S.E.W. v. THE NETHERLANDS
Doc ref: 25507/94 • ECHR ID: 001-3734
Document date: July 2, 1997
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 25507/94
by S.E.W.
against the Netherlands
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 2 July 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs. G.H. THUNE, President
MM. J.-C. GEUS
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
F. MARTINEZ
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
A. ARABADJIEV
Ms. M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 12 July 1994 by
S.E.W. against the Netherlands and registered on 27 October 1994 under
file No. 25507/94;
Having regard to :
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
2 January 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 6 March 1996;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Canadian national, born in 1951 in Lebanon,
and currently resides in Rotterdam. Before the Commission he is
represented by Mr. G. Spong, a lawyer practising in the Hague.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
In April 1985 a business contact of the applicant made a
statement to the police, accusing the applicant of forging bills of
lading in connection with a shipment of 25 non-existent passenger cars
from the Netherlands to Kuwait. From the subsequent police inquiry it
appeared that the applicant, who had been running an export company
dealing in passenger cars, had left the Netherlands on 15 March 1985,
whereas the alleged offence had taken place just before that date. An
international warrant for the applicant's arrest was issued on
6 August 1985.
On 10 June 1986 the investigating judge (Rechter-Commissaris)
closed the preliminary judicial investigation (gerechtelijk voor-
onderzoek) regarding the applicant and, since the applicant's address
was unknown at that time, deposited the notifications of this closure
and of the prosecution's decision to commit the applicant for trial
(kennisgeving van verdere vervolging) with the Registry of the
Rotterdam Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) on 18 June and
4 July 1986 respectively.
On the basis of the international arrest warrant, the applicant
was apprehended by the authorities of the United States of America at
the airport of Los Angeles on 7 June 1988 and was informed that he was
wanted in the Netherlands. With reference to the international arrest
warrant's diffusion number 6.813.3/81, the applicant's full name and
date of birth, the authorities of the USA informed the Dutch
authorities of this arrest, requesting them to urgently confirm the
warrant and whether extradition would be sought.
The Dutch authorities were unable to verify, within the time-
limit of 48 hours set for this purpose, whether the identity of the
arrested person corresponded to the applicant's. After the expiry of
this time-limit, the applicant was released from the federal prison
where he had been detained for lack of an extradition request.
It appears that the applicant was again arrested and detained in
the United States in the beginning of March 1990. He was informed that
he had been arrested at the request of the Dutch judicial authorities
and that they suspected him of forgery. Following consultations between
the Prosecutions Department (Openbaar Ministerie) of Rotterdam and the
United States Justice Department, the applicant's extradition was
requested on 30 March 1990. As the applicant did not contest his
extradition, he was extradited to the Netherlands on 9 April 1990 and
subsequently detained on remand.
On 20 April 1990 the applicant was summoned to appear before the
Regional Court of Rotterdam on 27 June 1990. He was released on
2 May 1990.
At the hearing before the Regional Court on 27 June 1990 the
applicant's lawyer argued that the determination of the criminal
charges against his client could not be held to have taken place within
a reasonable time.
By interlocutory judgment of 10 July 1990 the examination of the
case was suspended in order for an investigation to be carried out by
the investigating judge into the question whether or not the
Prosecutions Department had been, or could have been, aware, by seeking
information from Interpol Canada, of the applicant's address in Canada
at the time of the notification of the prosecution's decision to
commit the applicant for trial. Should this have been the case, the
notification had been deposited with the Regional Court's Registry
contrary to provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van
Strafvordering), entailing the inadmissibility of the prosecution. In
order to clarify this issue, the investigating judge travelled to
Canada.
Following a second hearing on 17 April 1991, the Regional Court,
on 1 May 1991, found that it had not been established that Interpol
Canada was aware of the applicant's address on 4 July 1986 and,
consequently, that the Prosecutions Department had acted correctly in
depositing the above-mentioned notification with the Registry of the
Court. The applicant was found guilty of forgery and sentenced to
15 months' imprisonment with deduction of the time spent in detention
in the United States pending the Netherlands' request for his
extradition and the time spent in pre-trial detention in the
Netherlands.
The Regional Court held that, as the applicant had left the
Netherlands and could not be found for a long time in spite of
sufficient efforts thereto by the prosecuting authorities, the delay
which had occurred between the offence being committed and the case
going to trial could not be attributed to the Prosecutions Department.
In addition, the Regional Court stated that the applicant could himself
at any time have shortened this period by travelling to the
Netherlands.
On 7 May 1991 the applicant filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeal (Gerechtshof) of The Hague against the Regional Court's judgment
of 1 May 1991.
A hearing took place before the Court of Appeal on
6 November 1992 and, in its judgment of 20 November 1992, the Court of
Appeal quashed the decision of the Regional Court for technical
reasons, convicted the applicant of forgery and sentenced him to
12 months' imprisonment with deduction of the time spent in detention
in the United States pending the Netherlands' request for his
extradition and the time spent in pre-trial detention in the
Netherlands.
The Court of Appeal rejected the argument of the defence that the
prosecution should be declared inadmissible on grounds that the
proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time within the meaning of
Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention. It held that neither the period
between the applicant's arrest on 7 June 1988 and the examination of
the case by the Regional Court on 27 June 1990 nor the period between
the filing of the appeal by the applicant on 7 May 1991 and the
examination of the case on appeal had been such as to justify the
conclusion that the determination of the criminal charges had exceeded
the reasonable time entailing the inadmissibility of the prosecution.
In this respect, the Court considered irrelevant the time between 10
July 1990 and 17 April 1991 during which the investigation into the
Prosecutions Department's knowledge of the applicant's address in
Canada had taken place, since this investigation had been necessitated
by the applicant's claim that the prosecution should be declared
inadmissible for not correctly having notified the applicant of the
decision to commit him for trial.
Although the Court of Appeal agreed with the sentence imposed on
the applicant by the Regional Court, it nevertheless imposed a lighter
sentence having regard to the time which had elapsed since the
commission of the offence.
The applicant filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court
(Hoge Raad) on 25 November 1992 against the Court of Appeal's decision
of 20 November 1992. He complained, inter alia, of the length of
proceedings.
At the end of October 1993 the applicant's case-file was received
by the Supreme Court from the Registry of the Court of Appeal.
A hearing took place before the Supreme Court on 18 January 1994,
during which the applicant, with reference to his complaint of the
length of the proceedings, also drew attention to the time which had
elapsed between the lodging of the appeal in cassation and the
examination of the case by the Supreme Court.
On 3 May 1994, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal in
cassation. With regard to the length of the proceedings, it accepted
the Court of Appeal's considerations and, furthermore, did not find
that the period which had passed between the lodging of the appeal in
cassation and the Supreme Court's hearing constituted a breach of
Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention
that the criminal charges against him were not determined within a
reasonable time. He submits in particular that the delays which
occurred between his arrest at the Los Angeles airport on 7 June 1988
and the first hearing before the Regional Court on 27 June 1990, the
judgment of the Regional Court of 1 May 1991 and the examination of the
case by the Court of Appeal on 6 November 1992, and the decision of the
latter Court of 20 November 1992 and the hearing before the Supreme
Court on 18 January 1994 cannot be regarded as reasonable.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 12 July 1994 and registered on
27 October 1994.
On 19 October 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government inviting them, pursuant to
Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure, to submit written
observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.
The Government's written observations were submitted on
2 January 1996. The applicant replied on 6 March 1996.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that the criminal proceedings against him
were not determined within a reasonable time as required by Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as
relevant, reads:
"In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time
by a ... tribunal..."
The Government submit in the first place that the applicant can
no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 25
(Art. 25) of the Convention as, in the determination of the applicant's
sentence, both the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal explicitly
took into account the time which had elapsed between the commission of
the offence at issue and their respective judgments.
As to the substance, the Government are of the opinion that the
applicant's first arrest on 7 June 1988 may be regarded as the start
of the proceedings, but that the Netherlands authorities cannot be held
responsible for the delay which occurred between the applicant's
release and his subsequent arrest in March 1990, as, aware of the
existence of a warrant for his arrest, the applicant chose to remain
abroad and to evade apprehension by the Dutch authorities. Although the
applicant is solely responsible for this delay, the Dutch courts
allowed him some clemency for the passage of time between the
commission of the offences and the applicant's conviction.
The Government further submit that the applicant's objection was
thoroughly investigated, which inevitably took some time. They further
submit that the proceedings against the applicant before the trial
courts were conducted within a reasonable time and that no unacceptably
long delays occurred. In this respect the Government further point out
that, apart from the period between 9 April to 2 May 1990, the
applicant was not detained pending the proceedings against him.
The applicant submits that, as the Dutch authorities failed to
act timely on the information - which included his full personal
details - that he had been arrested in the USA on 7 June 1988, the
Dutch authorities bear responsibility for the delay between his first
and second arrest.
As to the reduction of his sentence based on the lapse of time
between the commission of the offence and the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, the applicant submits that this does not constitute sufficient
redress. In his opinion, the prosecution should have been declared
inadmissible on the basis of the duration of the proceedings.
The applicant finally submits that the fact that he availed
himself of all the available remedies cannot be held against him, that
in any event the Dutch authorities are obliged to organise their legal
system in such a way that, even where an accused uses all available
remedies, a trial is held within a reasonable time, and that the
complexity of the case is an insufficient explanation for the total
duration of the proceedings at issue.
After an examination of the complaint in the light of the
parties' submissions, the Commission considers that it raises issues
of fact and law requiring an examination of the merits. The application
cannot, therefore, be declared manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other
grounds for inadmissibility have been established.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the
merits of the case.
M.-T. SCHOEPFER G.H. THUNE
Secretary President
to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber
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