PHILLIPS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 35698/97 • ECHR ID: 001-4060
Document date: December 3, 1997
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 35698/97
by Lionel Henry PHILLIPS
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 3 December 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs J. LIDDY, President
MM M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs M. HION
Mr R. NICOLINI
Mrs M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 7 August 1996 by
Lionel Henry PHILLIPS against the United Kingdom and registered on
22 April 1997 under file No. 35698/97;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1954 and currently
resident in Bangor, Northern Ireland. The facts of the application,
as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
A. The particular circumstances of the case
The applicant has a history of mental health problems and was
diagnosed in 1989 as suffering from ideas of persecution with a bizarre
delusional intensity. In 1990 the applicant was charged with
inflicting grievous bodily harm on a neighbour whom he had struck on
the head with a hammer, causing a depressed fracture of the skull. The
applicant believed this neighbour was persecuting him. The applicant,
who was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid psychosis, pleaded guilty,
and on 4 April 1990 he was sentenced to a hospital order under
Section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The applicant was
subsequently released into the community on the condition that
accommodation and backup in the community be provided. The applicant
continued to be monitored by social services and doctors. In March
1991 it was considered the applicant was in the early stages of a
relapse into paranoid schizophrenia, but it was considered that the
applicant was not a danger to himself or others and as such compulsory
admission to hospital was not necessary.
On 30 April 1991 the applicant moved to Northern Ireland and
found accommodation in Bangor. Following co-operation between both the
medical and social services of England and Northern Ireland, a social
worker visited the applicant at his new address and reported to his
former doctor in England that "there appears to be no problem".
Some time after his arrival in Northern Ireland the applicant
wrote a letter to the Brookwood Hospital in England, where he had
formerly been treated. In that letter he stated that he had, whilst
in Brookwood Hospital, been forcibly injected with poisonous substances
ordered by a doctor to whom he referred as "the demented Dr. Mengele."
This letter raised the concerns of the doctors who had been involved
in the applicant's treatment in England. There is a conflict of
evidence as to when this letter was sent. The applicant claims it was
sent in late May or early June 1991, whereas the hospital state the
letter was sent on 1 August 1991. In response to this letter a doctor
who had treated the applicant in England, Dr. Robinson, contacted a
medical colleague in Northern Ireland, Dr. Thompson, stating that he
was concerned by the applicant's letter and considered the applicant's
mental state was deteriorating and that an assessment was necessary.
Dr. Thompson contacted a consultant who advised that the applicant
should be visited in his own home by a doctor accompanied by a social
worker.
On 10 September 1991 at approximately 11.15 a.m. the applicant
was visited at his home in Bangor by Dr. Thompson and a social worker.
These professionals were accompanied by at least two uniformed police
officers and members of the ambulance service. It appears that the
applicant allowed Dr. Thompson and the social worker to enter his home,
but refused admittance to the uniformed individuals. The applicant
states that he was then assaulted, taken against his will, and without
any explanation, for an assessment at a hospital. In the ambulance the
applicant was given a sedative injection. The applicant states that
this injection was forced upon him against his will. Following the
applicant's admission to Downshire Hospital, the applicant was examined
by Dr. McDermott. She concluded of the applicant:
"I feel he needs a period of assessment and he is unwilling to
come in as a voluntary patient."
The applicant states that he awoke at 8 p.m on the day of his
admission and then fell unconscious again until the following morning,
when he demanded and was permitted to see a solicitor. On 12 September
1991, the applicant was transferred from Downshire hospital to Ards
Hospital and the following day he left the latter hospital without
permission. On being subsequently contacted, he agreed to return to
hospital to receive treatment. The applicant states on his return to
hospital he was coerced into agreeing to being injected in order that
he be allowed home. The applicant returned to the hospital on a
monthly basis until December 1991 to receive injections, after which
date he left the country for a period and received no further
injections.
The applicant brought proceedings in the High Court of Justice
in Northern Ireland for trespass to the person, unlawful arrest, libel
and unlawful imprisonment. The proceedings were directed against the
Chief Constable, Dr. Thompson, the social worker (Mr. McIntosh) and the
Eastern Health and Social Services Board. The action was tried before
Mr. Justice McCollum on 12 and 13 June 1995. The applicant appeared
in person. The judge held that on 10 September 1991 the applicant had
been subject to a consultation of about half an hour by Dr. Thompson
and the social worker, during which time an assessment of the applicant
was made and a decision taken to admit the applicant for assessment and
that this procedure was in accordance with the Mental Health (Northern
Ireland) Order 1986 ("the 1986 Order"). The judge considered that the
assessment of the applicant was provoked by the letter to Brookwood
Hospital sent on or about 1 August 1991, he also took into account the
past history of the applicant's mental health problems and resultant
violence. The judge held that the applicant had consented to a
sedative injection in the ambulance on the way to the hospital and that
after his initial self-discharge from hospital on 13 September 1991,
his further visits to the hospital for treatment were voluntary. The
applicant's case failed on all counts and on 26 July 1995 judgment was
given in respect of each defendant against the applicant. The
applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. On
2 May 1996 after an oral hearing where the applicant appeared in person
and the defendants were represented by counsel, it was ordered that the
applicant give security for the costs of his appeal in the sum of
£7,000 and that in default the appeal stand dismissed. The applicant
did not subsequently pursue the appeal.
B. Relevant domestic law
Article 4 (2) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986
provides, so far as relevant:
"An application for assessment may be made in respect of a
patient on the grounds that-
(a) he is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree
which warrants his detention in a hospital for
assessment...
(b) failure to so detain him would create a substantial
likelihood of serious physical harm to himself or to other
persons.
The 1986 Order further states that prior to making an application
for assessment the patient must be interviewed by a social worker who
must be satisfied that detention is the most appropriate way of
providing the medical care required by the patient (Article 40). It
is a further condition that an application for assessment of a patient
must be founded upon a medical recommendation by a medical practitioner
(Article 4(3)).
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that he was unlawfully arrested and
detained in violation of Article 5 para. 1 and Article 5 para. 5 of the
Convention. He also complains that his attempts to seek compensation
were frustrated and that the requirement that he provide security for
costs made him unable to pursue an appeal to the Court of Appeal
against the judgment of Mr. Justice McCollum.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that he was unlawfully arrested and
detained in violation of Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention
and that he was frustrated in his attempts to seek compensation.
Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention provides, so far
as relevant, as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following
cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
e. the lawful detention ... of persons of unsound
mind ...;"
The Commission recalls that in accordance with the case-law of
the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, an individual with
mental health problems should not be deprived of his liberty unless he
has reliably shown to be of "unsound mind" and that there must be
objective medical opinion to support such a finding. Further, the
mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory
confinement (see Eur. Court HR, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands judgment
of 24 October 1979, Series A no. 33, p. 18, para. 39).
The Commission further recalls that in deciding whether an
individual should be detained as a "person of unsound mind", the
national authorities are to be recognised as having a certain
discretion since it is in the first place for the national authorities
to evaluate the evidence adduced before them in a particular case. The
role of the Convention organs is to review under the Convention the
decisions of those authorities (see the above-mentioned Winterwerp
judgment at p. 18, para. 40).
The Commission notes that in the present case the applicant was
visited on the advice of a doctor who had been involved in treating the
applicant. A further doctor examined the applicant in his own home and
considered that the applicant should be admitted to hospital for an
assessment. On arrival at the hospital the applicant was seen by a
different doctor, who stated that in her view the applicant needed a
period of assessment but was unwilling to come in as a voluntary
patient. Further the applicant had a history of mental health problems
and of associated violence. In these circumstances, the Commission
considers there to have been sufficient objective medical opinion to
support the decision to admit the applicant to hospital for an
assessment of his mental health, and that the applicant's mental
disorder was such as to warrant a temporary compulsory confinement.
The Commission also notes that the circumstances surrounding the
admission of the applicant to hospital were considered by Mr. Justice
McCollum. The judge, after a two day hearing, held that the detention
of the applicant was justified and was in accordance with the 1986
Order. There is no appearance that the procedure stipulated in that
Order is not in conformity with the Convention's principles (see above-
mentioned Winterwerp judgment at pp. 19-20, para. 45). The judge
further held that the applicant was not injected against his will and
that after his initial self-discharge the applicant's return visits to
the hospital for treatment were voluntary. The Commission does not
consider that the facts of the case reveal any arbitrariness or
unfairness in the judge's conclusions as to the circumstances of the
applicant's treatment or his finding that the doctors were justified
in their admission of the applicant to hospital for assessment.
The Commission accordingly concludes that the detention of the
applicant constituted a "lawful detention of [a person] of unsound
mind" and "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law".
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within he meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant also complains that he had no enforceable right to
compensation and invokes Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the
Convention.
Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention provides as
follows:
"Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in
contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an
enforceable right to compensation."
The Commission recalls that the application of Article 5 para. 5
(Art. 5-5) pre-supposes the establishment of a breach of one of the
preceding paragraphs of Article 5 (Art. 5) (see e.g. No. 10371/83, Dec.
6.3.85, D.R. 42, p. 128). In the present case no such breach has been
established.
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within he meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
3. The applicant finally complains that he was unable to pursue an
appeal against the judgment Mr. Justice McCollum as he was unable to
raise the requisite security for costs of the appeal.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides, so far
as relevant, as follows:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law...".
The Commission recalls that an order to provide security for
costs in order to pursue an appeal does not impair the very essence of
the right of access to Court (Eur. Court HR, Tolstoy v. United Kingdom
judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A no. 316-B, pp. 78-81, paras. 59-67).
There is no indication in the present case that the requirement for
security of costs was anything other that a reasonable limitation on
access to an appeal given the applicant's means and the appeal's
prospects of success.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded with in the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
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