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KHARSA v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 28419/95 • ECHR ID: 001-2397

Document date: October 26, 1995

  • Inbound citations: 1
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 1

KHARSA v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 28419/95 • ECHR ID: 001-2397

Document date: October 26, 1995

Cited paragraphs only



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 28419/95

                      by Amal KHARSA

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

26 October 1995, the following members being present:

      MM.  S. TRECHSEL, President

                 H. DANELIUS

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           Mr.   F. MARTINEZ

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 G.B. REFFI

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 J. MUCHA

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 D. SVÁBY

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 P. LORENZEN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mr.   M. de SALVIA, Deputy Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 1 September 1995

by Amal Kharsa against Sweden and registered on 1 September 1995 under

file No. 28419/95;

      Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 6 October 1995 and the observations in reply submitted

by the applicant on 21 October 1995;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Syrian citizen born in 1967. Before the

Commission she is represented by her lawyer, Mr. Per-Erik Nilsson,

Djursholm.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

      The applicant arrived in Sweden on 1 August 1992 and applied for

asylum. She stated that her name was Amal Haydar, that she was a

citizen of Iraq, that she had left Iraq for political reasons and that

she and members of her family had been interrogated by the Iraqi police

about her brother's activities in the Communist Party. On the basis of

this information the National Immigration Board (Statens invandrar-

verk), on 26 February 1993, granted her a permanent residence permit.

      In August 1993 a man claiming to be the applicant's husband

reported to the Swedish police that the applicant's name was Amal

Kharsa and that she was a Syrian citizen. He further stated that the

applicant had also applied for asylum in Denmark. Investigations

carried out by the Swedish police, Interpol and the Swedish Embassy in

Damascus revealed that this new information was true. Moreover, the

applicant's Syrian passport was obtained from the Danish immigration

authorities. The investigations proved its authenticity. However, on

several occasions between November 1993 and January 1995, in letters

to the Swedish immigration authorities and in police interrogations,

the applicant maintained that the information she had given about her

background was correct. In an attempt to prove that she was not

married, she submitted a medical certificate indicating that she was

a virgin. Not until 24 January 1995 did she concede during a police

interrogation that she was married and that the information supplied

by her husband was true. At the same time, she stated that she had

married him only to escape from her father who had allegedly assaulted

and raped her since she was six years old. She also alleged that her

husband had assaulted her because of her refusal to prostitute herself.

The husband's brother had told her to supply the original false

information to the immigration authorities. The applicant further

stated that, as a student, she had been a member of the illegal Syrian

Communist Party, that her husband had informed the Syrian authorities

of her application for asylum in Sweden and that, for these reasons,

the authorities would consider her a spy.

      By decision of 24 February 1995, the National Immigration Board,

basing itself on Chapter 2, Section 9 of the Aliens Act (Utlännings-

lagen, 1989:529), revoked the applicant's residence permit due to the

false information originally submitted by her. It further ordered her

expulsion. The Board called into question the new information supplied

by the applicant and found her allegations of rape remarkable in view

of the medical certificate indicating that she was a virgin. The Board

further took into account that she had left Syria legally with a valid

passport. The Board thus considered that the applicant would not be

considered a spy by the Syrian authorities. It concluded that the facts

invoked by the applicant did not constitute a ground for granting her

a residence permit.

      The applicant appealed to the Aliens Appeals Board (Utlännings-

nämnden). She stated, inter alia, that her father had sexually

assaulted her without, as a result, their having had sexual

intercourse. Thus, the medical certificate concerning her virginity did

not exclude that she had been raped. She further claimed that her

husband had sent a letter to the Syrian Government, declaring that she

was married to an Iraqi citizen, that she had claimed to be Iraqi when

she applied for asylum and that she collaborated with the Government

of Iraq. For this reason, she could allegedly not return to Syria. If

returned, she would, furthermore, risk persecution due to the fact that

she was a Sunni-Muslim.

      The applicant further submitted two medical certificates, one

issued on 24 February 1995 by Dr. Dag Jansson at the Psychiatric Clinic

at Farsta and the other one issued on 11 April 1995 by Dr. Bengt

Malmgren, chief physician at the same clinic. According to Dr. Jansson,

the applicant would suffer mentally and physically if expelled from

Sweden. According to Dr. Malmgren, she was in a desperate situation and

was suffering from anxiety, depression, suicide thoughts and insomnia.

She had been admitted to a psychiatric ward on 27 March 1995 partly due

to the suicide risk. According to Dr. Malmgren, she had seen him

regularly thereafter. Dr. Malmgren further stated that the applicant

sometimes had difficulties in controlling her suicide thoughts and

considered that she would probably try to commit suicide if she was not

granted a residence permit.

      On 9 May 1995 the Aliens Appeals Board rejected the appeal.

Concurring with the National Immigration Board, it considered that the

applicant was not entitled to asylum in Sweden. It further found that

the circumstances invoked by the applicant did not justify granting her

a residence permit on humanitarian grounds.

      The applicant later lodged new applications for a residence

permit with the Aliens Appeals Board. She stated, inter alia, that she

had informed the Swedish police that her husband and his brother were

involved in the smuggling of asylum-seekers to Sweden and that she had

thus put her life at risk. She also submitted a statement of

4 June 1995 by Lars Billing, a psychologist, who considered the very

detailed information given by the applicant to the immigration

authorities to be credible and to constitute sufficient humanitarian

grounds for granting her a residence permit.

      The applicant further submitted a medical certificate issued on

25 August 1995 by Dr. Michael Brune, a specialist in psychiatry and

neurology, who made the following conclusions:

(translation)

      "[The applicant] is in a deep crisis and is absolutely

      desperate and probably on the verge of a complete nervous

      breakdown, which, if it happens, could involve a psychotic

      reaction and/or an absolute loss of control.

      One should assume that there is a great risk that she will

      commit self-destructive acts when she is told that the

      enforcement of the expulsion is inevitable or when the

      expulsion is actually enforced. Her expressed plans to take

      her own life if she is returned to Syria should be taken

      very seriously. There is thus a considerable suicide risk

      also after the expulsion has been enforced.

      Moreover, [the applicant] has obviously been traumatised by

      her life in Syria. A closer and deeper psychiatric

      assessment of this trauma is, however, possible only when

      the conditions under which she lives have become more

      stable. The seriously critical state she is in at the

      moment could probably to some extent be explained by this

      trauma."

      On 8 and 30 August 1995 the new applications were rejected by the

Aliens Appeals Board. On 23 August 1995 the applicant was placed in

detention pending enforcement of the expulsion order. This decision was

upheld by the County Administrative Court (Länsrätten) of Stockholm on

12 September 1995 and by the Administrative Court of Appeal

(Kammarrätten) of Stockholm on 3 October 1995.

      On 30 August 1995 the applicant was due to give testimony in a

trial in Stockholm concerning the murder of an Iraqi citizen which was

allegedly connected with the smuggling trade in which the applicant's

husband and brother-in-law were involved. This was, however, cancelled

as the applicant, fearing for her life, did not dare to testify.

      After the Commission had indicated to the respondent Government,

pursuant to Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure, that it was desirable

not to deport the applicant until the Commission had had an opportunity

to examine the present application, the National Immigration Board, by

decisions of 3 and 6 September 1995, stayed the enforcement of the

expulsion order pending the Commission's decision on the admissibility

of the application. The Board further decided that the applicant should

remain in detention.

COMPLAINT

      The applicant complains that her expulsion to Syria would violate

Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, as she would risk degrading

treatment by her family, other individuals and the Syrian authorities

and as, due to her present mental state, it would constitute inhuman

treatment and infringe upon her right to personal freedom and security

to expel her.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced and registered on

1 September 1995.

      On the same day the President of the Commission decided, pursuant

to Rule 36 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, to indicate to the

respondent Government that it was desirable in the interest of the

parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings not to deport the

applicant to Syria until the Commission had had an opportunity to

examine the application. The President further decided, in accordance

with Rule 48 para. 2 (b), to communicate the application to the

respondent Government.

      By decision of 14 September 1995, the Commission prolonged its

indication under Rule 36 until the end of the Commission's session

between 16 and 27 October 1995.

      The Government's observations were submitted on 6 October 1995

after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose. The

applicant replied on 21 October 1995.

THE LAW

      The applicant claims that she would risk degrading treatment upon

return to Syria and that, due to her present mental state, it would

constitute inhuman treatment and infringe upon her right to personal

freedom and security to expel her. She invokes Articles 3 and 5

(Art. 3, 5) of the Convention.

      The Commission considers that the applicant's complaint, as

submitted, falls to be examined exclusively under Article 3 (Art. 3)

of the Convention. This Article (Art. 3) reads as follows:

      "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

      degrading treatment or punishment."

      The Government submit that the application should be declared

inadmissible for being manifestly ill-founded. The Government argue

that the applicant initially submitted false information about her

identity and country of origin to the Swedish immigration authorities

and later maintained this information for a considerable period of

time. Allegedly, it is very likely that she would not have been granted

a residence permit had she submitted the correct information from the

beginning. In this connection, the Government assert that it was a

well-known fact at the time of the applicant's initial application for

asylum that Iraqi asylum-seekers were allowed to stay in Sweden. The

Government contend that Swedish authorities should not have to accept

that persons coming to Sweden under false premises are allowed to

remain in the country. The Government further submit that, against this

background, also the trustworthiness of the new information presented

by the applicant must be called into question. Moreover, considering

that the applicant left Syria legally and that the Syrian authorities

in December 1994 allegedly informed the Swedish Embassy in Damascus

that the applicant is welcome back to Syria, the Government find it

unlikely that she would suffer any harassment from the Syrian

authorities. The Government further contend that Swedish authorities

cannot be held responsible for the measures which, according to the

applicant, might be taken against her by her family or other private

subjects and which most certainly constitute criminal offences in

Syria.

      As regards the applicant's mental state, the Government submit

that her present situation, to a very large extent, has been created

by herself due to the false information submitted to the Swedish

immigration authorities. Moreover, a reason for her mental problems is

allegedly her fear of what will happen to her in Syria. Having regard

to the above statements, the Government contend that this fear is

highly exaggerated and, in any event, unsubstantiated. Finally, the

Government maintain that, when enforcing the expulsion, the police

authority in charge will take into account the applicant's state of

health and find the most appropriate manner for such an enforcement.

Should the applicant's health be such that expulsion cannot take place,

the police is obliged to notify the National Immigration Board which

may decide to stay the enforcement until further notice.

      The Government conclude that no substantial grounds have been

shown for believing that the applicant would face a real risk of

treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention if the

expulsion order were to be enforced and that she has not substantiated

her allegation that the enforcement would amount to inhuman treatment

in view of her present mental and personal conditions.

      The applicant submits that, being an Arabic woman and thus used

to obey the husband and other men, she followed her brother-in-law's

instructions when submitting the initial information to the immigration

authorities in support of her application for asylum. She was afraid

of what could happen to her if she did not follow those instructions.

She was not aware that Iraqi citizens at that time were allowed to stay

in Sweden. She contends that, if expelled to Syria, she runs a

substantial risk of being exposed to degrading treatment by her family,

in particular her father, and, due to her knowledge of certain

circumstances regarding the murder of the Iraqi citizen, by the people

involved in the trade of smuggling asylum-seekers. She contends that

it is irrelevant that this threat comes from private subjects.

Furthermore, the applicant claims that there are very good reasons to

believe that she is of interest to the Syrian authorities because of

her involvement in the Communist Party and the information submitted

by her husband to the Syrian Government. On account of that information

she might be considered an enemy of the Syrian State or might not be

protected from being ill-treated or murdered by the above smugglers.

      With regard to her present state of health, the applicant states

that it is a result of her fear of the treatment awaiting her in Syria.

Allegedly, as indicated in the medical certificates, she is likely to

commit serious self-destructive acts if returned to Syria. There are

thus strong humanitarian reasons for letting her stay in Sweden.

      The Commission recalls that Contracting States have the right to

control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens (cf., e.g., Eur.

Court H.R., Vilvarajah and Others judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A

no. 215, p. 34, para. 102). However, an expulsion decision may give

rise to an issue under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, and hence

engage the responsibility of the State, where substantial grounds have

been shown for believing that the person concerned would face a real

risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment

or punishment in the country to which he or she is to be expelled

(ibid., p. 34, para. 103). A mere possibility of ill-treatment is not

in itself sufficient (ibid., p. 37, para. 111).

      With respect to the risk allegedly facing the applicant upon

return to Syria, the Commission considers that she has not submitted

any evidence in support of her claim that she would suffer harassment

from the Syrian authorities and private persons and organisations. In

this connection, the Commission also notes that the applicant presented

this claim to the Swedish immigration authorities on 24 January 1995,

i.e. about two and a half years after her arrival in Sweden, and that

she had previously submitted false information about her identity,

country of origin and grounds for seeking asylum in Sweden. For these

reasons, the Commission does not find it established that there are

substantial grounds for believing that she would be exposed to a real

risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) in

Syria.

      The Commission next has to examine whether, in view of the

applicant's state of health, an enforcement at present of the expulsion

order would in itself involve such a trauma for her that Article 3

(Art. 3) would be violated.

      The Commission recalls that ill-treatment must attain a minimum

level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3

(Art. 3). The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all

the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the

treatment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its

physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and

state of health of the victim (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Cruz Varas and

Others judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A no. 201, p. 31, paras.

83-84).

      In the present case several medical certificates have been

adduced by the applicant. The Commission has paid particular attention

to the opinion of Dr. Brune of 25 August 1995, according to which the

applicant is on the verge of a nervous breakdown and might very well

try to commit suicide when informed about an imminent expulsion, during

the actual enforcement and after her return to Syria.

      In so far as the applicant's mental problems relate to her fear

of what will happen to her in Syria, the Commission recalls its above

finding that no substantial basis has been shown for this fear. The

Commission is, moreover, satisfied that the police authority in charge

of the enforcement of the expulsion will take into account the

applicant's state of health when deciding how the expulsion should be

carried out. In this connection, the Commission notes that, should the

applicant be taken into compulsory psychiatric care due to her mental

problems, the expulsion order could under no circumstances take place

without the permission of the chief physician responsible for her care

(cf. No. 27249/95, Lwanga and Sempungo v. Sweden, Dec. 14.9.95,

unpublished).

      In the above circumstances, the Commission does not find it

established that the applicant's return to Syria would amount to a

violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) on account of her present state of

health.

      It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Deputy Secretary to the Commission     President of the Commission

      (M. de SALVIA)                          (S. TRECHSEL)

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