AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 33283/96

                      by Anders and Gun PARADIS

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 2 July 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE, President

           MM.   J.-C. GEUS

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Ms.   M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 20 July 1996 by

Anders and Gun Paradis against Sweden and registered on 1 October 1996

under file No. 33283/96;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicants, a married couple, are Swedish citizens and were

born in 1946 and 1950, respectively.  The first applicant is a

clergyman and the second applicant is an instructor of data processing.

They reside in Angered.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

Taking into public care

      In the beginning of 1995 the Social District Council

(stadsdelsnämnden) of Lärjedalen, Göteborg, applied to the County

Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Göteborg and Bohus

for a care order concerning the applicants' sons Mattias, born in 1977,

Johan, born in 1979, Mikael, born in 1982, and Stefan, born in 1984.

The application was made pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of the Act with

Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (Lagen med särskilda

bestämmelser om vård av unga, 1990:52; hereinafter "the 1990 Act"),

according to which compulsory care is to be provided if there is a

clear risk of impairment of the health and development of a person

under 18 years of age due to ill-treatment, exploitation, lack of care

or any other condition in the home and if the necessary care cannot be

provided with the consent of the young person's custodian.  The Council

claimed that the sons' health had already been impaired due to physical

and mental ill-treatment and that there was a clear risk of further

impairment.

      After having held an oral hearing in the case, the County

Administrative Court, on 24 February 1995, granted the Social District

Council's application and ordered that the children be taken into

public care.  The court noted that the Council's investigation

contained information from several different sources on physical and

mental ill-treatment of the children.  Particular regard was had to a

report from the Children's Psychiatric Clinic (Barn- och

ungdomspsykiatriska mottagningen) in Angered, which included such

information given by the family members themselves.  The court also

took into account the statement of the chief physician at the clinic,

according to whom all the children were in need of psychiatric help on

account of the conditions in their home.

      The applicants, Mattias and Johan appealed to the Administrative

Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Göteborg.  The appellate court held

a further hearing in the case.  By judgment of 13 June 1995, it upheld

the care order in so far as it concerned Johan and Stefan but

discontinued the public care of Mattias and Mikael.  The court found

the investigation in the case to show that the conditions in the

applicants' home had at times been chaotic and that the children had

been punished, sometimes physically, by their father.  Mattias, Johan

and Stefan had on different occasions run away from home and school.

According to the court, Johan and Stefan had problems which required

therapeutic treatment.  In addition, Stefan had been diagnosed as

having a brain damage from birth and showed autistic signs.  Their

special care needs could not be met by the applicants.  Noting that the

children had different personalities and that Mattias and Mikael had

been less affected by the conditions in the family, the court found

that there were not sufficient grounds for taking Mattias and Mikael

into compulsory care.       On 6 July 1995 the Supreme Administrative

Court (Regeringsrätten) refused leave to appeal against the judgment

of the Administrative Court of Appeal.

Placement of Johan

      By decision of 10 May 1995, the Social District Council placed

Johan at the Tallbacken Children's Home (behandlingshem) in Vaxholm,

which later changed its name to the Roslagen Pupils' Home (elevhem).

The applicants did not appeal against the initial placement decision.

      On 17 October 1995 the Council decided that the placement of

Johan should continue.  The applicants appealed and requested that he

be placed in a Christian home.

      By decision of 22 December 1995, the County Administrative Court

found that no appeal lay from the decision of 17 October 1995.  The

court referred to Section 41 of the 1990 Act, according to which only

decisions concerning an initial placement or a change of placement

could be appealed against.  Moreover, according to the travaux

préparatoires to the Section in question, also a decision refusing a

request for a removal of the child from the home where he or she was

staying could be appealed against.  As none of these situations was at

hand, the appeal was dismissed.  On 11 March 1996 this decision was

upheld on appeal by the Administrative Court of Appeal.  On 8 May 1996

the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.

      On 19 January 1996 the applicants requested the Social District

Council to remove Johan from the Roslagen Pupils' Home.  On

5 March 1996 Johan ran away from the home.  After having been in hiding

for two months, he is now living with a Christian family in Göteborg.

Apparently, the Council has not taken any decision in regard to the

applicant's removal request.

Restrictions on access

      By decision of 19 March 1996, the Social District Council refused

the applicants access to Johan, by personal visits and by telephone

calls, for a period of three months.  The applicants appealed against

the decision.

      By judgment of 25 April 1996, the County Administrative Court

rejected the appeal.  It found the investigation in the case to show

that the applicants had a negative impact on Johan and that his

contacts with them hampered his development and his ability to profit

from the treatment he was undergoing at the Roslagen Pupils' Home.

Noting that Johan had run away from the home on 5 March 1996 and that

his whereabouts were still unknown, the court considered that his

escape had been supported by the applicants.  The court thus concluded

that there were sufficient grounds for the Council's decision.

      Upon the applicants' further appeal, the Administrative Court of

Appeal, on 23 May 1996, set aside the County Administrative Court's

judgment, noting that the Council on 16 April 1996, i.e. before that

judgment, had revoked the access restrictions.

Placement and continued care of Stefan, legal aid

      On 5 May 1995 Stefan was placed with foster parents in Vårgårda

in a so-called home for care and housing (hem för vård och boende;

hereinafter "HVB").  The applicants appealed against the placement,

requesting that he be placed in a Christian home where the parents were

regular churchgoers.

      The County Administrative Court held an oral hearing, at which

it heard the applicants, Stefan's counsel and representatives of the

Social District Council.  By judgment of 21 August 1995, it rejected

the applicants' appeal.  The court noted that Stefan, in accordance

with the applicants' wishes, had been placed in a special school due

to his brain damage.  The school's requirement that he be placed in an

HVB had led to the placement with the foster parents in question, one

of the few homes which accepted children with Stefan's special

problems.  The court noted that no complaints had previously been made

against the foster parents and found that Stefan had had a positive

development with them.  Moreover, he was allowed to practise his faith

and the foster parents were willing to take him to church.

      The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal

which held a further hearing and heard, in addition to the persons who

had appeared before the County Administrative Court, three witnesses

and a representative of the County Administrative Board

(länsstyrelsen).  On 13 December 1995 it rejected the appeal on

basically the same grounds as the County Administrative Court.

      On 22 January 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the

applicants leave to appeal.

      On 16 August 1996 the applicants requested that the public care

of Stefan be terminated and that he be allowed to move back to the

applicants.  On 15 September 1996 Stefan ran away from his foster

parents and the Social District Council has, as a consequence, not

taken any decision in regard to the applicant's request.  He is

presently in hiding and has refused to take part in an investigation

at the Children's Psychiatric Clinic, as requested by the Council.

      The applicants applied for legal aid in the case concerning

termination of care and requested that a designated lawyer, Mrs. Siv

Westerberg, be appointed.  On 9 September 1996 the County

Administrative Court noted that the applicants were entitled to a legal

aid lawyer but found that the lawyer in question did not have the

necessary qualifications.  The request for appointment of that lawyer

was accordingly rejected and the applicants were given an opportunity

to name another lawyer.  On 19 September 1996 this decision was upheld

by the Administrative Court of Appeal and on 5 November 1996 the

Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.

      Later the applicants requested that the County Administrative

Court instead appoint Mrs. Ruby Harrold-Claesson as their legal aid

lawyer.  This request was refused on 14 November 1996 on the same

grounds as the decision not to appoint Mrs. Westerberg.  The

applicants' appeal was rejected by the Administrative Court of Appeal

on 20 December 1996.  The applicants have since made an appeal to the

Supreme Administrative Court where, apparently, the case is presently

pending.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicants complain of the taking into care of their

children.  They maintain that the Social District Council investigation

which served as a basis for the taking into care was biased and

contained misinterpretations and distorted facts.  Furthermore, the

measure in question was made in disregard of the applicants' and their

children's Christian faith and traditions.

2.    The applicants also complain about the placements of Johan and

Stefan in their respective homes where, allegedly, they have received

inferior treatment or none at all.  Furthermore, they have been placed

in non-Christian settings which shows a contempt for their Christian

faith.  The placements constitute a denial of the parents' right to

educate their children in a religious manner and limit the children's

freedom of religion.  Allegedly, Johan and Stefan are not allowed to

attend church services.

3.    Moreover, the applicants challenge the decision of the Social

District Council of 19 March 1996 to restrict their access to Johan.

4.    The applicants further claim that the court proceedings in the

case have not been impartial, as the courts have had to rely on biased

statements of psychologists employed by the social authorities.

5.    The applicants also complain about the courts' refusal to appoint

either of the lawyers designated by them in the case concerning

termination of the care of Stefan.

6.    The applicants also claim, inter alia, that Johan and Stefan have

been physically assaulted at their respective homes, that Johan has had

his personal belongings stolen or destroyed, that the treatment of

Stefan has led to his expressing suicidal thoughts and that the

children have been denied their freedom of speech by the restrictions

on telephone calls and by the fact that their sentiments have been

neglected by the social authorities and the courts.  Moreover, by

denying the children the right to take part in, inter alia, church

services and recreational activities, their right to freedom of

association has been violated.

      The applicants invoke Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13,

14, 17 and 25 of the Convention, Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 to

the Convention and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the

Convention.

THE LAW

1.    The applicants complain of the taking into care of their

children.  They maintain that the Social District Council investigation

which served as a basis for the taking into care was biased and

contained misinterpretations and distorted facts.  Furthermore, the

measure in question was made in disregard of the applicants' and their

children's Christian faith and traditions.

      The Commission, however, is not required to decide whether or not

the facts alleged by the applicants disclose any appearance of a

violation of the Articles invoked as, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention, it "may only deal with the matter ... within a period of

six months from the date on which the final decision was taken".  The

Commission recalls that the taking into care of Johan and Stefan became

final by the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of

6 July 1995 not to grant the applicants leave to appeal.  The present

application was introduced on 20 July 1996, which is more than

six months after this decision.  It follows that this part of the

application has been introduced out of time and must be rejected under

Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

2.    The applicants complain about the placements of Johan and Stefan

in their respective homes where, allegedly, they have received inferior

treatment or none at all.  Furthermore, they have been placed in

non-Christian settings which shows a contempt for their Christian

faith.  The placements constitute a denial of the parents' right to

educate their children in a religious manner and limit the children's

freedom of religion.  Allegedly, Johan and Stefan are not allowed to

attend church services.

      The Commission notes first that the applicants did not appeal

against the Social District Council's decision of 10 May 1995 on the

initial placement of Johan.  Thus, in respect of this decision, the

Commission is not required to decide whether or not the facts alleged

by the applicants disclose any appearance of a violation of the

Articles invoked as, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it

"may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been

exhausted".

      It follows that this part of the application must be rejected for

non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

      It is true that the applicants later requested that Johan be

removed from the home where he was placed.  However, soon thereafter

Johan escaped from the home and he is now living with a Christian

family, apparently of his own choice.  As a consequence, no decision

has been taken by the Social District Council or the courts on the

question of removal of Johan.

      Noting that, after Johan's escape, there was no longer any

practical interest in deciding on the question of removal, the

Commission considers that an examination of this complaint fails to

disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms of

the Convention and in particular the Articles invoked.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      As regards the question of the placement of Stefan, the

Commission considers that the complaint should first be examined under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, which reads as follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

      family life, his home and his correspondence.

      2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority

      with the exercise of this right except such as is in

      accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

      society in the interests of national security, public

      safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

      prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

      health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and

      freedoms of others."

      Considering that the placement of Stefan with foster parents

interfered with the applicant's right to respect for his family life

as ensured by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, the

Commission finds that it must be examined whether this interference was

justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).  In this

respect, the Commission recalls that three conditions must be

satisfied: the interference must be "in accordance with the law", it

must pursue one or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in para. 2

and it must be "necessary in a democratic society" for that aim or

those aims.

      It has not been contested that the placement was made in

conformity with Swedish law.  Moreover, the Commission finds that the

measure had a legitimate aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), namely

the interests of the child, which in this case fall under the

expressions "for the protection of health or morals" and "for the

protection of the rights and freedoms of others".

      It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was

"necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the child.

      According to the established case-law of the Commission and the

European Court of Human Rights, the notion of necessity implies that

the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in

particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

In determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic

society", the Commission furthermore has to take into account that a

margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States.  However, the

Commission's review is not limited to ascertaining whether the

respondent State has exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and

in good faith.  Furthermore, it cannot confine itself to considering

the relevant decisions in isolation but must look at them in the light

of the case as a whole.  It must determine whether the reasons adduced

to justify the interference at issue are "relevant and sufficient"

(cf. Eur. Court HR, Olsson v. Sweden judgment of 24 March 1988,

Series A no. 130, pp. 31-32, paras. 67-68).

      In the present case, the Commission recalls that the County

Administrative Court, in its judgment of 21 August 1995 which was

upheld on appeal, noted that Stefan, in accordance with the applicants'

wishes, had been placed in a special school due to his brain damage.

The school's requirement that he be placed in an HVB had led to the

placement with the foster parents in question, one of the few homes

which accepted children with Stefan's special problems.  The court

further noted that no complaints had previously been made against the

foster parents and found that Stefan had had a positive development

with them.  Moreover, he was allowed to practise his faith and the

foster parents were willing to take him to church.

      The Commission further recalls that both the County

Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal held oral

hearings at which they heard the parties and certain witnesses.  Thus,

the courts cannot be said to have intervened without adequate knowledge

of the case.

      In the light of the foregoing the Commission finds that the

decisions on the placement of Stefan were supported by relevant and

sufficient reasons and that, having regard to their margin of

appreciation, the Swedish authorities were reasonably entitled to think

that it was necessary to place Stefan with the foster parents in

question.  Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the relevant

decisions can reasonably be regarded as "necessary in a democratic

society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention.      The applicants also invoke, inter alia, Article 9

(Art. 9) of the Convention, which provides the following:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,

      conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to

      change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or

      in community with others and in public or private, to

      manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,

      practice and observance.

      2.  Freedom to manifest one's religion shall be subject

      only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are

      necessary in a democratic society in the interests of

      public safety, for the protection of public order, health

      or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms

      of others."

      The Commission notes that, by the placement of Stefan with the

foster parents in question, no express restrictions were put on his

freedom to manifest his religion.  It is true that the applicants claim

that he was placed in a non-Christian setting.  The Commission recalls,

however, that when placing Stefan several factors had to be taken into

consideration, including his special needs owing to a brain damage.

The Commission cannot find that, in the circumstances of the case, the

placement with the foster parents in question showed any lack of

respect for his freedom of religion.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    The applicants challenge the decision of the Social District

Council of 19 March 1996 to restrict their access to Johan.

      The Commission, noting that the decision did not have any

practical effect as Johan, at the time, had already escaped from the

Roslagen Pupils' Home and that it was later revoked by the Council's

decision of 16 April 1996, considers that an examination of this

complaint fails to disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights

and freedoms of the Convention and in particular the Articles invoked.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.    The applicants claim that the court proceedings in the case have

not been impartial, as the courts have had to rely on biased statements

of psychologists employed by the social authorities.

      The Commission, noting that the courts have held several oral

hearings in the case at which, inter alia, the applicants have been

present and heard, considers that the applicants' submissions fail to

substantiate the present complaint.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.    The applicants complain about the courts' refusal to appoint

either of the lawyers designated by them in the case concerning

termination of the care of Stefan.     The Commission considers that

this complaint should be examined under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

      "1.  In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone

      is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ...

      tribunal...

      3.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the

      following minimum rights:

      ...

           c. to defend himself in person or through legal

      assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient

      means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when

      the interests of justice so require; ..."

      The Commission recalls that, although the Convention contains no

provision on legal assistance in civil rights disputes, Article 6

para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) dealing only with criminal proceedings,

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) may sometimes compel the State to provide

for the assistance of a lawyer when such assistance proves

indispensable for an effective access to court (cf. Eur. Court HR,

Airey v. Ireland judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 14-16,

para. 26).  However, Article 6 (Art. 6) does not guarantee a right to

choose which lawyer should be appointed by the court (cf., e.g., No.

12152/86, Dec. 9.5.89, D.R. 61, p. 171).

      In the present case, the County Administrative Court found that

the applicants were entitled to a legal aid lawyer.  The courts,

however, refused to appoint either of the two lawyers designated by the

applicants as they were found not to have the necessary qualifications.

The Commission cannot find that these decisions were arbitrary.  It

further notes that the applicants have the opportunity to name another

lawyer who could be accepted by the courts.  Thus, the Commission finds

that the relevant decisions do not disclose any appearance of a

violation of the applicants' rights under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

6.    The applicants also claim, inter alia, that Johan and Stefan have

at times not been allowed to go to school, that they have been

physically assaulted at their respective homes, that Johan has had his

personal belongings stolen or destroyed, that the treatment of Stefan

has led to his expressing suicidal thoughts and that the children have

been denied their freedom of speech by the restrictions on telephone

calls and by the fact that their sentiments have been neglected by the

social authorities and the courts.  Moreover, by denying the children

the right to take part in, inter alia, church services and recreational

activities, their right to freedom of association has been violated.

      The Commission, having examined the separate complaints as they

have been submitted, considers, however, that they fail to disclose any

appearance of a violation of the applicants' rights under the

Convention and its Protocols and in particular the Articles invoked.It

follows that these parts of the application are also manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

       M.-T. SCHOEPFER                           G.H. THUNE

         Secretary                               President

   to the Second Chamber                   of the Second Chamber