AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 22937/93

                      by Z.,S.,G. & V. I.

                      against Greece and the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 22 February 1995, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY,  Acting President

           MM.   C.L. ROZAKIS

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 16 November 1993

by Z., S., G. and V. I. against Greece and the United Kingdom and

registered on 17 November 1993 under file No. 22937/93;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicants are Greek citizens born in 1947, 1922, 1943 and

1945 respectively. The first applicant resides in London and the

remaining three in Athens. The second applicant is the first

applicant's mother and the third and fourth applicants the first

applicant's brothers. In the proceedings before the Commission the

second, third and fourth applicants are represented by the first

applicant.

     The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the

applicants, may be summarised as follows:

     In August 1982 the first applicant, who was an established

business woman in the United Kingdom, became the General Manager of A

United Kingdom S.A. (herein after A), a Greek public sector company set

up to help the farming community of Greece export their products

throughout the EEC. In early 1986 a dispute arose between the first

applicant and A.

a)   Criminal Proceedings against the first applicant in the United

     Kingdom

     On 23 April 1986 the Managing Director of A complained to the

London police that the first applicant had stolen a sum of money from

that company.

     On 30 April 1986 the police arrested the first applicant, seizing

at the same time a large quantity of valuable property and documents.

The applicant was charged with having stolen money from A and having

conspired with two others to steal a golden watch belonging to "X

Jewellers". She was remanded in custody.

     The applicant was detained in Holloway prison. The police opposed

consistently and successfully all the applicant's requests to be

released on bail.

     On 4 June 1986 the United Kingdom prosecuting authorities

requested the judicial assistance of the Greek authorities.

     On 12 January 1987 the applicant was visited by officers of the

Metropolitan Police in prison who allegedly mocked her.

     On 3 April 1987 the first applicant was arraigned before the

Inner London Crown Court and pleaded not guilty to two charges of theft

involving 745,402.31 pounds allegedly missing from A's accounts.

     On 26 April 1987 the applicant, who was still in detention,

underwent an operation for a perforated ulcer and a peritonitis.

     On 2 July 1987 the prosecution addressed, via Interpol, a request

to the public prosecutor of the Court of Appeal of Athens to authorise

the taking of evidence in Greece by the United Kingdom investigating

authorities.

     The first applicant's trial opened on 5 August 1987 before the

London Crown Court. The prosecution obtained leave to amend the

indictment limiting it to ten counts of theft involving 394,798.36

pounds. The applicant was re-arraigned and pleaded not guilty to all

ten charges. She contended that she had herself financed the London

operation of A, that she was an independent agent on 4% commission and

that A still owed her substantial monies. On 28 August 1987 the

applicant was acquitted of all charges.

     Between 14 and 16 September 1987 the applicant was tried on the

conspiracy charges. The prosecution offered no evidence and she was

acquitted.

     In early 1988 the applicant requested the Clerkenwell

Magistrates' Court to issue her with a copy of the warrant of her

arrest. On 15 March 1988 the senior chief clerk replied to the

applicant that he could not find a copy of the warrant, despite an

extensive search of his records.

     On 22 June 1988 the first applicant was arrested in connection

with other jewellery found in her possession on 30 April 1986. She was

charged with five offences of handling stolen goods. On 31 October 1988

a Magistrates' Court dismissed the prosecution as oppressive.

     In 1991 the first applicant sought confirmation from leading

counsel for the prosecution, the Crown Prosecution Service and the

trial judge that the charges in respect of which she was acquitted on

28 August 1987 were specimen charges which had replaced the blanket

charges in the first indictment. Such confirmation was, however, not

forthcoming. In a letter dated 11 March 1991, the Chief Crown

Prosecutor stated that "it is possible that the ten counts were simply

selected as being the strongest available and did not preclude the

possibility of other charges being preferred, particularly if further

evidence came to light".

     The first applicant claims that she was recently informed by the

police authorities that she was suspected of the bombing of the Israeli

embassy in London on 26 July 1994.

     She further claims that on 11 October 1994 she was threatened by

police officers that, if she did not withdraw the present application,

"she would be cut in half".

b)   Civil and other proceedings against the first applicant in the

United Kingdom

     In addition to complaining to the police about the alleged theft,

A brought a civil action for damages against the first applicant

claiming the total amount for the theft of which the applicant had been

charged in the criminal case. On 27 May 1986 A obtained a Mareava

injunction freezing all the applicant's assets.

     Following her acquittal of the criminal charges, the applicant

applied for A's claim to be struck out for want of prosecution and for

the Mareava injunction to be discharged. On 13 February 1989 the

Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice pronounced in favour of

the applicant and ordered A to bear the costs of the proceedings.

      In July 1989 the first applicant received back a large part of

the goods seized by the police at the moment of her arrest. She

instituted proceedings before the High Court of Justice seeking the

recovery of the remaining items in respect of which the police had

invited claims from the purported lawful owners under the Police

Property Act. At the time of the filing of the present application

these proceedings were still pending.

     While the applicant was in detention her husband instituted

divorce, maintenance and property settlement proceedings against her.

Interpleader proceedings in respect of a sum held for the first

applicant by her solicitors were also commenced.

     The first applicant and her husband were divorced. The outcome

of the maintenance and property settlement proceedings was not

favourable to the applicant. The applicant's second marriage has also

broken up. The interpleader proceedings are still pending.

     The applicant is finally involved in a dispute with the Inland

Revenue Authorities.

c)   Criminal proceedings against the applicants in Greece

     On 6 June 1986 the Managing Director of A lodged with the Public

Prosecutor of Athens a criminal complaint against the first applicant

in Greece for having embezzled money from A and against the second,

third and fourth applicants for having received part of that money.

     On 18 June 1986 the public prosecutor of Athens ordered a full

criminal inquiry into the complaint.

     On 10 September 1987 and 21 November 1988 the Athens

investigating judge requested the assistance of the United Kingdom

authorities.

     On 11 April 1990 the Greek authorities were informed, via

diplomatic channels, that the Crown Prosecution Service did not intend

to bring further criminal proceedings against the first applicant in

the United Kingdom "because of the number of aborted attempts to

convict her and the almost inevitable success of an abuse of process

argument". The Crown prosecution further declined to comply with the

request of the Greek authorities to furnish them with a transcript of

the first trial, because of the costs involved in obtaining one.

     On 28 June 1990 the public prosecutor of the Athens Court of

Appeal requested the public prosecutor of the Athens first instance

court to obtain a full copy of the decision of 28 August 1987 of the

London Crown Court acquitting the first applicant and of the transcript

of the proceedings. In the opinion of the prosecutor of the appeal

court, this was considered necessary to establish the extent of res

judicata, the existence of which would preclude the first applicant's

prosecution in accordance with Article 9 of the Greek Criminal Code.

     The public prosecutor of the first instance court referred the

request to the investigating judge. On 31 July 1990 the investigating

judge refused to pursue the matter further on the basis of the United

Kingdom authorities' failure to comply with similar requests in the

past. The judge noted that a copy of the indictment of the first

applicant in the United Kingdom and an excerpt of the court's decision

were available in the case-file. In the judge's view, it was

established on this basis that the various sums for the embezzlement

of which the first applicant was charged in Greece were different from

those for which she had been indicted and acquitted in the United

Kingdom.

     On 26 November 1990 the public prosecutor of the Court of Appeal

proposed that the first applicant be committed for trial for having

embezzled from A 358,471.50 pounds. He also proposed that the second,

third and fourth applicants be committed for trial for having received

part of the above-mentioned sum. The public prosecutor considered that

the sums for the embezzlement of which the applicant would be committed

for trial in Greece were different from those in respect of the

embezzlement of which she had been acquitted in the United Kingdom. He

further proposed that the case should be heard at first instance by the

three-member Court of Appeal (trimeles efeteio) because of the nature

of the charges against the first applicant.

     The Athens Court of Appeal, sitting in chambers, decided on the

same day to commit the four applicants for the above-mentioned charges

before the court proposed by the public prosecutor. It also renewed the

warrant of arrest which had been issued by the investigating judge

against the first applicant on a date which cannot be established on

the basis of the file.

     The case was heard by the three-member Court of Appeal of Athens

on 11 March 1991. Since the first applicant was still evading justice,

the court decided to sever her case from that against the other three

applicants. Since the committal of the second, third and fourth

applicants before the court of appeal was based on the assumption that

they would be tried together with the first applicant, the court

decided to commit the former before the three-member first instance

criminal court (trimeles plimeleiodikeio) of Athens.

     On 8 October 1991 the three-member first instance criminal court

of Athens found the second, third and fourth applicants guilty of

having received part of the money which the first applicant had

embezzled from A. Their conviction was upheld by the three-member Court

of Appeal of Athens on 19 March 1993.

     At a date which has not been specified the Court of Cassation

(Areios Pagos) reversed the second, third and fourth applicants'

conviction and remanded the case before of the Court of Appeal. On

27 January 1994 the three-member Court of Appeal of Athens acquitted

the second, third and fourth applicants. No appeal in cassation having

been lodged against that decision by 9 September 1994, their acquittal

became final.

     The criminal proceedings against the first applicant are still

pending.

d)   Civil proceedings against the applicants in Greece

     On 13 May 1986 the single-member first instance civil court

(monomeles protodikeio) of Athens, acting on an application by A,

ordered, by way of interim measures, the seizure of the first

applicant's assets.

     On 8 July 1986 A brought a civil action against the first

applicant before the three-member first instance civil court (trimeles

protodikeio) of Athens claiming 661,093.24 pounds. The action was

dismissed on technical grounds.

     On 23 April 1987 a second civil action was brought by A against

the applicant before the three-member first instance civil court of

Athens. Upon the applicant's acquittal in the United Kingdom the action

was withdrawn.

     On 28 March 1988 A brought a third civil action against the four

applicants before the three-member first instance civil court of Athens

seeking recovery of the money allegedly stolen by the first applicant.

The case was stayed to await the outcome of the civil proceedings

instituted against the first applicant in the United Kingdom.

     On 6 March 1989 A applied again for interim measures against the

first applicant before the single-member first instance civil court of

Athens. In June 1989 the court of Athens dismissed the application.

     On 21 May 1993 the single-member first instance civil court of

Athens ruled that a previous order seizing part of the first

applicant's real estate could be discharged upon the applicant's

providing a bank letter guaranteeing the payment of GDR 45,000,000 by

way of security. The first applicant has not been able to-date to

obtain such a letter.

     On 19 July 1993 the three-member first instance civil court of

Athens heard A's civil action of 28 March 1988. It ordered the second,

third and fourth applicants to pay the plaintiff GDR 172,117,056.21

plus interest and the costs of proceedings. The case against the first

applicant was remanded to the single-member first instance civil court

of Athens to be tried in accordance with the special procedure applying

in disputes between employer and employee.

     The second applicant suffered a series of strokes and a heart

attack and the fourth applicant pneumonia.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The first applicant complains about the legality of her pre-trial

detention in the United Kingdom. She argues that she was arrested and

detained without a warrant. She submits, in this connection, that no

copy could be found of the warrant that was allegedly issued by the

Clerkenwell Magistrates Court in April 1986. She further submits that

her detention was the result of a conspiracy and collusion between the

police, A and other parties. The first applicant also complains about

the length of her pre-trial detention in the United Kingdom which

lasted 16 months. She invokes in general Article 5 of the Convention.

2.   The first applicant complains of a violation of Article 3 of the

Convention. She complains in this connection of the conditions and

length of her detention in the United Kingdom, which resulted in

serious damage for her health, the leaking of information concerning

her trial, which resulted in the publication of degrading and

humiliating reports in the Greek press, the repeated attempts by the

Metropolitan Police to have her convicted and the failure of the United

Kingdom authorities to provide all the necessary information concerning

her acquittal to the Greek judicial authorities. She also submits that

she was humiliated by officers of the Metropolitan police who visited

her in prison on 12 January 1987 and that the police have instigated

the involvement of the Inland Revenue in her case.

3.   The first applicant complains that the United Kingdom authorities

have violated and continue to violate Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 by

trying to convict her of other offences after her initial acquittal in

the proceedings concerning the alleged theft from A.

4.   The first applicant complains that the Greek authorities violated

Article 5 and 6 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 by

prosecuting her for offences of which she had been acquitted in the

United Kingdom.

5.   The first applicant complains of a violation of Article 12 of the

Convention in that the court proceedings against her and the subsequent

harassment led to the successive breaking up of her two marriages.

Moreover, as a result of the criminal proceedings pending against her

in Greece, she is unable to enjoy a normal family life with her mother

and brothers. The first applicant does not invoke any provisions of the

Convention in relation to the latter complaint.

6.   The second, third and fourth applicants complain that they were

prosecuted in Greece despite the first applicant's acquittal in the

United Kingdom. They do not invoke any articles of the Convention.

THE LAW

1.   The first applicant complains under Article 5 (Art. 5) of the

legality and length of her pre-trial detention in the United Kingdom.

     The Commission notes that the first applicant's pre-trial

detention in the United Kingdom ended on 28 August 1987. It also notes

the applicant's allegations that it was only on 15 March 1988 that she

started suspecting that she had been detained without an arrest

warrant.

     The Commission recalls that the present application was

introduced on 16 November 1993. Even assuming that there were no

effective remedies which the applicant could have exhausted, the

Commission considers that in these circumstances the particular

complaint has not been introduced within the six months period provided

for under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

     As a result, this part of the application must be rejected in

accordance with Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

2.   The first applicant complains that she has been subjected to

inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention in the context of the criminal proceedings instituted

against her in the United Kingdom.

     The Commission recalls the case-law of the Court in accordance

with which ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity before

a breach of Article 3 (Art. 3) can be established (cf. Eur. Court H.R.,

Ireland v. United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25,

p. 65, para. 162). Even assuming that the applicant has exhausted

domestic remedies, the Commission considers that there is no evidence

that the above threshold has been reached in the circumstances of the

present case.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   The first applicant complains of the second and third criminal

proceedings instituted against her in the United Kingdom after her

initial acquittal in the proceedings concerning the alleged theft from

A. She further claims that she is currently threatened with a fourth

prosecution. She invokes in this connection Article 4 of Protocol

No. 4 (P4-4).

     The Commission considers that Article 4 of Protocol No. 4

(P4-4), which prohibits the collective expulsion of aliens, cannot be

of any relevance to the applicant's complaint. Insofar as it can be

assumed that the applicant wishes to complain of a violation of the

principle of ne bis in idem, the Commission considers that, even

assuming that the United Kingdom can be held accountable under the

Convention for a violation of this principle, there is no evidence that

the second and third prosecution against the applicant related to the

same facts as the first one. It also considers that the applicant's

allegations concerning a fourth prosecution have not been

substantiated.

     As a result, this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.   The first applicant complains under Articles 5 and 6

(Art. 5, 6) of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-4)

of the criminal proceedings instituted against her in Greece,

notwithstanding her acquittal in the United Kingdom.

     The Commission notes that, although an arrest warrant has been

issued against her, the applicant has not been subjected to any form

of deprivation of liberty in Greece. The Commission considers that, in

these circumstances, the applicant cannot claim to be a victim under

Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention of a violation of Article 5

(Art. 5) thereof. This complaint is, therefore, incompatible ratione

personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

     The Commission further notes that the applicant claims that she

is tried in Greece for an offence in respect of which she has already

been acquitted in the United Kingdom. The Commission recalls, however,

that neither the Convention nor any of the additional Protocols does,

either expressly or implicitly, guarantee the principle of ne bis in

idem in respect of convictions in different States (No. 1519/62,

27.3.63, Collection 10 p. 59; No. 7680/76, 16.5.77, D.R. 9 p. 190;

No. 8945/80, 13.12.83, D.R. 39 p. 43; 11069/84, 7.9.89, D.R. 62 p. 5).

It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with

the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para.

2 (Art. 27-2).

5.   The first applicant complains of the effects that the criminal

proceedings against her in the United Kingdom and in Greece had on her

family life. She invokes in this connection Article 12 (Art. 12) of the

Convention.

     The Commission recalls that Article 12 (Art. 12) of the

Convention guarantees the right of men and women of marriageable age

to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws

governing the exercise of this right. The right to respect for

somebody's private and family life, home and correspondence is,

moreover, guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

     Insofar as the first applicant complains that she is unable to

enjoy a normal family life with the second, third and fourth applicants

as a result of the criminal proceedings pending against her in Greece,

the Commission recalls that the institution of the criminal proceedings

against the first applicant in Greece does not disclose in itself an

appearance of a violation of the Convention. It further notes that,

prior to the institution of the proceedings against her, the first

applicant had been living for a number of years away from the remaining

applicants in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the first applicant does

not allege that the third and fourth applicants are in any manner

prevented from visiting her in the United Kingdom, neither has she

established that she would be denied permission to visit the second

applicant, who appears to be bed-ridden, should she decide to subject

herself to Greek justice. The Commission considers that, in these

circumstances, no appearance of an interference with the first

applicant's right to family life is disclosed. As a result, this part

of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     As regards the first applicant's allegations that the criminal

proceedings against her led to the successive breakdown of her two

marriages, the Commission considers that, insofar as the matters

complained of have been substantiated and are within its competence,

they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and

freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. As a result, this

part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

6.   The second, third and fourth applicants complain that they were

prosecuted in Greece despite the first applicant's acquittal in the

United Kingdom. They do not invoke any articles of the Convention.

     The Commission notes that the applicants were never prosecuted

in the United Kingdom and that they were finally acquitted in Greece.

In these circumstances, they cannot claim to be victims under Article

25 (Art. 25) of the Convention of a violation of any of its provisions.

     As a result, this part of the application is incompatible ratione

personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the First Chamber    Acting President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (J. LIDDY)