AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 26335/95

                      by    1. VERENIGING RADIO 100

                            2. Herman A. DE RAAIJ

                            3. Patrick J.A.M. FOLLON

                            4. Robert N. STRAUS

                            5. Christiaan SWART

                      against the Netherlands

     The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 27 June 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   H. DANELIUS, President

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           MM.   G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

           Ms.   M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 28 August 1994 by

VERENIGING RADIO 100, Herman A. DE RAAIJ, Patrick J.A.M. FOLLON,

Robert N. STRAUS, and Christiaan SWART against the Netherlands and

registered on 17 March 1995 under file No. 26335/95;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The first applicant is an association (vereniging), founded in

1986, and based in Amsterdam. The second, third, fourth and fifth

applicants are all Dutch citizens, born in respectively 1950, 1966,

1957 and 1956. They are journalists and reside in Amsterdam. Before the

Commission the applicants are represented by Mrs. T. Prakken, a lawyer

practising in Amsterdam.

A.   The particular circumstances of the case

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

     The applicant association Radio 100 has been transmitting radio

broadcasts in Amsterdam since 1986. Amateur radio operators may use the

station to transmit programmes of an experimental nature. Radio 100 has

never applied for the required licence under the Telecommunications Act

(Wet op de Telecommunicatievoorzieningen), inter alia because the cost

which this entails would require Radio 100 to sell broadcasting time

to commercial sponsors to which it is opposed for reasons of principle.

     Although it is submitted that Radio 100 takes care not to cause

interference with other transmissions it appears that some interference

with the reception of television programmes was experienced on old

television sets or television sets of inferior quality which were

positioned in close proximity to the transmitter.

     At the end of 1988, the mayor of Amsterdam, the chief public

prosecutor (hoofdofficier van justitie) and the chief superintendent

(hoofdcommissaris) of the Amsterdam police decided that judicial

proceedings should be initiated against Radio 100 in order to prevent

it from broadcasting on the ground, inter alia, that the broadcasts

transmitted by Radio 100 caused interference with the broadcasts of

legal radio and television stations. It was further taken into

consideration that many other illegal radio stations had been taken off

the air and that a failure to undertake any steps against Radio 100

could be construed as unequal treatment. The fact that Radio 100 had

in the past informed its listeners of the movements of the police

during large-scale police operations was also noted.

     On 3 May 1989, transmitting equipment belonging to Radio 100 was

seized (in beslagname). However, two days later Radio 100 resumed its

broadcasts.

     In 1990, the prosecuting authorities concluded that the

Telecommunications Act did not provide the authorities with sufficient

powers to bring the broadcasts of Radio 100 to an end, since this Act

only allowed for the seizure of transmitting equipment. A preliminary

investigation revealed that Radio 100 could be considered as an

organisation which intended to commit the offence of broadcasting

without a licence. Section 140 of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van

Strafrecht) makes it a criminal offence to participate in an

organisation which intends to commit offences.

     Within the framework of a preliminary judicial investigation

(gerechtelijk vooronderzoek) searches were carried out at seven

addresses in Amsterdam on 15 May 1991. The application concerns the

searches carried out at five of these addresses (hereinafter called A,

B, C, D and E) which include the premises from which the applicant

association transmitted its broadcasts and the homes of the other

applicants. During the searches many objects were seized, among which

transmitting equipment but also other material indispensable for the

broadcasting of radio programmes, such as compact discs and records.

A number of suspects were arrested but released on the following day.

     Also on the following day, Radio 100 resumed its broadcasts,

although the transmissions were of a poorer quality.

     In May and June 1991, the applicants filed objections in which

they complained of the seizures with the Regional Court

(Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Amsterdam. Apart from complaining of

irregularities which had occurred during the searches and which, in

their view, invalidated the lawfulness of these searches, the

applicants alleged that the seizure of transmitting equipment and other

property prevented them from broadcasting and therefore violated their

rights under Article 10 of the Convention. The second to fifth

applicants further complained that the searches of their homes in order

to seize goods constituted a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

     Following hearings on 21 June and 2 July 1991, the Regional Court

rejected in an interlocutory decision (beschikking) of 15 July 1991 the

applicants' argument that there had been a violation of Articles 8 and

10 of the Convention. In this respect it held that para. 2 of Article

10 allowed Contracting States to institute a licensing system for radio

communications and that in the Netherlands this system had been laid

down in the Telecommunications Act. Finding it established that none

of the applicants was in possession of the required licence, the

Regional Court concluded that the methods for investigation and

prosecution provided for in the Telecommunications Act could be applied

without infringing the applicants' rights under the Convention.

     The Regional Court further considered that no Convention or other

legal provision prevented the prosecution pursuant to Section 140 of

the Criminal Code of persons who were suspected of participating in an

organisation which transmitted broadcasts without a licence. The

question whether the investigating and prosecuting authorities had thus

been equipped with more wide-ranging powers than they would have been

had the prosecution been conducted pursuant to the provisions of the

Telecommunications Act was found by the Regional Court to be of no

relevance in the proceedings at issue which only concerned complaints

about the seizure of goods.

     For the same reasons the Regional Court rejected the applicants'

argument of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

     The Regional Court then adjourned its examination of the case to

enable the prosecuting authorities to complete the file. A further

hearing was held on 15 November 1991.

     In its decision of 6 December 1991, the Regional Court ruled that

the searches relating to the addresses A and B had been wholly or

partly unlawful as the premises where the searches had taken place did

not correspond to the addresses indicated in the search warrants. The

search which had taken place at the address C was also found to have

been conducted unlawfully since the applicants' representative had not

been allowed to be present on the premises during the search. The

Dsitrict Court ordered the return of the goods which had been seized

at these addresses. It declared the searches at the addresses D and E

lawful.

     The public prosecutor filed an appeal in cassation against the

Regional Court's decision insofar as it had declared searches unlawful.

On 19 December 1991, the applicants also filed an appeal in cassation.

     By letter of 9 January 1992, the applicants' representative

requested the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) to transmit copies of the case-

file and of the submissions of the Procurator General (Procureur-

Generaal) at the Supreme Court as soon as these became available. She

further requested the Supreme Court to enable her to comment on the

submissions of the Procurator General and to fix a time-limit for the

submission of the grounds of cassation. The grounds of cassation were

submitted by the applicants' representative on 19 June 1992. On 12

November 1992, she made inquiries by telephone about the state of the

proceedings and by letter of 6 October 1993, she requested the Supreme

Court to expedite matters. In reply, the Registrar of the Supreme Court

informed the applicants' representative on 7 October 1993 that the case

was still with the Office of the Procurator General but that he would

urge the Procurator General to deal with the case expeditiously.

     On 23 November 1993, the Advocate General made his submissions.

These were, however, not transmitted to the applicants' representative.

     In its decision on the appeals in cassation of 1 March 1994, the

Supreme Court first dealt with the applicants' complaints under

Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention that the authorities had made use

of the more-wide ranging powers conferred on them by the Code of

Criminal Procedure rather than those provided for in the

Telecommunications Act. The Supreme Court held that para. 2 of Article

10 did not prevent the seizure of goods resulting in the temporary

discontinuation of radio broadcasts. According to the Supreme Court,

the finding of the Regional Court that legal provisions had allowed for

the seizure of goods in the circumstances of the case, should be

understood to mean that the seizure had been "in accordance with the

law" pursuant to Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention and "prescribed

by law" pursuant to para. 2 of Article 10 of the Convention. This

finding also included that the seizure had been "necessary in a

democratic society ... for the prevention of disorder or crime" and

"for the protection of the ... rights of others" pursuant to these

provisions. In view of the fact that none of the applicants had been

in possession of the required licence and that it did not appear that

this licence had been withheld from them in an arbitrary manner, the

Supreme Court found that the Regional Court had been right in

concluding that Articles 8 and 10 had not been violated.

     The Supreme Court further did not agree with the applicants that

where a person is suspected of participating in an organisation which

intends to transmit broadcasts without a licence, only such property

may be seized as is liable to seizure pursuant to the provisions of the

Telecommunications Act.

     The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Regional Court as

regards the finding that the searches at the addresses A and B had been

unlawful for technical reasons. It also upheld the Regional Court's

finding that the searches at the addresses D and E had been lawful.

     The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Regional Court only

in respect of the search at the address C which the Regional Court had

found to have been unlawful. This part of the case was referred to the

Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of Amsterdam.

     At the hearing before this Court of Appeal on 29 July 1994, the

Procurator General at the Court stated that in view of the time which

had passed since the seizure, the criminal proceedings would not be

continued. She argued, however, that the complaints concerning the

seizure which had taken place at the address C should still be rejected

since the prosecuting authorities intended to demand the withdrawal

from circulation of the seized goods given that their uncontrolled

possession was illegal.

     On 11 August 1994, the Court of Appeal declared the search at the

address C unlawful and ordered the return of the property which had

been seized at that address. The prosecuting authorities filed an

appeal in cassation against this decision.

     On 14 February 1995, the Supreme Court quashed the decision of

the Court of Appeal. It held that even if the search had been unlawful

the Court of Appeal should have examined the question whether the

possibility of withdrawal from circulation justified the continued

seizure of the goods. The Supreme Court referred the case to the Court

of Appeal of The Hague.

     Following a hearing before the Court of Appeal of The Hague on

23 May 1995, this court pronounced its decision on 6 June 1995 in the

absence of the applicants' representative. The registry informed the

representative by telephone that a number of the seized objects would

be returned. Despite several requests in writing, including one to the

chairman of the criminal chamber of the Court of Appeal, the

representative has still not been provided with a written copy of the

decision and is unaware of its precise contents.

     It appears from the file that the property seized at the address

A belonged to the second applicant. The property seized at the address

B belonged to the applicant association and the third applicant. The

property seized at the address C belonged to the applicant association

and the fourth applicant. The property seized at the address D belonged

to the applicant association. Finally, the property seized at the

address E belonged to the fifth applicant.

B.   Domestic law and practice

     Pursuant to Section 17 of the Telecommunications Act, a

Ministerial authorisation is required for the instalment and use of

broadcasting installations. When the instalment and use of a

broadcasting installation is considered to be contrary to an efficient

use of the air waves, an authorisation is withheld (Section 17 para.

7 (b) Telecommunication Facilities Act).

     The Telecommunications Act provides for the seizure of only those

objects which may be used in evidence in respect of the offence of

broadcasting without the required licence. It does not provide for

searches of premises from which no broadcasts are transmitted.

     According to Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(hereinafter referred to as "CCP"), items which may serve to establish

the truth or whose confiscation (verbeurdverklaring) or withdrawal from

circulation (onttrekking aan het verkeer) may be ordered are liable to

seizure (inbeslagneming).

     Section 33a of the Criminal Code (hereinafter referred to as

"CC") defines the property which is liable to confiscation. This

property includes, inter alia, items and/or claims partially or wholly

obtained by criminal offences or through the proceeds thereof and items

with which such offences have been committed.

     According to Section 33 CC, confiscation may be pronounced

following a conviction for a criminal offence.

     Withdrawal from circulation is provided for in Sections 36b, 36c

and 36d CC. Withdrawal from circulation entails that the ownership of

(already seized) items passes to the State, which may then dispose of

them. Under Section 36b CC withdrawal from circulation may be

pronounced either by a judgment, or, in the absence of criminal

proceedings, by a separate judicial order upon the request of the

public prosecutor when it is found that the items concerned are of such

a nature that their uncontrolled possession is contrary to the law or

the public interest. Consequently, a conviction is no prerequisite for

an order for withdrawal from circulation.

     Pursuant to Section 552a para. 1 CCP interested parties including

the suspect may file an objection against, inter alia, a seizure, the

use of seized objects and the failure to order their return. If the

competent court finds the objection well-founded, it will issue a

corresponding order.

     It is for the prosecuting authorities to decide whether or not

a person who is suspected of a criminal offence shall be prosecuted

(Sections 167 and 242 CCP).

     If the interests of criminal proceedings no longer require

seizure, seized goods are, in principle, returned to the person from

whom they have been seized (Section 118 CCP). Such a situation may

arise when no criminal proceedings have been brought or when they have

been discontinued and no final order for withdrawal from circulation

has been issued.

COMPLAINTS

     The applicants complain of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of

the Convention, in that in the cassation proceedings leading to the

Supreme Court's decision of 1 March 1994 they were not informed of the

submissions of the Advocate General at the Supreme Court and were

therefore not able to reply to these submissions. They also complain

of the length of the proceedings before the Supreme Court.

     They further complain that their right to freedom of expression

and their right to impart information within the meaning of Article 10

para. 1 of the Convention has been interfered with and that this

interference was not justified under para. 2 of the provision. In this

respect the applicants submit that by using the powers which have been

provided for the investigation and prosecution of the offence of

Section 140 CC instead of those provided for in the Telecommunications

Act, the interference was not prescribed by law. The applicants argue

that the interference was also not necessary in a democratic society

for the protection of any of the legitimate aims enumerated in para. 2.

     Finally, the applicants argue that the search of premises in

order to seize goods belonging to them violated their right to respect

for their home and they invoke Article 8 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1.   The applicants complain that the proceedings before the Supreme

Court which led to the decision of 1 March 1994 were not in conformity

with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. This provision

reads, insofar as relevant:

     "1.   In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or

     of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a

     fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an

     independent and impartial tribunal established by law ..."

     The Commission must in the first place determine whether the

proceedings at issue fall within the scope of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention. In this respect the Commission is of the

opinion that these proceedings cannot in any event be regarded as

determining a "criminal charge" within the meaning of Article 6 para.

1 (Art. 6-1), as they did not concern the question whether or not the

applicants were guilty of a criminal offence.

     As regards the question whether the proceedings involved the

determination of "civil rights and obligations" the Commission recalls

that for Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention to be

applicable under its "civil" head, there must be a dispute over civil

rights and obligations and the outcome of the proceedings in question

must be directly decisive for such a right or obligation, mere tenuous

connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) into operation (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Fayed

judgment of 21 September 1994, Series A no. 294-B, p. 46, para. 56).

     The Commission observes that the proceedings at issue did not

deprive the applicants of the ownership of the seized property. The

seizure merely prevented the applicants from freely using this property

pending the possible subsequent criminal proceedings before the trial

courts or, in the absence of such criminal proceedings, pending an

order for the property to be returned or an order for the withdrawal

of the objects from circulation.

     The Commission, noting that at the time of the impugned decision,

i.e. 1 March 1994, it was not yet known that the criminal proceedings

would be discontinued, concludes that these proceedings were merely of

a conservatory and provisional character and concerned an interim

measure taken in the interest of the criminal proceedings concerning

an offence against the Criminal Code.

     Consequently, the Commission finds that the proceedings of which

the applicants complain did not involve a determination of civil rights

and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf. No. 23908, Dec. 7.3.96, unpublished).

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the

Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

2.   The applicants also invoke Article 10 (Art. 10) of the

Convention. They allege that the seizure of their property prevented

them from transmitting radio broadcasts. Article 10 (Art. 10)

provides:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This

     right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and

     impart information and ideas without interference by public

     authority and regardless of frontiers.  This Article shall not

     prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,

     television or cinema enterprises.

     2.    The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it

     duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,

     conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law

     and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of

     national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for

     the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health

     or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of

     others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in

     confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of

     the judiciary."

     The first question which the Commission must examine is whether

there has been an interference with the applicants' rights under

Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) of the Convention.

     The present case concerns the seizure of goods indispensable for

the transmission of radio broadcasts. It thus relates principally to

the freedom enshrined in Article 10 para. 1  (Art. 10-1) "to ... impart

information and ideas without interference by a public authority". The

Commission

finds that the seizure of the property at issue constituted an

interference with the applicants' right to impart information and

ideas.

     However, according to the third sentence of Article 10 para. 1

(Art. 10-1) of the Convention, Article 10 (Art. 10) does "not prevent

States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting ... enterprises".

By applying a licensing system, the Contracting States are allowed

under this provision of the Convention to regulate broadcasting

activities in their territories for the purpose of controlling, inter

alia, the technical aspects of broadcasting (Eur. Court H.R.,

Informationsverein Lentia and Others judgment of 24 November 1993,

Series A no. 276, p. 14, para. 32). Given that in the present case the

aim of the licensing system, as expressed in Section 17 para. 7 (c) of

the Telecommunications Facilities Act, was to obtain an efficient use

of the air waves, the Commission cannot find this system to be at

variance with the third sentence of Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) of

the Convention.

     However, although the aim of the interference at issue was

legitimate under the third sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 10

(Art. 10-1) of the Convention, the interference must also be assessed

in the light of the requirements of Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of

the Convention (Informationsverein Lentia and Others judgment, loc.

cit., p. 14, para. 32).

     As regards the question whether the interference was prescribed

by law, the Commission recalls that the phrase "prescribed by law" in

Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) must be given the same interpretation

as the phrase "in accordance with the law" in Article 8 para. 2

(Art. 8-2) of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., Silver judgment of

25 march 1983, Series A no. 61, p. 33, para. 85). Where the Convention

refers to domestic law, it is primarily the task of the national

authorities to apply and interpret domestic law. The Convention organs

have a limited jurisdiction in controlling the manner in which this is

done (cf. No. 10689/83, Dec. 14.5.84, D.R. 37 p. 225 and Eur. Court

H.R., Otto-Preminger-Institut judgment of 20 September 1994, Series A

no. 295-A, p. 17, para. 45).

     The phrase "prescribed by law", or the equivalent phrase "in

accordance with the law" does not, however, merely refer back to

domestic law, but also relates to the quality of the law. A norm must

be formulated with sufficient precision, but a law conferring a

discretion is not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of

foreseeability provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner

of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity (Eur. Court H.R.,

Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 30, para. 61;

Kruslin and Huvig judgments of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176 A and

B respectively, pp. 22-25, para. 30-36, and pp. 54-57, paras. 29-35).

     The Commission notes that in the present case the applicants had

never applied for the licence required pursuant to Section 17 of the

Telecommunications Act. The Commission finds it established that the

applicants were sufficiently aware of the relevant statutory rules.

     The Commission further notes that in the present case the seizure

of the property took place within the framework of a preliminary

judicial investigation into an offence against the Criminal Code,

rather than an offence against the Telecommunications Act. The powers

of seizure under the former Code are more extensive than under the

latter Act. However, the Commission does not consider that measures

taken in order to terminate a situation which contravenes a licensing

system must themselves be contained in the legislation by which the

licensing system is enacted.

     The Commission observes that the offence at issue was the

participation in an organisation which intended to transmit broadcasts

without a licence. In the circumstances of the present case, where the

applicants must have been aware of the fact that they were committing

an offence in an organised manner, the Commission cannot find that the

way in which the interference took place was not foreseeable.

     Accordingly, the Commission finds that the interference was

"prescribed by law" within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2

(Art. 10-2) of the Convention. The Commission also finds that it was

intended to prevent disorder and crime and to protect the rights of

others, these being legitimate purposes under that provision.

     As regards the notion of necessity, the Commission recalls that

the phrase "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of

Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention implies that the

interference must correspond to a "pressing social need" and be

proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In determining whether an

interference is "necessary in a democratic society" the Convention

organs must also take into account that the Contracting States enjoy

a margin of appreciation, but this goes hand in hand with European

supervision. In cases where there has been an interference with the

rights and freedoms guaranteed by Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) of the

Convention, this supervision must be strict because of the importance

of these rights and freedoms. The necessity for any restriction must

be convincingly established (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Autronic AG judgment

of 22 may 1990, Series A no. 178, p. 26, para. 61; and Otto-Preminger-

Institut judgment, loc. cit., p. 19, para. 50).

     The Commission further recalls that the freedom of expression,

subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (Art. 10-2), is also applicable

to "information" or "ideas" which shock, offend or disturb the State

(cf. Otto-Preminger-Institut judgment, loc. cit., p. 19, para. 49). In

this respect the Commission notes that when the authorities decided

that judicial proceedings should be instigated against Radio 100, they

took into account the fact that Radio 100 had in the past through its

broadcasts informed its listeners of the movements of the police during

large-scale police operations. While accepting that this was an element

which is likely to have disturbed the authorities, the Commission

cannot find it established that this was the only or the overriding

reason for the decision to instigate judicial proceedings against Radio

100. In fact, it appears that other reasons were that the broadcasts

transmitted by Radio 100 had disturbed the broadcasts of legal radio

and television stations and that other illegal radio stations had

previously been taken off the air.

     Furthermore, the Commission notes that on an earlier occasion,

namely on 3 May 1989, the authorities had also attempted to bring the

broadcasts of Radio 100 to an end by seizing their transmission

equipment. However, two days later Radio 100 resumed its broadcasts.

     In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the seizure

of the property at issue was not disproportionate to the legitimate

aims pursued and that the Dutch authorities cannot be regarded as

having overstepped their margin of appreciation in this respect.

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.   Finally, the applicants argue that the search of premises in

order to seize property belonging to them was contrary to Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention, which, insofar as relevant, reads as

follows:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for ... his home ...

     2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with

     the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

     the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

     of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

     of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

     protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

     rights and freedoms of others."

     a.    As regards the searches which took place at the addresses

A and B, the Commission notes that although the national courts did not

accept that the applicants' rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention had been violated, they did find that these searches had

been conducted unlawfully and consequently ordered the goods seized

there to be returned. Given that the applicants' objection to the

seizure of the property at these addresses pursuant to Section 552a CCP

was successful in that it resulted in a finding of unlawfulness, the

Commission considers that the applicant association and the second and

third applicants, whose property was seized at these addresses, cannot

be considered victims in regard to these searches within the meaning

of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.

     The Commission notes that it is not clear what the outcome has

been of the proceedings in respect of the search at the address C.

However, if this search was found by the Court of Appeal of The Hague

to have been conducted unlawfully, the above finding would apply also

to the applicant association and the fifth applicant insofar as the

seizure at that address was concerned.

     b.    Insofar as the applicants complain that the searches

conducted at the addresses D and E was an interference with their right

to respect for their homes which was not in conformity with the

provisions of the Telecommunications Act on which they should have been

based, the Commission refers to its findings in this respect on the

applicants' complaint under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.

     The Commission notes furthermore that the searches at these

addresses were found by the national courts to have been conducted

lawfully. The Commission cannot find any circumstances in the present

case which suggest any illegality and therefore accepts that the

requirement of lawfulness was satisfied.

     The Commission further considers that the interference pursued

the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder and crime and the

protection of the rights of others.

     As regards the question whether the interference was necessary

in a democratic society, the Commission similarly refers to its

findings on the complaint under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.

     This finding would also apply to the search conducted at the

address C if it should appear that the Court of Appeal of The Hague had

found this search to have been conducted lawfully.

     It follows that this part of the application must also be

rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article

27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber     President of the Second Chamber

      (M.-T. SCHOEPFER)                       (H. DANELIUS)