AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 30381/96

                      by Vassil MIRONOV

                      against Bulgaria

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 23 October 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs   J. LIDDY, President

           MM    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mrs   M. HION

           Mr    R. NICOLINI

           Mrs   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 5 October 1994 by

Vassil Mironov against Bulgaria and registered on 6 March 1996 under

file No. 30381/96;

      Having regard to:

-     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

      the Commission;

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

      16 December 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the

      applicant on 18 March and 9 May 1997;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Bulgarian national born in 1930 and residing

in Rousse.  Before the Commission he is represented by Mr Dobri Dobrev,

a lawyer practising in Lovech.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

A.    Particular circumstances of the case

a.    The applicant's convictions and prison terms

      The applicant has had several convictions on various charges.

His convictions date from 1949, 1960, 1964, 1982, 1986 and 1988.  Prior

to the events relevant to the present case he had served several prison

terms.  Thus, he was in prison between March 1983 and May 1985.

      In 1986 the applicant was convicted and sentenced to four years'

imprisonment by the Burgas Regional Court (Okrazhen sad). On 4 January

1988 he was convicted by the Kardjali Regional Court for forgery and

fraud and was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment.  On 14 June 1988

the Supreme Court (Varhoven sad) confirmed this judgment.  Subsequently

the Kardjali Regional Court fixed a general term of twelve years'

imprisonment for these two convictions.

      The applicant began serving his prison term on 18 December 1988.

      On 29 November 1990 the Supreme Court, which was seized by the

applicant's second petition for review (molba za pregled po reda na

nadzora) of the convictions and the sentence, decided to suspend

temporarily the serving of his prison term, pending the outcome of the

review proceedings.  The applicant was released on the following day.

      On 27 September 1991 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's

petition for review.  This decision had the effect of automatically

terminating the temporary suspension of the applicant's prison term.

However, due to an administrative omission the competent prosecutors

whose duty was to supervise the enforcement of sentences were not

informed of the Supreme Court's decision until some time in 1993.

      On 13 May 1993 the serving of the applicant's twelve years'

sentence was renewed by an order of the Regional Prosecutor's Office

in Rousse.  At that time the applicant was in prison as on 18 November

1992 he had been detained on remand in case No. 1856/92 on charges of

misappropriation of funds, allegedly committed in 1991 and 1992 (see

below).

      On 29 April 1996 the Lovech Regional Court examined the state of

enforcement of the applicant's 1988 sentence.  The Court ordered his

conditional release on parole (predsrochno uslovno osvobozhdavane),

thus granting a remission of the remaining part of his twelve years'

sentence.  However, the applicant was not released in view of the

prosecutor's orders for his detention on remand in case No. 1856/92

(see below).

      On 30 September 1996 the applicant was convicted by the Rousse

Regional Court in other criminal proceedings, opened in 1995, for

having threatened to kill a person.  The applicant had sent letters to

a prosecutor stating that he would see to it that she and her family

be "liquidated".  He was convicted under Section 114 para. 3 of the

Penal Code and sentenced to two years' imprisonment.

      On 16 January 1997 the conviction and sentence were confirmed on

appeal by the Rousse Regional Court.  The applicant began serving the

two years' prison term on 20 February 1997.

      On 20 May 1997, upon the applicant's petition for review, the

Supreme Court quashed the 1996 conviction and acquitted the applicant.

b. The 1992 criminal proceedings and the applicant's detention on

remand

      On an unspecified date in 1992 the investigation service

(sledstvena sluzhba) in Rousse opened preliminary investigation

No. 1856/92 against the applicant on charges of misappropriation of

funds by means of forgery of documents under Section 212 para. 4 of the

Penal Code (Nakazatelen kodeks).  The charges concerned the activities

of A., the limited liability company which the applicant had registered

with other persons in 1991.  It was alleged, inter alia, that the

applicant and his accomplices had offered non-existing deliveries of

clothes by using forged documents to convince potential buyers to sign

a contract and to pay an advance.  In one transaction the buyer issued

a letter of credit the payment of which was obtained by the applicant

allegedly thorough the presentation of false invoices.

      On 18 November 1992 the applicant was arrested and detained on

remand.  On 1 December 1992 his lawyer unsuccessfully appealed to the

Rousse Regional Court against his client's detention on remand.

      On 18 January 1993 the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office (Glavna

prokuratura) dismissed another petition for release as there existed

a danger of absconding and of repetition.  On 13 April 1993 and again

on 25 April 1995 the investigator (sledovatel) charged the applicant

with some additional crimes in the framework of case 1856/92 and

confirmed that the 1992 order for his detention on remand was in force.

      At the time there were other criminal proceedings pending against

the applicant.  They had been opened by the Gorna Oriahovitsa District

Prosecutor's Office (Raionna prokuratura) in 1990, on charges of

misappropriation of funds, but were eventually discontinued by a

prosecutor's decision of 24 January 1995.  It appears that there has

been no separate decision for the applicant's detention on remand in

the framework of these criminal proceedings.

      In the course of the proceedings in case 1856/92 the investigator

in Rousse collected documentary material and examined witnesses. Some

of the witnesses were examined by delegation in other cities.

      On an unspecified date in 1994 the preliminary investigation in

case No. 1856/92 was concluded and an indictment was submitted to the

Rousse Regional Court.  On 29 December 1994 the Court found that the

investigating authorities had incorrectly refused to allow the

examination of certain witnesses.  As a result the case had to be

returned to the prosecution authorities for further investigation.

      On an unspecified date in 1995 the additional investigation was

concluded and a new indictment was submitted to the Regional Court.

On 9 October 1995 a judge at the Court ordered the return of the case

again to the prosecution authorities.  The order stated inter alia that

the prosecution authorities had not examined the applicant's request

for the replacement of the investigator in his case.  Also, additional

evidence had to be collected.

      On 16 October 1995 the Regional Prosecutor's Office in Rousse

refused the applicant's request for the replacement of the investigator

and sent the case for additional investigation.   This was concluded

soon thereafter and an indictment was prepared on an unspecified date

in 1996.

      The criminal proceedings against the applicant, which originated

in investigation case No. 1856/92 are still pending.

      In a letter of 18 December 1995, one of his numerous letters to

the Chief Public Prosecutor, the applicant asked inter alia that

measures be taken against the Rousse Regional Prosecutor's Office

(Okrazhna prokuratura) for having delayed allegedly deliberately the

examination of the criminal case.

      On 13 May 1996 the applicant unsuccessfully requested the Chief

Public Prosecutor to release him as he had no sentence to serve any

more, the courts having relieved him from serving the remainder of his

twelve years' sentence (see above, The applicant's convictions and

prison terms).  The applicant further contended that the charges

against him in case No. 1856/92 were absurd.

      On 3 June 1996 the Rousse Regional Court examined another request

for release and ordered the applicant's release on bail (pod

garantzia).  The amount of the bail was fixed at 800,000 leva (about

30,000 FF at the time).  The decision stated inter alia that the Court

had taken into account "the information about [the applicant's] state

of health".

      The applicant appealed against this decision, stating that he

could never find 800,000 leva.  On 30 September 1996 the Supreme Court

dismissed the appeal.  The Court found that in view of the crimes with

which the applicant was charged, and because he was a recidivist, it

was obligatory under Section 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(Nakazatelno-protzesualen kodeks) that he should be detained on remand.

In the Supreme Court's view release on bail was not possible.

Therefore, the Regional Court's decision of 3 June 1996 was contrary

to the law.  However, the Supreme Court could not quash it and could

not order the applicant's detention on remand as the decision was

challenged only by the applicant, not by the prosecutor.

      The applicant failed to post bail and was not released.  On

20 February 1997 he began serving his 1996 sentence (see above).

Following the Supreme Court's judgment of 20 May 1997 which quashed the

1996 conviction and sentence and acquitted the applicant, he remained

in the Lovech prison, apparently on the strength of the orders for his

detention on remand in the framework of the criminal proceedings which

had commenced in 1992 and are still pending.

      On 11 August 1997 the applicant posted bail of 800,000 leva and

was released.

c.    The alleged taking of the applicant's and his company's property

      In 1991 the applicant engaged in trade and registered limited

liability company A., together with several other persons, one of whom

was apparently a former prosecutor.  On an unspecified date the

Bulgarian People's Party, a political party which has never been

represented in Parliament, also became a shareholder.  The applicant

was a shareholder and the president of A.

      Disputes developed among the shareholders and on 8 May 1992 the

commercial register at the local court registered the ousting of the

applicant and the election of a Mr. B. as president.  On 13 July 1992

Mr. B. and the police broke into the applicant's apartment pursuant to

a prosecutor's order.  The order instructed the police to assist the

new president of A. to take possession of the company's property.

      On 15 September 1992 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of

8 May 1992.  It appears that since 20 October 1992 the applicant has

again been legally recognised as president of A.

      On 30 April 1992, in the framework of criminal case 1856/92, the

investigating authorities conducted a search in the applicant's

apartment and confiscated documents and a teargas gun.

      On 30 November 1992, following the applicant's arrest, the

investigator in case 1856/92 decided to seize four automobiles as a

security in respect of the moneys allegedly misappropriated by the

applicant.  The attachment order stated that the automobiles belonged

to the applicant.  However, in a document issued later, on 13 April

1993, the investigator referred to the cars as the property of A., the

applicant's company.  In his submissions before the Commission the

applicant also states that the cars belong to his company A.

      Two of the attached automobiles were found and were taken for

keeping by the police.  The other two were in the possession of two

shareholders of A.

      The applicant submitted numerous complaints to various

institutions alleging that the prosecutor and the investigator who were

conducting his case had personal interest in it as they were connected

with private companies which sought to destroy his business.  He stated

inter alia that the prosecutor had stolen the property of his company,

that in 1993 a sum of 1,400,000 leva disappeared from his company's

account with a private bank, that the investigator had asked him for

1 million leva in exchange for his release, and generally that his

arrest and detention were the result of a plot against him.  On

29 November 1995 the applicant was heard personally by the Chief Public

Prosecutor of Bulgaria.  The parties have not substantiated whether the

applicant's complaints have resulted in the institution of any

proceedings against the implicated persons.

      In 1994 and again in 1996 the applicant, acting without a lawyer,

brought civil actions for damages against two prosecutors personally

and against the Regional Prosecutor's Office.  After inviting the

applicant to clarify his claims on an unspecified date in the end of

1995 the Regional Court rejected the first claim as it clearly

constituted a criminal complaint, and sent it to the prosecution

authorities.  The second civil claim concerned the alleged damages

suffered by the applicant from the fact that his 1988 conviction and

sentence of twelve years' imprisonment were allegedly unlawful.  The

Kardjali Regional Court dismissed this claim on 9 December 1996.

      The applicant apparently has not instituted civil proceedings to

recover a particular possession.

d.    The applicant's correspondence with the Commission

      On 13 February 1996 the applicant prepared his application form

to the Commission and sent it through the prison administration, as

required by the relevant law and prison regulations.  At least until

14 March 1996 the applicant was under the impression that his

application to the Commission had been withheld by the prison

administration.  On that date he wrote a letter to the Commission

complaining about the alleged hindrance of his right to bring an

application and enclosing a second copy of his application form.  In

fact the application form signed by the applicant on 13 February 1996

was received by the Commission on 4 March 1996.  His second application

form of 14 March 1996, identical in content, arrived on 25 March 1996.

B.    Relevant domestic law and practice

a.    As regards the criminal proceedings and the detention on remand

      A crime under Section 212 para. 4 of the Penal Code is a

misappropriation of large amounts effected through the use of forged

documents, when the case is grave.  The penalty is ten to twenty years'

imprisonment.

      The relevant part of Section 152 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, as in force until 4 June 1995, provided as follows:

      "(1) Detention on remand shall be imposed [in cases where the

      charges concern] crimes punishable by ten or more years'

      imprisonment or capital punishment.

      (2)  In the cases under the preceding paragraph [detention on

      remand] shall not be imposed if there is no danger of the accused

      evading justice or of committing another crime ..."

      The relevant part of Section 152 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, as in force after 4 June 1995 and until August 1997,

provided as follows:

"(1) Detention on remand shall be imposed [in case where the

charges concern] a serious wilful crime.

(2)  In the cases under paragraph 1 [detention on remand] may

not be imposed if there is no danger of the accused evading

justice, obstructing the investigation, or committing another

crime.

(3)  Paragraph 2 shall not apply where other criminal

proceedings for [a publicly prosecuted] crime are pending

against the accused person; or where [the accused is a

recidivist] ..."

b.    As regards the alleged taking of property

      Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an

investigator, a prosecutor, or the court should "take measures", by way

of attachment or seizure, to secure the payment of sums, which could

become due in respect of a civil claim brought by the victims of the

alleged crime or in respect of fines or confiscations which could be

imposed if the accused person is convicted.  Paragraph 4 of Section 156

reads as follows:

     "The measure [to secure the payment] ... shall be effected

according to the Civil Procedure Code (Grazhdansko-protzesualen

kodeks)".

      This provision is apparently construed in the sense that only the

rules concerning the types of seizures or attachments and the legal

consequences thereof are to be found in the Civil Procedure Code.  It

has not been construed, in the courts' jurisprudence, as meaning that

prosecutors or investigators have to follow the procedure under the

Civil Procedure Code and, accordingly, apply to a court for an

attachment or seizure order.

      In practice attachments and seizures are ordered by an

investigator or by a prosecutor, when the case is at the preliminary

investigation stage.  This decision apparently can be appealed against

only to the higher levels of the prosecution authorities, as long as

the case has not been sent for trial.

      According to Section 255 when the criminal case comes into the

hands of the court, the judge rapporteur, before the commencement of

the trial, is competent to decide on requests concerning the imposed

attachment or seizure.  During the trial such requests are to be

examined by the trial court.  According to Section 344 the orders

delivered by the judge rapporteur or by the court are subject to appeal

to the higher court (cf. opredelenie No. 398 ot 11.11.1993 po n.d.

No. 901/92, Sbornik nak. kolegii 1992/93, str. 176).

c.    As regards the applicant's correspondence with the Commission

      Under Section 37 para. 2 of the Law on the Execution of

Punishments (Zakon za izpalnenie na nakazaniata) the prisoners' letters

to the President's Office, the Council of Ministers, the Committee for

State Control, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior

and the prosecution authorities are not subject to control if they have

been submitted in a sealed envelope.  The letters to the Commission are

not covered by this provision. According to Section 43 of the

Regulations implementing the Law on the Execution of Punishments all

petitions and appeals by prisoners are sent to the addressees after

their registration in a register maintained by the prison

administration.  The entries to be made in the register include the

subject matter of the petition or appeal, except where it has been

submitted in a sealed envelope.

      Section 33 of the Law on the Execution of Punishments provides

inter alia that a detained person has the right to receive and send

letters subject to control by the prison administration.  Under para. 2

of Section 37 of the Regulations, a letter sent by, or to, a prisoner

may be withheld where its content is such that on grounds of "security,

[the prison] regime, or on the basis of educational considerations",

this is necessary.  In these cases the prisoner shall be informed.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains under Article 5 of the Convention that

his detention is unlawful and unreasonably lengthy.  Thus, in 1990 he

was lawfully released from prison but afterwards, in November 1992, he

was detained on remand on new charges.  However, as the new charges

allegedly proved very weak, in 1993 he was ordered to serve the

remaining part of his 1987 sentence.  The applicant contends that the

purpose of his detention was to keep him out of business and to

facilitate the stealing of his property.

      The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention of the

length of the criminal proceedings which are pending against him since

1992 and also that the prosecutors and the investigators in his case

are corrupt and biased.

      The applicant complains, invoking Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to

the Convention, that his and his company's property was stolen by

shareholders of A. and by the prosecutors and that nothing has been

done to punish the perpetrators.

      The applicant also alleges that the prison administration checked

the content of his application to the Commission.  He states that when

he passed to the prison administration his letter containing the

application form, he was told that an official translation into

Bulgarian was necessary since the application form had been written in

a foreign language, in English.  The applicant offered his own

translation, but this was allegedly rejected.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 5 October 1994 and registered

on 6 March 1996.

      On 22 October 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government.

      The Government's written observations were submitted on

16 December 1996.  The applicant replied on 18 March and 9 May 1997.

      On 21 January 1997 the Commission granted the applicant legal

aid.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains under Articles 5 and 6 (Art. 5, 6) of the

Convention in respect of the criminal proceedings against him, under

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention of the alleged

taking of his and his company's property, and also of the alleged

control by the prison administration of his application form sent to

the Commission.

      The Government make a preliminary objection that the application

is an abuse of the right of petition within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention because it is premature, the

applicant not having brought all his complaints before the national

authorities, and also because it contains defamatory statements which

tarnish Bulgaria's international reputation.

      The applicant disputes the Government's position.

      The Commission considers that the arguments relied upon by the

Government, insofar as they have been substantiated, cannot lead to a

finding that the application is an abuse of the right of petition

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention

(cf.  No. 22497/93, Dec. 20.2.95, D.R. 80, p. 138; No. 24760/94, Dec.

27.6.96, D.R. 86, pp. 54, 68).

2.    The applicant complains under Article 5 (Art. 5) that his

detention is unlawful and unreasonably lengthy.

      Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention, insofar as relevant,

provides as follows.

      "1.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.

      No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following

      cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

           a.    the lawful detention of a person after conviction by

      a competent court;

      ...

           c.    the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected

      for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal

      authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence

      or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his

      committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

      ...

      3.   Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the

      provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall ... be

      entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending

      trial.  Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for

      trial.

      ..."

a)    As regards the applicant's complaint under Article 5 para. 1

(Art. 5-1) of the Convention that his detention was unlawful the

Government submit that he has not exhausted all domestic remedies

because the criminal proceedings against him are still pending.  The

Government further maintain that the applicant's detention has been

lawful at all times.  Thus, there have been two grounds for his

detention - his conviction and his detention on remand and they were

lawfully imposed, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the

Code of Criminal Procedure.

      The applicant replies inter alia, that his 1988 conviction was

based on false evidence and that therefore he should have been entitled

to its revision and annulment.  Furthermore, the charges brought

against him in 1992 were invented and were a part of a plot which

involved corrupt prosecutors.

      The Commission finds that this complaint is manifestly ill-

founded, the applicant's detention having been partly a detention

"after conviction by a competent court" under subpara. 1(a) of

Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention and, in its remaining part,

detention on remand in pending criminal proceedings, under subpara.

1(c) of this provision.  Furthermore, in the light of all the material

in its possession the Commission does not find any indication that the

detention was unlawful or ordered otherwise than "in accordance with

a procedure prescribed by law", within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1

(Art. 5-1).

      Insofar as the applicant may be understood as complaining that

there was no "reasonable suspicion" of his having committed a crime

when he was detained on remand in the framework of case 1856/92, the

Commission notes that the charges against him were based on documents,

testimonies and other evidence which indicated that he may have forged

documents and acted fraudulently in order to obtain money from third

persons.  Finally, there was no dispute that the acts of which he was

accused were considered a crime under Bulgarian law (cf. Eur. Court HR,

Loukanov v. Bulgaria judgment of 20 March 1997, Reports 1997-II,

No. 34,  para. 41).

      It follows that this part of the application has to be rejected

as being manifestly ill-founded under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2)

of the Convention.

b)    As regards the complaint under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of

the Convention concerning the length of the applicant's detention on

remand, the Government submit that the applicant has not complied with

Article 26 (Art. 26) as the criminal proceedings against him are still

pending, because he has not submitted requests for a speedy examination

of his case and also because he has not raised before the domestic

authorities, at least in substance, the complaint now made before the

Commission.

      Furthermore, the applicant was a recidivist and was accused of

committing a crime which carried a penalty of 10 to 20 years'

imprisonment.  In these circumstances Section 152 para. 3 of the Code

of Criminal Proceedings did not allow any discretion, but required that

the accused be detained on remand.  The Government recall that

nevertheless on 3 June 1996 the Regional Court ordered the applicant's

release on bail because he invoked his health problems.  However, the

applicant did not post the bail, in which situation he could not be

released.

      The Government finally maintain that the length of the

applicant's detention was not contrary to Bulgarian law, which does not

provide for a time-limit for detention on remand.  Also, it was

"reasonable", within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the

Convention, regard being had to the complexity of the investigation.

      The applicant replies inter alia that he has submitted numerous

requests for release and has complained to all levels of the

prosecution authorities.  He contends that the release on bail was

fictitious as he could not pay 800,000 leva.  Furthermore, the

detention was unreasonably long.

      The Commission recalls that the only remedies that Article 26

(Art. 26) requires to be exhausted are those which are available and

sufficient and relate to the particular breaches alleged (Eur. Court

HR, Brozicek v. Italy judgment of 19 December 1989, Series A no. 167,

p. 16, para. 32).  When a State seeks to rely on the rule of exhaustion

of domestic remedies, it falls to the State to indicate the relevant

remedies that have not been utilised by those concerned (Eur. Court HR,

De Jong, Baljet and van den Brink v. the Netherlands judgment of 22 May

1984, Series A no. 77, p. 18, para. 36).

      The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the

Convention that there has been a violation of his  right to "a trial

within a reasonable time or to release pending trial".  It does not

appear that the fact that the criminal proceedings against him are

still pending has any relation to the question of exhaustion of

domestic remedies in respect of this complaint.

      It is not disputed that the applicant appealed against his

detention on remand to the Rousse Regional Court on 1 December 1992,

shortly after his arrest, and that within the relevant period of time

he submitted many other requests for release to the prosecution

authorities and again to the court.  Furthermore, he eventually

obtained an order for release on bail and then appealed against it,

seeking the lowering of the amount of bail.  In all these petitions the

applicant disputed the existence of reasons justifying his detention

on remand and insisted to be released, thereby clearly invoking in

substance his right under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the

Convention.  Finally, the Government have not indicated any legal

provision in Bulgarian law which provides for a remedy other than those

used by the applicant.

      The Commission, therefore, is satisfied that the applicant has

exhausted all domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention.

      Having examined the applicant's complaint under Article 5 para. 3

(Art. 5-3) of the Convention, the Commission finds that it raises

serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that

their determination should depend on an examination of the merits.

This part of the application cannot, therefore, be regarded as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no other grounds for declaring it

inadmissible have been established.

3.    The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention that the criminal proceedings in case 1856/92 have continued

for an unreasonably long period.  He also complains that the

investigators and the prosecutors were biased and corrupt.

      Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, insofar as relevant,

provides as follows:

           "1.   In the determination of ... any criminal charge

      against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing

      within a reasonable time by an ... impartial tribunal established

      by law.

      ..."

      The Government submit that the requirements of Article 26

(Art. 26) have not been complied with as the applicant has not

submitted requests for a speedy examination of his case.  Furthermore,

the complaint is inadmissible as the criminal proceedings are still

pending.

      The applicant replies inter alia that he has employed all

available remedies and that his complaints are well-founded.

a)    As regards the applicant's complaint of the alleged bias of the

prosecutors and the investigators, the Commission recalls that the

primary purpose of Article 6 (Art. 6), as far as criminal matters are

concerned, is to ensure as a whole a "fair trial" by a "tribunal"

competent to determine "any criminal charge".  The requirements of this

provision could be relevant in pre-trial proceedings insofar as the

fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an

initial failure to comply with them (Eur. Court HR, Imbrioscia v.

Switzerland judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no. 275, p. 13,

para. 36; cf. also Can v. Austria, Comm. Report 12.7.84, paras. 49, 50,

Eur. Court HR, Series A no. 96, pp. 15, 16).

      However, the applicant's complaints of alleged bias concern the

preliminary investigation, and not a "trial" before a "tribunal" within

the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.  The criminal

proceedings against the applicant are still pending.  The Commission

cannot speculate whether the applicant will be put on trial, whether

the evidence taken will be used at this trial, whether the trial will

be fair as a whole, or whether the applicant will be convicted.  The

Commission finds that the applicant cannot, at this stage, claim to be

a victim of the alleged violation of his right to a "fair trial" by an

"impartial tribunal" under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention (cf. No. 31195/96, Dec. 27.2.97, D.R. 88, p. 169).

      It follows that this part of the application is premature and

thus manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

b)    As regards the complaint concerning the length of the criminal

proceedings in case 1856/92 against the applicant, the Commission notes

that the Government have not indicated any provision of Bulgarian law

which affords a remedy in respect of such a complaint.  Moreover, the

Commission recalls that as regards complaints of excessive length of

criminal proceedings an application by the accused to accelerate the

proceedings cannot be regarded as an effective remedy.  The accused

person cannot be obliged to step into the role of the prosecution and

advance the proceedings against himself (No. 8435/78, Dec. 6.3.82,

D.R. 26, pp. 18, 20).  Finally, in his letter to the Chief Public

Prosecutor of 18 December 1995 the applicant indeed raised the question

of the alleged improper delays in the proceedings.

      This complaint, therefore, cannot be rejected under Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention.

      Having examined the applicant's complaint under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention concerning the length of the criminal

proceedings against him, the Commission finds that it raises serious

questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their

determination should depend on an examination of the merits.  This part

of the application cannot, therefore, be regarded as manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention, and no other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have

been established.

4.    The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) that he has been deprived unlawfully of certain possessions and

that nothing has been done to punish the perpetrators.

      The Government submit that part of the complaints concern acts

of private persons, that the applicant has not exhausted all domestic

remedies in respect of the acts of the authorities complained of, and

that in any event their acts, such as the attachment of the applicant's

cars,  were lawful and justified measures.

      The applicant replies inter alia that he has exhausted all

possible remedies as he complained to all levels of the prosecution

authorities.  Furthermore, in January 1994 he submitted a request to

the President of the Rousse Regional Court seeking the repeal of the

seizure order of 30 November 1992.  As he did not receive an answer

he submitted another request to the President of the Supreme Court on

23 August 1994.  The applicant admits that these requests were not in

the proper legal form, but states that the courts were required to

examine them.

      The applicant also argues that the seizure had to be ordered by

an enforcement judge, in accordance with Section 319 of the Civil

Procedure Code, to which Section 156 para. 4 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure refers, and that this was not done in his case.

      The applicant further states that his property was stolen with

the active participation of corrupt prosecutors and investigators and

that the respondent Government are hiding the facts, thus protecting

the criminals who ruined him.

a)    Insofar as the applicant's complaints concern the seizure of

documents from his office on 30 April 1992 and other events prior to

7 September 1992, the date of the Convention's entry into force in

respect of Bulgaria, the Commission finds that it is not competent

ratione temporis to examine them.

      The Commission further notes that most of the applicant's

complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention,

such as the allegation that a sum of money has "disappeared" from his

company's bank account with a private bank and that some shareholders

of A. have allegedly unlawfully taken the property of the company,

concern acts of private persons and are incompatible ratione personae

with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

      Insofar as the applicant complains of the refusal of the

authorities to prosecute those responsible for the alleged stealing of

his property, the Commission finds that this complaint is incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, the Convention

not guaranteeing a right to institute criminal proceedings against a

third person (No. 7116/75, Dec. 4.10.76, D.R. 7, p. 91).

      It follows that this part of the application has to be rejected

under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

b)    As regards the seizure of four automobiles on 30 November 1992,

the Commission observes that they apparently belonged to A., a limited

liability company with its own legal personality, which is free to

bring an application to the Commission (cf. Eur. Court HR, Agrotexim

v. Greece judgment of  24 October 1995, Series A no. 330).

      Nevertheless, the Commission need not decide whether the

applicant's complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the

Convention is raised in his individual capacity or on behalf of A., or

whether the applicant currently represents A., as this part of the

application is in any event inadmissible for failure to exhaust all

domestic remedies under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

      The Commission recalls the Convention organs' case-law according

to which normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies

which are available and capable of remedying the breaches alleged (Eur.

Court HR, Beis v. Greece judgment of 20 March 1997, Reports 1997-II,

No. 34, para. 32).  There is no exhaustion of domestic remedies where

a domestic appeal is not admitted because of a procedural mistake (No.

6878/75, Dec. 6.10.76, D.R. 6, p. 79).

      The applicant claims, without submitting a copy of any document

in this respect, that he has made a request to the President of the

Rousse Regional Court in January 1994, asking for the return of his

cars.  However, it is unclear whether the criminal case against him was

already pending before the Rousse Regional Court at that time.  If the

case was still at the preliminary investigation stage, the Court was

apparently not competent to examine the request.

      In any event, the applicant did not appeal against the refusal

of the Rousse Regional Court to examine his request, but submitted, on

23 August 1994, a fresh petition, addressed to the President of the

Supreme Court.  In this petition the applicant asked the President of

the Supreme Court to repeal the order of the investigator of

30 November 1992 and to order the return of his stolen property.

However, neither the Supreme Court, nor its President, are competent

to repeal orders of investigators.

      Moreover, the applicant has not made before the national

authorities the submission which he is now putting before the

Commission: that the cars were seized in violation of Section 156

para. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of the

Code of Civil Procedure.  In his numerous letters to various

institutions he stated that the seizure was unlawful, but only because

he had been a victim of a plot for the stealing of his possessions.

In these circumstances it does not appear surprising that the

authorities apparently treated the applicants' petitions as repeated

criminal complaints for the institution of criminal proceedings against

the allegedly implicated prosecutors.

      Finally, insofar as the applicant claims that the cars are in the

possession of third persons without any legal ground, it is open to him

to seek their recovery by way of civil action for restitution.

      The Commission considers, therefore, that the applicant has not

made proper use of the opportunities to challenge the seizure of the

cars before the national authorities and that, consequently, he has not

exhausted all domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention in this respect.

      It follows that this part of the application has to be rejected

under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

5.    The applicant complains that the prison administration checked

the content and requested the translation of his application to the

Commission.

      The Government provide excerpts of Section 33 of the Law on

Execution of Punishments and Section 37 of the Regulations for the

implementation of this law, which concern the prisoners' general

correspondence (see above Relevant domestic law and practice).  The

Government state that the content of the prisoners' letters to the

Commission in general, and in the applicant's case,  cannot be withheld

under Section 37 of the Regulations, as this would not be considered

necessary on grounds of "security, [the prison] regime or on the basis

of educational considerations".

      The applicant maintains his complaint.  He states in addition

that prisoners cannot send registered letters or make telephone calls.

      The Commission considers that the applicant's complaint about the

control of his letter of 13 February 1996 to the Commission falls to

be examined in the light of the alleged hindrance of the right of

individual petition under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, and

also under Article 8 (Art.  8) of the Convention (cf. Campbell v. the

United Kingdom, Comm. Report 12.7.90, para. 74, Eur. Court HR, Series

A no. 233, p. 41).  Furthermore, in his observations in reply to the

Government's observations the applicant raises a general complaint as

regards his right to correspondence.

a)    Having examined the applicant's complaint about the control of

his letter of 13 February 1996 in the light of Article 8 (Art. 8) of

the Convention, the Commission finds that it raises serious questions

of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination

should depend on an examination of the merits.  This part of the

application cannot, therefore, be regarded as manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention,

and no other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been

established.

b)    In respect of the alleged hindrance of the right to individual

petition the Commission finds no evidence that the applicant, whose two

application forms arrived promptly, and who was able to communicate

effectively with the Commission since the introduction of his

complaints, suffered any prejudice in regard to the presentation of his

application or that he was in any way frustrated in the exercise of his

right to submit an application.

      The Commission does not consider, therefore, that  the applicant

was hindered in the exercise of his right of individual petition under

Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the

      applicant's complaints: under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention

      of an alleged breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable

      time or to release pending trial; under Article 6 para. 1 of the

      Convention of the length of the criminal proceedings against him;

      and his complaint under Article 8 of the Convention that the

      prison administration checked the content and requested the

      translation of his application form to the Commission.

      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

      DECIDES to take no further action in respect of the applicant's

      complaint of the alleged hindrance of his right to individual

      petition under Article 25 of the Convention.

  M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                 J. LIDDY

     Secretary                                    President

to the First Chamber                        of the First Chamber