AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 22401/93

                      by D.F.

                      against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 24 October 1995, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 G.B. REFFI

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 11 June 1993 by

Mr. D.F. against the United Kingdom and registered on 2 August 1993

under file No. 22401/93;

     Having regard to:

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

     28 July 1994 and the observations in reply submitted by the

     applicant on 1 December 1994;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen born in 1942.  He is

a pharmacist, and is represented before the Commission by

Mr. J.P. Gardner, solicitor, of London.

The particular circumstances of the case

     The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the

parties, may be summarised as follows.

     On 1 November 1987 the applicant was visited at his business by

two policemen who questioned him concerning the purchase of

pharmaceutical products from a third person ("Mr. X") and dealings with

three companies.  The dealings involved a scheme which may have been

set up with a view to circumventing the Pharmaceutical Price Scheme,

an arrangement which is intended to fix prices for drugs available only

on prescription.  The applicant made a witness statement in the context

of the investigations against Mr. X on 5 November 1987.

     The applicant states that he heard through contacts that the

police were investigating him, and adds that the police asked him to

attend an interview in March 1988.  The applicant states that he

contacted his solicitor, who advised that the applicant was likely to

be arrested and accompanied him.  At the interview, it was agreed that

the police would consider not bringing proceedings against the

applicant if he would assist the police.

     The Government state that they have no record of the above-

mentioned conversations in March 1988, but submit copies of a request

for an interview from the applicant's solicitors of 5 April 1988 and

a refusal from the Crown Prosecution Service of 29 April 1988.  The

reply read: "This matter is now under investigation by the police.  The

police will see your client in due course.  I do not consider that any

useful purpose would be served by having a meeting at this stage."

     The Government continue that by February 1988 the police had

identified 9 wholesalers, including the applicant, who had been

involved with Mr. X, but that the decision to treat the wholesalers as

potential defendants was only taken in the summer or autumn of 1989,

by which time it had become apparent that there would be considerable

difficulties in extraditing Mr. X from France.

     The applicant was arrested on 9 January 1990 and released on

bail.

     The Government state that it was decided at a conference with

counsel in January 1991 to prosecute the applicant and three other

individuals.  On 13 May 1991 the applicant was charged with 17 offences

of obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception, contrary to Section

15(1) of the Theft Act 1968.

     On 19 June 1991 the Cheshunt Magistrates' Court was informed that

it was likely that a notice of transfer would be issued with the result

that the case would be transferred to the Crown Court under Section 4

of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 rather than by way of committal

proceedings.  The case was adjourned on the prosecution's request to

14 August 1991, when it was then further adjourned to 9 October. The

bulk of the prosecution evidence had been served on the defence on

9 August.  On 9 October 1991 the prosecution requested and were granted

a further four-week adjournment.  The case was transferred to

Chelmsford Crown Court by a notice of transfer dated 30 October 1991,

on which date further prosecution evidence was served on the applicant.

     A substantive preparatory hearing before the Chelmsford Crown

Court was held on 23 and 24 July 1992, after an earlier hearing on

12 June at which the judge informed the parties that he had not read

the papers, but at which the prosecution and defence nevertheless

agreed certain procedural matters.

     At the preparatory meeting on 23 and 24 July the number of

transactions on which the prosecution sought to rely was reduced from

183 to 26.  The defence also requested witness summonses on the

pharmaceutical manufacturers concerned.

     The applicant's trial began on 9 November 1992.  The

prosecution's case lasted five weeks, and at the close of the

prosecution case the applicant's counsel made a submission to the judge

that there was no case to answer.  On 21 December 1992 the judge ruled

that the evidence produced by the prosecution had been so undermined

by the evidence from the one of the witnesses from the manufacturers

in particular, that it would not be proper to leave to the jury the

question of whether the manufacturers of the pharmaceutical in question

had been deceived, as they knew about, or took commercial decisions not

to find out about, what was actually happening to the drugs.

Accordingly, there was no deception, and he directed the jury to

acquit.  The applicant was duly acquitted.

     The applicant applied for a defendant's costs order under

Section 16 of the Prosecution of Offenders Act 1985.  The judge

indicated that his preliminary view was that "if ever a man brought a

prosecution upon himself it was [the applicant]" and gave time for the

applicant's representatives to formulate their arguments.  The

applicant's counsel then submitted, inter alia, that when the Lord

Chief Justice, in his Practice Direction, said that an order should be

made unless the applicant has brought suspicion on himself and misled

the prosecution into thinking the case was stronger that it was, both

criteria had to be present if the judge was to refuse a costs order.

They also submitted that the reason the prosecution had failed was

because the manufacturers of the pharmaceutical had known and approved

of the arrangements, and the costs involved in contesting that had been

very substantial.  The judge said "... there is certainly a view that

is capable of being formed about this case, whichever way you turn to

examine the motive that prompted the parties, it stinks of greed, greed

in the hands of ... [the applicant], greed in the hands of the

pharmaceutical companies ...".  Counsel for the applicant pointed out

that commercial life may be like that, but the applicant had spent a

great deal of time and money clearing himself since 1987.

     The exchange continued:

     "Judge Beaumont:

     ...   Let us look at it from the viewpoint of the prosecution.

     Along comes the police inspector, investigating what presumably

     is drawn to his attention by one manufacturer.  He gets [the

     applicant's name], as the recipient of what he is looking into,

     goods are only going as far as Antwerp and coming back and he

     receives a statement couched in these terms, which deals with

     three transactions only, and that is the end of it as far as

     Mr. X is concerned, he signs off and this remains the witness

     statement.  The prosecution inquiries continue and they discover

     what in fact has been happening is not just Mr. X's three  ...

     transactions with [the applicant], but that this is the tip of

     a very considerable iceberg and the decision is then made to

     prosecute [the applicant] and he stands on his right not to say

     a further word until these proceedings are deployed and the case

     statement, at my order in 1992, filed in the way it is.

     Mr. Swift:

     ... Your Honour, ... there is a gap between the making of the

     witness statement and charging him and your Honour, I know, with

     the greatest possible respect, you are not holding against him

     in any way at all he relied on the rights he was entitled to rely

     on.  So that your Honour would not take that view, he was

     entitled to silence and advised to keep silent and that does not

     come into the issue at all.  So that he brought suspicion on

     himself, as any defendant would, but it is not by his positive

     conduct, your Honour, and that has to be set off against all the

     other material, and the two areas of material which we submit are

     relevant to this position are first, that there is now that when

     he spoke he told his understanding, and that is the issue upon

     which the defence succeeded at half time, it is not a different

     issue, it is understanding in terms conveyed to the officers,

     that he understood it was with the approval of the manufacturers

     And ... the other side of the coin was that all the documentation

     we obtained could have been available to the Crown.

     ...

     Judge Beaumont:

     In the light of all the evidence I have listened to in this case

     and in particular putting the terms of the witness statements

     Exhibit No. 240 onwards into the context of that evidence, I ...

     am of the view that the defendant's own conduct has brought

     suspicion on himself and misled the prosecution into thinking the

     case against him is stronger that it is.  Accordingly ... I

     refuse the application for the award of the defendant's costs

     order in this case, save and insofar as the defence have brought

     to my attention the costs of what Mr. Swift has called the

     witness summonses material ...

     ... May I say, leaving the application, that the interests of

     justice have been well served by the time and the expertise and

     the experience which both sides have put into a far from simple

     case, and the public has been greatly served by the commitment

     that both the prosecution and the defence showed in obtaining

     that objective.  If all of these transfer cases could be

     conducted with the same degree of cooperation which was apparent

     to the court existed between the prosecution and the defence

     here, then the public would be well served.

     ...

     I hope my remarks will be considered by the taxing authorities

     in respect of both prosecution and defence, because the time that

     has been given to the proper consideration of the evidence in

     this case is certainly, in my experience, virtually unequalled."

     The applicant's costs up until 1 October 1992, when his personal

resources were exhausted and he was granted legal aid for the future

proceedings, amounted to £118,362.25.  The costs which the applicant

was entitled to recover as relating to the witness summonses he had

applied for were taxed on 11 June 1993 at £7,000.

     Leading counsel advised that, in the light of Section 29(3) of

the Supreme Court Act 1981 as applied by the House of Lords in the case

of Re Sampson [1987] 1 WLR 194 judicial review of the decision to

refuse the costs order would not lie.

Relevant domestic law and practice

     Section 16 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 provides, so

far as relevant, as follows:

     "(2) Where -

           (b) any person is tried on indictment and acquitted on any

           count in the indictment;

           the Crown Court may make a defendant's costs order in

           favour of the accused."

     On 3 May 1991 Lord Lane, the Lord Chief Justice, gave a Practice

Direction of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) which is binding

on the Crown Court and which included the following:

     "In the Crown Court.

     2.2 Where a person ... has been acquitted on any count in the

     indictment, the court may make a defendant's costs order in his

     favour.  Such an order should usually be made ... unless there

     are positive reasons for not doing so.  Examples of such reasons

     are: (a) the defendant's own conduct has brought suspicion on

     himself and has misled the prosecution into thinking that the

     case is stronger than it is; (b) there is ample evidence to

     support a conviction but the defendant is acquitted on a

     technicality which has no merit." (Practice Direction (Crime:

     Costs) [1991] 1 WLR 498).

     Section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 provides that the

High Court has the same powers of judicial review over the Crown Court

as over an inferior court save in respect of the Crown Court's

"jurisdiction in matters relating to trial on indictment".

     In the case of Re Sampson [1987] 1 WLR 194, a case concerning a

legal aid contribution order at the end of a trial on indictment, Lord

Bridge of Harwich said:

     "... certain orders made at the conclusion of a trial on

     indictment are excluded from judicial review as 'relating to

     trial on indictment' not because they affect the conduct of the

     trial, but rather because they are themselves an integral part

     of the trial process."

     In that case, the question of the judge's order could not,

therefore, be judicially reviewed.

     In the case of Re Ashton and Others ([1993] 2 WLR 846) the House

of Lords rejected a suggestion that the above proposition in Re Sampson

was wrong.

     Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 provides that a matter

may be transferred to the Crown Court without committal proceedings if

it "reveals a case of fraud of such seriousness and complexity that it

is appropriate that the management of the case should without delay be

taken over by the Crown Court".

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant alleges violations of Articles 6 and 13 of the

Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

     In connection with Article 6 of the Convention the applicant

complains of the length of the proceedings, and also of the overall

fairness arising from the ambiguity of the police investigations.  The

applicant points out that he offered to co-operate with the

investigation but was then criticised for exercising his right to

silence and then massively penalised by being refused a defendant's

costs order after his acquittal.

     The applicant also alleges a violation of his right to be

presumed innocent by the refusal to award him his costs.

     In connection with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant

considers that, given the unlawfulness of the refusal to make a full

defendant's costs order in his favour, the order could not be lawful

for the purposes of Article 1.

     Finally, the applicant alleges a violation of Article 13 of the

Convention in connection with the above.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 11 June 1993 and registered on

2 August 1993.

     On 6 April 1994 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48

para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.

     The Government's written observations were submitted on

28 July 1994, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that

purpose.  The applicant replied on 1 December 1994, also after an

extension of the time-limit.

     On 19 January 1995 the Government informed the Commission that

they intended make a brief response to the applicant's reply.  No

response was, in the event, submitted.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2)

of the Convention, which provides as follows:

     "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed

     innocent until proved guilty according to law."

     The Government consider that cases involving acquittal should be

considered in the same way as cases involving discontinuance for the

purposes of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2).  They note that the

Convention does not give the right for a successful defendant to be

granted his costs, and consider that the judge nowhere stated or

implied that the applicant was, although acquitted, in fact guilty of

the crimes as charged or of other crimes.

     The applicant disagrees.  Referring to the Sekanina case (Eur.

Court H.R., judgment of 25 August 1993, Series A no. 266) he underlines

that there was no case against him, considers that the consequential

orders by the courts should have reflected that fact, and notes that

the Government have failed to recognise the distinction between the

problems caused by the discretionary nature of the order, and those

caused by the grounds on which it was refused.  He also sees a clear

distinction between discontinuance and acquittal for the purposes of

the assessment of judicial statements imputing guilt or continuing

suspicion to a defendant.  For the applicant, it is implicit in the

Sekanina reasoning that Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention

does give a successful defendant the right to reimbursement of his

costs.  The applicant also considers that the statements made by the

judge were in violation of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) in that they

penalised the applicant for not giving fuller evidence at an earlier

stage of the proceedings.  In his opinion, this penalisation renders

nugatory the right to silence which is part of the principle that the

prosecution must be put to proof of any criminal allegation without the

defendant being compelled to contribute to that process.

     The applicant stresses that the weaknesses in the prosecution's

case were the responsibility of the prosecution, and it was not right

for the trial judge to regard them as amounting to the applicant

bringing suspicion upon himself or misleading the prosecution. In

particular, the judge should not have used the coloured language he did

use ("it stinks of greed ..."), and he must ultimately have reached his

decision not to award costs on the basis of the prosecution evidence

alone.

     The Commission recalls that neither Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2)

nor any other provision of the Convention contains an express right for

a successful defendant to be awarded the costs incurred in defending

a prosecution (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Masson and Van Zon judgment of

28 September 1995, Series A no. 327, para. 49).  The Commission does

not accept the applicant's argument that it is implicit in Article 6

para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention that an acquitted defendant must

be reimbursed his own costs.  The question is based on the principles

laid down by the European Court of Human Rights in the above-mentioned

Sekanina case:

     " The voicing of suspicions regarding an accused's innocence is

     conceivable as long as the conclusion of criminal proceedings has

     not resulted in a decision on the merits of the accusation.

     However, it is no longer admissible to rely on such suspicions

     once an acquittal has become final."

     The question for the Commission under Article 6 para. 2

(Art. 6-2) of the Convention is therefore whether the trial judge in

the applicant's case relied on suspicions after the applicant had been

acquitted.

     The Commission would first note that there is no question in the

present case of the judge refusing to make a full defendant's costs

order because he disagreed with the verdict of the jury: it was the

judge who stopped the trial from continuing because he considered the

evidence insufficient.

     Next, the Commission would note that the judge did in fact make

a limited defendant's costs order.  The order he made covered the

expense incurred by the applicant in calling witnesses from the drugs

manufacturers.  This did, it is true, only cover some £7,000 of the

applicant's stated costs expenditure of some £118,000, but it is

nevertheless an indication that the judge did not continue to harbour

suspicion as to the defendant's guilt.

     Further, the domestic law in the present case does not require

a judge to harbour continuing suspicion against an acquitted defendant

if he is to refuse a defendant's costs order.  Whilst Section 16 (2)

(b) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 provides for a simple

discretion for the Crown Court to make a defendant's cost's order, the

statutory framework has been supplemented by a Practice Direction which

provides that an order should normally be made unless there are

positive reasons for not doing so.  The Practice Direction gives as

example that the "defendant's own conduct has brought suspicion on

himself and has misled the prosecution into thinking that the case

against him is stronger than it is".

     Paragraph 2.2.(a) of the Practice Direction relates purely to

questions of the defendant's conduct in relation to the prosecution:

it does not as such call for any assessment of continuing suspicion

before a defendant's costs order can be refused.  The mere application

of the provision cannot therefore give rise to issues under Article 6

para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention.  The Commission must consider

what the judge actually said.

       The applicant takes particular exception to the judge's

statements "... there is certainly a view that is capable of being

formed about this case, whichever way you turn to examine the motive

that prompted the parties, it stinks of greed, ... greed in the hands

of [the applicant] ...".  However, greed is not a criminal offence, and

the Commission does not agree with the applicant that this statement

indicates that the judge voiced or otherwise relied on any continuing

suspicions against the applicant.  This view is confirmed by the reply

of the applicant's counsel at the hearing before the judge: "...it may

be that commercial life is like that".

     The applicant draws attention to the fact that in their

observations the Government refer to the applicant's involvement in a

"dishonest trade".  The Commission notes that the Government use the

phrase "a dishonest trade" in their observations in the following

context: "To the extent that the judge's comments imply that the

applicant was involved in a dishonest trade, ... that was ... clear on

facts and evidence not disputed by the defence ...".

     If the judge had used phrases referring to, or implying,

dishonesty in his ruling, it may indeed have been difficult to separate

those phrases from an assessment of guilt, given that dishonesty is a

common element in criminal offences, and that the absence of

"deception" - a concept linked in many cases to "dishonesty" - was the

crucial factor in the applicant's acquittal.  The judge did not,

however, use any phrases which could permit the imputation by the judge

of dishonesty or deception to the applicant in the present case.

     Finally, the Commission notes the applicant's argument to the

effect that in not making a full defendant's costs order in the

applicant's favour, the judge was penalising the applicant for not

bringing exculpatory evidence earlier, and that the Commission should

bear in mind the right to silence in this context.

     The Commission recalls that it has previously held that the

indirect pressure put on an accused where adverse inferences may be

drawn from an accused's silence is not necessarily in violation of

Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention (cf. No. 18731/91,

Murray v. the United Kingdom, Comm. Report 27.6.94).  In the absence

of a right to reimbursement of costs for a successful defendant, it is

inevitable that in certain circumstances a defendant who declines to

produce any evidence until trial will incur costs until trial, and that

those costs will then have to be borne by the defendant.  In the

present case, the weakness in the prosecution case only became apparent

when the applicant was served with evidence in August 1991 and witness

summonses were made.  That the applicant had to bear his costs until

1 October 1992, when he received legal aid, does not therefore affect

the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2)

of the Convention.  Moreover, as the judge made clear, his refusal to

award the defendant his full costs was based not on the ground that the

applicant had failed to bring forward exculpatory evidence earlier, but

on the ground that, by his conduct in making a statement to the police

which was less than candid, he had brought suspicion on himself and

misled the prosecution into thinking the case against him was stronger

that it was.

     Taking these considerations together, the Commission finds that

these complaints are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant also alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention as regards the length of the proceedings.

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention provides so far as relevant:

     "1.   In the determination ... of any criminal charge against

     him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

     reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

     established by law."

     The Government consider that the period to be considered for the

purposes of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is 9 January 1990,

when the applicant was arrested and charged, and that it ended on

21 December 1992, when he was acquitted.  They do not accept that the

period to be considered began on an earlier date as the applicant was

no more than a potential witness in the case against Mr. X, and mere

suspicions and rumours do not suffice to constitute a "criminal charge"

within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.  They point

out that the investigations were very complex as they related to over

100 transactions which had to be reconstructed, and furthermore Mr. X,

the suspect and potential defendant, was abroad.  They also point out

that the judicial proceedings lasted approximately 18 months, which is

less than the average for this type of proceedings.

     The applicant considers that the proceedings against him began

on 5 November 1987, when he made a witness statement in the context of

the proceedings against Mr. X, or at the latest in February 1988, when

his business dealings were affected by the police investigations, and

those with whom he was dealing in the ordinary course of his business

referred to the investigations and to the fact that he was being

referred to by the police as a "crook".  The applicant does not accept

that the case was complex, and considers that to the extent that it was

complex, it was so rendered by the prosecution insistence on pursuing

183 counts on the indictment, even though this was ultimately reduced

to 26 two months before the trial.  The applicant accepts that there

was no culpable delay on the part of the judicial authorities, but

considers that there were substantial periods of inactivity on the part

of the prosecution for which the Government are responsible.  He

concludes that the period of four and three-quarter years it took for

the case to be dealt with the conclusion of the first instance exceeds

the reasonable time requirement of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.

     The Commission recalls that in criminal cases, the "'reasonable

time' referred to in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) begins to run as soon

as a person is 'charged' ....  'Charge' ... may be defined as 'the

official notification given to an individual ... of an allegation that

he has committed a criminal offence', a definition that also

corresponds to the test whether 'the situation of the [suspect] has

been substantially affected ...'" (Eur. Court H.R., Eckle judgment of

15 July 1982, Series A no. 51, p. 33, para. 73).

     The first official notification the applicant received of

criminal proceedings against him was when he was arrested on

9 January 1990.  The applicant was, however, aware of the allegations

against Mr. X as early as November 1987, and states that he became

aware of the police investigations in the course of early 1988 and that

this amounted to being "substantially affected" such that the period

to be considered ran from then.

     The Commission accepts that the applicant may have been aware

that the police were considering bringing proceedings against him at

some point in 1988.  Indeed, if he knew that Mr. X had left the

country, he may have expected the police to evince an interest in him

and other wholesalers, even without being told by third parties in his

business dealings.

     To be substantially affected by the actions of the prosecution

authorities within the meaning of the Convention involves being

directly affected by official action concerning a prosecution.  Merely

being aware of investigations is not sufficient on its own: although

a direct step such as a search of premises, the arrest of the person

concerned, the seizure of goods, or even a less direct matter such as

the questioning of third parties by the police with reference to the

"defendant", may well substantially affect a person, it cannot be said

that becoming aware of possible police interest can be equated with the

bringing of a "criminal charge" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     In the present case the applicant does not allege that he was

affected by any direct action on the part of the police until he was

arrested on 9 January 1990, and the Commission finds that the existence

of rumours as to the existence of an investigation - which is in

substance what he contends - is not sufficient to mark the beginning

of the period referred to in Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.  The

period to be taken into consideration thus began on 9 January 1990 with

the applicant's arrest.

     The proceedings, which uncontestedly determined a criminal

charge, therefore lasted from 9 January 1990 to 21 December 1992, a

total of a little under three years.

     The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of proceedings

must be assessed in the light of the following criteria: the complexity

of the case, the conduct of the parties and the conduct of the

authorities dealing with the case (see Eur. Court H.R., Ferraro

judgment of 19 February 1991, Series A no 197, p. 9, paras. 16 - 17).

     The Commission notes that the proceedings were not simple, and

that they fell within the provisions of Section 4 of the Criminal

Justice Act 1987 as revealing "a case of fraud of such seriousness and

complexity that it is appropriate that the management of the case

should without delay be taken over by the Crown Court".  The Commission

finds nothing in the applicant's behaviour which could be said to have

delayed the proceedings, but also accepts that the investigations into

a fraud case will inevitably take some time.  It sees nothing

inherently unreasonable in the period of 16 months between the

applicant's arrest on 9 January 1990 and the charge on 13 May 1991, and

the applicant accepts that the judicial authorities did not cause undue

delay.

     Taking the proceedings as a whole, the Commission considers that

they did not exceed the "reasonable time" permitted by Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   The applicant also alleges further violations of Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention by reason of the way in which the police

investigations were carried out and the failure to give a full

defendant's costs order, and violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) to the Convention.

     The Commission has commented on the applicant's complaints

concerning the defendant's costs order above.  It has considered the

remainder of the applicant's complaints as they have been submitted and

finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the

Convention.

     The remainder of the application is therefore manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber       President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (C.L. ROZAKIS)