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U.S. v. AUSTRIA

Doc ref: 18859/91 • ECHR ID: 001-1851

Document date: June 29, 1994

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U.S. v. AUSTRIA

Doc ref: 18859/91 • ECHR ID: 001-1851

Document date: June 29, 1994

Cited paragraphs only

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 18859/91

by U.S.

against Austria

The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 29 June 1994, the following members being present:

MM. A. WEITZEL, President

C.L. ROZAKIS

F. ERMACORA

E. BUSUTTIL

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

G.B. REFFI

B. CONFORTI

N. BRATZA

I. BÉKÉS

E. KONSTANTINOV

Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 10 September 1991

by U. S. against Austria and registered on 25 September 1991 under file

No. 18859/91;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having regard to :

- reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the

Commission;

- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

7 May 1992 and the observations in reply submitted by the

applicant on 24 June 1992;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1950 and living in

Leonding. She is represented by Mr. Karl KRÜCKL, a lawyer practising

in Linz.

The facts, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as

follows.

On 28 September 1982 the applicant brought an action for damages

against a lawyer alleging that he had caused her damage in that he

wrongly advised her in company law matters. The applicant had been the

majority shareholder of a business company. She alleged that she lost

the majority because the defendant as her representative had wrongly

advised her not to attend a shareholders meeting during which an

increase of the company's capital had been agreed upon.

On 28 November 1986 the Regional Court (Landesgericht) in Linz

gave a partial judgment (Teilurteil) dismissing part of the applicant's

claim in the amount of AS 36,980.96. The remaining claim of AS 220,000

plus interest and costs was considered to be well-founded in principle

(dem Grunde nach) while the exact amount to be paid by the defendant

was left to be determined in a further judgment. The partial judgment

of 28 November 1986 was served on the applicant's counsel on

19 December 1986.

On 19 January 1987 the applicant lodged an appeal, while the

defendant appealed on 2 February 1987. On 17 May 1988 the Court of

Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) in Linz rejected the defendant's appeal and

partly granted the applicant's appeal. The judgment of the Court of

Appeal was served on the applicant's lawyer on 3 April 1989.

On 2 May 1989 the defendant lodged an appeal on points of law

(Revision) to the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof).

On 11 October 1990 the Supreme Court ordered the Court of Appeal

to amend its judgment on the question of whether or not an appeal on

points of law was admissible.

On 17 December 1990 the Court of Appeal amended its judgment to

the effect that an appeal on points of law was admissible.

On 11 July 1991 the Supreme Court partly granted the defendant's

appeal on points of law and partly confirmed the Regional Court's

partial judgment of 28 November 1986. The Supreme Court reserved the

decision on costs for the final judgment.

Proceedings then continued before the Regional Court which had

to determine the amount of the applicant's claim. Hearings before this

court took place on 25 November 1991 and 31 March 1992. Judgment was

served on 16 July 1992.

The defendant party appealed on 14 September 1992. On

15 June 1993 the appeal was heard and a judgment was served on the

parties on 12 July 1993. It became final on 20 September 1993 no

appeal on points of law having been lodged.

COMPLAINTS

In her application, the applicant has complained of the length

of the proceedings and she invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was lodged on 10 September 1991 and registered

on 25 September 1991. On 13 January 1992 the Commission decided to

communicate the application to the respondent Government for

observations on admissibility and merits. The Government submitted

their observations on 7 May 1992 and the applicant replied on

26 June 1992.

THE LAW

The applicant complains of the length of the civil proceedings

instituted by her and alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention, which provides that:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a

reasonable time by ... (a) tribunal."

The proceedings in question were instituted by the applicant on

28 September 1982 and ended on 20 September 1993 when the appellate

court's judgment of 15 June 1993 became final.

The applicant contends that the length of time in question cannot

be regarded as reasonable within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention. The Government disagrees, arguing that

the length of the proceedings is largely attributable to the complexity

of the matter and to the conduct of the applicant.

Under the established case-law of the Convention organs, the

reasonableness of the length of proceedings under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention has to be assessed in each case according

to the particular circumstances and by applying the following criteria:

the complexity of the facts and the law, the applicant's conduct and

the conduct of the authorities dealing with the case.

Applying those criteria and having regard to the particular

circumstances of the case as they have been submitted by the parties,

the Commission takes the view that the complaint relating to the length

of the proceedings raises complex issues of fact and law which require

an examination of the merits. It accordingly cannot declare this part

of the application manifestly ill-founded. No other grounds for

declaring the application inadmissible have been established.

For these reasons, the Commission unanimously

DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the

merits.

Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber

(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (A. WEITZEL)

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