AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 22377/93

                      by T.M.

                      against Finland

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

21 October 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   S. TRECHSEL, President

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 P. LORENZEN

                 K. HERNDL

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 16 May 1993 by

T.M. against Finland and registered on 28 July 1993 under file

No. 22377/93;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 4 January 1996 and the observations in reply submitted

by the applicant on 15 January 1996;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Finnish citizen, born in 1934 and resident at

Kerava. He is a lawyer.

A.    The particular circumstances of the case

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

      The applicant lost his job in December 1986 and was thereafter

granted earnings-related unemployment allowance for 900 days of

unemployment, i.e. up to 19 November 1990, by a decision of the

Unemployment Fund for Lawyers and Legal Associates ("the Unemployment

Fund"). The applicant had reached the age of 55 before having collected

the allowance for the maximum number of 500 days stipulated in section

26, subsection 1 of the 1984 Act on Unemployment Benefits (työttömyys-

turvalaki 602/84, lag 602/84 om utkomstskydd för arbetslösa; "the 1984

Act"). Due to his age and a 1987 amendment to section 26, subsection

3 of the 1984 Act he had therefore been entitled to continue collecting

an allowance for an additional 400 days.

      According to a further amendment to section 26, subsection 3 of

the 1984 Act which was enacted in 1990 and entered into force on

1 January 1991, an earnings-related allowance which an unemployed had

been receiving while reaching the age of 55 could be paid until he or

she reached the age of 60, regardless of the maximum number of

unemployment days prescribed in section 26, subsection 1.

      In January 1991 the applicant requested a further earnings-

related allowance, referring to the 1990 amendment to section 26 of the

1984 Act. His request was rejected by the Unemployment Fund on

29 January 1991, the Fund having found that his right to such allowance

had ceased to exist on 20 November 1990, i.e. when he had been

collecting it for the then maximum period of 900 days.

      The applicant appealed to the Board for Unemployment Benefits

(työttömyysturvalautakunta, arbetslöshetsnämnden), again referring to

the 1990 amendment and the preparatory works relating to the 1984 Act.

Before deciding on his appeal the Board obtained an opinion from the

Unemployment Fund in which reference was made to certain instructions

issued by the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health (sosiaali- ja

terveysministeriö, social- och hälsovårdsministeriet) concerning the

application of the 1990 amendment. Pursuant to these instructions an

earnings-related allowance could also be granted to an unemployed who

had reached the age of 55 and who, on 1 January 1991, had been

collecting an allowance under the old legislation for more than 500

days. The Unemployment Fund noted that the applicant's right to collect

an allowance for the 400-day period exceeding the 500 day-period

prescribed in section 26, subsection 1 of the 1984 Act had ceased to

exist prior to 1 January 1991.

      The Unemployment Fund's opinion was not communicated to the

applicant. The full text thereof has not been made available to the

Commission.

      In its decision of 27 August 1991 the Board for Unemployment

Benefits summarised the facts, the applicant's appeal and the

Unemployment Fund's opinion. Agreeing with the essence of that opinion,

the Board then went on to reject the appeal, finding that his right to

collect an earnings-related allowance had ceased to exist before

1 January 1991. Section 26 of the 1984 Act was therefore applicable as

amended in 1987.

      The applicant appealed further to the Insurance Court (vakuutus-

oikeus, försäkringsdomstolen), arguing that the 1990 amendment to the

1984 Act had not delegated any right to the Ministry to issue any

instructions restricting the scope of those entitled to an earnings-

related allowance.

      On 9 January 1992 the Social Insurance Commission (sosiaali-

vakuutustoimikunta, socialförsäkringskommissionen) of Kerava rejected

the applicant's request for a basic unemployment allowance. The Social

Insurance Commission noted a binding opinion which it had obtained from

the Employment Commission (työvoimatoimikunta, arbetskrafts-

kommissionen) of Kerava. According to that opinion of 7 January 1992,

the applicant had repeatedly declined to accept offers of employment

or education. The Social Insurance Commission stated, however, that

provided the other conditions for receiving the basic allowance were

fulfilled, the applicant would again be entitled thereto after having

worked or received education for eight weeks.

      The applicant appealed to the Board for Unemployment Benefits

against the Social Insurance Commission's refusal, requesting to be

exempted from the obligatory work or education while the appeal

proceedings concerning his entitlement to an earnings-related allowance

were pending.

      Before deciding on the applicant's appeal the Board for

Unemployment Benefits obtained opinions both from the Employment

Commission and the Social Insurance Commission. In its observations of

23 January 1992 the Deputy Director of the Kerava branch of the Social

Insurance Institution (kansaneläkelaitos, folkpensionsanstalten),

apparently acting on behalf of the Social Insurance Commission, stated

as follows:

      "The Kerava branch of the Social Insurance Institution has

      rejected the applicant's request for a basic unemployment

      allowance as from 11 November 1991, having regard to the

      ... binding opinion of the Employment Commission.

      ... The applicant has appealed ...

      ... The Employment Commission has been heard in respect of

      the appeal and has, on 22 January 1992, submitted an

      additional opinion. ... Reference is made to [that]

      opinion. ..."

      Annexed was the Employment Commission's opinion of 22 January

1992 which, apart from recollecting the facts of the case, read as

follows:

      "The ... Employment Commission has acquainted itself with

      [the applicant's appeal] and does not propose any change to

      its ... opinion of 7 January 1992, given that [his] appeal

      does not contain anything ... which was not known [to the

      Employment Commission] when it issued [that] opinion. ..."

      None of the above-cited observations were communicated to the

applicant.

      In its decision of 6 May 1992 the Board for Unemployment Benefits

summarised the facts, the applicant's appeal and the Employment

Commission's opinion. It also noted that the Social Insurance

Commission had referred to the Employment Commission's opinion.

Agreeing with the essence of that opinion, the Board then went on to

reject the appeal, noting that the salary which he could have received,

had he accepted the employment offered to him, would have exceeded the

basic allowance. It furthermore found that the pending appeal

proceedings concerning his entitlement to an earnings-related allowance

did not constitute a valid reason for his refusal to accept the post

offered to him.

      The applicant again appealed to the Insurance Court, where his

appeals were joined. Before deciding on them it obtained observations

both from the Unemployment Fund (as regards his entitlement to an

earnings-related allowance) and the Social Insurance Commission (as

regards his entitlement to a basic unemployment allowance).

      In its observations of 20 December 1991 the Unemployment Fund

stated, apart from summarising the facts of the case and the 1991

amendment to the 1984 Act, as follows:

      "... In his appeal the applicant repeats his views as

      expressed in his appeal to the Unemployment Fund.

      ... An earnings-related unemployment allowance can,

      according to the instructions of the Ministry of Social

      Affairs and Health, be paid up to the age of 60 provided

      that the person is at least 55 years old and is, on 1

      January 1991, collecting an allowance for an additional

      [400] days. Since [the applicant's] right to an allowance

      for additional days ceased to exist on 19 November 1990,

      the Unemployment Fund has not granted him any allowance for

      the period 1-20 January 1991.

      Since the applicant has not in his appeal to the Insurance

      Court submitted any new relevant information which was not

      known to the Unemployment Fund at the time of deciding the

      matter, [the Fund] proposes that its decision be upheld."

       In her submissions of 18 September 1992 the Director of the

Kerava branch of the Social Insurance Institution, apparently acting

on behalf of the Social Insurance Commission, stated, apart from

summarising the facts of the case, as follows:

      "... In his appeal to the Insurance Court the applicant has

      requested ... that the decision concerning his [entitlement

      to] a basic unemployment allowance be amended.

      The Employment Commission's opinion has been requested once

      more and [it] does not propose any change to its opinion of

      7 January 1992 [to the Unemployment Board].

      Our opinion is that no reason has been put forward for

      amending the decision which has been appealed against."

      Apparently annexed to the above opinion was the Employment

Commission's opinion of 7 September 1992 which, apart from summarising

the facts of the case, read as follows:

      "The ... Employment Commission has acquainted itself with

      [the applicant's appeal] and does not propose any change to

      its ... opinion of 7 January 1992, given that [his] appeal

      does not contain anything ... which was not known [to the

      Employment Commission] when it issued [that] opinion. ..."

      None of the above-cited observations were communicated to the

applicant.

      In its decision of 18 February 1993 the Insurance Court

summarised the applicant's appeals and noted that the Unemployment Fund

and the Social Insurance Commission had lodged observations in reply.

It then went on to reject the appeals, referring to the reasoning of

the Board for Unemployment Benefits in its respective decisions.

B.    Relevant domestic law

      1.   Unemployment benefits

      The 1984 Act prescribes, as a general condition, that an

unemployment allowance shall be paid to any unemployed person who is

capable of working and has reported himself or herself to the

unemployment authority for the purpose of obtaining full-time work and

provided that no employment or education has been found (section 4).

      The 1984 Act also sets out specific conditions which are to be

met by an unemployed before he or she can be granted an earnings-

related allowance. These comprise, for instance, membership in an

unemployment fund during a certain period of time preceding the loss

of employment (section 16). If an unemployed has received an earnings-

related allowance for the full number of days laid down by the law, he

or she has to meet the specific conditions anew in order to qualify for

a further period (section 26, subsection 3).

      An unemployed who meets the conditions stipulated by section 4

and who is in need of financial assistance can be granted a basic

unemployment allowance which is not related to previous earnings

(section 13).

      The Board for Unemployment Benefits shall afford an appellant an

opportunity to be heard in respect of material which is not known to

him or her already (section 39, subsection 4)

      According to the 1958 Insurance Court Act (laki vakuutus-

oikeudesta, lag om försäkringsdomstolen 14/58), the provisions

governing the proceedings in the ordinary courts may, when appropriate,

be applied to those in the Insurance Court (section 9, subsection 4).

According to the Code of Judicial procedure (Oikeudenkäymiskaari,

Rättegångs Balk), if a court of appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätt) has

obtained of its own motion an opinion or other written statement which

may have an impact on its determination of the case, it must, unless

it is clearly unnecessary, request the parties concerned to comment

thereon in writing (chapter 26, section 6).

      2.   Access to the case-files of authorities

      Under the 1951 Act on Publicity of Public Documents (laki 83/51

yleisten asiakirjain julkisuudesta; lag 83/51 om allmänna handlingars

offentlighet, "the 1951 Act") documents drawn up and issued by an

authority, or which have been submitted to an authority and are still

in  that  authority's possession, are public (section 2, subsection 1).

An exception to the rule of full publicity is made, inter alia, for

medical and similar reports, which are accessible to the public only

with the consent of the person they relate to (section 17).

      If a public official refuses access to a document, that decision

may be submitted for reconsideration by the authority on whose behalf

he or she has acted, following which there lies an appeal under the

general rules for appeals against a decision of that authority. If no

right of appeal exists under those general rules, an appeal may be

lodged with the superior authority. If no such authority exists, an

appeal against a state authority's decision may be lodged with the

Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta

förvaltningsdomstolen). An appeal against a decision by another

authority may be lodged with a County Administrative Court (läänin-

oikeus, länsrätten) (section 8, subsection 1 of the 1951 Act, as

amended by Act no. 472/87).

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention

that he was denied a fair hearing in the proceedings relating to his

entitlement to a further unemployment allowance on the basis of the

1990 amendment to the 1984 Act. Allegedly, neither the refusal to grant

him such an allowance nor the subsequent decisions to reject his

appeals had any basis in domestic law. In particular, the Ministry's

instructions on the application of the 1990 amendment were issued in

the absence of any delegation in the amendment itself and were contrary

to its ratio. The decisions on the applicant's appeals allegedly

included grounds which had not been invoked by the Unemployment Fund

in its refusal of his request. Allegedly, he was also unable to comment

on the Unemployment Fund's opinion which was obtained by the Board for

Unemployment Benefits and taken into account both by that Board and by

the Insurance Court.

2.    Under Article 6 para. 1 as well as Article 13 of the Convention

the applicant also complains that he was denied a fair hearing in the

proceedings relating to his entitlement to a basic unemployment

allowance. Allegedly, the refusal to grant him such an allowance while

the appeal proceedings concerning the refusal to grant him a further

earnings-related allowance were pending sought to prevent him from

enjoying the benefits which he would have been entitled to, had his

appeals in this respect been successful.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 16 May 1993 and registered on

28 July 1993.

      On 18 October 1995 the Commission (First Chamber) decided to

communicate the application.

      The Government's written observations were submitted on 4 January

1996. The applicant replied on 15 January 1996.

      On 15 October 1996 the plenary Commission ordered the transfer

of the application to itself.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention that he was denied a fair hearing in the proceedings

relating to his entitlement to a further unemployment allowance on the

basis of the 1990 amendment to the 1984 Act. It is alleged that the

refusal to grant him such an allowance and the subsequent decisions to

reject his appeals had no basis in domestic law. The decisions on his

appeals allegedly included grounds which had not been invoked by the

Unemployment Fund in its refusal of his request. Allegedly, he was also

unable to comment on the Unemployment Fund's opinion which was obtained

by the Board for Unemployment Benefits and taken into account both by

that Board and by the Insurance Court.

      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, in so far

as it is relevant, as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

      ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a]

      ... tribunal established by law. ..."

      The Government dispute the applicability of Article 6 (Art. 6)

as the applicant had - prior to the entry into force of the 1990

amendment to the 1984 Act - lost his "right" to any further earnings-

related unemployment allowance. In the alternative, the Government

submit that Article 6 (Art. 6) has not been violated in the special

circumstances of the case. It is true that the Board for Unemployment

Benefits did not communicate to him the opinion of the Unemployment

Fund, where a reference was made to the instructions issued by the

Ministry for Social Affairs and Health. Nor was the Fund's opinion to

the Insurance Court communicated to him. However, the Fund's opinion

to the Board was virtually reproduced in that body's decision, as was

the Fund's opinion to the Insurance Court in the decision of that

court. The non-communicated submissions did not include any information

which was new to the applicant or which he could not have obtained by

consulting the case-file of the respective authorities.

      The Government stress that the case is distinguishable from the

case of Kerojärvi v. Finland (Eur. Court HR, judgment of 19 July 1995,

Series A no. 322) in that the present applicant, by virtue of his legal

profession, was aware of his possibility of consulting the case-files

and commenting on the various opinions as they had been reproduced

without that material having been formally communicated to him. In sum,

he had ample opportunity to challenge the lower authorities' views at

the latest in his appeal to the Insurance Court.

      The applicant contends that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies.

Under the 1990 amendment to the 1984 Act he retained his right to a

further earnings-related unemployment allowance. The instructions

issued by the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health effectively

restricted the scope of applicability of the 1990 amendment.

      The applicant also maintains that the proceedings were unfair.

The Unemployment Fund did not base its decision on the Ministry's

instructions and these were never communicated to him. Their inclusion

in the decision of the Board for Unemployment Benefits caught him by

surprise, as he had no reason to believe that the decisions would be

based on material which had not been communicated to him. His legal

profession is irrelevant, as the same requirement of fairness must

apply irrespective of someone's professional background.

      The Commission must ascertain whether Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention is applicable in the instant case and,

first, whether there was a dispute over a "right" which can be said,

at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The

dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the

actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its

exercise. Finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly

decisive for the right in question (e.g., the above-mentioned Kerojärvi

judgment, p. 12, para. 32).

      The Commission observes that the disagreement between the

applicant and the authorities concerned the question whether he was

still entitled to an earnings-related unemployment allowance under the

1984 Act as amended in 1990. This dispute related to the existence of

a "right" of the applicant which could be said, at least on arguable

grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The outcome of the

proceedings was, moreover, directly decisive, for the purposes of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), for that right. Consequently, there was

a genuine and serious dispute over a "right".

      The Commission has next examined whether the right at issue was

"civil" within the meaning of Article 6 para 1 (Art. 6-1). It recalls

that, as a general rule, this provision is applicable in the field of

social insurance, including even welfare assistance (Eur. Court HR,

Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no.

263-A, p. 17, para. 46; Salesi v. Italy judgment of 26 February 1993,

Series A no. 257-E, pp. 59-60, para. 19). Thus, State intervention

alone is not sufficient to establish that Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) is inapplicable. Other considerations might argue in favour

of the applicability, such as whether or not the applicant was affected

in his relations with the administrative authorities as such, acting

in the exercise of discretionary powers, or whether he suffered an

interference with his means of subsistence. It must further be

determined whether the applicant was claiming an individual, economic

right flowing from specific rules laid down by law (ibid.)

      The Commission observes that the right in question had certain

public law features in that it related to a allowance-scheme

established by law and administered by public authorities. However,

other considerations argue in favour of the applicability of Article

6 (Art. 6). The possibility for the applicant to obtain an earnings-

related allowance was dependent on, among other things, his membership

in the relevant Unemployment Fund prior to his loss of employment. The

allowance at issue was individual and pecuniary in nature and was aimed

at compensating for loss of means of subsistence resulting from

unemployment. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the

entitlement in issue was a "civil" right and that Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) therefore applies.

      The Commission must next examine whether the relevant proceedings

were "fair" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). It

recalls that it is normally not competent to deal with a complaint

alleging that errors of law and fact have been committed by domestic

courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved

a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the

Convention or one of its Protocols, for instance in that a judgment has

no legal justification and thereby violates a party's right to receive

a fair trial (cf. Eur. Court HR, De Moor v. Belgium judgment of 23 June

1994, para. 55, to be published in Series A no. 292-A; No. 7987/77,

Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45). The Commission's power to review

compliance with domestic law is limited (e.g., Eur. Court HR, Fredin

v. Sweden judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, pp. 16-17,

para. 50). As a general rule, it is for the domestic courts to assess

the evidence before them. The task of the Convention organs is to

ascertain whether the proceedings, considered as a whole, including the

way in which evidence was taken and submitted, were fair (e.g., Eur.

Court HR, Lüdi v. Switzerland judgment of 15 June 1992, Series A

no. 238, p. 20, para. 43).

      In the present case the Commission finds no indication that the

decisions of the authorities to refuse the applicant a further

earnings-related unemployment allowance lacked a legal justification.

As furthermore regards the fairness of the proceedings in themselves,

it is undisputed that the opinion on the applicant's appeal which the

Board for Unemployment Benefits had obtained from the Unemployment Fund

was not communicated to the applicant before the Board reached its

decision. The Commission notes, however, that the essence of the Fund's

opinion was reproduced in the decision of the Board for Unemployment

Benefits. In his appeal to the Insurance Court the applicant indeed

made reference to this opinion, thereby challenging those arguments

which in his view had not been put forward by the Unemployment Fund in

its own refusal of his request. He did not, however, complain about the

fact that the Board for Unemployment Benefits had not communicated the

Fund's opinion to him.

      It is true that before deciding on the applicant's appeal the

Insurance Court obtained observations thereon from the Unemployment

Fund. Although these observations were not communicated to the

applicant either, they were in essence similar to those which the Fund

had previously submitted to the Board for Unemployment Benefits. Thus

the Fund's position had already become known to the applicant and had

been challenged by him. Noting also that he did not in his appeal to

the Insurance Court refer to the Board's failure to communicate the

Fund's observations as an issue affecting the fairness of the

proceedings, the Commission considers that the non-communication by the

Insurance Court of the Fund's further observations does not suffice to

render the proceedings before that court unfair. In effect the

Insurance Court simply upheld the decision of the Board for

Unemployment Benefits by referring to the reasoning of that body.

      In these specific circumstances and considering the proceedings

as a whole, the Commission cannot find any indication that they were

unfair. Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article

6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in this respect.

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    Under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) as well as Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention the applicant also complains that he was

denied a fair hearing in the proceedings relating to his entitlement

to a basic unemployment allowance. Allegedly, the refusal to grant him

such an allowance while the appeal proceedings concerning the refusal

to grant him an earnings-related allowance under the 1991 amendment to

the 1984 Act were pending sought to prevent him from enjoying the

benefits which he would have been entitled to, had his appeal been

successful. In this respect the applicant also invokes Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention which reads as follows:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

      before a national authority notwithstanding that the

      violation has been committed by persons acting in an

      official capacity."

      The Government submit that in the special circumstances of the

case Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) has not been violated on this point

either. Although the opinions of the Employment Commission and the

Social Insurance Commission were not communicated to the applicant, the

opinion of the first-mentioned body was to the relevant extent

reproduced in the decision of the Board for Unemployment Benefits and

the opinion of the last-mentioned body only referred to the opinion of

the first-mentioned. As none of these submissions contained anything

new to the applicant, the Insurance Court, following its practice, did

not obtain his views on them.

      The Government furthermore submit that the applicant could also

have consulted the case-file of the respective authorities. As a lawyer

he therefore had ample opportunity to challenge the lower authorities'

views at the latest in his appeal to the Insurance Court.

      The applicant again contests the Government's views.

      The Commission has first considered the complaint under the

above-cited Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). Recalling the general

criteria for the applicability of that provision, it observes that the

present disagreement between the applicant and the authorities

concerned the question whether he was entitled to a basis unemployment

allowance under section 26 of the 1984 Act, as amended in 1990. The

Commission finds that this dispute equally concerned the existence of

a "right" of the applicant which could be said, at least on arguable

grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The outcome of the

proceedings was, moreover, directly decisive, for the purposes of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), for that right. Consequently, there was

a genuine and serious dispute over a "right".

      Recalling the above-cited case-law of the Convention organs on

the notion of "civil" rights, the Commission observes that also the

present right had certain public law-features in that it related to an

allowance-scheme established by law, administered by public authorities

and in this case apparently funded entirely by the State. However,

other considerations argue in favour of the applicability of Article

6 (Art. 6). The allowance now at issue was likewise individual and

pecuniary in nature and was aimed at compensating for loss of means of

subsistence resulting from unemployment. Accordingly, the Commission

concludes that the entitlement now in issue was also a "civil" right

and that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) therefore applies.

      Recalling the general principles governing the Convention organs'

assessment of the fairness of proceedings, the Commission has next

examined the compliance with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in the

present context. It observes that the applicant was denied a basic

unemployment allowance, since the pending appeal proceedings concerning

his entitlement to an earnings-related allowance was not found to be

a valid reason for his refusal to accept the employment offered to him.

The Commission finds no indication that this denial of the allowance

and the reasoning adduced therefor were not legally justified.

      Furthermore, as regards the fairness of the proceedings in

themselves, it is undisputed that the Board for Unemployment Benefits

obtained opinions both from the Employment Commission and from the

Social Insurance Commission without communicating them to the applicant

before deciding on his appeal. The Commission observes, however, that

the Employment Commission's opinion was in essence reproduced in the

decision of the Board for Unemployment Benefits and that, according to

the same decision, the Social Insurance Commission had, in its opinion,

referred to the opinion submitted by the Employment Commission. In his

appeal to the Insurance Court the applicant indeed challenged the

opinions of the Employment Commission and the Social Insurance

Commission. He did not, however, complain about the fact that the Board

for Unemployment Benefits had not communicated those opinions to him.

      It is true that before deciding on the applicant's appeal the

Insurance Court obtained observations thereon from the Social Insurance

Commission. Although these observations were not communicated to the

applicant either, they were in essence similar to those which the

Social Insurance Commission had previously submitted to the Board for

Unemployment Benefits. Thus the Social Insurance Commission's position

had already become known to the applicant and had been challenged by

him. Noting also that he did not in his appeal to the Insurance Court

refer to the Board's failure to communicate the opinions of the

Employment Commission and the Social Insurance Commission as an issue

affecting the fairness of the proceedings, the Commission considers

that the non-communication by the Insurance Court of the Social

Insurance Commission's further observations does not suffice to render

the proceedings before that court unfair. In effect the Insurance Court

simply upheld the decision of the Board for Unemployment Benefits by

referring to the reasoning of that body.

      In these specific circumstances and considering the proceedings

as a whole, the Commission cannot find any indication that they were

unfair. Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article

6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in this respect either.

      Having regard to its above conclusion, the Commission finds it

unnecessary to consider the complaint also under Article 13 (Art. 13),

given that the requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13) are less strict

than, and are here absorbed by, those of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

(e.g., Eur. Court HR, HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson v. Sweden judgment of

21 February 1990, Series A no. 171, p. 21, para. 69).

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

        H.C. KRÜGER                         S. TRECHSEL

         Secretary                            President

     to the Commission                    of the Commission