AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 21752/93

                      by Edwin KRICKL

                      against Austria

     The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 21 May 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE, President

           MM.   J.-C. GEUS

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 K. HERNDL

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Ms.   M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 24 February 1993

by Edwin KRICKL against Austria and registered on 27 April 1993 under

file No. 21752/93;

     Having regard to :

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

     20 March 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the

     applicant on 24 April 1995;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is an Austrian citizen, born in 1920 and residing

in Linz.  In the proceedings before the Commission he is represented

by Mr. K. Steiner, a lawyer practising in Linz.

     The facts, as they have been submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

A.   Particular circumstances of the case

     The applicant is the owner of land in Bad Ischl (Upper Austria),

comprising two parcels of building land, registered in the Ahorn land

register (Grundbuch) as Nos. 310/99 and 310/100.  The latter parcel is

situated adjacent to parcel No. 310/101 owned by the applicant's

neighbour R.B.

     On 22 October 1973 the Mayor of Bad Ischl granted R.B. a building

permit for a house on his land in which the minimum distance from the

border of the parcel was fixed at 4 metres.  This condition was in

accordance with the building plan (Bebauungsplan) of 1985 for that

area.

     When starting the construction works for his house R.B. did not

comply with the above condition and the house was built at a distance

of two metres from the neighbouring parcel owned by the applicant.  On

6 August 1976, following a complaint by the applicant, the Mayor

ordered the interruption of the construction works.  On 5 July 1978 the

Mayor ordered R.B. to apply for a retrospective building permit or to

remove the construction.

     On 22 November 1978 the Municipal Council (Gemeinderat) of Bad

Ischl amended the building plan.  The amendment consisted, inter alia,

in the division of the two parcels of land owned by the applicant in

three parcels of building land, a narrow road between the applicant's

land and the land of R.B., and the fixing of a minimum distance of 0,5

metres for buildings to be erected on R.B.'s land.  After having been

approved by the Regional Government, the amended building plan entered

into force on 25 April 1979.

     On 20 November 1985 the Mayor granted a retroactive building

permit to R.B.  On 6 February 1987 the Municipal Council (Gemeinderat)

dismissed the applicant's appeal against the building permit and on

2 June 1987 the Upper Austrian Regional Government (Landesregierung)

dismissed the applicant's further appeal.

     Subsequently the applicant filed a complaint against the Regional

Government's decision with the Constitutional Court

(Verfassungsgerichtshof).  He submitted that the decision had been

based on an unlawful decree, namely the building plan of

22 November 1978.

     On 30 September 1989 the Constitutional Court found the amendment

of the building plan of Bad Ischl, as far as parcel No. 310/101 owned

by R.B. was concerned, to be incompatible with the Upper Austrian

Regional Planning Act (Raumordnungsgesetz).  On 5 December 1989 the

Constitutional Court therefore upheld the applicant's individual

complaint against the final decision of the regional authorities

regarding the lawfulness of R.B.'s building permit.  Proceedings were

then resumed before the local and regional authorities.

     On 22 June 1990 the Bad Ischl Municipality Council quashed the

Mayor's decision of 20 November 1985 granting R.B. a building permit.

By letter of 14 January 1991 the Mayor of Bad Ischl informed the

applicant that, on 5 October 1990, R.B. had been ordered to demolish

his house within eight years.

     On 1 February 1991 the applicant, claiming to be a party to the

proceedings regarding the demolition order, lodged an appeal against

the Mayor's demolition order of 5 October 1990, challenging, inter

alia, the length of the period which his neighbour had been granted for

the compliance with this order.

     On 27 February 1991 the Municipal Council rejected the appeal as

being inadmissible.  Referring to the constant case-law of the

Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) on this matter it found

that the applicant had no locus standi in the proceedings at issue

because neighbours were not a party to proceedings for a demolition

order.

     By letter of 3 June 1991 the Upper Austrian Regional Government

informed the Mayor that the applicant had lodged a further appeal

(Vorstellung) against the demolition order of 5 October 1990.  It

stated that under the law in force the applicant clearly had no locus

standi in proceedings for a demolition order.  However, the Regional

Government had doubts whether the length of the time-limit granted to

R.B. in the demolition order was in compliance with Section 87 para. 2

of the Constitutional Court Act.  If the Regional Government on further

consideration of the matter would arrive at the conclusion that the

decision was unlawful it would consider quashing the demolition in the

exercise of its supervisory function (Aufsichtsrecht).

     On 30 December 1991 the Upper Austrian Regional Government

dismissed the applicant's further appeal.  It found that the decision

given in the proceedings regarding the demolition order did not

infringe the applicant's rights as he had no locus standi in these

proceedings.

     On 19 February 1992 the applicant lodged a complaint with the

Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof).  He complained about the

refusal of the authorities to accept him as a party to the proceedings

regarding the demolition order and relied in this respect on Article 6

of the Convention.  He further complained that the excessive time-limit

granted for the compliance with the demolition order violated his

property rights because he could not sell his land at an appropriate

price as long as the neighbour's building had not been demolished.

     On 24 June 1992 the Constitutional Court declined to entertain

the applicant's complaint for lack of prospect of success and referred

the case to the Administrative Court.

     On 10 November 1992 the Administrative Court dismissed the

applicant's complaint.  It referred to its constant case-law regarding

the relevant provisions of the Upper Austrian Building Regulations

(Oberösterreichische Bauordnung) according to which neighbours were not

to be considered as a party to proceedings for a demolition order.

     Subsequently, the applicant filed a complaint (Beschwerde) with

the Ombudsman's Office (Volksanwaltschaft) relating to the above

events.

     On 13 January 1994 the Ombudsman's Office issued a recommendation

(Empfehlung) concerning the applicant's complaint.  It considered that

the fixing of a time-limit of eight years for complying with the

demolition order and the failure of the Regional Government to quash

the demolition order in the exercise of its supervisory function

constituted an undesirable state of affairs in public administration

(Mißstand im Bereich der öffentlichen Verwaltung).  It recommended to

the Regional Government to exercise its supervisory powers.  The

Ombudsman's Office found that neither the Constitutional Court nor the

Administrative Court in their respective proceedings could have

examined whether the time-limit had been appropriate.  Nevertheless,

the Regional Government should have quashed the demolition order ex

officio in the exercise of its supervisory powers and the building

authorities should have fixed a shorter time-limit.

     On 11 April 1995 the Ombudsman's Office informed the applicant

that the Regional Government saw no possibility to follow the

Ombudsman's Office's recommendation.

B.   Relevant domestic law

     Section 61 of the Upper Austrian Building Regulations

(Bauordnung), in the version applicable in the present case, reads as

follows:

[Translation]

     "In case the building authority establishes that a building

     requiring a  building permit is being or has been erected without

     such a permit, it shall make an order requesting the owner of the

     construction to either retroactively request a permit within a

     reasonable period of time to be determined by the authority, or

     else to demolish the construction, again within a reasonable

     period of time to be determined by the authority.  The

     possibility to apply retrospectively for a building permit shall

     not be granted if under the law in force a building permit cannot

     be granted."

[German]

     "Stellt die Baubehörde fest, daß eine bewilligungspflichtige

     bauliche Anlage ohne Baubewilligung ausgeführt wird oder bereits

     ausgeführt wurde, so hat sie dem Eigentümer mit Bescheid

     aufzutragen, entweder nachträglich innerhalb einer angemessen

     festzusetzenden Frist um die Baubewilligung anzusuchen oder die

     bauliche Anlage innerhalb einer weiters festzusetzenden Frist zu

     beseitigen.  Die Möglichkeit, nachträglich um die Baubewilligung

     anzusuchen, ist dann nicht einzuräumen, wenn nach der

     maßgeblichen Rechtslage eine Baubewilligung nicht erteilt werden

     kann."

     Section 87 para. 2 of the Constitutional Court Act of 1953

provides as follows:

[Translation]

     "If the Constitutional Court allows a complaint, the

     administrative authorities are under the obligation to

     re-establish in the case at issue with the use of all the powers

     granted to them by law and without delay a legal situation

     corresponding to the legal opinion expressed by the

     Constitutional Court."

[German]

     "Wenn der Verfassungsgerichtshof einer Beschwerde stattgegeben

     hat, sind die Verwaltungsbehörden verpflichtet, in dem

     betreffenden Fall mit den ihnen zu Gebote stehenden rechtlichen

     Mitteln unverzüglich den der Rechtsanschauung des

     Verfassungsgerichtshofes entsprechenden Rechtszustand

     herzustellen."

     Section 8 of the General Administrative Procedure Act

(Allgemeines Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) reads as follows:

[Translation]

     "Persons who make use of the service of a public authority or who

     are subject to acts by a public authority are participants to

     proceedings.  However, insofar as they take part in the

     proceedings on the basis of a right granted to them or an

     interest protected by the law they are parties."

[German]

     "Personen, die eine Tätigkeit einer Behörde in Anspruch nehmen

     oder auf die sich die Tätigkeit einer Behörde bezieht, sind

     Beteiligte und, insoweit sie an der Sache vermöge eines

     Rechtsanspruches oder eines rechtlichen Interesses beteiligt

     sind, Parteien."

     According to the constant case-law of the Constitutional Court

and the Administrative Court Section 8 of the General Administrative

Procedure Act only grants procedural rights in administrative

proceedings but does not grant substantive rights.  Whether or not a

person has, in administrative proceedings, the position of a party

depends on whether he or she can rely on provisions of administrative

law which grant a subjective right (see Antoniolli-Koja, Allgemeines

Verwaltungsrecht, Second Edition, Vienna 1986, p. 274 with reference

to VwSlg. [Collection of Decisions of the Administrative Court]

5258A/1960, 5722A/1962, 6115A/1963, 7488A/1969, 7662A/1969, 7810A/1970,

8498A/1973; VfSlg. [Collection of Decisions of the Constitutional

Court] 1650/1948, 4227/1962, 5358/1966, 6257/1970; Walter-Mayer,

Grundriß des österreichischen Verwaltungsverfahrensrechts, sixth

edition 1995, p. 48 with reference to Administrative Court

9 November 1982, 82/15/0112; 30 September 1992, 89/03/0224 and

VfSlg. 11.934).

     As regards the issuing of orders in building law proceedings, in

particular concerning the permit to use a building after a building

permit has been issued and the building has been erected

(Benützungsbewilligung) or demolition orders, the Administrative Court,

having regard to the specific Building Regulations, has constantly held

that the neighbour is no party to such proceedings (see Administrative

Court 23 September 1968, 1251/68; 29 February 1972, 120/72;

20 November 1972, 1410/72; 18 September 1973, 1365/73;

26 February 1974, 98/74; 12 February 1981, VwSlg. 10368/A;

15 September 1983, 83/06/0146; 29 January 1985, 83/05/0189;

12 February 1985, 85/05/0012; 28 April 1992, 91/05/0204; Dolp, Die

Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, second edition 1987; p. 224 ff.).

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that

he did not have a fair hearing in the proceedings for the demolition

order, because the Austrian authorities and courts had refused to

decide on the merits of his appeals and complaints and to accept him

as a party to the proceedings on the demolition order.

     The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that

his right to respect for his property has been infringed.  He submits

that it was arbitrary to grant an unreasonably long time-limit of eight

years for compliance with the demolition order.  The building on his

neighbour's land had been erected unlawfully and as long as the

building is not removed it is impossible to sell the applicant's

property at an adequate price.  He also invokes Article 14 of the

Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 24 February 1993 and registered

on 27 April 1993.

     On 12 October 1994 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government.

     The Government's written observations were submitted on

20 March 1995, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that

purpose.  The applicant replied on 24 April 1995.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention that he did not have a fair hearing in the proceedings on

the demolition order.

     Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, as far as

relevant, provides as follows:

     "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

     ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing

     ...    by an independent and impartial tribunal established

     by law."

     The Government submit that the proceedings concerning the

demolition of a house built on an adjacent parcel of land were purely

a matter of public law and had no direct bearing on any of the

applicant's civil rights.  According to the constant case-law of the

Administrative Court neighbours have no valid claim as regards the

demolition of an illicitly erected building and therefore cannot be a

party to administrative proceedings in the course of which a decision

on a demolition order is taken by the building authority.  Such a right

can neither be derived from Section 61 of the Upper Austria Building

Regulations nor from Section 87 para. 2 of the Constitutional Court

Act.  The applicant therefore has no civil right within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention as regards the

demolition order as this provision does not grant new rights which had

not been recognised previously by domestic law.

     In any event, by quashing the building permit on 22 June 1990 and

by issuing a demolition order on 5 October 1990 the competent building

authorities have speedily complied with the Constitutional Court's

decision of 5 December 1989 by which the building permit granted to the

neighbour had been quashed.

     This is disputed by the applicant.  In his view he did have a

subjective right under domestic law to request the demolition of his

neighbour's building.  If the Administrative Court, which denied him

locus standi in the proceedings for the demolition order, would have

interpreted correctly Section 8 of the General Administrative Procedure

Act it should have granted him locus standi.  Furthermore, the

administrative authorities had not complied with the Constitutional

Court's decision of 5 December 1989 because they had failed to order

the immediate demolition of his neighbour's building.

     The applicant submits that the case-law of the Administrative

Court according to which neighbours had no locus standi in proceedings

for a demolition order was problematic as it led to a situation where

a neighbour who had succeeded in having the building permit granted to

his neighbour quashed was nevertheless deprived of the possibility to

have this decision appropriately enforced.  Since under the building

regulations he was entitled to claim that his neighbour respect the

minimum distance from his land, he must have had the possibility to

have this right enforced.  From these considerations it was apparent

that he should have been accepted by the authorities as a party to the

proceedings regarding the demolition order.

     The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) extends

only to "contestations" (disputes) over (civil) "rights and

obligations" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be

recognised under domestic law (Eur. Court HR, Oerlemans v. the

Netherlands judgment of 27 November 1991, Series A no. 219, pp. 20-21,

paras. 45-49).  Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is not aimed at creating

new substantive rights, without a legal basis in the Contracting State,

but at providing procedural protection of rights already recognised in

domestic law (Eur. Court HR, W. v. United Kingdom judgment of 8 July

1987, Series A no. 121-A, p. 32, para. 73; Kraska v. Switzerland

judgment of 19 April 1993, Series A no. 254-B, p. 48, para. 24; Zander

v. Sweden judgment of 25 November 1993, Series A no. 279, p. 39, para.

24).

     The Commission observes that Austrian law, in particular the

Building Regulation at issue, did not provide for locus standi of a

neighbour in proceedings regarding a demolition order.  Also Section 8

of the General Administrative Procedure Act, like Article 6 (Art. 6)

of the Convention itself, only transforms substantive rights in

procedural rights, but does not guarantee itself a particular

substantive right.  In this respect the Commission refers to the

constant case-law of the Administrative Court and the findings of the

Austrian courts and authorities in the present proceedings, which found

that according to the Upper Austrian Building Regulations a neighbour

is not entitled to make objections to any decisions taken in the course

of proceedings regarding a demolition order.

     In these circumstances the Commission finds that in the

proceedings regarding the demolition order the applicant could not rely

on a right recognised under domestic law and that Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1)  was consequently not applicable to these proceedings.

     The applicant submits, however, that although he had succeeded

in having his neighbour's building permit quashed he nevertheless was

deprived of the possibility to have this decision appropriately

enforced.

     The Commission finds that these submissions raise a further issue

to be examined under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

In this respect it recalls that in the Hornsby case the European Court

of Human Rights found that the right of access to court also includes

the right to be sufficiently protected against the refusal of state

authorities to comply with a court judgment (Eur. Court HR, Hornsby v.

Greece judgment of 19 march 1997, paras. 40-41, to be published in

Reports 1997-I). The relevant passage of the judgment reads as follows:

     "40.  The Court reiterates that, according to its established

     case-law, Article 6 § 1 (Art. 6-1) secures to everyone the right

     to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations

     brought before a court or tribunal; in this way it embodies the

     `right to a court', of which the right of access, that is the

     right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters,

     constitutes one aspect (see the Philis v. Greece (no. 1) judgment

     of 27 August 1991, Series A no. 209, p. 20, para. 59).  However,

     that right would be illusory if a Contracting State's domestic

     legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain

     inoperative to the detriment of one party.  It would be

     inconceivable that Article 6 (Art. 6) should describe in detail

     procedural guarantees afforded to litigants - proceedings that

     are fair, public and expeditious - without protecting the

     implementation of judicial decisions; to construe Article 6

     (Art. 6 as being concerned exclusively with access to a court and

     the conduct of proceedings would be likely to lead to situations

     incompatible with the principle of the rule of law which the

     Contracting States undertook to respect when they ratified the

     Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, the Golder v. the United

     Kingdom judgment of 7 May 1974, Series A no. 18, pp. 16-18,

     paras. 34-36).  Execution of a judgment given by any court must

     therefore be regarded as an integral part of the `trial' for the

     purposes of Article 6 (Art. 6); moreover, the Court has already

     accepted this principle in cases concerning the length of

     proceedings (see, most recently, the Di Pede v. Italy and Zappia

     v. Italy judgments of 26 September 1996, to be published in

     Reports 1996-I).

     41.   The above principles are of even greater importance in the

     context of administrative proceedings concerning a dispute whose

     outcome is decisive for a litigant's civil rights.  By lodging

     an application for judicial review with the State's highest

     administrative court the litigant seeks not only annulment of the

     impugned decision but also and above all the removal of its

     effects.  The effective protection of a party to such proceedings

     and the restoration of legality presuppose an obligation on the

     administrative authorities' part to comply with a judgment of

     that court.  The Court observes in this connection that the

     administrative authorities form one element of a State subject

     to the rule of law and their interests accordingly coincide with

     the need for the proper administration of justice.  Where

     administrative authorities refuse or fail to comply, or even

     delay doing so, the guarantees under Article 6 (Art. 6) enjoyed

     by a litigant during the judicial phase of the proceedings are

     rendered devoid of purpose."

     The Commission observes that in the Ortenberg case the Court

recognised that proceedings for the granting of a building permit to

a particular person also involve the determination of a civil right of

the neighbour who opposes a building permit.  The Court found that in

such proceedings pecuniary interests of the opposing neighbour could

be at stake and therefore found the civil right limb of Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) to be applicable (Eur. Court HR, Ortenberg v.

Austria judgment of 25 November 1994, Series A no. 295-B, p. 48-49,

paras. 28).  Moreover, under Austrian law, as can also be seen from the

present case, the right of a neighbour to be a party to proceedings

regarding a building permit is explicitly recognised.

     The Commission therefore has to examine whether the order

addressed to the applicant's neighbour to demolish his house within a

period of eight years is in accordance with the principles set out by

the European Court of Human Rights in the above Hornsby case.

     The Commission finds, however, that there are significant

differences between the situation of the present applicant and Mr and

Mrs Hornsby, the applicants in the case referred to above.  While the

granting of a license for running a language school to Mr and Mrs

Hornsby, which was the subject matter of the dispute in the above case,

may be considered as the only appropriate response to a decision by

which the refusal of such a licence had been quashed, this is not true

for the demolition of the neighbour's building in the present case.

     The applicant was successful in the proceedings for the granting

of a building permit to his neighbour, and such a permit had therefore

been refused.  The Commission cannot find, however, that this should

automatically give the applicant a right to have the building

immediately destroyed.  Demolition would only be one possibility to

give effect to the decision rendered in the building permit

proceedings.  Another possibility would be pecuniary compensation to

the applicant for the alleged damage caused by the unlawfully erected

building.  Thus, the applicant could have introduced civil proceedings

against his neighbour for compensation if he had actually sustained

prejudice because of the illicit construction and/or official liability

proceedings against the Municipality arguing that the lengthy time-

limit granted for the compliance with the demolition order was

unlawful, that he could not otherwise challenge this decision, and that

this decision had caused him prejudice.  The applicant, however, did

not choose these avenues but insisted on the immediate demolition of

his neighbour's building and he did so although he must have been aware

that in view of Austrian law as in force he could not have obtained any

decision in his favour in the proceedings regarding the demolition

order.

     Furthermore, the authorities, after the Constitutional Court has

given its decision on 5 December 1989, have reacted without delay as

they quashed the building permit and ordered the demolition of the

building.

     Taking these circumstances into account, the Commission cannot

find that there is any appearance of a violation of the applicant's

rights under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in the

proceedings regarding the building permit or the demolition order.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.   The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

that the lengthy time-limit granted to his neighbour for compliance

with the demolition order violated his right to respect for his

property rights.  He submits that it was arbitrary to grant an

unreasonably long time-limit of eight years for compliance with the

demolition order.  The building on his neighbour's land had been

erected unlawfully and as long as the building is not removed it is

impossible to sell his property at an adequate price.  He also invokes

Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

     The Commission finds that this complaint falls to be considered

under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), which reads as follows:

     "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

     enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his

     possessions except in the public interest and subject to the

     conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of

     international law.

     The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair

     the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary

     to control the use of property in accordance with the general

     interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions

     or penalties."

     The Government submit that the proceedings at issue neither

deprived the applicant of his property rights nor contained any

restriction on the use of his land.  The amended building plan which

allowed for a more densely structured built-up area would have led to

an increase in the value of the applicant's property, as similarly

structured development areas are generally selling at a much higher

rate.  It was however this very amendment of the building plan which

was later quashed by the Constitutional Court at the applicant's

request.  In any event, the applicant's allegation that he was unable

to sell his property at a reasonable price has not been further

substantiated in any way.

     This is disputed by the applicant.  He submits that it must be

considered as obvious that the market value of his land was diminished

because the neighbour's building was erected in violation of the

minimum distance.  Because of the diminished market value of his land

he could not freely dispose of it.  There was no question of an

increase of the value of his property as no owner wished that the

neighbour lived too close to himself.

     The Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

comprises three distinct rules.  The first rule, set out in the first

sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates

the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property.  The second rule,

contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers

deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions.

The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that

Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the

use of property in accordance with the general interest.  The three

rules are not "distinct" in the sense  of being unconnected: the second

and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference

with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore

be construed in the light of the general principles enunciated in the

first rule (e.g. Eur. Court HR, Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden judgment of

23 October 1989, Series A no. 163, para. 53).

     The Commission observes that the applicant was not prevented by

law from disposing of his land as he wished to do as he could build on

it or sell it.  The Commission therefore finds that the situation

complained of did not amount to a deprivation of the applicant's

possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of the first

paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-1-2).  Nor did it constitute a control

of the use of the applicant's property which would have to be examined

under the second paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-2).

     It remains to ascertain whether the situation complained of

amounts to an interference with the rights guaranteed to the applicant

in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-1-1).

     The applicant argues that his right to dispose of his land was

in fact limited because of the authorities' failure to have the

building on his neighbour's land demolished. In this respect the

Commission observes that the neighbour had the right to build on his

land and that the unlawfulness of the neighbour's building lay in the

fact that the building he had erected was situated two metres too close

to the applicant's land.  The Commission finds however, that the

applicant has not sufficiently substantiated that this fact led to a

loss of value of his land or that he could not be compensated for such

loss if any.

     Moreover, if the applicant's only interest was to achieve a

higher price for his land it does not appear unreasonable that the

value of his land could have been increased by having it divided in

more parcels, as provided for in the amendment of the building plan,

since this may have led to more parcels which were building land.

     Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of the

applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions as

guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

     It follows that also this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

   M.-T. SCHOEPFER                              G.H. THUNE

      Secretary                                  President

to the Second Chamber                      of the Second Chamber