AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 21357/93

                      by Tauno YLIPÄÄ

                      against Finland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 29 November 1995, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 21 December 1992

by Tauno YLIPÄÄ against Finland and registered on 9 February 1993 under

file No. 21357/93;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

THE FACTS

      The applicant was a Finnish citizen, born in 1921. He was a war

veteran. He died in 1995. On 29 September 1995 his daughter as the

administrator of his estate informed the Commission that the estate

wanted to pursue the application pending before the Commission.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

                                   I

      In 1969 the State Office for Accident Compensation

(tapaturmavirasto), hereinafter "the Compensation Office", granted the

applicant a life annuity (elinkorko) under the 1948 Military Injuries

Act on the basis of an established ten per cent disability caused by

a wartime shrapnel wound in his left cheek and impairment of hearing.

      In 1987 the applicant requested the Compensation Office to raise

this life annuity as he considered that the degree of his disability

now exceeded ten per cent. He furthermore now submitted a request for

compensation for certain other injuries which he claimed resulted from

his service in the 1941-44 war.

      On 10 May 1990 the Compensation Office found in favour of the

applicant raising his degree of disability to fifteen per cent. The

existing life annuity was accordingly also raised and given retroactive

effect as from 1 April 1987. However, the Compensation Office rejected

the applicant's request for compensation in respect of the new claims

made.

      The applicant appealed against this decision to the Insurance

Court (vakuutusoikeus) maintaining that the degree of his disability

should be raised even further. Secondly, he upheld his request for

compensation and thirdly, he presented two new issues: that the degree

of his disability should take effect retroactively as from 1972 instead

of 1987 and that he was entitled to compensation for certain additional

conditions not mentioned previously.

      On 21 March 1991 the Insurance Court rejected the applicant's

appeal. As regards the two new issues raised in the appeal the Court

did not examine them as they had not previously been brought before the

Compensation Office, this being the competent authority.

      The applicant's appeal against the above decision was rejected

by the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus) on 3 January 1992.

      In the meantime the applicant had submitted a new application to

the Compensation Office in which he first requested that the increase

of the degree of his disability, which apparently in the meantime had

been raised to twenty per cent with effect from 1987, should take

effect retroactively as from 1972 instead of 1987. Secondly, he claimed

compensation for certain alleged other war injuries to his shoulder and

ankle, these being the two issues which the Insurance Court had

previously excluded from its examination (cf. above).

      On 30 June 1991 the applicant requested the Military Medical

Archives at the Compensation Office (tapaturmaviraston sotilas-

lääkintäarkisto) to send him copies of his medical file kept in the

relevant archives. On 16 July 1991 these copies were sent to him.On 21

January 1992 the Compensation Office refused to give retroactive effect

to the degree of disability already as from 1972. Furthermore, the

applicant's new claims for compensation for the alleged injuries to his

shoulder and ankle were rejected. The Compensation Office took into

account the applicant's military file as well as the medical file kept

in its Military Medical Archives.

      The applicant appealed against this decision to the Insurance

Court maintaining his claims as submitted to the Compensation Office

which, upon request from the Court, submitted without any further

reasoning that the appeal ought to be rejected. It appears that a copy

of this statement was not transmitted to the applicant. It also appears

that the Insurance Court had at its disposal a document of

7 April 1992, unknown to the applicant, in which the question was

raised whether further examinations were necessary in respect of a

possible operation on the applicant's jaw.

      On 4 June 1992 the Insurance Court rejected the applicant's

appeal referring to the reasons set out in the Compensation Office's

decision. The Insurance Court did not in any way refer to the document

concerning the applicant's jaw in its reasoning. The Court's decision

was dispatched to the applicant on 2 July 1992.

      A further appeal to the Supreme Court lay open to the applicant

in so far as the Insurance Court's decision concerned his right to

compensation on the grounds of alleged injuries to his shoulder and

ankle, but he did not avail himself of this remedy. No further appeal

lay open in so far as the decision concerned the question of giving

retroactive effect earlier than 1987.

                                  II

      On 20 May 1990 the applicant requested that he be granted a

supplementary life annuity pursuant to section 18 of the Military

Injuries Act, which reads in so far as relevant as follows:

(translation)

      "A wounded or ill person whose degree of disability has by

      virtue of section 8 been established to be at least twenty

      per cent, may on application be granted a supplementary

      life annuity for a specified period, or if the wounded or

      ill person has reached the age of 65, until further

      notice."

      On 4 March 1991 the Compensation Office found for the applicant

and granted him a supplementary life annuity (täydennyskorko) as from

1 July 1987, the day on which a twenty per cent disability had been

established in respect of the applicant.

      The applicant appealed, requesting that he be granted a

supplementary life annuity as from 3 October 1972.

      The Insurance Court obtained an opinion from the Compensation

Office to the effect that the appeal should be rejected. The opinion

did not contain any further information. The Compensation Office's file

concerning the applicant's request was appended to the opinion.   On

4 June 1992 the Insurance Court rejected the applicant's appeal. The

Insurance Court stated that under section 18 of the Military Injuries

Act supplementary annuity could not be granted in respect of a period

prior to the date when the disability degree of twenty per cent had

been established.

      No further appeal lay against this decision which was dispatched

to the applicant on 2 July 1992.

                                  III

      It appears that on 31 June 1991 the applicant was taken against

his will to a health care institution, where he stayed until

3 August 1991.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains that he was wrongly denied further

compensation for his injuries allegedly caused by the war.

2.    He also complains that the Compensation Office is not a

"tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

3.    As regards the first set of proceedings before the Compensation

Office, the Insurance Court and the Supreme Court (cf. section I of

THE FACTS) the applicant complains, under Article 6 of the Convention,

that he was denied a right to consult documents which the Insurance

Court had obtained. He submits that neither his medical file nor the

Compensation Office's opinion on his appeal was communicated to him for

comments. He submits that the Supreme Court was obliged to cure defects

in proceedings before the Insurance Court. He complains further that

the Supreme Court's decision of 3 January 1992 contained no reasoning.

4.    As regards the second set of proceedings (cf. section I of

THE FACTS) the applicant complains that he was likewise denied a right

to consult the documents which the  Compensation Office obtained from

its Military Medical Archives. He further complains that this material

was not communicated to him for comments prior to the Compensation

Office's decision. The applicant also alleges as regards the

proceedings in the Insurance Court that the document of 7 April 1992

concerning his jaw had been submitted to the Insurance Court by a

dentist without his knowledge. He maintains that the Insurance Court

did not communicate this document to him, nor did it communicate to him

the Compensation Office's opinion on his appeal.

5.    As regards the proceedings concerning the supplementary life

annuity (section II of THE FACTS) the applicant complains that his

right to a fair hearing was violated inter alia since the Insurance

Court and the Compensation Office did not communicate to him for

comments documents obtained by them.

6.    The applicant further maintains that he has been discriminated

against in connection with the examination of his different requests

and appeals.

7.    Finally, the applicant complains (cf. section III of THE FACTS)

that he was unlawfully detained against his will in a health care

institution from 30 July to 3 August 1991. In this respect he invokes

no express provision of the Convention or its Protocols.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 21 December 1992 and registered

on 9 February 1993.

      On 5 April 1995 the Commission (First Chamber) decided to adjourn

the application pending the judgment of the European Court of Human

Rights in the case of Kerojärvi v. Finland. The Court gave its judgment

on 19 July 1995 (Eur. Court H.R., Kerojärvi judgment of 19 July 1995,

Series A, no. 322).

THE LAW

      The Commission first notes that the applicant has died in the

course of the proceedings. The Commission recalls that in such event

the applicant's heirs, especially his parents, spouse or children, are

in principle entitled to take his place in the proceedings (see Eur.

Court H.R., Scherer judgment of 25 March 1994, Series A, no. 287, p. 15

para. 31 and the other cases mentioned therein)

      In the present case the applicant's estate has expressed the wish

to continue the proceedings. The Commission notes that the estate,

administered by the applicant's daughter, includes close relatives of

the applicant. The Commission therefore concludes that the applicant's

estate may take over and continue the proceedings instituted by the

applicant before the Commission.

1.    In respect of the different requests for compensation and other

matters the applicant complains that he was wrongly denied further

compensation.

      In this respect the Commission recalls that, in accordance with

Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its task is to ensure the

observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to the

Convention. In particular, it is not competent to deal with an

application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by

domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have

involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out

in the Convention. The Commission refers, on this point, to its

constant case-law (cf., e.g., No. 21283/93, Dec. 5.4.94, D.R. 77-A

p. 88).

2.    It is true, however, that the applicant has also raised a number

of points under the Convention in respect of the domestic proceedings

and his right to a fair hearing as guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention which reads as far as relevant as follows:

      "1.  In the determination of his civil rights and

      obligations ...,  everyone is entitled to a fair ...

      hearing ... by (a) tribunal ..."

      The applicant first complains that the Compensation Office is not

a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

      The Commission recalls that whilst Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

embodies the "right to a court", it nevertheless does not oblige the

Contracting States to submit disputes over "civil rights and

obligations" to a procedure conducted at each of its stages before

"tribunals" meeting the Article's various requirements. Demands of

flexibility and efficiency, which are fully compatible with the

protection of human rights, may justify the prior intervention of

administrative bodies which do not satisfy the said requirements in

every respect (cf., Eur. Court H.R., Le Compte, Van Leuven and De

Meyere judgment of 10 October 1980, Series A, no. 43, p. 23, para. 51)

      The Commission recalls that in Finland questions concerning a

life annuity and compensation for war injuries are under the Military

Injuries Act first considered by the Compensation Office. Although this

body may not be a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention the Commission notes that its decisions

may be brought before the Insurance Court and in certain cases even

further to the Supreme Court. In these circumstances the Commission

finds that Finnish law secures a right to a tribunal within the meaning

of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in the dispute over

"civil rights".

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention that during the first set of proceedings, which ended with

the decision of the Supreme Court on 3 January 1992, his right to a

fair hearing was violated on the grounds of non-communication of

certain documents obtained by the Insurance Court. He complains that

the Supreme Court did not cure the defects in the proceedings before

the Insurance Court. He further complains that the Supreme Court's

decision did not contain any reasoning.

      The Commission is not, however, required to decide whether or not

the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a

violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) as invoked by the applicant, as Article

26 of the Convention provides that the Commission "may only deal with

the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which the

final decision was taken".

      In the present case the decision of the Supreme Court, which was

the final decision regarding the subject of this particular complaint,

was given on 3 January 1992, whereas the application was submitted to

the Commission on 21 December 1992, that is, more than six months after

the date of this decision.  Furthermore, an examination of the case

does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which

might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period.

      It follows that this part of the application has been introduced

out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

4.    As regards the second set of proceedings, which concerned the

compensation for the alleged injuries to the applicant's shoulder and

ankle and the question from which date the degree of disability was to

be considered, the applicant complains that he was denied a right to

consult the documents obtained by the Compensation Office from its

Military Medical Archives and that this material was not communicated

to him for comments. He also complains that the Insurance Court did not

communicate the document of 7 April 1992 concerning his jaw and the

Compensation Office's opinion to him prior to its decision.

      In respect of these complaints the Commission finds it can leave

the question open whether all the issues raised concern a dispute over

a "right" and whether the applicant has in all respects exhausted

domestic remedies since it considers that this part of the application

is in any event manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons.

      As regards the proceedings in the Compensation Office the

Commission recalls that on 16 July 1991 the Military Medical Archives

at the Compensation Office sent copies of the applicant's medical file

to him. Therefore, as regards the alleged denial of access to this

file, or that it was not communicated to him, the Commission finds that

these allegations are unfounded.

      As regards the proceedings in the Insurance Court the Commission

recalls that the Court obtained an opinion from the Compensation Office

which contained nothing but a recommendation to reject the appeal. It

also received a document dated 7 April which apparently related to the

need for an operation to the applicant's jaw. These documents were not

communicated to the applicant.

      However, the Commission further recalls that the Insurance Court

was faced with the question as to whether or not the applicant was

entitled to compensation on the ground of injuries to his shoulder and

ankle, and whether an existing life annuity should be calculated as

from 1972 or 1987. It is true that where a court determines such issues

without an appellant having had the possibility to acquaint himself

with and, if necessary, comment upon relevant documents this may raise

an issue under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (cf. the Kerojärvi

judgment mentioned above, para. 42). However, the Commission finds that

in the circumstances of the present case the applicant in fact had

access to all relevant documents of his file and that the two remaining

documents to which he has referred did not adversely affect his

capability of challenging the Compensation Office's decision in respect

of the two issues he had raised. The Commission also notes that the

applicant had requested, and received, copies of the documents material

to his requests and that therefore the procedure, seen as a whole, was

such as to allow him a proper participation in the proceedings.

      Thus, taking into account the entirety of the proceedings the

Commission considers that they do not disclose any appearance of a

violation of the right to a fair hearing within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.    As regards the proceedings concerning the supplementary life

annuity (section II of THE FACTS) the applicant complains that his

right to a fair hearing was violated since the Insurance Court did not

communicate certain documents to him prior to its decision in the case.

      The Commission recalls that in order for Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention to apply to the proceedings in question it must first

ascertain whether there was a dispute over a right which can be said,

at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law

(cf. for example Eur. Court H.R. Skärby judgment of 28 June 1990,

Series A no. 180-B, p. 36, para. 27). In the present case there was no

dispute as to whether the applicant was entitled to the supplementary

life annuity as his request in this respect was complied with. The

dispute concerned the possibility of obtaining this annuity

retroactively as from 1972. This was, however, a right which, as stated

by the Insurance Court, the applicant did not have since supplementary

life annuity could not be granted in respect of a period prior to the

date when the disability degree of twenty per cent had been

established. Thus he cannot claim any arguable ground that he had a

right under domestic law and Article 6 (Art. 6) therefore does not

apply to these proceedings. This complaint is accordingly incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be

rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

6.    In respect of all of the above proceedings the applicant

complains, under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, that he has

been discriminated against. However, after an examination of this

complaint as submitted by the applicant, the Commission finds that it

does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 14

(Art. 14) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

7.    The applicant has finally complained (cf. section III of THE

FACTS) that he was unlawfully deprived of liberty from 30 July to

3 August 1991. In this respect he has not invoked any provision of the

Convention or its Protocols.

      The Commission is not required, however, to decide whether or not

the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a

violation of the Convention or its Protocols, as Article 26 (Art. 26)

of the Convention provides that the Commission "may only deal with the

matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which the

final decision was taken".

      In the present case the alleged deprivation of liberty took place

from 30 July to 3 August 1991, whereas the application was submitted

to the Commission on 21 December 1992, that is, more than six months

after the date on which the alleged deprivation of liberty ended.

Furthermore, an examination of the case does not disclose the existence

of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended

the running of that period.

      It follows that this part of the application has been introduced

out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber

      (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                     (C.L. ROZAKIS)