AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 24426/94

                      by Günter, Margreth and Learco TEWS

                      against Austria

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 16 January 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 24 March 1994 by

Günter, Margreth and Learco TEWS against Austria and registered on

17 June 1994 under file No. 24426/94;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The first applicant, born in 1956, is a lawyer practising in

Linz. The second applicant, born in 1955, is his wife.  The third

applicant, born in 1988, is the son of the second applicant and the

adopted son of the first applicant.  All three applicants are Austrian

citizens and reside in Linz.  The first applicant represents the second

and third applicants in the proceedings before the Commission.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

     In 1991 the first applicant's previous marriage was dissolved and

custody of the two children from this marriage, E.T. and R.T., was

granted to the applicant's former wife, C.T.

     On 17 May 1991 the first applicant married the second applicant

and subsequently adopted the third applicant.

     On 9 January 1993 during the exercise of his right of access to

the children of his first marriage, the first applicant's daughter E.T.

was injured and had to be treated in hospital.  Subsequently, a dispute

arose between the second applicant and C.T.  This incident lead to

criminal proceedings being instituted against C.T. for having caused

bodily harm to the second applicant.

     On 14 January 1994 the Linz District Court (Bezirksgericht),

after a court hearing conducted in public, acquitted C.T. of the charge

of having caused bodily harm to the second applicant.  In these

criminal proceedings the second applicant participated as a private

party and the first and second applicants were heard as witnesses.

     The District Court based its judgment on a detailed account of

the facts.  It noted that the first applicant's marriage was dissolved

in 1991 and that two children resulted from this marriage.  One month

after the divorce the first applicant had married the second applicant,

a housewife without income.  She had a child born out of wedlock whose

father was probably a foreigner.  Meanwhile the first applicant had

adopted the third applicant.  On 9 January 1993, while the first

applicant exercised his right of access to his children, his daughter

E.T. hurt herself in the first applicant's apartment because a rocking

horse fell apart.  The District Court added that it did not transpire

from the file whether criminal proceedings for negligently causing

bodily harm had been instituted.

     The first and second applicants brought E.T. to the hospital

where she received medical treatment.  Her mother was then informed of

the incident and went to the hospital.  She refused to leave E.T. at

the hospital and signed the relevant form (Revers).  She was informed

by the doctor that the child should be put to bed and kept under

observation.  The first applicant refused to return E.T. to her mother.

Only after having been asked to do so by the doctor did the first

applicant agree to bring E.T. to C.T.'s home.  He did not want to let

E.T. drive with her mother because he had the impression that C.T. was

too excited.  However, the first applicant did not drive E.T. to C.T.'s

apartment but brought her together with the second applicant to his own

apartment.  The District Court noted that it was not fully clear why

the first applicant did not immediately bring E.T. to her mother's

home.  One possible explanation which transpired from the statements

of the second applicant but which the District Court found rather

extraordinary was that the first and second applicants had the habit

of changing R.T.'s and E.T's clothes on the visiting days.  While the

second applicant's child born out of wedlock was always perfectly

dressed, the two children of the first applicant always wore dirty

dresses on visiting days.

     C.T. followed the first and second applicants to their home.  She

repeatedly requested the first applicant to give her back E.T., but was

insulted by the second applicant.  C.T. attacked the second applicant

whereupon they both fell to the ground.  The first applicant separated

them and kept C.T. on the ground.  The second applicant meanwhile

brought E.T. to the first applicant's parents.  At this moment the

police intervened.  C.T. and the second applicant went to the hospital

for a medical check.  C.T. had scratches to the face while the second

applicant had a bruise on the temple.  For several days the second

applicant continued to receive treatment in the department of

otolaryngology of the hospital.  In this respect the District Court

found that it was not proven that the second applicant actually

suffered from an injury, as the medical certificates submitted by her

were contradictory and not supported by the report of a court appointed

expert.

     The District Court concluded that C.T. had acted in legitimate

self defence when she attacked the second applicant as at that time the

first applicant no longer had the right to withhold E.T. from her

mother.  Although it was pedagogically unwise that C.T. had started a

fight with the present wife of E.T.'s father in front of the daughter,

this did not render her conduct unlawful.  In any event, C.T.'s conduct

was not punishable as the injuries of the second applicant were minor

and C.T.'s guilt was negligible.

     When the judgment was pronounced, the Public Prosecutor filed a

plea of nullity which was, however, subsequently withdrawn.

     On 14 March 1994 Judge R.S., who had given the judgment of

14 January 1994, transmitted the written text of the judgment to two

judges at the Linz District Court who were dealing with cases pending

before the District Court between the first applicant and C.T.  He also

transmitted the text of the judgment to two trainee lawyers

(Rechtspraktikanten) who had been assigned to him for training and who

had participated in the trial as court clerks (Schriftführer).

     On 22 March 1994 the first applicant lodged a disciplinary

complaint against Judge R.S. with the Federal Ministry of Justice

(Bundesministerium für Justiz).  He complained that the written

judgment of 14 January 1994 contained several statements which were

irrelevant and which referred to the applicants in a disparaging

manner.  These statements therefore violated Section 53 (3) of the

Rules of Procedure for Courts of First and Second Instance

(Geschäftsordnung für Gerichte I. und II. Instanz), according to which

a judge had to refrain from statements which were irrelevant and which

could unnecessarily harm third persons (Ausführungen, die nicht zur

Sache gehören oder jemanden ohne Not verletzen könnten, sind

unzulässig).  In particular it was irrelevant whether the father of the

third applicant was a foreigner or not.  It was  also irrelevant that

nobody had been charged with having caused negligent bodily harm

because of the accident which had happened to E.T.  Lastly, when

examining the reasons why the first and second applicants had gone to

their apartment after having left the hospital with E.T., it had not

been necessary to refer to the third applicant as born out of wedlock,

since for the purpose of distinguishing the children it would have been

sufficient to mention their names.  The first applicant also complained

that Judge R.S. had sent a copy of the written judgment to other judges

and two trainee lawyers.  In this respect he requested that criminal

proceedings be instituted against Judge R.S. for abuse of authority and

breach of official secrecy.

     Subsequently the first applicant requested unsuccessfully to

inspect the disciplinary file of Judge R.S and to receive the latter's

comments on his disciplinary complaint.

     On 17 May 1994 the Linz Public Prosecutor's Office informed the

first applicant that his criminal information (Anzeige) against Judge

R.S. had been filed without further action (zurückgelegt).

     On 15 December 1994 the President of the Linz Court of Appeal

(Oberlandesgericht) informed the first applicant that his complaint

about Judge R.S. would be considered by the court, but that the result

of these considerations could not be communicated to him.

     On the same day the Linz Court of Appeal dismissed a further

complaint lodged by the first applicant against Judge R.S., in which

he had complained under Article 8 of the Convention about the

transmission of the written text of the judgment of 14 January 1994 to

other judges and trainee lawyers.  The Court of Appeal noted that the

trial in which the applicant had been heard as witness had been public

and that no request for a hearing in camera had been made.

Furthermore, the applicant had not availed himself of the right to

refuse testimony against his divorced wife.  The Court found that the

right to respect for private and family life met its limits when

private and family life matters were concerned which had to be examined

in a trial which, according to Article 90 of the Federal Constitution,

had to take place in public.  Therefore the issues of the first

applicant's private and family life which the District Court considered

were bound to become known to third persons who e.g. were present at

the trial as audience.  Moreover, the first applicant had not used any

legal remedies which could have prevented this.  In any event, it was

unobjectionable that copies of the written judgment were given for

internal use to other judges and trainee lawyers in training at the

District Court.

COMPLAINTS

     The applicants complain about a violation of their right to

respect for their private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8

of the Convention.  They submit that the District Court's judgment of

14 January 1994 contained statements concerning their private and

family life which offended them and were not necessary for deciding the

case.  Since these statements were also in violation of Section 53 (3)

of the Rules of Procedure for Courts of First and Second Instance, the

interference was not provided for by law.  Moreover, the responsible

judge transmitted the written judgment to two trainee lawyers who did,

at that time, no longer work at the District Court.  The applicants

further submit that no domestic remedy was available to them against

the unnecessary and insulting remarks about their private and family

life made in the judgment of 14 January 1994.

THE LAW

     The applicants complain about a violation of their right to

respect for their private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention.

     Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads as follows:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

     family life, his home and his correspondence.

     2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with

     the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

     the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

     of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

     of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

     protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

     rights and freedoms of others."

     The applicants submit that the District Court's judgment of

14 January 1994 contained statements concerning their private and

family life which offended them and were not necessary for deciding the

case.  Moreover the responsible judge transmitted the written judgment

to two trainee lawyers who, at that time, no longer worked at the

District Court.

     The Commission observes that the statements which the applicants

find offensive were made in a judgment which concerned a criminal

charge against a third person.  The Commission in examining the issue

under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention must also have regard to

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention which provides that "in the

determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal

charge against him everybody is entitled to a fair and public hearing

... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law" and

that "judgment shall be pronounced publicly ...".

     Insofar as issues of the applicants' private and family life had

been considered by the Linz District Court and have been mentioned in

the judgment, these issues, since they have been dealt with in public

court proceedings, have to a certain extent become public issues (see

mutatis mutandis No. 10038/82, Dec. 11.5.84, D.R. 38 p. 53).  They do

not enjoy therefore the same protection by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention as matters of private and family life which have not been

examined by a court in public proceedings.  Thus, only under specific

circumstances, when a judgment discloses particularly sensitive

information concerning the private life of a person may an issue under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention arise (No. 22009/93, Dec. 28.2.95,

unpublished).

     In the present case it must be taken into account that the

accused was the first applicant's former wife, and the second applicant

his present wife and that the accusation related to an incident which

was closely related to the personal situation of all the persons

involved namely the exercise of the first applicant's right of access

to the children of his former marriage.  Thus, the competent judge

found it necessary to give in his judgment of 14 January 1994 a

detailed account of the private and family situation of the persons

involved and of the events which took place on 9 January 1993.

     In these circumstances the Commission finds that the wording of

the judgment of 14 January 1994 does not show any lack of respect for

their private and family life within the meaning of Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention.

     Moreover, the Commission finds that also the transmission to

third persons of a judgment which according to Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention and the relevant provisions of the Austrian Code of

Criminal Procedure had to be pronounced publicly, does not disclose any

lack of respect for the applicants' private and family life as

guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

     It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (C.L. ROZAKIS)