BAUMANN v. AUSTRIA
Doc ref: 25818/94 • ECHR ID: 001-3835
Document date: September 10, 1997
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 25818/94
by Alfred BAUMANN
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 10 September 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs. J. LIDDY, President
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M. HION
Mr. R. NICOLINI
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 30 July 1993 by
Alfred BAUMANN against Austria and registered on 1 December 1994 under
file No. 25818/94;
Having regard to:
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
20 December 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 26 February 1997;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, born in 1945, is an Austrian national residing in
Vienna. In the proceedings before the Commission he is represented by
Mr. D. Böhmdorfer, a lawyer practising in Vienna.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
The first set of proceedings
On 4 December 1987, following his divorce, the applicant applied
to the Döbling District Court (Bezirksgericht) for a partition of
matrimonial property. He requested in particular that the plot of land
and the house in Vienna, which he and his divorced wife owned jointly,
be transferred to him against payment of adequate compensation to his
divorced wife. He submitted inter alia that he had been awarded
guardianship for their son and that it was in the interest of the child
to remain in the house. On 15 December 1987 his divorced wife made a
similar request. Both, the applicant and his former wife filed a number
of written submissions with the District Court.
On 20 January, 16 March, 11 May, 22 June, 3 August and
16 November 1988, as well as on 1 March 1989 the Döbling District Court
held hearings.
On 13 March 1989 the Döbling District Court partitioned the
matrimonial property. It ordered that the applicant's title concerning
the land and the house be transferred to his former wife and ordered
the latter to pay ATS 2,876,000 as compensation to the applicant. The
Court considered that, for reasons of equity, the title was to be
transferred to the party who was willing to pay the higher amount of
compensation, i.e. the applicant's former wife. Further, the Court
found that the former spouses were entitled to equal portions of the
property as they had contributed equally to its purchase, the applicant
by working full-time in his hairdresser's shop, his former wife by
working part-time there and taking care of the household and their son.
Subsequently, on 7 and 10 April 1989, both parties filed an
appeal (Rekurs) against this decision.
On 31 August 1989 the Vienna Regional Civil Court (Landesgericht
für Zivilrechtssachen) upheld both appeals and quashed the District
Court's decision. It found that the court had failed to take evidence
as regards the objective value of the land and house at issue, it had
not taken the interest of the child into account and had failed to
properly establish the extent to which the applicant's former wife had
contributed to the purchase of matrimonial property.
Both parties filed an appeal on points of law (Revisionsrekurs)
on 27 September 1989.
On 29 January 1991 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof)
dismissed the appeals on points of law of both parties as being
unfounded.
The second set of proceedings
Subsequently, on 25 March, 17 April and 27 May 1991, the Döbling
District Court held hearings. It heard the applicant and his former
wife as well as three witnesses on the distribution of work between the
former spouses in order to establish their respective contribution to
the purchase of their property. It also ordered an expert, P., to file
an opinion as regards the value of the plot of land and the house.
On 24 July 1991 the Döbling District Court issued a new decision
partitioning the matrimonial property. It ordered the applicant's
former wife to transfer her title concerning the land and the house to
the applicant against a payment of compensation of ATS 3,358,200.
Having regard to the evidence before it, the court found that the
property had to be divided in a proportion of 40 to 60 percent between
the applicant and his former wife.
Subsequently, on 19 and 20 August 1991, both parties appealed
against this decision.
On 18 March 1992 the Vienna Regional Civil Court dismissed the
applicant's appeal. Upon the appeal of his former wife, the court
quashed the decision and referred the case back to the District Court.
It found in particular that the court had dismissed her submissions
challenging the expert opinion, on the ground that they had been made
belatedly with the intention to delay the proceedings. However, the
relevant procedural law did not provide a basis for such a ruling.
The third set of proceedings
On 19 May 1992 the Döbling District Court held a hearing and on
25 May 1992 it appointed a second expert, C., who submitted his opinion
as regards the value of the house at issue on 7 July 1992. A further
hearing was held on 22 July 1992 at which two witnesses were heard at
the applicant's request. The expert opinions were discussed.
Meanwhile, the competent tax authorities had introduced
proceedings relating to the applicant's business, i.e. the
hairdresser's shop, in order to establish whether he had duly declared
all profits between 1981 and 1989. On 29 July 1992, the Tax Office
(Finanzamt) issued tax assessment notices for 1981 to 1989 in respect
of turnover, income and trade tax, against which the applicant
appealed.
On 23 October 1992 the Döbling District Court issued a partial
decision (Teilbeschluß). It ordered the applicant's former wife to
transfer her title concerning the land and the house to the applicant
against a payment of compensation of ATS 4,000,000. Referring to its
earlier decision the court found that the property had to be divided
in a proportion of 40 to 60 percent between the applicant and his wife.
As regards the value of the land and the house, the Court noted that
the two expert opinions differed substantially. It argued that the
average value had to be taken as a basis. The Court adjourned the
proceedings as regards possible further compensation to the applicant's
wife for her contribution to his business. It noted that such a
decision could not be taken until the termination of the tax
proceedings. At first instance the applicant had been ordered to pay
additional taxes of ATS 980,000 for 1981 to 1986, i.e. the period when
the former spouses were still married. The proceedings which were
pending at the appeal stage were relevant, as debts which were
connected to the marital property had to be taken into account.
Subsequently, on 17 November 1992, both parties appealed against
this decision. On 10 March 1993 the Vienna Regional Civil Court
upheld both appeals and quashed the District Court's partial decision
on the ground that the court had not properly established the value of
the plot of land and the house at issue. It had failed to hear the two
experts on the discrepancies between their opinions. Eventually it
should have ordered a further expert opinion.
The fourth set of proceedings
Subsequently, the applicant and his divorced wife filed requests
for the taking of evidence. On 16 July 1993 the applicant requested an
extension of three weeks of a time-limit and on 31 August 1993 he
challenged expert C. for bias. However, his motion remained
unsuccessful. On 27 September 1993 the Döbling District Court held a
hearing.
By submissions of 14 October, 3 November and 17 November 1993 the
applicant requested extensions of two and three weeks, respectively,
of the time-limit to file further documentary evidence. He submitted
the evidence on 24 November 1993.
On 19 January 1994 the Döbling District Court held a further
hearing.
On 12 August 1994 the Döbling District Court again issued a
partial decision. It ordered the applicant's former wife to transfer
her title concerning the land and the house to the applicant against
a payment of compensation of ATS 4,300,000. Again, it adjourned the
proceedings as regards a possible further compensation to the
applicant's wife for her contribution to his business until the
termination of the relevant tax proceedings.
Subsequently, on 2 and 8 September 1994, both parties appealed
against this decision.
On 22 February 1995 the Vienna Regional Civil Court confirmed the
decision. It partly dismissed the appeal of the applicant's divorced
wife as being unfounded but partly upheld it as regards interest to be
paid on the compensation. It rejected the applicant's appeal as being
lodged out of time. The applicant's request for reinstatement remained
unsuccessful.
On 20 September 1995 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's
appeal on points of law. Thereby, the proceedings were terminated as
regards the transfer of the land and the house and the related
compensation payment.
As regards possible further compensation to the applicant's wife
for her contribution to his business, the proceedings are pending until
termination of the tax assessment proceedings. On 14 November 1994 the
Regional Tax Office (Finanzlandesdirektion) gave its appeal decision.
On 18 January 1995 the applicant lodged a complaint with the
Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof), which has not yet given
judgment.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention about
the duration of the proceedings relating to the partition of
matrimonial property.PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 30 July 1993 and registered on
1 December 1994.
On 4 September 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the
application.
The Government's written observations were submitted on
20 December 1996 after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that
purpose. The applicant replied on 26 February 1997.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention about the duration of the proceedings relating to the
partition of matrimonial property.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), so far as relevant, reads as
follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time
by [a] ... tribunal established by law. ..."
The Government submit that the proceedings were extremely
complex, in that they necessitated extensive taking of evidence. The
District Court held altogether fourteen hearings. It had to order
expert opinions from real estate experts, which had to be supplemented
and discussed at the hearings. Moreover, the Government point out that
there have so far been four rounds of proceedings, two of which went
through all three instances available. The opening of tax assessment
proceedings concerning the applicant's business further complicated the
matter, as their outcome has to be taken into account when deciding on
the compensation due to the applicant's former wife for contributing
to his business. Nevertheless, the main issue, namely the transfer of
the house, was decided by the District Court's partial decision of
12 August 1994, which became final with the Supreme Court's judgment
of 20 September 1995. Moreover, the tense atmosphere between the
parties and the fact that they made use of all available remedies made
the courts' work even more difficult.
As to the conduct of the authorities, the Government submit that
there was never an actual standstill in the proceedings. According to
the Government the appellate courts' repeated setting aside of the
District Court's decisions did not contribute to the length of the
first instance proceedings as they merely required the District Court
to supplement its investigations. As to the conduct of the applicant,
the Government argue that the applicant did nothing to expedite the
proceedings. In particular, he failed to make use of the possibility,
available since 1 January 1990, of filing an application for fixing a
time-limit (Fristsetzungsantrag) under S. 91 of the Court Organisation
Act. This provision allows the parties, whenever a court fails to take
a specific procedural measure - such as setting a date for a hearing
or obtaining an expert opinion - in due time, to file with that court
an application directed to the higher court requesting it to fix an
adequate time-limit for taking the procedural measure at issue.
Finally, the applicant contributed to the length of the proceedings in
that he filed a number of requests for the extension of time-limits. The
applicant firstly claims that the proceedings, concerning mainly the
transfer of the house in which he is living with his son over whom he
has been awarded custody, required particular diligence. Further, the
applicant argues that the proceedings were not particularly complex.
That the assessment of the value of the house at issue necessitated the
repeated taking of expert evidence was partly caused by the duration
of the proceedings and the rise in real estate prices, which occurred
meanwhile. The applicant contests in particular the Government's
argument that the authorities did not contribute to the length of the
proceedings. As the first instance court repeatedly failed to carry out
the necessary investigations, time-consuming appeal proceedings were
necessary, which ended with orders by the appellate court to the first
instance court to supplement its proceedings. Thus, considerable delays
are attributable to the defective conduct of the proceedings by the
District Court. Finally, the applicant contests that any delays are
attributable to him.
The Commission considers, in the light of the criteria
established by the case-law of the Convention organs on the question
of "reasonable time", and having regard to all the information in its
possession, that an examination of the merits of the complaint is
required.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the
merits of the case.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber