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FRISCHKNECHT v. SWITZERLAND

Doc ref: 28334/95 • ECHR ID: 001-2707

Document date: January 18, 1996

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FRISCHKNECHT v. SWITZERLAND

Doc ref: 28334/95 • ECHR ID: 001-2707

Document date: January 18, 1996

Cited paragraphs only



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 28334/95

                      by Paul FRISCHKNECHT

                      against Switzerland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 18 January 1996, the following members being present:

           MM.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

                 S. TRECHSEL

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 23 August 1995 by

Paul Frischknecht against Switzerland and registered on 28 August 1995

under file No. 28334/95;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

      The applicant, a Swiss citizen born in 1956, resides at Herisau

in Switzerland.

Particular circumstances of the case

      Since 1990 the applicant is a house husband (Hausmann) and not

gainfully employed.  His wife is a teacher.

      The Compensation Office (Ausgleichskasse) of the Canton of St.

Gallen registered the applicant as a person who was not gainfully

employed (erwerbstätig) and ordered him to pay insurance contributions

for the Old Age and Survivors' Insurance (Alters- und

Hinterlassenenversicherung) amounting to 333.60 CHF per year for 1991,

1992 and 1993.  On 21 February 1992 the Compensation Office annulled

its previous decision and ordered the applicant to pay yearly amounts

of 832 CHF for 1991-1993.

      The applicant filed an appeal (Rekurs) with the Insurance Court

(Versicherungsgericht) of the Canton of St. Gallen, claiming that he

should be exempted from the obligation to pay contributions.  He

referred in particular to the situation of housewives who according to

Section 3 para. 2 b) of the Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance

Act (Bundesgesetz über die Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung: see

below, Relevant domestic law) were exempted from the obligation to pay

contributions.  The Insurance Court on 30 June 1994 dismissed the

appeal insofar as the applicant had complained of unequal treatment

between man and woman; the appeal was partly upheld in respect of the

calculation of the amounts.

      The applicant's administrative law appeal (Verwaltungsgerichts-

beschwerde) was dismissed by the Federal Insurance Court

(Eidgenössisches Versicherungsgericht) on 2 February 1995, the decision

being served on 23 February 1995.  In its decision, the Court stated

inter alia:

      "One must agree with the applicant that the notion of family

      underlying the Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Act is hardly

      reconcilable with present legal reality, in particular with the

      principle of the distribution of roles among partners on which

      the new matrimonial law is based.  However, the law in force

      offers no possibility to consider the concerns put forward by

      him.  Section 4 para. 2 of the Federal Constitution only offers

      the person concerned a directly enforceable right in the area of

      equality of pay ...  For the rest, Section 4 para. 2 of the

      Federal Constitution, according to its clear text, is directed

      at the legislator who must ensure equality between man and woman

      in particular in family, education and labour.  According to

      case-law, since the entry into force of Section 4 para. 2 of the

      Federal Constitution the cantonal and federal legislator is

      prohibited in principle from enacting laws which treat man and

      woman unequally ... On the other hand, statutes enacted by

      Federal Parliament ... cannot be examined by the judge as to

      their constitutionality (Section 113 para. 3 ... of the Federal

      Constitution).  The Federal Insurance Court cannot, therefore,

      examine in the light of the principle of legal equality statutory

      unequal treatment between wives and husbands who are exclusively

      active in the household in respect of their obligation to pay

      contributions.  This also implies that it cannot set aside the

      clear meaning of a legal rule by means of an interpretation

      conforming to the constitution ...  The clear text of Section 3

      para. 2 a) of the Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Act expressly

      excludes solely wives who are not gainfully employed from the

      obligation to pay contribution; thus, the judge is prohibited

      from correcting by means of an interpretation the distribution

      of roles as conceived by the model of the Civil Code in 1907."

      "Dem Beschwerdeführer ist darin beizupflichten, dass das

      Familienbild, wie es dem AHVG zugrundeliegt, mit der heutigen

      Rechtswirklichkeit, insbesondere auch dem auf dem Prinzip der

      partnerschaftlichen Rollenverteilung aufbauenden neuen Eherecht,

      kaum vereinbar ist.  Das geltende Recht enthält jedoch keine

      Handhabe, um dem von ihm vorgetragenen Anliegen Rechnung zu

      tragen.  Art. 4 Abs. 2 BV gibt den Betroffenen nur einen direkt

      klagbaren Anspruch im Bereiche der Lohngleichheit ... Im übrigen

      wendet sich Art. 4 Abs. 2 BV nach seinem klaren Wortlaut an den

      Gesetzgeber, der für die Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau vor

      allem in Familie, Ausbildung und Arbeit zu sorgen hat.  Nach der

      Rechtsprechung ist es dem kantonalen und dem eidgenössischen

      Gesetzgeber seit Inkrafttreten von Art. 4 Abs. 2 BV grundsätzlich

      untersagt, Normen zu erlassen, welche Mann und Frau ungleich

      behandeln ... Anderseits können die von der Bundesversammlung

      erlassenen Gesetze ... vom Richter nicht auf ihre

      Verfassungsmässigkeit überprüft werden (Art. 113 Abs. 3 ... BV).

      Das Eidgenösasische Versicherungsgericht kann daher die

      gesetzlich festgelegte Ungleichbehandlung zwischen

      ausschliesslich im Haushalt tätigen Ehefrauen und Ehemännern

      bezüglich der Beitragspflicht nicht am Grundsatz der

      Rechtsgleichheit messen.  Dies beinhaltet zugleich aber auch,

      dass es den klaren Sinn einer Gesetzesnorm nicht durch eine

      verfassungskonforme Auslegung beiseite schieben darf ... Da nach

      dem klaren Wortlaut des Art. 3 Abs. 2 lit. b AHVG ausdrücklich

      nur die nichterwerbstätigen Ehefrauen von der Beitragspflicht

      ausgenommen sind, ist es dem Richter untersagt, das nach dem

      Muster des ZGB von 1907 konzipierte Rollenverständnis auf dem Weg

      der Auslegung zu korrigieren."

Relevant domestic law

      Section 4 para. 2 of the Swiss Federal Constitution (Bundesver-

fassung) provides that "man and woman are equal; the law shall ensure

their equality, in particular in family, education and labour ..."

("Mann und Frau sind gleichberechtigt.  Das Gesetz sorgt für ihre

Gleichsstellung in Familie, Ausbildung und Arbeit ...").

      According to Section 113 para. 3 of the Federal Constitution,

"the statutes ... enacted by Federal Parliament ... are binding for the

Federal Court" ("die von der Bundesversammlung erlassenen Gesetze

(sind) für das Bundesgericht massgebend").

      Section 3 of the Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Act

(Bundesgesetz über die Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung)

determines those persons who are obliged to pay insurance contributions

(beitragspflichtig).  Para. 2 b) states:

      "2.  There shall be no obligation to pay contributions for:

      ...

      b.   wives of insured persons who are not gainfully employed,

      and wives who collaborate in the husband's enterprise to the

      extent that they have no salary."

      "2.  Von der Beitragspflicht sind befreit:

      ...

      b.   die nichterwerbstätigen Ehefrauen von Versicherten sowie im

      Betriebe des Ehemannes mitarbeitenden Ehefrauen, soweit sie

      keinen Barlohn beziehen."

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains under Article 14 of the Convention of

unequal treatment in that he, as a house husband, is obliged to pay

insurance contributions, whereas a housewife is not.  He submits that

his wife must pay approximately 10% more contributions than her male

colleagues earning the same salary.  There is, therefore, a difference

of pay of approximately 0,5%.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains of unequal treatment in that he, as a

house husband, is obliged to pay insurance contributions, whereas a

housewife is not.  He relies on Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention

which states:

      "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

      such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other

      opinion, national or social origin, association with a national

      minority, property, birth or other status."

2.    The Commission notes that the Federal Insurance Court in its

decision of 2 February 1995 stated that it was bound by the text of

Section 3 para. 2 b) of the Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance

Act.  An issue arises therefore whether the applicant had an effective

remedy at his disposal and whether he has complied with the time-limit

of six months within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention.  The Commission need nevertheless not resolve these issues

since the application is inadmissible for the following reasons.

3.    According to the Convention organs' case-law, Article 14

(Art. 14) of the Convention complements the other substantive

provisions of the Convention and the Protocols.  It has no independent

existence since it has effect solely in relation to "the enjoyment of

the rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those provisions.  Although the

application of Article 14 (Art. 14) does not necessarily presuppose a

breach of those provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous -,

there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall

within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see Eur. Court H.R.,

Abdulaziz and others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 May 1985,

Series A no. 94, p. 35, para. 71).

      The Commission has therefore considered whether the facts at

issue fall within the ambit of any other provision of the Convention

or its Protocols.

      As Switzerland has not ratified Protocol No. 1, the Commission

must not examine whether the facts at issue fall within the ambit of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) of the Convention which enshrines

the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.

      Next, the Commission has had regard to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention which states, insofar as relevant:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

      family life ...

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority with

      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

      rights and freedoms of others."

      In the Commission's opinion, however, the applicant has not shown

that the obligation to pay insurance contributions hindered him in the

enjoyment of, or in any other way affected, his right to respect for

family life.

      This part of the application is, therefore, manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.    The Commission has also had regard to Article 5 of Protocol No. 7

(P7-5) which states, insofar as relevant:

      "Spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of

      a private law character between them ... during marriage ..."

      The Commission notes that the issue in the present case is the

exemption from the obligation to pay social insurance contributions.

It is true that the Convention organs have considered social-security

disputes as involving the determination of a "civil right" within the

meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, while

distinguishing them from private-law disputes in the traditional sense

(see Eur. Court H.R., Deumeland v. Germany judgment of 29 May 1986,

Series A no. 100, p. 22, para. 60; Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland

judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, p. 17, para. 46).

      In the Commission's opinion, however, it cannot be concluded that

as a result of the above interpretation the "rights and

responsibilities" at issue were of a "private law character" within the

meaning of Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-5).

      The Commission finds a confirmation herefor in the explanatory

report to Protocol No. 7 (P7) to the Convention according to which

Article 5 (Art. 5) does not apply to other fields of law, such as

administrative, fiscal, social or labour laws.

      The remainder of the application is, therefore, incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber

      (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (C.L. ROZAKIS)

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