J.K. v. AUSTRIA
Doc ref: 20713/92 • ECHR ID: 001-3199
Document date: June 26, 1996
- Inbound citations: 0
- •
- Cited paragraphs: 0
- •
- Outbound citations: 0
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 20713/92
by J. K.
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 26 June 1996, the following members being present:
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS, President
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
G.B. REFFI
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 12 May 1992 by
J. K. against Austria and registered on 29 September 1992 under file
No. 20713/92;
Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having regard to the Commission's decision of 7 April 1994 to
declare the application partly inadmissible and to communicate and
adjourn the remaining complaint pending the Court's judgment in the
case of Bulut v. Austria;
Having regard to the judgment of the Court in the case of Bulut
v. Austria (Eur. Court. H.R., Bulut judgment of 22 February 1996,
Reports 1996).
Having regard to the Government's letter of 9 May 1996 and the
applicant's letter of 9 May 1996.
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1943. He has
formerly been a police officer. Before the Commission he was initially
represented by Mr. M. Tuschl, residing in Vienna, and is now
represented by Mr. R. Danner, residing in Krems.
The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be
summarised as follows.
A. Particular circumstances of the case
On 8 January 1990 the applicant was taken into detention on
remand. He was suspected of having taken heroin from a police deposit
of confiscated drugs and sold it.
On 16 February 1990 the applicant was released, but from 5 March
to 16 March 1990 and from 13 April to 16 April 1990 he was again taken
into detention on remand.
On 26 September 1990 the Vienna Regional Court (Landesgericht),
presided by Judge K., convicted the applicant of abuse of authority,
handling of drugs and false testimony and sentenced him to 3 years
imprisonment. The Regional Court found that the applicant, who
investigated drug cases had on 15 August 1989 taken heroin from a
deposit of seized drugs and handed it over to V.J., a drug dealer known
to him, who sold the heroin. Notwithstanding the secret message from
Q.H. found in the course of the search of the applicant's office the
applicant had denied in his capacity as a witness at the trial of Q.H.,
that he had received such a message
On 31 January 1991 the Supreme Court partly upheld the
applicant's plea of nullity and quashed the Regional Court's judgment
insofar as it concerned the conviction of abuse of authority and
handling of drugs because the Regional Court had not heard H.H. as a
witness as requested by the defence.
Proceedings were resumed before the Regional Court, presided over
by Judge St. On 14 June 1991 the applicant was convicted again of
abuse of authority and handling of drugs and sentenced to 3 years
imprisonment. This time H.H. was heard as a witness at the trial.
On 8 October 1991 the applicant lodged a plea of nullity and an
appeal. In his plea of nullity, relying on Section 281 paras. 5 and
5a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung), he
complained about the Regional Court's assessment of evidence. In
particular, he raised doubts as to the credibility of V.J., the main
witness for the prosecution, and complained that, contrary to what the
Regional Court had stated, this witness had given different versions
of the events in the course of the proceedings.
On 23 January 1992 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's
plea of nullity under Section 285d para. 1 sub-para. 1 and 2 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure without an oral hearing. The Supreme Court
held that the assessment of evidence could only be attacked if the
conclusions drawn by a court were illogical. It was not the Supreme
Court's task to verify the material correctness of the Regional Court's
findings. As regards the alleged discrepancies in the successive
statements of the witness V.J., the Supreme Court found that the
Regional Court had correctly assumed that they only concerned side
issues but not the essential facts of the case. In any event, the
applicant's allegations did not find any support in the file.
On 17 March 1992 the Vienna Court of Appeal, after an oral
hearing, dismissed the applicant's appeal.
B. Relevant domestic law
Section 281 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Straf-
prozeßordnung) provides for the specific grounds on which a plea of
nullity may be made. These include:
"5. if the judgment of the trial court in respect of decisive
facts is unclear, incomplete or self-contradictory ...
5a. if substantial doubts on the correctness of the decisive
facts on which the decision on the guilt is based arise from the
file."
Section 285a para 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
"The court of first instance at which a plea of nullity against
the final judgment has been lodged has to reject this plea:
2. if at the giving of notice of the plea of nullity or its
presentation one of the grounds for nullity as mentioned in
Section 281 para. 1 (1 to 11) has not been indicated clearly, in
particular if the circumstances to which the ground of nullity
relates are not referred to expressly or at least by a clear
indication."
Section 285d para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
"During the private deliberations, an appeal on grounds of
nullity may be rejected immediately:
1. if it ought to have been rejected by the court at first
instance under Section 285 (a) ...,
2. if it is based on the grounds of nullity enumerated in
Section 281 para. 1 (1-8 and 11) and if the Supreme Court
unanimously finds that the complaint should be dismissed as
manifestly ill-founded without any need for further
deliberation."
COMPLAINT
The applicant's remaining complaint under Article 6 para. 1 of
the Convention concerns the lack of an oral hearing before the Supreme
Court on his plea of nullity.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 12 May 1992 and registered on
29 September 1992.
On 7 April 1994 the Commission decided to communicate the
applicant's complaint regarding the lack of an oral hearing in the
proceedings on his plea of nullity before the Supreme Court to the
respondent Government and declared inadmissible the remainder of the
application. At this stage the Commission did not request the parties
to comment on the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaint
as it decided to await the outcome of the case of Bulut v. Austria then
pending before the European Court of Human Rights.
On 22 February 1996 the European Court of Human Rights gave its
judgment in the case of Bulut v. Austria (Eur. Court. H.R., Bulut
judgment of 22 February 1996, Reports 1996).
On 17 April 1996 the Commission invited the parties to submit the
comments they wished to make in the light the above judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights.
On 9 May 1996 the Government informed the Commission that it did
not intend to make any submission. On the same day the applicant
informed the Commission that he wished to pursue his application.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention that the Supreme Court did not hold a hearing on his plea
of nullity.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as relevant,
reads as follows:
"1. In the determination ... of any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law."
The Commission recalls that the manner of application of
Article 6 (Art. 6) to proceedings before appellate courts depends on
the special features of the proceedings involved; account must be taken
of the entirety of the proceedings in the domestic legal order and of
the role of the appellate court therein (Eur. Court H.R., Kerojärvi
judgment of 19 July 1995, Series A no. 322, p. 15, para 40 with
further references). Provided that there has been a public hearing at
first instance, the absence of "public hearing" at second instance may
be justified by the special features of the proceedings at issue. Thus
proceedings for leave to appeal or proceedings involving only questions
of law, as opposed to questions of fact, may comply with the
requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) even where the appellant was not
given an opportunity of being heard in person by the appeal or
cassation court (Eur. Court H.R., Monnell and Morris judgment of 2
March 1987, Series A no. 115, p. 22, para. 58).
In the present case the applicant had a public hearing at first
instance. On 23 January 1992 the Supreme Court rejected the
applicant's plea of nullity in which he had relied essentially on
Sections 281 paras. 5 and 5a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
Supreme Court based its decision on Section 285d para. 1 sub-para. 1
and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In the case of Bulut v. Austria, which also concerned the
rejection of a plea of nullity by the Supreme Court in proceedings
under Section 285d para. 1 sub-para. 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the European Court of Human Rights has found as follows:
"In the instant case, the Court notes that a public hearing was
held at first instance. It further notes that the Supreme Court
rejected Mr. Bulut's appeal pursuant to Article 285d para. 1 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure ... Under this provision the
Supreme Court, in summary proceedings, may refuse further
consideration of an appeal which it unanimously regards as
manifestly lacking any merit. The nature of the review can
therefore be compared to that of proceedings for leave to appeal.
Moreover, the Court is not satisfied that the grounds of nullity
under Article 281 para. 1 (4) and (5) if the Code of Criminal
Procedure, as formulated by the applicant ..., raised questions
of fact bearing on the assessment of the applicant's guilt or
innocence that would have necessitated a hearing. They
essentially challenged the trial court's assessment of the
available evidence, a challenge which the Supreme Court
considered inadmissible" (Eur. Court H.R., Bulut judgment of
22 February 1996, para. 42, Reports of Judgments and decisions
for 1996).
The Commission finds that the above Court's reasoning also
applies to the present case. Therefore, there is no appearance of a
violation of the applicant's rights under Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention because of the lack of a hearing before
the Supreme Court.
It follows that the applicant's remaining complaint is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remaining complaint about the lack of
a hearing before the Supreme Court in the proceedings on the
applicant's plea of nullity.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (C.L. ROZAKIS)
LEXI - AI Legal Assistant
