ALFORD AND 57 OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 26475/95 • ECHR ID: 001-3574
Document date: April 9, 1997
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 26475/95
by Geraldine ALFORD and 57 others
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 9 April 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs. J. LIDDY, President
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs. M. HION
Mr. R. NICOLINI
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 4 October 1994 by
Geraldine ALFORD and 57 others against the United Kingdom and
registered on 9 February 1995 under file No. 26475/95;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are all British citizens, a complete list is
annexed to this report. They are represented before the Commission by
Freeth Cartwright Hunt Dickins, a firm of solicitors practising in
Nottingham.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants'
representative, may be summarised as follows.
A. The particular circumstances of the case
Between 1988 and 1992 a large number of proceedings were issued
by individual plaintiffs who alleged that death or personal injury had
resulted from the taking of one or more Benzodiazepine drugs, which it
was alleged were addictive, induced dependency and caused physical,
psychological, social and intellectual impairment, mental distress and
potential drug withdrawal syndrome. Some plaintiffs made claims against
the manufacturers of the drugs alone and others claimed against both
the manufacturers and those who had prescribed the drugs ("the
prescribers"). Some of those who had prescribed the drugs were
consultant psychiatrists employed by Health Authorities and others were
general practitioners. It appears from the conduct of the case, that
the claims against the prescribers were brought in the alternative; the
plaintiffs only intended to pursue the claims against the prescribers
if the claims against the manufacturers failed.
The applicants were amongst the group of plaintiffs that sued
both the manufacturers and the prescribers of the drugs.
On 6 December 1990 a Practice Note was issued by the then Lord
Chief Justice, Lord Lane, that the progress of all of the
"Benzodiazepine" claims should be monitored by a single Judge,
Mr Justice Ian Kennedy (Kennedy J).
Kennedy J subsequently treated the claims concerning the
Benzodiazepine drugs as a multi-party action.
Although the cases were administered together, each claim was
issued separately and involved separate and individual claims for
damages. The plaintiffs in these domestic proceedings were not "joint
plaintiffs" but were a group of individuals whose claims were
administered together.
By October 1992 there were approximately 5,000 sets of
proceedings in the Benzodiazepine litigation. In approximately 3.4% of
these actions, the prescribers of the drug were joined with the
manufacturer as co-defendants. In 19 cases it was the consultant
psychiatrist employed by the relevant Health authority who was the
prescriber, and for whom the Health Authority was vicariously liable;
in approximately 150 cases the prescriber was the general practitioner;
there were also a small number of cases where the plaintiff claimed
against both the Health Authority and general practitioner, in addition
to the manufacturer.
On 23 October 1992 Kennedy J struck out the claims against the
Health Authority prescribers. The strike out was made pursuant to Order
18 Rule 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1981 and under the
inherent jurisdiction of the court, on the following grounds:
"that it would be unjust and an abuse of the process of the
court for the Health Authorities to be required to remain
in this litigation because:
i. They cannot properly defend the claims against them
without being present at the generic trial;
ii. The claims made against them could not reasonably have
been brought if the primary claims were not being
advanced;
iii. The cost to the Health Authorities of taking as
limited a part in the generic trial as they can fairly
take would bear no sensible relationship to any
benefit that the Plaintiffs might hope to obtain from
their inclusion."
On 15 March 1993 Kennedy J struck out the claims against the
general practitioner prescribers, pursuant to the same powers and
relying on the same reasons, but adding two additional reasons. The
first additional reason was that if the claims against the general
practitioners were stood over for possibly another 4 years (until after
the trial against the manufacturers), the treatments by the prescribers
would be 15 or more years in the past and many prescribers would be
either dead or disabled in their recollection. The second additional
reason resulted from the fact that the vast majority of the plaintiffs
were legally aided. Since the claims against the prescribers were only
going to be pursued if the action against the manufacturer failed, any
damages that legally aided plaintiffs might recover against the
prescribers, would be consumed by the legal aid charges for the costs
of the unsuccessful action against the manufacturers.
The applicants' claims against the manufacturers of the drugs
remained in existence, despite the striking out of the claims against
the prescribers.
The plaintiffs who had had claims against the prescribers,
appealed to the Court of Appeal against both striking out orders. The
applicants were among the group of plaintiffs who appealed. On
26 November 1993 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The Court
of Appeal stated inter alia that:
"in the absence of any plea by the manufacturers that any
negligent prescribing constituted a novus actus
interveniens, it is clear that if liability is established
against the manufacturers, they will be liable for all the
damages that can be proved to have been caused, including
any that is consequent upon the prescribers' prescription.
On the other hand, it is common ground that if the
Plaintiffs succeed only against the prescribers, the
quantum of damages recoverable will be very modest."
The Court of Appeal also stated that in most cases it would be
inappropriate to enter into a cost benefit analysis of the plaintiffs'
prospects of receiving a certain sum and the defendants' cost of
defending the action. However, in this case the prescriber defendants
would be put to astronomical expense in defending the contingent claims
and having their interests represented at the trial against the
manufacturers, which would involve issues relevant to the claims
against the prescribers, such as the side effects and addictive nature
of the drugs and the state of medical knowledge about the drugs at the
relevant time. In circumstances of such an extreme disparity, the
comparison of the plaintiffs' potential gain and defendants' costs of
litigation, was a relevant factor. The Court of Appeal was also of the
view that whilst there were significant advantages to group actions,
enabling plaintiffs to join together to bring a case which individually
would never be possible, group actions must not be conducted in a way
to do injustice to other parties. There would be injustice to the
prescriber defendants in this case, who would be locked into extremely
expensive litigation on a very large scale, despite being only
contingent co-defendants in a small number of cases.
At the hearing on 26 November 1993 leave to appeal to the House
of Lords was requested. The Court of Appeal rejected that application,
saying that such an application would have to be made to the House of
Lords itself.
Subsequently the House of Lords was petitioned for leave to
appeal against the Order of the Court of Appeal. On 27 June 1994 the
House of Lords rejected this petition.
B. Relevant domestic law
There is no specific body of rules of the Supreme Court providing
for special procedures in Multi-Party Actions.
Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1981 states:
"19. (1) The court may at any stage of the proceedings
order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the
indorsement of any writ in the action or anything in any
pleading or in the indorsement, on the ground that -
(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence,
as the case may be;
(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;or
(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of
the action;or
(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court;
and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or
judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be."
In addition to the powers under Order 18 Rule 19 the court also
has an inherent jurisdiction to dismiss actions which it holds to be
frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process.
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complain that the striking out of their claims
against the prescribers of the Benzodiazepine drugs, deprived them from
receiving a fair and public hearing by an impartial tribunal, and as
such constituted a breach of Article 6 of the Convention.
THE LAW
The applicants complain that as a result of the striking out of
their claims against the prescribers of Benzodiazepine drugs they were
deprived from access to court in violation of Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1).
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly
but the press and public may be excluded from all or part
of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society, where the
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private
life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests
of justice."
The Commission accepts that this case concerns civil rights and
obligations within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (see
Eur. Court HR, H v. France judgment of 28 November 1989, Series A no.
162, p. 20).
The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) secures
to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights
and obligations brought before a court or tribunal (see Eur. Court HR,
Golder v. United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18,
p. 18, para. 36 and Ashingdane v. United Kingdom judgment of 28 May
1985, Series A no. 93, p. 24, para. 55). However the Commission notes
that the right of access to a court is not absolute (see Eur. Court HR,
Golder v. United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18,
p. 18, para. 38).
Limitations on the right of access to court are permitted, due
to the fact that the right of access:
"by its very nature calls for regulation by the State,
regulation which may vary in time and in place according to
the needs and resources of the community and of
individuals." (see above mentioned Golder judgment, p. 19,
para. 38 quoting the "Belgian Linguistic" judgment of
23 July 1968, Series A no. 6, p. 32, para. 5).
The Commission recalls that the Contracting States enjoy a margin
of appreciation in laying down regulations restricting access to court.
However, notwithstanding the national authorities' margin of
appreciation, any restriction on access to courts must not be such that
the very essence of the right is impaired. The restriction must have
a legitimate aim and there must be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
achieved (see above-mentioned Ashingdane v. United Kingdom judgment of
28 May 1985, Series A no. 93, para. 59).
The Commission notes that in the present case the applicants did
initially have access to bring their claim to the High Court, and
proceedings were issued against the prescribers. However under domestic
procedure the applicants' claims were struck out by the High Court.
This strike out took place after there had been an oral hearing at
which the applicants were represented by counsel; further, the
applicants were able to and did appeal against the decision. There was
an oral hearing before the Court of Appeal, at which the applicants
were again represented by counsel. The Court of Appeal upheld the
ruling of the High Court that the claims against the prescribers be
struck out. Thus to this extent the applicants did have access to
court.
With regard to the striking out of the applicants' claim, the
Commission notes that the continuance of the claim against the
prescribers would have locked the prescribers into extremely costly
litigation, quite out of proportion to the likely damages that could
ever be recovered against them by the applicants. The Commission
further notes that the applicants were involved in multi-party
litigation, which gave them significant advantages by working together
and pooling resources against the principal defendant (the
manufacturer), and that the claim against the prescribers was at most
a contingent claim of limited value, to be pursued only, if at all
(given the limited value of the claim and the realities of the legal
aid position), if the principal claim against the manufacturers failed.
Despite the striking out of their claims against the prescribers, the
applicants' claims against the manufacturers in respect of the same
damages remained in existence. Thus the striking out did not deny the
applicants from pursuing damages but merely restricted them to suing
only the manufacturers of the drugs, whom the applicants themselves
considered as the principal defendants. In these circumstances the
Commission concludes that the decision by the national authorities to
strike out the applicants' claims against the prescribers, largely on
the basis of economic expediency, was a legitimate restriction which
did not impair the essence of the right to access to court.
In view of all the circumstances, the striking out of the
applicants claims does not disclose any appearance of the impairment
of the very essence of the applicants' "right to court" or a
transgression of the principle of proportionality.
It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
A N N E X
Applicant Nationality Date of birth Domicile
1. ALFORD Geraldine British not given Hillingdon
2. ASHDOWN Michael British 01.12.1936 Ringmer
3. BRAMHALL Donald British 03.06.1921 St. Helens
4. CASSIDY Chloe D. British 01.06.1945 Cornwall
5. CASTANOS Mary E. British 19.05.1928 Littlehampton
6. CLARENCE William British 18.12.1936 Prestwich
7. CLARK Bernard R. British 19.06.1928 Kingswood
8. COCKSHOTT Lilian British 31.12.1930 Middleton
9. DEMPSEY Elsie British 16.11.1940 Wythenshawe
10. DOUBTFIRE Elsie E. British 21.08.1942 Tyne & Wear
11. ELLIS James G. British 05.11.1947 Wigan
12. FRAIS Betty P. British 19.06.1933 Manchester
13. FRENCH James British 26.09.1946 London
14. GEU Margaret British 09.01.1925 Liverpool
15. GORMAN Francis British 26.08.1938 Reading
16. GRAY Glynis J. British 08.08.1948 Enfield
17. GRIFFITHS Ann V. British 10.08.1938 Cheetham
18. HAMBLETT Mark British 02.08.1957 Birmingham
19. GRANT-HANLON Terence British 12.07.1951 Liverpool
20. HARRISON Peter G. British 09.12.1954 Cobham
21. HOLMES Christine G. British 30.12.1949 Grasmoor
22. HOLT Kathleen British 01.03.1941 Birmingham
23. HUGHES Ann J. British 27.08.1939 Huddersfield
24. HUGHES Robert A. British 18.10.1947 Clwyd
25. INGRAM Delcia R. British 08.08.1932 Estover
26. KAY Jennifer E. British 24.02.1944 Rochdale
27. KENNEDY Peter E. British 27.06.1947 Rotherham
28. LAIDLER David British 11.08.1952 Tyne & Wear
29. TAMS(LOWE)Barbara A. British 20.08.1952 Stoke-on-Trent
30. MACGUGAN Duncan British 27.10.1933 Cronton
31. McCOURT June British 15.02.1944 Washington
32. MEEKS John A. British 29.09.1938 Milton Keynes
33. MERRIE Dudley British 25.02.1941 Huyton
34. MORGAN Gerwyn British 18.02.1945 Treharris
35. NICHOLLS Jean British 04.08.1944 Rochdale
36. NICHOLSON Irene M. British 14.08.1938 Northwood
37. OATES Edith British 18.11.1942 Carlisle
38. PEARCE Phyllis M. British 07.11.1948 Birmingham
39. REED George British 04.05.1924 Tyne & Wear
40. RICHARDSON James A. British 01.10.1939 Hanley
41. ROGER'S Lillian G. British 04.03.1928 Chatham
42. ROUNDHILL Betty British 25.02.1928 Hull
43. SCHOLEG John D. British 13.06.1944 Batley
44. SCOTT Getrude E. British 01.07.1918 Cliftonville
45. SCOTT Kathleen British 14.11.1947 Darwen
46. SERRET Bernadette M. British 05.12.1947 London
47. SERRET Sylvia T. British 22.09.1919 Stratford
48. SHAW Karen R. British 08.04.1942 Chadderton
49. THOMPSON John J. British 03.03.1931 Southport
50. TRUMAN Lorna British 16.06.1950 Bramcote
51. TWIGG Kathlene British 29.08.1940 Whiston
52. WALKER Rita C. British 27.09.1952 Hull
53. WARCHALOWSKI Witold British 20.11.1920 London
54. WATSON Brenda British 18.05.1933 Sutton on Sea
55. WELLS Valerie W. British 20.06.1939 Gillingham
56. WHARMBY Peter B. British 27.06.1951 Oldham
57. WILBOURNE Jean British 25.04.1925 Grassmoor
58. WILLIAMS Wesley C. British 07.10.1947 Derby
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