Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 22747/93

by Stig and Gun OLSSON

against Sweden

The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 5 April 1995, the following members being present:

Mrs. G.H. THUNE, Acting President

MM. H. DANELIUS

G. JÖRUNDSSON

S. TRECHSEL

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

F. MARTINEZ

L. LOUCAIDES

J.-C. GEUS

M.A. NOWICKI

I. CABRAL BARRETO

J. MUCHA

D. SVÁBY

Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 29 September 1993

by Stig and Gun OLSSON against Sweden and registered on 6 October 1993

under file No. 22747/93;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

a. Introduction

The applicants are a married couple, born in 1941 and 1944

respectively. They are Swedish citizens and reside at Alingsås.

Before the Commission they are represented by Mrs. Siv Westerberg, a

lawyer practising in Gothenburg.

The applicants have three children: Stefan, born in June 1971,

Helena, born in December 1976, and Thomas, born in January 1979.

The applicants' children were taken into public care pursuant to

the relevant provisions of the Child Welfare Act (Barnavårdslagen,

1960:97) by a decision of the Social District Council No. 6 (Sociala

distriktsnämnden 6) of Gothenburg of 16 September 1980. The decision

was later confirmed on appeal by the administrative courts. The basis

for the care decision was that the health and development of the

children were jeopardised as a result of the parents' inability to give

them satisfactory care and education.

After having been taken into care the applicants' children were

placed in separate foster homes, Helena in Näsviken, close to

Hudiksvall, and Thomas in Maråker, south of Söderhamn. The distances

from Hudiksvall and Söderhamn to Gothenburg, where the applicants lived

at the time, is about 600 km. The applicants' right of access to their

children was restricted while the children were in public care.

The applicants addressed several requests for termination of the

care of the children to the Social Council which remained unsuccessful.

However, after the Council had rejected two termination requests lodged

in 1984 and 1985 and the County Administrative Court (Länsrätten) of

the County of Gothenburg and Bohus had dismissed the applicants'

appeals, the Administrative Court of Appeal (Kammarrätten) of

Gothenburg, by judgment of 16 February 1987, decided that the public

care of Stefan be terminated. After a further appeal, the Supreme

Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten), by judgment of 18 June 1987,

ordered that the public care of Helena and Thomas should also

terminate.

Following these judgments, Stefan returned to the applicants'

home. In regard to Helena and Thomas, the Social Council, however,

decided, on 23 June 1987, pursuant to the relevant provision of the

Social Services Act (Socialtjänstlagen, 1980:620), to prohibit the

applicants until further notice from removing them from their

respective foster homes. The Council considered that there was a risk,

which was not of a minor nature, of harming Helena's and Thomas'

physical and mental health by separating them from the foster homes.

The reasons given for this were, inter alia, that a long time had

passed since their parents last took care of them, that they only had

little contact with their parents during the public care, that they had

emotional ties with their foster homes and that Helena had expressed

a wish to stay in her foster home. The Council's decision was

confirmed on appeal by the administrative courts. The Supreme

Administrative Court, however, set a time limit for the prohibition on

removal, a time limit that was later extended several times, ultimately

until 28 February 1991 by a decision of the County Administrative Court

of 27 July 1990.

Restrictions on parental access remained after the prohibition

on removal was imposed. After an access request had been rejected by

the Council on 18 December 1987, the administrative courts dismissed

the applicants' appeals, finding that no appeal lay from an access

decision taken while a prohibition on removal was in force. On

18 July 1988 the Supreme Administrative Court, recalling that the

parents could request that the children be returned to them in

accordance with the rules laid down in Chapter 21 of the Parental Code

(Föräldrabalken), found that the Council's decision on access was null

and void, there being no legal provision authorising the Council to

restrict access while a prohibition on removal was in force. The

applicants' subsequent request under Chapter 21 of the Parental Code

was rejected by the administrative courts.

The applicants have previously submitted two applications (Nos.

10465/83 and 13441/87) regarding the public care of their children.

The first application, covering the period from 16 September 1980 to

18 June 1987, mainly concerned the taking into care of the children,

the refusal to terminate the care and the implementation of the care

decision. The Commission found that the care decisions concerning the

applicants' children in combination with the placement of the children

in separate foster homes far from each other and far away from the

applicants constituted a violation of Article 8 of the Convention

(Olsson v. Sweden, Comm. Report 2.12.86, para. 179, Eur. Court H.R.,

Series A no. 130, p. 62). The Court found that the implementation of

the care decision, but not the decision itself or its maintenance in

force, gave rise to a breach of Article 8 of the Convention (cf. Eur.

Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130). The

second application, covering the period from 18 June 1987 to

24 January 1991, mainly concerned the prohibition on removal, the

different restrictions on parental access while the prohibition was in

force, the impossibility of appealing against the access decisions and

the length of certain court proceedings. The Commission found that the

restrictions on access before 1 July 1990 and the prohibition on

removal had violated Article 8 of the Convention. The Commission

further found a breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention in that

the applicants had not been able to challenge the access restrictions

in a court (Olsson v. Sweden (no. 2), Comm. Report 17.4.91, paras. 113,

130 and 134, Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 250, pp. 52 and 56-57). The

Court agreed with the Commission as to the violations of Articles 8 and

6 para. 1 of the Convention in connection with the restrictions on

access, but found no violation in respect of the prohibition on removal

(cf. Eur. Court H.R., Olsson v. Sweden (no. 2) judgment of

27 November 1992, Series A no. 250).

b. The particular circumstances of the case

The facts of the present case, as submitted by the applicants,

may be summarised as follows.

On 31 October 1989 the Social District Council (Stadsdelsnämnden)

of Gunnared, Gothenburg decided to institute proceedings in the

District Court (Tingsrätten) of Alingsås requesting that the legal

custody of Helena and Thomas be transferred from the applicants to

their respective foster parents in accordance with Chapter 6, Section

8 of the Parental Code.

The District Court held hearings on 9 and 10 October 1990, at

which the applicants, their lawyer and representatives of the Social

District Council were present and heard. The District Court further

heard Helena's foster mother, Thomas' foster parents and four other

witnesses, among them two medical doctors who had been in contact with

the children on different occasions and had submitted expert opinions

in earlier court proceedings.

By judgment of 24 January 1991, the District Court transferred

the custody, finding this to be in the children's obvious best

interests. The reasons for the transfer were the considerable time the

children had spent in their foster homes, their strong relations with

their foster parents, the wishes of the children, Thomas' special need

of stability and the little contact that had occurred between the

applicants and their children. The Court further ordered that the

applicants should each year receive three day-time visits by the

children at their home and be able to visit them at the foster homes

during three weekends. The Court noted in this respect that it was in

the children's best interest to have more frequent contacts with the

applicants in the future but that, in view of the children's wishes and

the few meetings - none at all since June 1989 - that had taken place

after the placement of them in the foster homes, it was not possible

to order parental access to a greater extent.

The applicants later claimed that Helena's foster mother and one

of the medical doctors heard during the District Court hearings had

committed perjury. They reported the matter to the police which, after

questioning the two witnesses, decided to close the investigation.

The applicants appealed against the District Court's judgment to

the Court of Appeal (Hovrätten) of Western Sweden. They maintained,

inter alia, that the foster parents were unsuited as custodians. In

particular, they contended that they had learned after the District

Court judgment that Helena's foster father had been charged in 1986-87

with assault, including sexual assault, and sexual exploitation of a

minor, namely another foster girl. The foster father had been

acquitted due to lack of evidence. He had, however, stated during the

police investigations that he had acted in a manner which, according

to the applicants, constituted sexual assault. The applicants further

raised suspicions of maltreatment of Thomas by his foster parents.

Referring to this and to the alleged perjury, the applicants requested

the Court of Appeal to stay execution of the District Court's judgment.

The request was, however, refused on 9 April 1991 and, following the

applicants' repeated requests, on 26 April and 2 September 1991.

The Court of Appeal held hearings in the case on

11-13 December 1991, during which it heard the same persons as the

District Court with the exception of Helena's foster mother. In

addition, it heard Helena, her foster father and one of her school

teachers who had been appointed by the Social District Council as her

contact person (kontaktperson).

By judgment of 24 January 1992, the Court of Appeal upheld the

District Court's judgment. It stated, inter alia, that, having regard

to Helena's and Thomas' age and degree of maturity, great importance

should be attached to their views about custody and access. It was

clear that they both wanted to remain in their foster homes. Moreover,

contacts between the applicants and the children had been very

infrequent, especially in recent years. In the Court of Appeal's

opinion, the absence of contacts was due rather to a lack of desire and

initiative on the part of the applicants to visit the children than to

any preventive measures taken by the foster parents or the social

authorities. As concerns the alleged unsuitability of the foster

homes, the Court of Appeal, taking into account the evidence given

before it, found no indication that Helena had been, or ran a risk of

being, a victim of improper conduct on the part of her foster father

or that Helena's foster mother or Thomas' foster parents were unsuited.

After a further appeal, the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), by

decision of 21 January 1993, granted the applicants leave to appeal.

In the meantime, Helena's foster mother had died on 5 November 1992.

The Social District Council had allegedly not notified the applicants

of her death. Instead, the applicants were informed of her death by

their representative, who got to know about this in January 1993 after

having contacted a former foster girl of the foster mother. By letter

to the Supreme Court of 19 March 1993, the Council withdrew the request

for transfer of custody of Helena, as her foster father was not

prepared to be her sole custodian. For this reason, the Supreme Court,

by decision of 19 May 1993, set aside the judgments of the District

Court and the Court of Appeal in so far as they concerned Helena. The

applicants' custody of Helena was thus restored.

On 1 May 1993 Helena, at the time 16 years old, moved from the

foster home to an apartment of her own in Hudiksvall where she attended

secondary school. The Social District Council paid the rent for the

apartment and other housing costs. It also granted Helena social

allowance for furniture and subsistence costs and renewed the

appointment of her contact person. The Council's decisions were taken

in accordance with Helena's wishes. She had expressly stated that she

wanted to stay in the area of Hudiksvall and finish her studies there.

In letters to the Social District Council the applicants objected

to any grant to Helena by the Council. They stated that they intended

to take care of their daughter themselves, both financially and

otherwise, and had decided that she should live with them. Claiming

that it was unlawful to grant Helena assistance without their consent,

they demanded that the Council annul its assistance decisions.

The Social District Council replied that the applicants had a

right to provide for their daughter and that, if they intended to do

so, the Council wished to be informed thereof. The Council stated

that, due to Helena's age, it was not possible to move her against her

own will. It further stated that its assistance decisions were based

on Sections 3 and 12 of the Social Services Act and that, according to

Section 73 of the same Act, no appeal lay from the decisions.

In a further letter to the Social District Council the applicants

claimed that it could not legally grant assistance to Helena, as she

did not live in the municipality of Gothenburg. They referred to

Section 2 of the Social Services Act.

In the case concerning transfer of custody of and access to

Thomas, the Supreme Court held hearings on 19 and 20 October 1993, at

which the applicants and their lawyer and representatives of the Social

District Council were present and heard. The Court further heard

Thomas' foster parents. The applicants requested, inter alia, that the

Court should order access under penalty of a fine (vitesföreläggande)

to be paid by Thomas' foster parents. By judgment of 10 November 1993,

the Supreme Court upheld the judgments of the lower courts as concerns

both custody and access. It stated that transfer of custody was in

Thomas' obvious best interests as he had spent 13 years in the foster

home and was rooted there. In view of his age and degree of maturity,

great importance should also be attached to his wishes. The Supreme

Court noted that Thomas had expressed his wish to remain with the

foster parents whom the Court found to be well suited as custodians.

The Court further took into account that contacts between Thomas and

the applicants had been very infrequent. Noting that Thomas' foster

parents had invited the applicants to visit Thomas as often as they

wanted, but that no personal contacts had taken place since June 1989,

it agreed with the Court of Appeal that the absence of contacts was,

to a great extent, due to the applicants' lack of initiative. With

respect to access, the Supreme Court, noting that the extent of future

contacts depended mainly on Thomas' wishes, rejected the applicants'

request for an access order under penalty of a fine.

The applicants later accused Thomas' foster mother of having

committed perjury during the Supreme Court hearings. By letter of

6 December 1993, the President of the Supreme Court stated that he

would not take any action in the matter. The applicants then requested

the Public Prosecution Authority (Ã…klagarmyndigheten) of Stockholm to

investigate the matter and bring an indictment against the foster

mother. On 11 February 1994 and, following the applicants' request for

a review, on 13 April 1994 the Authority decided not to commence

preliminary investigations, as there was no reason to suspect that a

crime had been committed. On 25 April 1994 the Prosecutor-General

(Riksåklagaren) decided not to take any action with regard to the

applicants' further request for a review.

On 11 October 1994 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the

applicants' request for a re-opening of the case concerning return of

Helena and Thomas to the applicants under Chapter 21 of the Parental

Code.

c. Relevant domestic law

Decisions concerning the applicants' children relevant to the

present application were based on the Parental Code and the Social

Services Act.

Chapter 6 of the Parental Code concerns custody and access. The

relevant provisions read as follows:

(translation)

Section 8:

"If a child has been permanently cared for and brought up

in a private home and if it is obviously in the best

interests of the child that the prevailing relationship may

continue and that custody be transferred to the person or

persons who have received the child or to one of them, the

court shall appoint the said person or persons to exercise

custody of the child as specially appointed guardians.

Questions concerning the transfer of custody

under subsection 1 are to be examined at the

request of the Social Council."

Section 15, subsection 2:

"If the child's custodian opposes the access requested by

a parent who is not custodian, the court decides on the

question of access at the request of this parent in

accordance with the child's best interests."

The Social Services Act contains provisions concerning supportive

and preventive measures effected with the approval of the individuals

concerned. Section 2 provides that every municipality is responsible

for the social services within its area. According to Section 3, the

municipality is ultimately responsible for ensuring that those who stay

in that area get the necessary support and assistance. With respect

to children, the extent of this responsibility is laid down in Section

12. Section 6 stipulates that the individual has a right to assistance

from the Social Council for his subsistence, if his needs cannot be

satisfied in another way. The decisions of the Social Council taken

pursuant to Section 6 may, according to Section 73, be appealed to the

County Administrative Court, while no appeals lie from decisions taken

under Sections 3 and 12.

COMPLAINTS

1. Invoking Article 8 of the Convention, the applicants complain of

the courts' decisions to transfer custody of Helena and Thomas to their

respective foster parents. They also complain of the extent and the

arrangements of their access to Helena and Thomas awarded by these

decisions.

2. The applicants further claim that Article 8 of the Convention has

been violated as a result of the Social District Council's failure to

inform them of the death of Helena's foster mother.

3. The applicants allege that several violations of Article 6 of the

Convention occurred in the transfer of custody proceedings. They claim

that the District Court's judgment of 24 January 1991, in so far as it

concerned Helena, and the Supreme Court's judgment of 10 November 1993

concerning Thomas were based on perjured evidence, which shows that the

courts were not impartial. They also challenge the impartiality of the

Court of Appeal, as it allegedly ignored the perjury committed in the

District Court and based its judgment on the statements of the social

authorities and the foster parents, although they were guilty of lies,

perjury and withholding information. Furthermore, the Supreme Court

allegedly let itself be deceived by the parties' different appearances.

4. The applicants contend that the transfer of custody of Thomas to

his foster parents constitutes a breach of Articles 6 and 8 of the

Convention, as the applicants have been deprived of the possibility of

instituting proceedings on behalf of Thomas concerning possible

maltreatment of him by his foster parents. Furthermore, invoking

Article 25 of the Convention, the applicants contend that the effective

exercise of their right to lodge complaints with the Commission has

been hindered, as, owing to the transfer of custody of their children,

they have not been able to complain on their behalf.

5. The applicants further contend that the refusal of the police and

the social authorities to investigate their reports of maltreatment of

Thomas by his foster mother constitutes a violation of Articles 6 and

13 of the Convention. In this connection, the applicants further

complain under Article 6 that the social authorities, which have

appointed the foster homes, also investigate complaints against these

homes.

6. The applicants allege that the access awarded to them by the

courts was not clearly defined, as no dates or places of the meetings

were given, for which reason they were not given a "determination" of

the access issue. They further submit that these vague formulations

render a request for a court execution order impossible, that Swedish

courts usually refuse to execute access orders in respect of children

who have reached the age of the applicants' children and that the

courts regularly follow statements by social authorities and foster

parents that foster children do not want to meet their natural parents.

The applicants further contend that the Supreme Court should have

ordered access under penalty of a fine for Thomas' foster parents, as

the applicants have had no access to Thomas, his foster parents having

persuaded him to refuse such meetings. The applicants invoke Articles

6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.

7. The applicants further complain that the Social District

Council's grant of social assistance to Helena after the Supreme

Court's decision to annul the previous judgments on transfer of custody

constitutes an unjustified interference with their right to respect for

their family life under Article 8 of the Convention.

8. The applicants also complain that they could not appeal against

the assistance decisions, as they were taken under Sections 3 and 12

of the Social Services Act. They invoke in this respect Articles 6 and

13 of the Convention.

9. Finally, the applicants complain that Swedish authorities and

courts violate Article 53 of the Convention by continuing to prevent

the applicants' contacts with Helena and Thomas.

THE LAW

1. The applicants claim that the courts' decisions to transfer

custody of Helena and Thomas to their respective foster parents and the

access awarded to the applicants by these decisions have violated

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, which reads as follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority

with the exercise of this right except such as is in

accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

society in the interests of national security, public

safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others." The applicants allege that the

decisions to transfer custody were not in accordance with

Swedish law, as the transfer was not obviously in the

children's best interests, and not necessary in a

democratic society. They further claim that the access

awarded by these decisions was not sufficient to re-

establish and maintain the family ties between them and

their children.

The Commission finds that the transfer of custody of Helena and

Thomas from the applicants to their respective foster parents and the

decisions on the applicants' access to their children interfered with

the applicants' right to respect for their family life as ensured by

Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention. In this connection,

the Commission recalls that the applicants' custody of Helena was,

after the Social District Council had withdrawn its transfer request,

restored by decision of the Supreme Court of 19 May 1993. Custody of

Helena had, however, been bestowed upon her foster parents since the

District Court judgment of 24 January 1991. There was thus an

interference with the applicants' right in respect of Helena during the

period from 24 January 1991 to 19 May 1993. Having established that

the applicants' right under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the

Convention was interfered with, the Commission must examine whether

this interference was justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2

(Art. 8-2). In this respect, the Commission recalls that three

conditions must be satisfied: the interference must be "in accordance

with the law", it must pursue one or more of the legitimate aims

enumerated in para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and it must be "necessary in a

democratic society" for that or those aims.

As regards the first condition, the applicants argue that the

decisions to transfer custody were not in accordance with Swedish law,

as the transfer was not obviously in the children's best interests.

The Commission, however, finds that, although the relevant provision -

Chapter 6, Section 8 of the Parental Code - confers discretion on the

courts, this discretion is sufficiently defined. Taking into account

that the particular circumstances in cases concerning transfer of

custody may vary greatly and that, thus, norms cannot be formulated

with absolute precision, the Commission finds the discretion conferred

by the provision in question to be reasonable and acceptable for the

purposes of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (cf. Eur. Court H.R.,

Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, pp. 30-31, paras.

61-62). The Commission thus considers that the court decisions as to

transfer of custody and access were in conformity with Swedish law,

namely Chapter 6, Sections 8 and 15 of the Parental Code.

The Commission further finds that the interference had a

legitimate aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), namely the interests

of the children, which in this case fall under the expressions "for the

protection of health or morals" and "for the protection of the rights

and freedoms of others".

It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was

"necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the children.

According to the established case-law of the Commission and the

European Court of Human Rights, the notion of necessity implies that

the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in

particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

In determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic

society", the Commission furthermore has to take into account that a

margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States. That does

not mean, however, that the Commission's review is limited to

ascertaining whether the respondent State has exercised its discretion

reasonably, carefully and in good faith. Furthermore, it cannot

confine itself to considering the relevant decisions in isolation but

must look at them in the light of the case as a whole. It must

determine whether the reasons adduced to justify the interference at

issue are "relevant and sufficient" (cf. above-mentioned Olsson

judgment, pp. 31-32, paras. 67-68).

In the present case, the Commission recalls that the reasons for

transferring the custody of the applicants' children to their

respective foster parents were, inter alia, the considerable time they

had spent in their foster homes - Helena more than 11 years at the time

of the judgment of the Court of Appeal and Thomas more than 13 years

at the time of the judgment of the Supreme Court. The courts also

considered that the children's wish to remain in the foster homes

should be given great importance in view of their age - Helena 15 years

and Thomas almost 15 years at the time of the respective judgments -

and their degree of maturity. The courts further took into account the

children's strong relations with their foster parents and the little

contact they had had with the applicants. The courts therefore

concluded that a transfer of custody was in the children's obvious best

interests. As regards parental access, the courts took into account

that the applicants had had very little contact with their children and

that no meetings had taken place since June 1989, for which reason the

courts concluded that, at the time of the judgments, it was not

possible to grant access to a greater extent than the six yearly

meetings awarded by the District Court. The Commission further recalls

that the courts, before giving their judgments, had held hearings, at

which the applicants, their lawyer, the foster parents, representatives

of the Social District Council and several witnesses were heard. Thus,

the courts cannot be said to have intervened without adequate knowledge

of the cases.

In the light of the foregoing the Commission finds that the

transfer of custody of the applicants' children to their respective

foster parents and the access awarded to the applicants were supported

by relevant and sufficient reasons and that, having regard to their

margin of appreciation, the Swedish authorities were reasonably

entitled to think that these measures were necessary. Accordingly, the

Commission concludes that the relevant decisions can reasonably be

regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2. The applicants further claim that Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention has been violated as a result of the Social District

Council's failure to inform them of the death of Helena's foster

mother.

The Commission, recalling that the foster mother died on

5 November 1992 and that the applicants' representative got to know

about this in January 1993, finds that an examination of this complaint

as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a

violation of the rights and freedoms of the Convention and in

particular the Article invoked.

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3. The applicants make several complaints with respect to the court

proceedings regarding custody and access. They claim that the District

Court's judgment of 24 January 1991, in so far as it concerned Helena,

and the Supreme Court's judgment of 10 November 1993 concerning Thomas

were based on perjured evidence, which shows that the courts were not

impartial. They also challenge the impartiality of the Court of

Appeal, as it allegedly ignored the perjury committed in the District

Court and based its judgment on the statements of the social

authorities and the foster parents, although they were guilty of lies,

perjury and withholding information. Furthermore, the Supreme Court

allegedly let itself be deceived by the parties' different appearances.

The applicants invoke Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention which, in

so far as relevant, reads as follows:

"1. In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone

is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and

impartial tribunal ..."

The Commission recalls that the alleged perjury in the District

Court and the Supreme Court was reported to the police and the Public

Prosecution Authority which decided not to bring any indictments

against the alleged perjurers. The Commission finds that neither the

complaints made in relation to the alleged perjury nor the additional

complaint concerning the Supreme Court as they have been submitted

disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms of

the Convention and in particular the Article invoked.

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4. The applicants contend that the transfer of custody of Thomas to

his foster parents constitutes a breach of Articles 6 and 8

(Art. 6, 8) of the Convention, as the applicants have been deprived of

the possibility of instituting proceedings on behalf of Thomas

concerning possible maltreatment of him by his foster parents.

Furthermore, invoking Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, the

applicants contend that the effective exercise of their right to lodge

complaints with the Commission has been hindered, as, owing to the

transfer of custody of their children, they have not been able to

complain on their behalf.

The Commission recalls its above conclusion as to the compliance

of the decision to transfer custody with Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention.

Having regard to that conclusion, the Commission finds that an

examination of the applicants' complaint under Articles 6 and 8

(Art. 6, 8) of the Convention does not disclose any appearance of a

violation of the rights and freedoms of these Articles.

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

Also in the light of the said conclusion, the Commission finds

that the effective exercise of the applicants' right of individual

petition has not been hindered in a way which gives rise to an issue

under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.

The Commission therefore concludes that it need take no further

action in respect of the alleged interference with this right.

5. The applicants further contend that the refusal of the police and

the social authorities to investigate their reports of maltreatment of

Thomas by his foster mother constitutes a violation of Articles 6 and

13 (Art. 6, 13) of the Convention. In this connection, the applicants

further complain under Article 6 (Art. 6) that the social authorities,

which have appointed the foster homes, also investigate complaints

against these homes.

The Commission, recalling that neither the Convention nor its

Protocols guarantee a right to have criminal investigations instituted

against third persons, notes that there is nothing in the file to

suggest that Thomas has been maltreated by his foster mother and that,

thus, the information given by the applicants fail to substantiate the

present complaint.