Lexploria - Legal research enhanced by smart algorithms
Lexploria beta Legal research enhanced by smart algorithms
Menu
Browsing history:

JALKALAN KALASTUSKUNTA AND OTHERS v. FINLAND

Doc ref: 25155/94 • ECHR ID: 001-2908

Document date: May 15, 1996

  • Inbound citations: 1
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 1

JALKALAN KALASTUSKUNTA AND OTHERS v. FINLAND

Doc ref: 25155/94 • ECHR ID: 001-2908

Document date: May 15, 1996

Cited paragraphs only



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 25155/94

                      by Jalkalan kalastuskunta and Others

                      against Finland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 15 May 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 8 June 1994 by

Jalkalan kalastuskunta and Others against Finland and registered on

15 September 1994 under file No. 25155/94;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The first applicant is a statutory local fishing association

(kalastuskunta, fiskelag), registered in Finland. By virtue of the

Fishing Act (kalastuslaki, lagen om fiske), it is represented by its

chairman (esimies, förman), Mr. Veikko Suihkonen. The other five

applicants, including Mr. Veikko Suihkonen personally, are Finnish

citizens residing in Suonenjoki, Finland. These applicants are listed

in the Appendix in alphabetical order. They are all members of the

applicant association. Before the Commission the applicants are

represented by Mr. Risto Airikkala, a lawyer at the Central Union of

Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners in Helsinki.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

      The individual applicants own real property in the municipality

of Suonenjoki. The individual applicants are joint owners of a total

of 355 hectares of fishery waters in seven lakes. By virtue of section

3 of the Fishing Act, the individual applicants, together with the

other joint owners of the fishery waters, form a fishing association,

namely the first applicant, hereinafter "the applicant association".

      Fishing associations are members of Fishing Areas (kalastusalue,

fiskeområde). Activities of Fishing Areas are directed and supervised

by Fishing Districts (kalastuspiiri, fiskeridistrikt), which are

authorities subject to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (maa-

ja metsätalousministeriö, jord- och skogsbruksministeriet) (sections

71 and 86 of the Fishing Act).

      On 6 May 1984 the applicant association adopted its rules,

hereinafter "the 1984 Rules". By virtue of section 49 of the Fishing

Act, the rules of a fishing association shall be submitted for the

approval of a Fishing District. The 1984 Rules of the applicant

association were approved by the Fishing District of Kuopio on

18 February 1985.

      Under section 1 of the 1984 Rules, which corresponds to section

1 of the Fishing Act, the applicant association shall arrange fishing

so as to maximise the permanent productivity of the relevant water

area. The fish stocks shall be utilized rationally and taking into

account factors relevant to the fishing industry. Under section 2 of

the 1984 Rules, fishing in the applicant association's fishing waters

shall be practised in a manner which is prescribed in the Fishing Act

and, in greater detail, in the applicant association's rules. The

latter provision corresponds to section 48 of the Fishing Act,

according to which a fishing association shall, in arranging fishing

and maintenance of the fish stocks, take into account the provisions

of the Fishing Act. In addition, a fishing association is to perform

other tasks prescribed by the Fishing Act.

      Under section 3 of the 1984 Rules, which also corresponds to the

Fishing Act, the right to fish in the joint fishery waters is

determined on the basis of trap units (pyydysyksikkö, redskapsenhet).

According to the 1984 Rules, there is a total of 600 trap units, of

which 550 are to be divided between the joint owners of the relevant

water areas according to their share of the water areas. A so-called

unit value for traps, reflecting the capacity of the traps, is also

defined. A certain share of the trap units is reserved for professional

fishermen.

      On 19 May 1992 the applicant association requested, under section

49 of the Fishing Act, the Fishing District to approve the following

amendments to its rules: 1) a change in the manner of dividing the trap

units; 2) an increase in the unit value of a trawl and 3) abolition of

the provision reserving a share of trap units for professional

fishermen.

      On 23 September 1992 the Fishing District of Kuopio decided not

to approve the proposed amendments. By virtue of an amendment to the

Fishing Act (4.12.1992/1204), Fishing Districts were changed to

Agricultural Industry Districts. However, the former name "the Fishing

District" is used throughout this text.

      The applicant association appealed to the Ministry of Agriculture

and Forestry. It stated that the amendments to its rules strengthened

the equality between the members of the association without violating

the rights of professional fishermen. They referred to an expert

opinion on the use of trawl and on fish stocks in the relevant water

areas. According to this opinion the catch of fish by trawl was about

7,000 kilograms per summer.

      By virtue of the Act on the Appellate Board for the Agricultural

Industry (4.12.1992/1203), which came into force on 1 January 1993, the

appeal was dealt with by the Appellate Board for the Agricultural

Industry (maaseutuelinkeinojen valituslautakunta, landbruksnäringarnas

besvärsnämnd), hereinafter "the Board". The Board functions in

connection with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. It consists

of three members, who act judicially. The Board may hold an oral

hearing or arrange an inspection. The procedural rules applicable to

ordinary courts, i.e. the Code of Judicial Procedure (oikeudenkäymis-

kaari, rättegångsbalken), in principle also apply to the Board. The

cases before the Board are decided on the basis of a report by a

reporting officer (esittelijä, föredragande). The reporting officers

are civil servants at the Ministry. The reporting officer must report

on the facts of the case and the relevant law and prepare a draft

decision. The reporting officer is not a member of the Board.

      On 23 June 1993 the Board rejected the applicant association's

appeal by virtue of, inter alia, section 1 of the Fishing Act. The

Board had at its disposal, inter alia, an expert opinion from the Game

and Fishery Research Institute. Also the applicant association had

submitted further information to the Board. As regards the first

amendment, the Board stated that the amendment would violate a joint

owner's right to use the whole joint water area for fishing. As regards

the second amendment, it stated that the permanent productivity and

rational utilization of the relevant water areas did not require the

proposed increase. Finally, as regards the third amendment, it stated

that the reservation of trap units for professional fishermen was

necessary for the effective utilization of fish stocks.

      The applicant association appealed to the Supreme Administrative

Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen). By

virtue of section 15 of the Supreme Administrative Court Act, the

Supreme Administrative Court may hold an oral hearing. However, the

applicant association did not request an oral hearing.

      On 4 February 1994 the Supreme Administrative Court, without

holding an oral hearing, upheld the Board's decision.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The individual applicants complain that the authorities' refusal

to approve the proposed amendments to the applicant association's rules

violated their right to freedom of association. They invoke Article 11

of the Convention.

2.    The individual applicants complain further that, as the proposed

amendments regulated the economic relations between the members of the

applicant association, the refusal to approve the amendments violated

their right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. In this respect they

invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

3.    The individual applicants complain, finally, that the

authorities' refusal to approve the relevant amendments resulted in

discrimination based on status since the applicants, as joint owners

of the water areas, were discriminated against in comparison with

professional fishermen. In this respect they invoke Article 14 of the

Convention.

4.    As regards the procedure, the applicants maintain that the

reporting officer at the Board had also acted as a reporting officer

at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in relation to an

administrative complaint (hallintokantelu, förvaltningsklagan) lodged

by the applicant association and that, therefore, the Board's status

as an independent tribunal was questionable. They also maintain that

there were pencilled remarks on the documents, which apparently meant

that the Board's reporting officer had received some pieces of

information by telephone. The applicants allege that the applicant

association was not given an opportunity to comment on these remarks.

Finally, they maintain that there was no oral hearing at any appellate

level. The applicants complain that these aspects of the proceedings

resulted in a breach of Article 6 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1.    The individual applicants complain that their right to freedom

of association was violated since they, as members of the applicant

association, were prevented from amending its rules. They invoke

Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention which reads:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly

      and to freedom of association with others, including the

      right to form and to join trade unions for the protection

      of his interests.

      2.   No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of

      these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and

      are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of

      national security or public safety, for the prevention of

      disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals

      or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

      This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful

      restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of

      the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of

      the State."

      The Commission recalls the established case-law according to

which public-law institutions cannot be considered as associations

within the meaning of Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention (cf., for

example, Eur. Court H.R., Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment

of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, pp. 26-27, paras. 64-65).

      In the instant case the Commission notes that the foundation of

a fishing association is governed by legislation, namely by section 3

of the Fishing Act, according to which joint owners of fishery waters

form a fishing association. A fishing association remains integrated

within the structures of the State in the light of the supervisory

powers of Fishing Districts, which, for their part, are authorities

subject to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. A fishing

association pursues aims which are in the general interest, namely the

protection and development of fish stocks. It must perform tasks

prescribed by the Fishing Act and in performing its tasks it must take

into account the provisions of the Fishing Act. In the light of these

factors the Commission concludes that a fishing association is to be

considered a public-law institution.

      In these circumstances the Commission finds that the relevant

Fishing Association cannot be considered as an association within the

meaning of Article 11 (Art. 11). This provision of the Convention hence

does not apply and consequently, the Commission finds that it is not

necessary to decide whether the question of amending the rules of an

association would as such fall under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the

Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be

rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The individual applicants complain further that the refusal to

approve the proposed amendments to the applicant association's rules,

which regulate the economic relations between its members, involved a

violation of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.

      Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention reads:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of

      his possessions except in the public interest and subject

      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

      principles of international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

      deems necessary to control the use of property in

      accordance with the general interest or to secure the

      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

      The Commission notes that, in the instant case, the Fishing

Association proposed three amendments to its rules changing the

division of the trap units (which, naturally, corresponded to the real

catch of fish) to the benefit of the joint owners of the water areas.

At the same time, however, professional fishermen's share of trap units

would have been reduced.

      The Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

comprises three rules. The first rule is of a general nature and

enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property. The

second rule covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to

certain conditions. The third rule recognises that the Contracting

States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of

property in accordance with the general interest. The three rules are

connected. The second and third rules are concerned with particular

instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of

property and are therefore to be construed in the light of the general

principle enunciated in the first rule (see, for example, Eur. Court

H.R., Lithgow and Others judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p.

46, para. 106).

      The Commission notes that the applicants' possession rights under

the applicant association's 1984 rules have not been altered.

Therefore, the Commission finds that the applicants have not been

deprived of their property within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1). However, the Commission finds that the refusal to approve

the relevant amendments involves a "control of use" of property.

Accordingly, the Commission considers that it must examine whether the

requirements set out in the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1) are met.

      The Commission recalls that the interference must achieve a "fair

balance" between the demands of the general interest of the community

and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental

rights. The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the

structure of Article 1 (Art. 1) as a whole, including the second

paragraph: there must therefore be a reasonable relationship of

proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued (see,

for example, Eur. Court H.R., Air Canada judgment of 5 May 1995, Series

A no. 316, p. 12, para. 36).

      The Commission notes that the proposed amendments would not have

affected the number of trap units to be divided between the joint

owners of the water areas, but mainly concerned professional

fishermen's opportunities to use what was probably the most effective

fishing method in the relevant environment. The Commission finds that

the competent authorities carefully considered the applicant

association's request for amendments to its rules. They came, however,

to the conclusion that, taking into account the rights of others,

namely the right to use the whole joint water area instead of a limited

area for fishing, and the protection of the fish stocks, the proposed

amendments could not be accepted. In assessing the fair balance between

the means chosen and the aim pursued the Commission cannot, in these

circumstances, find that the chosen measure was inappropriate or

disproportionate to the aim pursued.

      The Commission finds that the interference with the applicant's

right, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the

Convention, was justified under the terms of the second paragraph of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    The individual applicants complain further that they have been

discriminated against with comparison to professional fishermen on the

grounds of their status. They invoke Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention which reads:

      "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any

      ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,

      political or other opinion, national or social origin,

      association with a national minority, property, birth or

      other status."

      The Commission recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention complements the other substantive provisions of the

Convention and the Protocols. It may be applied in an autonomous manner

as a breach of Article 14 (Art. 14) does not presuppose a breach of

those other provisions. On the other hand, it has no independent

existence since it has effect solely in relation to "the enjoyment of

the rights and freedoms" safeguarded by the other substantive

provisions (see Eur. Court H.R., Van der Mussele judgment of 29

September 1983, Series A no. 70, p. 22, para. 43).

      The Commission considers that it must examine this complaint in

conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.

In so doing it recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) does not forbid every

difference in treatment in the exercise of the rights and freedoms

recognised by the Convention. It safeguards persons who are "placed in

analogous situations" against discriminatory differences of treatment.

For the purposes of Article 14 (Art. 14), a difference of treatment is

discriminatory if it "has no objective and reasonable justification".

Furthermore, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of

appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in

otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law (see

the above-mentioned Lithgow judgment, p. 66, para. 177).

      The Commission finds that the applicants cannot be regarded as

being "placed in analogous situation" with the professional fishermen

to whom the allegation of discrimination refers. Consequently, the

Commission finds that the case does not disclose any appearance of a

violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Art. 14+P1-1) to the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.    Finally, the applicants complain that their right to a fair

hearing has been violated. They invoke Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention which reads, as far as relevant, as follows:

      "1.  In the determination of his civil rights and

      obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public

      hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal

      established by law.

      ..."

      The Commission notes, firstly, that the basic dispute concerned

the rules of the applicant association. In the proceedings the

applicant association was the sole party. The Commission finds that it

is questionable whether the proposed amendments to the applicant

association's rules determined directly the applicants' "civil rights"

as regards their possessions. However, the Commission finds that this

question can be left open since it considers that the complaint under

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is in any event inadmissible for

the following reasons.

      The Commission notes that the applicant association's appeal was,

in the first instance, examined by the Appellate Board for the

Agricultural Industry. As regards this body the applicants complain,

firstly, that its status as an independent tribunal was questionable

since its reporting officer had dealt with the applicant association's

administrative complaint at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

      The Commission recalls the case-law of the Convention organs as

regards the meaning of an "independent and impartial tribunal"

according to which in determining whether a body can be considered to

be an "independent" tribunal regard must be had to various criteria,

for example the manner of appointment, as regards its members (cf.,

Eur. Court H.R., Langborger judgment of 22 June 1989, Series A no. 155,

pp. 28-29, paras. 115-119).

      The Commission will confine its examination to the specific

complaint of the applicants relating to the reporting officer of the

Board.

      The Commission notes that a reporting officer is not a member of

the Board, but it is the task of the reporting officer to report on the

facts and the relevant law to the Board and to prepare a draft

decision. In these circumstances the Commission finds that the

independence of the Board is not affected by the fact that it decides

cases on the basis of a report by a reporting officer who is a civil

servant at the relevant Ministry.

      The Commission considers, however, that it must examine whether

the fact complained of, namely the reporting officer having dealt with

the applicant association's administrative complaint at the Ministry,

affected the impartiality of the Board.

      Even assuming that the reporting officer's possible bias could

influence the impartiality of the Board, the Commission finds that, in

the instant case, there is no reason to cast doubt on the reporting

officer's impartiality on the grounds that she had reported on the

applicant association's other case, which was of a different nature

from the relevant appeal, to another body (cf. 11831/85, Dec. 9.12.87,

D.R. 54 p. 144).

      The applicants complain, secondly, that the reporting officer at

the Board had received pieces of information which the applicant

association had not had an opportunity to express its opinion on.

      In this respect the Commission notes, on the basis of the Board's

reasoning in the case, that there is no indication that the Board based

its decision on facts that were unknown to the applicant association

as the appellant party in the case. Furthermore, even assuming that

there were relevant new facts, the applicant association had, at least

when appealing to the Supreme Administrative Court, the opportunity to

express its opinion on such possible information. Consequently, the

Commission finds that the proceedings before the Board and the Supreme

Administrative Court, taken as a whole, were such as to allow proper

participation of the applicant association (cf., Eur. Court H.R.,

Kerojärvi judgment of 19 July 1995, Series A no. 322, para. 42).

      Finally, the applicants complain that there was no oral hearing

at any appellate level.

      As regards the question of an oral hearing the Commission recalls

that Finland has made a reservation concerning Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

      "For the time being, Finland cannot guarantee a right to an

      oral hearing in so far as the current Finnish laws do not

      provide such a right. This applies to:

      ...

      2.   proceedings before ... the Supreme Administrative

      Court in accordance with ... Section 15 of the Supreme

      Administrative Court Act;

      ..."

      The Commission finds that the Finnish reservation expressly

covers the lack of an oral hearing before the Supreme Administrative

Court.

      As regards the oral hearing before the Appellate Board for the

Agricultural Industry, the Commission recalls that this body may hold

oral hearings but is not, under the current Finnish laws, obliged to

hold such a hearing. The Commission finds that it is not necessary to

examine, in the instant case, whether the Finnish reservation covers

this body since it finds that this part of the application is in any

event inadmissible for the following reasons.

      The Commission recalls that public character of court hearings

constitutes a fundamental principle enshrined in Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention. This provision does not prevent a person

from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the

entitlement to have his case heard in public. Any such waiver must,

however, be made in an unequivocal manner and must not run counter to

any important public interest (cf., Eur. Court H.R. Schuler-Zgraggen

judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, pp. 19-20, para. 58).

      In the instant case the Commission notes that the applicant

association appealed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

However, while the appeal was pending at the Ministry the relevant

legislation was amended and, subsequently, the appeal was dealt with

by the Board. In these circumstances the Commission finds that the

applicant association could not be expected to have requested an oral

hearing when it lodged the appeal with the Ministry. However, its

appeal was pending for almost six months before the Board after 1

January 1993, i.e. after the new Act on the Board had come into force.

The applicant association submitted further statements to the Board

while the appeal was pending. It has not been alleged that the

applicant association requested an oral hearing before the Board, and

the applicant association did not appeal to the Supreme Administrative

Court on account of the lack of an oral hearing. Furthermore, the

applicant association did not request the Supreme Administrative Court

to remedy the lack of an oral hearing by holding an oral hearing

itself, as it had the opportunity to do under section 15 of the Supreme

Administrative Court Act.

      The Commission finds that if the applicant association, as a

party before the Board, considered it important to have an oral

hearing, it could be expected to apply for one since an opportunity for

an oral hearing existed, but an oral hearing was not, under the current

Finnish laws, the general rule before the Board. As the applicant

association did not request an oral hearing, and did not appeal on this

basis, it may reasonably be considered that it unequivocally waived its

opportunity to have an oral hearing before the Board. Furthermore, it

does not appear that the dispute raised issues of public importance

such as to make a hearing necessary. The evaluation of the dispute over

the applicant association's rules was based on different written expert

opinions on the question of how the proposed measures would have

affected the productivity of the water areas and the fish stocks.

      Consequently, the Commission finds that, in the instant case,

there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention in respect of the oral and public nature of the proceedings.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (C.L. ROZAKIS)

© European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu, 1998 - 2024
Active Products: EUCJ + ECHR Data Package + Citation Analytics • Documents in DB: 398107 • Paragraphs parsed: 43931842 • Citations processed 3409255