AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 20087/92

                      by E.M.

                      against Norway

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

26 October 1995, the following members being present:

           MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President

                 H. DANELIUS

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           Mr.   F. MARTINEZ

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 G.B. REFFI

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 J. MUCHA

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 D. SVÁBY

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 P. LORENZEN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 28 May 1992 by

E.M. against Norway and registered on 5 June 1992 under file No.

20087/92;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 15 July 1994 and the observations in reply submitted by

the applicant on 17 November 1994;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

      The applicant is a Norwegian citizen, born in 1944. He resides

in Oslo. Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. Johan Hjort,

a lawyer practising in Oslo.

A.    The particular circumstances of the case

      By indictments of 16 March and 27 December 1990 the applicant and

seven others were accused of having induced employees of a bank's

branch-office in Oslo and the headquarters of the National Bank of

Norway to pay them altogether 25,100,000 NOK. The fraud consisted in

presenting certain documents and in concealing that the person who had

issued them was not authorised to do so. The documents were issued

under false pretences giving the holder no right to obtain the money.

      The trial commenced in the City Court of Oslo (Oslo byrett) on

2 January 1991 and lasted until 10 July 1991 following a total of 102

court sessions. The Court heard 118 witnesses and police statements of

six witnesses were read out in the court. Statements from witnesses

questioned in Germany were also read out. The Court finally heard eight

experts, five of whom were relevant to the applicant's involvement in

the case.

      By judgment of 6 September 1991 the applicant was found guilty

of some of the charges brought against him whereas he was acquitted of

others. He was sentenced to 21/2 years' imprisonment. He was also ordered

to pay damages, amounting to 21 million NOK, jointly with three

co-accused.

      On 15 October 1991 the applicant applied to the Appeals Selection

Committee of the Supreme Court (Høyesteretts Kjæremålsutvalg) for a new

trial in the High Court (lagmannsrett) or, in the alternative, for

leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett). In support of the

request for a new trial in the High Court the applicant maintained his

innocence and contested that the City Court had made a correct

evaluation of various parts of the available evidence. In support of

the alternative request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court the

applicant directed his appeal against alleged procedural errors in that

the reasons for the Court's finding were incomplete (mangelfulle

domsgrunner), against an alleged wrongful application of the law and

against the sentence imposed which he found disproportionate when

compared to that of a co-accused.

      A copy of the applicant's requests was transmitted to the public

prosecution authority for comments. Such comments were submitted on

2 November 1991 and the applicant's reply thereto was submitted on

13 November 1991. Further comments were submitted by the prosecuting

authority on 18 November 1991 and a copy was transmitted to the

applicant for information.

      The applicant's request for a new trial or, in the alternative,

leave to appeal to the Supreme Court were examined by the Appeals

Selection Committee of the Supreme Court on 21 November 1991. Both

requests were rejected. The applicant was informed hereof by letter of

28 November 1991 from the Supreme Court's Registry.

      Subsequently, on 8 April 1992, the applicant requested

the Appeals Selection Committee to reconsider its decision of

21 November 1991. By letter of 10 April 1992 the applicant was informed

that the Appeals Selection Committee had found no reason to reconsider

its previous decision.

      On 15 June 1992 the applicant requested the Oslo City Court to

re-open the case (begjæring om gjenopptakelse). This was refused by the

City Court on 4 September 1992 and by the Eidsivating High Court on

25 November 1992.

B.    Relevant domestic law

      The appeal system in criminal cases was at the relevant time

governed by Act No. 25 of 22 May 1981 relating to Legal Procedure in

Criminal Cases (hereinafter the Criminal Procedure Act). According to

this Act the consideration of criminal cases, with certain exceptions,

starts in the District Court (herredsretten) or the City Court

(byretten) cf. chapter 22 of the Act. (In order to simplify the account

below the expression "City Court" will cover the courts in the

districts as well as in the cities). In individual cases the City Court

is composed of one professional judge, who presides over the

proceedings, and two lay judges (section 276).

      Criminal proceedings are instituted by the public prosecuting

authority when it deems it possible to produce sufficient evidence to

prove that the criminal act in question has been committed by one or

more specified persons. When the public prosecuting authority has

decided to prefer an indictment, the said authority shall send the

court a copy of the indictment with a summary of the evidence it will

produce (section 262, first paragraph). At the same time, the public

prosecuting authority shall send a copy of the indictment and a summary

of the evidence to the defence counsel together with the documents

relating to the case (section 264).

      The Court shall immediately appoint a defence counsel if one has

not already been appointed (section 262, second paragraph). The

defendant enjoys the right to be assisted by a defence counsel of his

own choice (section 94, first paragraph). As a general rule the defence

counsel will be remunerated by the State. According to section 265, the

defence counsel shall without unnecessary delay contact the person

indicted and discuss how the defence shall be conducted. Within a fixed

time-limit, the defence counsel shall return the documents relating to

the case together with a statement of the evidence he will produce.

Counsel may also request that an attempt be made to procure evidence

in another way, and that the public prosecuting authority shall proceed

to obtain any new evidence he specifies.

      The proceedings of the main hearing of the City Court are oral

(section 278). The person indicted (tiltalte) has the right to be

present (cf. sections 280-282). The Court shall in its official

capacity see to it that the case is fully clarified (section 294).

Written evidence shall be read aloud by the person producing the

evidence unless the Court decides otherwise (section 302). After the

examination of each individual witness and after the reading aloud of

each piece of written evidence, the person indicted shall be given an

opportunity to speak (section 303).

      When the production of evidence (bevisførselen) is completed,

first the prosecutor and then the defence counsel may address the

Court. Each of them is entitled to speak twice. When the defence

counsel has finished, the person indicted shall be asked whether he has

any further comment to make (section 304). In deciding what is deemed

to be proved, only the evidence produced at the main hearing shall be

taken into consideration by the Court (section 305).

      The judgment of the City Court must satisfy the requirements set

out in section 40, second paragraph. Hence the grounds of the judgment

concerning the question of guilt shall specifically and fully state the

facts of the case that the Court has found to be proved as a basis for

the judgment, and shall refer to the penal provision pursuant to which

the person charged has been convicted. Furthermore the grounds of the

judgment shall state the reasons to which the Court has attached

importance in determining the penalty and other sanctions.

      Judgments of the City Court are subject to two kinds of review

in criminal cases: "appeal" to the Supreme Court (Chapter 24 of the

Act) or "new trial" by the High Court (Chapter 25 of the Act). The

choice between these remedies depends upon the aspects of the judgment

that are contested before the higher court.

      Despite the wording of the Criminal Procedure Act both the

"appeal" (as the Act defines the term) and the petition for a "new

trial" are covered by the ordinary meaning of the term appeal.

Consequently, the Norwegian criminal procedure provides for a right to

appeal against a judgment of the City Court irrespective of the grounds

invoked, either to the Supreme Court ("appeal") or to the High Court

(petition for a "new trial"). However, the Appeals Selection Committee

of the Supreme Court may, subsequent to "leave to appeal proceedings",

decide that an "appeal" shall not be allowed to proceed or that it

shall not give its consent for a new trial.

      "Appeal" (anke) to the Supreme Court is available with one

exception: error in the assessment of evidence in relation to the

question of guilt (bevisbedømmelsen under skyldspørsmålet) cannot be

a ground for "appeal" (section 335), but for a new trial. Consequently,

"appeal" is the relevant remedy in relation to any alleged defects

concerning:

- the application of law with regard to the question of guilt (lovan-

vendelsen under skyldspørsmålet);

- the application of rules of procedure (saksbehandling);

- the determination of sanctions (avgjørelsen av reaksjonsspørsmålet),

for instance the meting out of the penalty (straffutmåling).

      An "appeal" shall not be allowed to proceed when the Appeals

Selection Committee of the Supreme Court unanimously finds it clear

that it will not succeed (section 349). The Committee may itself decide

an "appeal" against a judgment of the City Court when it unanimously

finds that the judgment should be set aside, that the accused should

be acquitted or altered in his or her favour (section 350). Otherwise,

the "appeal" shall be referred to appeal proceedings (section 352 first

paragraph).

      The parties may petition for a "new trial" (begjæring om fornyet

behandling) in the High Court of any case which has been adjudicated

by the City Court when the question of evidence in relation to the

issue of guilt is alleged to have been wrongly decided (section 369).

      The consent of the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme

Court is required for a "new trial". Such consent shall be given when

there may be reason to doubt whether the assessment of evidence was

correct or other special reasons so indicate (section 370).

      The Appeals Selection Committee is composed of four Justices of

the Supreme Court who serve on a rotating basis. Three of these

Justices participate in each case. The Committee is assisted by the

Supreme Court's Secretariat.

      Both parties may lodge an "appeal" against a judgment of the City

Court, or petition for a "new trial" in the High Court (section 335

first paragraph and section 369). The time-limit for an "appeal" is two

weeks from the date on which judgment is delivered, i.e. to the

defendant (cf. section 339 which also applies in cases of petitions for

a "new trial", cf. section 371).

      If the person charged has a defence counsel appointed by the

state, the latter shall on request advise the defendant on the question

of an "appeal" and assist him with the notice of "appeal" (cf.

section 342 which also applies in cases of petition for a "new trial",

cf. section 371). At this stage too the defence counsel will be

remunerated by the state.

      The notice of "appeal" shall state (section 343) inter alia

whether the appeal relates to procedure, the application of law with

regard to the question of guilt, or the decision concerning a penalty.

If the "appeal" is against the application of law, the notice of

"appeal" should also state the error on which the "appeal" is based,

and the alteration demanded.

      The notice of "appeal", the judgment of the City Court and other

documents of the case are sent to the Appeals Selection Committee of

the Supreme Court, which will examine the issue whether the "appeal"

has been made in time and otherwise fulfils the legal requirements

(sections 345-348). Corresponding rules govern the handling of a

petition for a "new trial, (cf. sections 371 and 372).

      According to section 351 (also applicable in cases of petition

for "new trial", cf. section 371), the decisions of the Appeals

Selection Committee are made without party proceedings. However, the

parties may be allowed to express their views in writing, and the other

party shall be informed of all statements containing new facts which

are not obviously without significance.

      Thus, the documents of the case, and first of all the judgment

of the City Court, taken together with the arguments found in the

submissions and replies by the parties, constitute the basis for the

assessment by the Appeals Selection Committee as to whether an "appeal"

should not be allowed to proceed or consent to a "new trial" should be

given.

      The Appeals Selection Committee gives no reasons for its decision

not to allow an "appeal" to proceed or to refuse to give its consent

to a "new trial". The decisions are final, and not subject to review.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains that the examination by the Appeals

Selection Committee of the Supreme Court in respect of his requests for

a new trial or for leave to appeal did not fulfil the requirements of

Article 2 para. 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. Accordingly, he

is of the opinion that he could not have his conviction or sentence

reviewed by a higher tribunal within the meaning of this provision.

      He also invokes Article 6 of the Convention complaining that he

did not have a fair trial when the Appeals Selection Committee

considered his request for a new trial in the High Court or for leave

to appeal to the Supreme Court.

      Finally, he invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention

maintaining that, as he was ordered to pay damages, he has been

deprived of his right to enjoy, in the future, the fruits of his own

labour.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 28 May 1992 and registered on

5 June 1992.

      On 6 April 1994 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to bring

the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to

invite them to submit observations on the admissibility and merits of

the complaints submitted under Article 6 of the Convention and

Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.

      After an extension of the time-limit the Government's

observations were submitted on 15 July 1994. Following two extensions

of the time-limit the applicant's observations in reply were submitted

on 17 November 1994.

THE LAW

1.    Relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) to the Convention

the applicant complains that the examination by the Appeals Selection

Committee of the Supreme Court of his application for a new trial or

leave to appeal, did not comply with the requirements of this

provision.

      Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) reads as follows:

      "1.  Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal

      shall have the right to have his conviction or sentence

      reviewed by a higher tribunal.  The exercise of this right,

      including the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall

      be governed by law.

      2.   This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to

      offences of a minor character, as prescribed by law, or in

      cases in which the person concerned was tried in the first

      instance by the highest tribunal or was convicted following

      an appeal against acquittal."

      Having regard to the fact that a conviction and sentence may

involve severe punishment as well as an obligation to pay enormous sums

in damages the applicant maintains that the above provision should be

interpreted as securing a right of an accused to have a "complete

review" of the entire case before a higher tribunal without a need

first to obtain leave to appeal. Furthermore, he maintains that the

"review" performed by the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme

Court cannot be considered as satisfying the review required by

Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2).

      The Government submit that under Norwegian law there are no

limitations as to what aspects of a case an appeal court may consider.

As Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) refers on the other hand to a

review of the conviction or the sentence the Government maintain that

the applicant enjoyed procedural rights which were more extensive than

those prescribed by this provision.

      Furthermore, the Government maintain that where leave is refused

the review is carried out by the Appeals Selection Committee of the

Supreme Court which under sections 349 and 370 of the Criminal

Procedure Act shall consider, depending on the type of appeal

requested, whether or not the appeal, which may concern all aspects of

a case, is unfounded or whether there is reason to doubt the assessment

of the evidence made by the first instance court. Having regard to this

and to the fact that Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) explicitly

leaves it to the national legislator to decide how the right of review

shall be exercised, the Government contend that the "leave to appeal

proceedings" as applied in the present case satisfied the requirements

of this provision.

      The Commission notes that different rules govern review by a

higher tribunal in the member States of the Council of Europe. In some

countries such review is in certain cases limited to questions of law

such as the "recours en cassation" (in French law) or "Revision" (in

German law). In other countries there is a right to appeal against

findings of fact as well as on questions of law; and in some States a

person wishing to appeal to a higher tribunal must in certain cases

apply for leave to appeal.

      As regards Norway the Commission recalls that judgments of the

City Court are subject to two kinds of review in criminal cases in the

form of an examination by the Supreme Court or a new trial in the High

Court. The choice between these remedies rests with the appellant and

depends on the aspects of the judgment which are contested. Whereas a

party may petition for a new trial in the High Court when the question

of evidence in relation to the issue of guilt is alleged to have been

wrongly decided by the City Court, an "appeal" to the Supreme Court may

be based on alleged defects covering the application of the law, the

application of the rules of procedure and the determination of the

sanction.

      Having regard to this the Commission considers that in principle

the possibility exists in Norway for a person convicted of a criminal

offence to have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher

tribunal within the meaning of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) to

the Convention.

      However, the possibility of such a "review" depends on leave from

the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court. The question

accordingly arises whether the Norwegian system of "leave to appeal",

as applied in the present case, was such that the applicant was denied

a review of his conviction or sentence as required by Article 2 of

Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) to the Convention.

      The second sentence of this provision requires that the exercise

of the right to a review by a higher tribunal shall be governed by law

but it does not otherwise specify its scope or actual implementation.

However, as the reference to the grounds for the review being governed

by law clearly shows the Contracting States have a discretion as to the

modalities for the exercise of the right of review. Consequently, the

Article gives the States the possibility to regulate the review in

several ways.

      The Commission recalls, as a matter of comparison, that the right

of access to the courts secured by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention may also be subject to limitations in the form of regulation

by the State. The State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation but in

addition to pursuing a legitimate aim the limitations applied shall not

restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way that

the very essence of the right is impaired (cf. for example Eur. Court

H.R., Tolstoy Miloslawsky v. the United Kingdom, judgment of

13 July 1995, Series A no. 323, para. 59).

      Although it is not the Commission's task to substitute itself for

the competent Norwegian authorities in determining the most appropriate

policy for regulating the exercise of the right of review, the

Commission finds that similar considerations should be kept in mind

when examining whether the limitations on the right to a review as

guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) are compatible with

the very essence of this right.

      In the present case the Commission recalls that the Appeals

Selection Committee of the Supreme Court may decide that an "appeal"

may not be allowed to proceed when it unanimously finds it clear that

it will not succeed (cf. section 349 of the Criminal Procedure Act).

Furthermore, the Committee may refuse leave to obtain a new trial in

the High Court if there is no reason to doubt that the assessment of

evidence was correct or there are no other special reasons for granting

such leave (cf. section 370).

      The Commission considers that these provisions of the Criminal

Procedure Act pursue a legitimate aim, i.e. the fair administration of

justice. Furthermore, the Commission has found no evidence which could

lead to the conclusion that the Appeals Selection Committee pursued any

other aims. Before the Committee the applicant had not only the

opportunity to present any submissions he considered to be of relevance

to his case, but also to comment on the observations submitted by the

prosecuting authority. Although it is not the Commission's role to

assess the facts which led the Committee to adopt one decision rather

than another the Commission is satisfied that the decision taken was

based on a full evaluation of all relevant factors.

      In these circumstances the Commission does not find that the

Appeals Selection Committee overstepped its margin of appreciation when

refusing the applicant leave to appeal having found that the conditions

therefor were not fulfilled. These conditions, as set out in the

Criminal Procedure Act, cannot be said to impair disproportionately the

essence of the applicant's right to a review by a higher tribunal

within the meaning of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) to the

Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    The applicant also complains that in the proceedings before the

Appeals Selection Committee he did not have a fair trial within the

meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. This

provision reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

      "In the determination of ... any criminal charge against

      him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ...

      by an independent and impartial tribunal ..."

      In particular the applicant refers to the fact that there was no

public hearing before the Appeals Selection Committee, no witnesses

were heard and no reasons for the decision taken were given.

      The Government submit that Article 6 (Art. 6) applies to the

proceedings before the Appeals Selection Committee but maintain that

when account is taken of the entirety of the proceedings the

requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) were fulfilled.

      As regards the applicability of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention the Commission recalls that the Appeals Selection Committee

was called upon to decide whether the applicant's request for a new

trial in the High Court or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to

the Supreme Court should be granted. The issue therefore arises whether

the Committee can be said to "determine" the criminal charge against

the applicant. In the present case, however, the Commission finds it

can leave this question open and proceed on the assumption that

Article 6 (Art. 6) applies.

      The manner of application of Article 6 (Art. 6) to proceedings

before appeal courts depends on the special features of the proceedings

in the domestic legal order seen in their entirety and the role of the

appellate court therein. Regard must be had to the nature of the appeal

system, to the scope of the appeal court's powers and to the manner in

which the applicant's interests were actually presented and protected

before the appeal court, particularly in the light of the nature of the

issue to be decided (cf. for example Eur. Court H.R., Fejde judgment

of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-C, p. 67, para. 27).

      In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant's

and the co-accused's case was heard in the City Court of Oslo from

2 January 1991 until 10 July 1991 involving a total of 102 court

sessions and the hearing of 118 witnesses. Nothing has emerged from the

examination of this case which indicates that the applicant was not

afforded all the guarantees secured by Article 6 of the Convention

during this trial.

      As regards the "appeal proceedings" the Commission recalls that

the Appeals Selection Committee was called upon to decide whether or

not to grant leave to appeal. Had this question been answered in the

affirmative, new proceedings would have commenced in either the High

Court or the Supreme Court. Otherwise, as in this case, the City Court

judgment would stand. Thus, the limited nature of this issue does not,

in the Commission's view, in itself call for oral argument or a public

hearing or the personal appearance of the applicant, but Article 6

requires that the applicant be provided, in some appropriate way, with

a fair procedure to present his case to the Appeals Selection Committee

(cf. Eur. Court H.R., Monnell and Morris v. the United Kingdom,

judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 115, pp. 22 and 23, paras. 58

and 61).

      In this respect the Commission notes that the principle of

equality of arms was respected in that none of the parties were heard

orally by the Appeals Selection Committee. Furthermore, the applicant

was assisted by counsel under a grant of free legal aid and had the

possibility to submit, in writing, all that in his opinion would be of

relevance to his request. He was also afforded the opportunity to study

and reply to the submissions made by the prosecuting authority.

Accordingly, the proceedings cannot be said to have taken place in such

conditions as to put the applicant unfairly at a disadvantage. In

addition, the Commission has no cause to doubt that the Appeals

Selection Committee's decision to refuse the applicant leave to appeal

was based on a full and thorough evaluation of the relevant factors.

      As regards the applicant's reference to the fact that no reasons

were given by the Appeals Selection Committee for its refusal to grant

leave to appeal the Commission accepts that under specific

circumstances the absence of reasons in a court decision might raise

an issue as to the fairness of the procedure which is guaranteed by

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. It considers, however,

that if the domestic law, as in the present case, subjects the

acceptance of the appeal to a decision by the competent court whether

it considers that the appeal raises a legal issue of fundamental

importance and whether it has any chances of success, it may be

sufficient for this court simply to reject or accept this petition (cf.

No. 8769/79, Dec. 16.7.81, D.R. 25 p. 240).

      Thus, having regard to the circumstances of the case, in

particular the scope of review exercised by the Appeals Selection

Committee, the Commission finds that the proceedings against the

applicant, seen as a whole, do not disclose any appearance of a

violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    The applicant finally invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

to the Convention complaining that the obligation imposed on him to pay

damages, jointly with other defendants in the case, in the amount of

21 million NOK, deprived him of his right to enjoy, in the future, the

fruits of his own labour.

      As regards expectations for future income, the Commission recalls

that it could only be considered to constitute a possession if it had

already been earned or if an enforceable claim existed (cf.

No. 10438/83, Dec. 3.10.84, D.R. 41 p. 170). Furthermore, even assuming

that a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) to the Convention existed in the present case, the Commission

finds that Article (P1-1) does not protect a person against payment of

legally imposed debts.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission            President of the Commission

      (H.C. KRÜGER)                          (S. TRECHSEL)