance with Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of
Procedure, to give notice of this complaint to the respondent
Government.
For these reasons, the Commission unanimously
DECIDES TO ADJOURN its examination of the complaint as regards
the lack of a hearing before the Supreme Court in the proceedings
on the applicant's application for compensation;
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (A. WEITZEL)
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