AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 26493/95

                      by Willem ZEGWAARD and ZEGWAARD B.V.

                      against the Netherlands

     The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 3 December 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs   G.H. THUNE, President

           MM    J.-C. GEUS

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Ms    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 22 November 1994

by Willem ZEGWAARD and ZEGWAARD B.V. against the Netherlands and

registered on 13 February 1995 under file No. 26493/95;

     Having regard to:

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

     29 January 1997 and the observations in reply submitted by the

     applicants on 9 April 1997;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The first applicant, W. Zegwaard, is a Dutch citizen, born in

1944, and residing at Rijswijk. The applicant company, Zegwaard B.V.,

is a company with limited liability, established under Dutch law, which

has its registered seat in Delft. The first applicant is the managing

director of the applicant company and holder of all its shares. Before

the Commission the applicants are represented by Mr. C.J. van Bavel,

a lawyer practising in Utrecht.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

A.   The particular circumstances of the case

     In April 1989 preliminary judicial investigations were initiated

into allegations of, inter alia, forgery and illegal dumping of

chemical waste perpetrated by the applicant company. On 11 April 1989

the house of the first applicant and the premises of the applicant

company were searched, and on 18 September 1990 the first applicant was

detained on remand. On 17 October 1990 he was released.

     On 14 October 1991 the applicants were summoned to appear before

the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague on

25 November 1991. The first applicant was charged with the following

criminal offences:

1.   participation in an organisation managed by him which intended

     to commit the criminal offences of (i) forgery, (ii) fraud,

     (iii) the deliberate dumping of chemical waste and (iv) the

     deliberate dumping of polluted waste matter;

2.   attempt to obtain a permit to dump waste matter under false

     pretences committed by an organisation on his orders and/or

     whilst he was in actual charge of this act;

3.   obtaining of an unlawful advantage committed by an organisation

     on his orders and/or whilst he was in actual charge of this act;

4.   deliberate use of false or forged documents committed by an

     organisation on his orders and/or whilst he was in actual charge

     of this act;

5.   forging of documents stating weights committed by an organisation

     on his orders and/or whilst he was in actual charge of this act;

6.   forging of invoices committed by an organisation on his orders

     and/or whilst he was in actual charge of this act;

7.   dumping of chemical waste committed by an organisation on his

     orders and/or whilst he was in actual charge of this act; and

8.   violation of the regulations laid down in the Surface Water

     Pollution Act (Wet Verontreiniging Oppervlaktewateren) committed

     by an organisation on his orders and/or whilst he was in actual

     charge of this act.

     The applicant company was charged with the following offences:

A.   participation in an organisation which had the intention to

     commit the criminal offences of (i) forgery of so-called border

     documents and other documents, (ii) fraud, (iii) the deliberate

     dumping of chemical waste and (iv) the deliberate dumping of

     polluted waste matter;

B.   attempt to obtain a permit to dump waste matter under false

     pretences;

C.   obtaining of an unlawful advantage;

D.   deliberate use of false or forged documents;

E.   forging of documents stating weights;

F.   forging of invoices;

G.   dumping of chemical waste; and

H.   violation of the regulations laid down in the Surface Water

     Pollution Act.

     Public hearings took place on 26 November and 3 December 1991.

     As regards the first applicant, the Regional Court on

17 December 1991 declared the indictment in respect of the charges

under 1 (i) and (iii) null and void, acquitted him of the other charges

under 1 and the charges under 3, 4, 6 and 7, and convicted him of the

charges under 2, 5 and 8. It sentenced the first applicant to a

partially suspended term of 24 months' imprisonment less the time spent

in pre-trial detention. The Regional Court furthermore imposed a fine

of 100,000 Dutch guilders on the first applicant.

     As regards the second applicant, the Regional Court on the same

day declared the indictment in respect of the charges under A (i) as

regards forgery of other documents and (iii) null and void, acquitted

it of the other charges under A and the charges under C and G, and

convicted the applicant company of the charges under B, D, E, F and H.

The Regional Court imposed a fine of 600,000 Dutch guilders on the

applicant company and obliged it to pay the State 50,000 Dutch guilders

to deprive it of the estimated financial advantages it had obtained.

     Both applicants and the Prosecutions Department filed an appeal

against the Regional Court's decisions with the Court of Appeal

(Gerechtshof) of The Hague.

     Public hearings before the Court of Appeal were held on 15 and

16 February, 9 March and 19 April 1993.

     On 3 May 1993 the Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court's

judgments. In regard to the first applicant, the Court of Appeal

considered that only the offence of attempted fraud (2) had been

proved. Nevertheless, it sentenced the first applicant to 12 months'

imprisonment less the time spent in pre-trial detention. In this

respect the Court of Appeal held, inter alia:

     "Het hof heeft de op te leggen straf bepaald op grond van de

     ernst van het feit en de omstandigheden waaronder dit is begaan

     en op grond van de persoon en de persoonlijke omstandigheden van

     de verdachte zoals daarvan is gebleken uit het onderzoek ter

     terechtzitting.

     Daarbij is in het bijzonder het volgende in aanmerking genomen.

     De verdachte was binnen de Zegwaard-bedrijven niet alleen formeel

     maar ook, mede gezien de zogenaamde platte organisatiestructuur

     van de Zegwaard-bedrijven, materieel degene bij wie de

     uiteindelijke beslissingsmacht en verantwoordelijkheid berustten.

     Hij is voorts getypeerd als iemand die "zeer goed op de hoogte"

     was van hetgeen zich binnen de bedrijven afspeelde. Het moge zijn

     dat van de telastegelegde feiten maar één enkel feit bewezen is

     verklaard, maar feit blijft niettemin dat uit het onderzoek ter

     terechtzitting in hoger beroep naar voren is gekomen dat in de

     telastegelegde perioden binnen de Zegwaard-bedrijven tal van

     strafbare feiten - zoals oplichting van de dienst Gemeente

     Reiniging Den Haag en die van Voorburg (LVZ), het opzettelijk

     gebruikmaken van valse BNL-50 formulieren, het vervalsen dan wel

     valselijk opmaken van weegbonnen en facturen en het zich in

     strijd met de regels ontdoen van chemisch afval - heeft

     plaatsgevonden. Dat dit kon gebeuren, valt de verdachte

     - ongeacht het bepaalde in artikel 51 van het Wetboek van

     Strafrecht - ten zeerste aan te rekenen en moet, gezien het feit

     dat hij zich erop voorstond dat bij de Zegwaard-bedrijven alles

     volgens de regels gebeurde, des te verwerpelijker worden

     geoordeeld.

     De verdachte had er kennelijk geen bezwaar tegen dat, zulks

     uitsluitend ten bate van de Zegwaard-bedrijven en met voorbijgaan

     van milieubelangen, door middel van misleiding van overheden

     vergunningen c.q. ontheffingen werden verkregen. Een en ander

     acht het hof dermate strafwaardig dat het zwakke en weinig alerte

     beleid van die overheden alsook dat de milieuwetgeving zich als

     chaotisch en gebrekkig doet kennen daarvoor nauwelijks als een

     verzachtende omstandigheid kunnen gelden.

     Het hof is van oordeel dat, gelet op de aard en ernst van het

     bewezen feit en gelet op het vorenoverwogene, het opleggen van

     een onvoorwaardelijke gevangenisstraf ... de enige passende

     reactie vormt. Bij het bepalen van de strafmaat heeft het hof

     mede rekening gehouden met mogelijk negatieve effecten van alle

     publiciteit die de media sedert de huiszoekingen hebben gewijd

     aan deze strafzaak."

     "The Court has determined the sentence on the basis of the

     severity of the criminal offence and the circumstances under

     which it was committed, and on the basis of the personality and

     the personal circumstances of the accused as these have emerged

     from the hearings before the Court.

     The Court has had particular regard to the following.

     Within the Zegwaard group of companies the accused was the person

     in charge, taking final decisions and bearing responsibility, not

     only formally, but also in substance given the flat

     organisational structure of the group. He has furthermore been

     typified as a person who was "very well informed" of all matters

     within the companies. It may be true that of the offences he was

     charged with only one has been proved, but it has nevertheless

     emerged from the hearings on appeal that in the period during

     which the alleged offences took place a number of criminal

     offences were committed within the Zegwaard group, such as

     fraudulent acts in dealings with the municipal sanitation

     departments of The Hague and Voorburg (LVZ), the deliberate use

     of false border documents, the forging or false drawing up of

     documents stating weights and of invoices, and the disposal of

     chemical waste contrary to the regulations. The fact that these

     offences were allowed to occur may, despite Section 51 of the

     Criminal Code, to a large extent be attributed to the accused and

     should, given that he prided himself on the fact that everything

     at the Zegwaard group was done according to the rules, be deemed

     all the more reprehensible.

     The accused manifestly did not object to the fact that through

     deception of the authorities permits and exemptions were

     obtained, such only for the benefit of the Zegwaard group whereas

     the interests of the environment were ignored. The Court

     considers these facts worthy of punishment to such an extent that

     neither the feeble and not very alert policy of those authorities

     nor the chaotic and deficient appearance of the environmental

     legislation, could serve as a mitigating circumstance.

     The Court is of the opinion that, in view of the nature and

     seriousness of the proved offence and of the considerations

     above, the imposition of a non-suspended prison sentence ... is

     the only fitting reaction. In the determination of this sentence

     the Court has also had regard to the possible negative effects

     of all the publicity which the media have devoted to this case

     ..."

     In regard to the applicant company, the Court of Appeal declared

the indictment in respect of the charges under A (i) insofar as this

concerned the forgery of other documents, (iii) and (iv) and H null and

void and acquitted it of the remaining charges under A and the charges

under C and G. It convicted the applicant company of the charges under

B, D, E and F and imposed on it a fine of 600,000 Dutch guilders. In

this respect, it held, inter alia:

     "Het hof heeft de op te leggen straf bepaald op grond van de

     ernst van de feiten en de omstandigheden waaronder zij zijn

     begaan en op grond van de omstandigheden van de verdachte zoals

     daarvan is gebleken uit het onderzoek ter terechtzitting.

     Daarbij is in het bijzonder het volgende in aanmerking genomen.

     De verdachte heeft zich meermalen schuldig gemaakt aan valsheid

     in geschrift en het gebruikmaken van valselijk opgemaakte

     geschriften; zij heeft zich voorts schuldig gemaakt aan een

     poging tot oplichting. Het moge zo zijn dat de overige

     telastegelegde feiten het niet tot een bewezenverklaring hebben

     kunnen brengen, feit blijft dat uit het onderzoek ter

     terechtzitting naar voren is gekomen dat zich bij Zegwaard B.V.

     in de telastegelegde perioden tal van feiten hebben voorgedaan

     die stuk voor stuk als strafbare feiten zijn aan te merken.

     Zo heeft Zegwaard B.V. de Dienst Gemeente Reiniging van

     's Gravenhage en die van Voorburg (LVZ) ertoe weten te bewegen

     een ontheffing voor het storten van 100.000 ton huisvuil in

     Mellery (België) te verkrijgen, welke ontheffing zij vervolgens

     ten onrechte uitsluitend ten eigen bate heeft aangewend. Voorts

     heeft Zegwaard B.V. zich in strijd met de regels veelvuldig

     ontdaan van allerlei soorten chemisch afval, zulks terwijl zij

     over geen enkele vergunning, ontheffing of deskundigheid terzake

     beschikte. Kennelijk diende een en ander om de bestaande praktijk

     te laten voortbestaan en stond men in werkelijkheid - anders dan

     naar buiten toe werd voorgewend - onverschillig tegenover het

     milieu, de milieuwetgeving en de daarvoor verantwoordelijke

     overheden. Dat die wetgeving zich als chaotisch en gebrekkig doet

     kennen en het door die overheden terzake gevoerde beleid zwak en

     weinig alert kan worden genoemd, doet aan de ernstige

     strafwaardigheid van voorgaande gedragingen niet af.

     Het hof is, gelet op de ernst van de bewezen feiten en gelet op

     het vooroverwogene, van oordeel dat, niettegenstaande de

     omstandigheid dat het tot minder bewezenverklaarde feiten komt

     dan waartoe de rechtbank is gekomen, toch een geldboete van

     gelijke omvang dient te worden opgelegd.

     Bij de vaststelling van de geldboete heeft het hof rekening

     gehouden zowel met de draagkracht van de verdachte zoals deze uit

     het onderzoek ter terechtzitting is gebleken, als met mogelijke

     negatieve effecten van alle publiciteit die de media sedert de

     huiszoekingen hebben gewijd aan deze strafzaak."

     "The Court has determined the sentence on the basis of the

     severity of the criminal offences and the circumstances under

     which they were committed, and on the basis of the accused's

     circumstances as these have emerged from the hearings before the

     Court.

     The Court has had particular regard to the following.

     The accused has several times committed forgery and has

     deliberately made use of documents falsely drawn up; it has also

     attempted to commit fraud. It may be true that the other offences

     [with which the accused was charged] have not been proved, but

     it has nevertheless emerged from the hearings on appeal that in

     the period during which the alleged offences took place a number

     of facts have occurred at Zegwaard B.V., each of which may be

     characterised as criminal offences.

     Thus Zegwaard B.V. has managed to persuade the municipal

     sanitation departments of The Hague and Voorburg (LVZ) to grant

     an exemption enabling it to dump 100,000 tons of household refuse

     in Mellery (Belgium), which exemption was subsequently wrongfully

     used with the sole purpose of benefiting [Zegwaard B.V.] only.

     Zegwaard B.V. has furthermore many times disposed of different

     kinds of chemical waste contrary to the regulations and without

     being in possession of any permit, exemption or professional

     knowledge. All these actions were manifestly undertaken in order

     to continue an existing practice, whereas in reality, contrary

     to what was pretended towards the outside world, [Zegwaard B.V.]

     was indifferent towards the environment, the environmental

     legislation and the responsible authorities. The Court considers

     these facts worthy of punishment to such an extent that neither

     the feeble and not very alert policy of those authorities nor the

     chaotic and deficient appearance of the environmental

     legislation, could serve as a mitigating circumstance.

     The Court is of the opinion, in view of the seriousness of the

     proved offences and of the considerations above, and

     notwithstanding the fact that it has found the accused guilty of

     fewer offences than the Regional Court, that a fine of the same

     amount should nevertheless be imposed.

     In the determination of this fine the Court has had regard to the

     accused's financial resources as these have appeared from the

     hearings, as well as to the possible negative effects of all the

     publicity which the media have devoted to this case ..."

     The applicants and the Prosecutions Department both filed appeals

in cassation against the judgments of 3 May 1993 with the Supreme Court

(Hoge Raad). The applicants raised, inter alia, the following complaint

concerning the reasoning applied by the Court of Appeal in respect of

the determination of the sentences:

     "...

     2.    The Court of Appeal was wrong to take account of criminal

     offences which came to light during the hearings, since it has

     not been determined that the applicants committed these offences

     ...

     3.    The offences to which the Court refers in this respect

     concern offences in respect of which the indictment has been

     declared null and void, whereas in respect of one offence - the

     illegal dumping of chemical waste - the applicants have been

     acquitted ..."

     On 31 May 1994 the Supreme Court declared the appeals in

cassation of the Prosecutions Department inadmissible on the ground

that they had been lodged out of time, and rejected the applicants'

appeals in cassation. As regards the applicants' complaint of the

determination of the sentences, the Supreme Court considered that, in

general, a judge, when determining the sentence to be imposed, may take

account of facts and circumstances which have emerged at the hearing.

In respect of the first applicant, the Supreme Court held furthermore:

     "7.2. ... Weliswaar blijkt uit de processen-verbaal van de

     terechtzittingen in hoger beroep niet dat de verdachte de

     strafbare feiten heeft begaan die hem zijn telastegelegd doch ten

     aanzien waarvan het Hof de inleidende dagvaarding nietig heeft

     verklaard en die waarvan hij is vrijgesproken, doch het is niet

     onbegrijpelijk dat het Hof uit het verhandelde ter

     terechtzittingen, zoals blijkt uit de daarvan opgemaakte

     processen-verbaal, heeft afgeleid dat binnen de

     Zegwaard-bedrijven tal van strafbare feiten zijn begaan, zoals

     die welke het Hof ... heeft vermeld. Voorts kon het Hof uit het

     verhandelde ter terechtzittingen ... afleiden dat de

     beslissingsmacht in en de verantwoordelijkheid over de

     Zegwaard-bedrijven op de verdachte rustten.

     7.3. Het Hof mocht een en ander in onderling verband beschouwen.

     Door aldus te overwegen dat het de verdachte ten zeerste valt aan

     te rekenen dat binnen de Zegwaard-bedrijven die strafbare feiten

     werden gepleegd, heeft het Hof kennelijk en niet onbegrijpelijk

     tot uitdrukking gebracht dat de verdachte, als degene die de

     beslissingsmacht had binnen de Zegwaard-bedrijven, een

     verantwoordelijke positie bekleedde en dat hij die

     verantwoordelijke positie niet of onvoldoende heeft aangewend om

     te voorkomen dat de door het Hof bedoelde strafbare feiten binnen

     die bedrijven werden gepleegd. Het stond het Hof vrij deze op de

     persoon van de verdachte betrekking hebbende omstandigheid in

     aanmerking te nemen bij het bepalen van de op te leggen

     straf. ..."

     "7.2 ... It is true that it does not appear from the minutes of

     the hearings on appeal that the accused committed the criminal

     offences with which he had been charged but in respect of which

     the Court of Appeal had declared the indictment null and void or

     of which he had been acquitted. However, the fact that the Court

     of Appeal deduced from what was debated at the hearings ... that

     within the Zegwaard group a number of criminal offences have been

     committed, such as those mentioned by the Court of Appeal ...,

     is not inexplicable. The Court of Appeal was further able to

     deduce from what was debated at the hearings ... that within the

     Zegwaard group the power of decision and the responsibility for

     the group lay with the accused.

     7.3.  The Court of Appeal was entitled to consider the above in

     correlation. By holding that the commission of criminal offences

     within the Zegwaard group was to a large extent attributable to

     the accused, the Court of Appeal obviously and not inexplicably

     stated that the accused, as the person entrusted with the power

     to decide within the Zegwaard group, held a position of

     responsibility and that he did not or not sufficiently exercise

     this position of responsibility in order to prevent the criminal

     offences indicated by the Court of Appeal from being committed

     within these companies. The Court of Appeal was free to take

     account of these circumstances which concern the person of the

     accused when it determined the sentence to be imposed. ..."

     The Supreme Court's judgment concerning the applicant company

contained phrases of a similar nature.

B.   Relevant domestic law and practice

     Article 51 of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) provides

as follows:

     1.    Strafbare feiten kunnen worden begaan door natuurlijke

     personen en rechtspersonen.

     2.    Indien een strafbaar feit wordt begaan door een

     rechtspersoon, kan de strafvervolging worden ingesteld en kunnen

     de in de wet voorziene straffen en maatregelen, indien zij

     daarvoor in aanmerking komen, worden uitgesproken:

     1*. tegen die rechtspersoon, dan wel

     2*. tegen hen die tot het feit opdracht hebben gegeven, alsmede

     tegen hen die feitelijke leiding hebben gegeven aan de verboden

     gedraging, dan wel

     3*. tegen de onder 1* en 2* genoemden te zamen.

     3.    (...)

     1.    Offences may be committed by natural persons and legal

     persons.

     2.    If an offence is committed by a legal person criminal

     proceedings may be instituted and the punishments and other

     measures provided for by law may be implemented where

     appropriate:

     1*.   against the legal person, or alternatively,

     2*.   against the persons who ordered the commission of the

           offence as well as the persons who were in actual charge of

           the prohibited act, or alternatively,

     3*.   against the persons referred to under 1* and 2* together.

     3.    (...)

     In its well-established case-law the Supreme Court further holds

that the court dealing with the facts may not impose a sentence which

exceeds the maximum sentence provided for in the relevant legal

provisions. However, when determining the sentence, there is no legal

impediment preventing the court from taking into account, to the

detriment of the accused, any aggravating circumstances which have

emerged from the trial.

     According to Section 99 para. 1 (2) of the Judicial Organisation

Act (Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie) the Supreme Court may quash

judgments of lower courts if it finds that they are contrary to the

law. The Convention is part of Dutch law.

COMPLAINTS

     The applicants complain that when it determined the sentences to

be imposed on them, the Court of Appeal took into account offences with

which the applicants had not been charged, of which they had been

acquitted, or in respect of which the indictment had been declared null

and void. In addition, the first applicant also complains that in the

sentence imposed on him he was held responsible for offences committed

by a legal entity, whereas he had been acquitted of the charges

accusing him of ordering and guiding the legal entity to commit these

offences.

     The applicants furthermore complain that it was only at the stage

of sentencing that they were confronted with the fact that the Court

of Appeal took account of offences with which they had not been

charged, of which they had been acquitted or in respect of which the

indictment had been declared null and void. They had thus been unable

to react to this and, if necessary, provide evidence to the contrary.

The applicants claim not to have been able to challenge this state of

affairs before the Supreme Court, because the decision of the Court of

Appeal to take into account certain offences when determining the

sentences is closely related to the facts, whereas the Supreme Court

does not establish facts.

     They invoke Article 6 paras. 1 and 2 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 22 November 1994 and registered

on 13 February 1995.

     On 16 October 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government.

     The Government's written observations were submitted on

29 January 1997, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that

purpose.  The applicants replied on 9 April 1997, also after an

extension of the time-limit.

THE LAW

     The applicants claim to have been victims of a breach of

Article 6 paras. 1 and 2 (Art. 6-1, 6-2) of the Convention in that the

principle of presumption of innocence was violated and in that they

were unable adequately to challenge before the Supreme Court the taking

into account of offences of which they had not been found guilty in the

determination of the sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal.

     Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as

relevant, reads:

     "In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,

     everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

     reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

     established by law ..."

     Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention reads:

     "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed

     innocent until proved guilty according to law."

1.   The Government contend in the first place that the applicants

have failed to comply with the requirement laid down in Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention in that they did not bring the alleged

violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 2 (Art. 6-1, 6-2) before the

Supreme Court.

     The applicants argue that they did complain before the Supreme

Court that they had in effect been convicted of offences which had not

been proved. They further maintain that since the Supreme Court cannot

rule on the facts of a case, they were unable to exercise their defence

rights in respect of the offences which the Court of Appeal took into

account when determining the sentence to be imposed.

     The Commission recalls that pursuant to Article 26 (Art. 26) of

the Convention it may only deal with a matter after all domestic

remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised

rules of international law. The mere fact that an applicant has

submitted his case to the competent courts does not in itself

constitute compliance with this rule. It is also required that any

complaint made before the Commission should have been raised at least

in substance, and thus without necessarily requiring a particular

reference to the Convention, during the proceedings concerned (cf. No.

11921/86, Dec. 12.10.88, D.R. 57, p. 81; No. 16278/90, Dec. 3.5.93,

D.R. 74, p. 93).

     The Commission notes that the applicants did not raise their

complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, either

formally or in substance, during the proceedings before the Supreme

Court. However, it appears from Section 99 para. 1 (2) of the Judicial

Organisation Act and the fact that the Convention is part of Dutch law

that alleged violations of the Convention may be invoked in cassation

proceedings. The Commission considers that in these circumstances the

applicants, in order to exhaust domestic remedies, should and could

have complained to the Supreme Court that they had not been able to

exercise their defence rights in respect of the offences taken into

account by the Court of Appeal in the determination of their sentence.

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected

pursuant to Articles 26 and 27 para. 3 (Art. 26, 27-3) of the

Convention.

     As regards the complaint under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of

the Convention, the Commission notes that in the proceedings before the

Supreme Court the applicants complained that the Court of Appeal, when

determining their sentence, had taken into account criminal offences

which had come to light during the hearings. The Commission accepts

that the applicants thus basically complained that they were punished

for offences of which they had not been found guilty according to law.

In the Commission's view, this amounts to a complaint of a violation

of the principle of the presumption of innocence as laid down in

Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention.

     It is true that in their cassation memorial the applicants then

stated that the Court of Appeal had referred to offences in respect of

which the indictment had been declared null and void and to one offence

of which the applicants had been acquitted. They thus did not raise

expressis verbis the complaint that account had been taken of offences

with which they had not been charged.  Nevertheless, the Commission

considers that for the purposes of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention in the present case it must be deemed sufficient for the

applicants to have complained in the domestic proceedings, as they did,

that in the determination of their sentence regard was had to offences

the commission of which had emerged from the hearings. Insofar as their

complaint under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) is concerned, therefore,

the applicants must be considered to have satisfied the requirement of

exhaustion of domestic remedies.

2.   As to the merits of the complaint under Article 6 para. 2

(Art. 6-2), the Government submit that the applicants were only

convicted of offences with which they had been charged. However, when

determining a penalty, a court is not obliged to confine itself to the

offences with which an accused has been charged, but it may also bear

in mind circumstances as long as these have been raised at the hearing

or are generally known. The Government point out that in the present

case the Court of Appeal thus also took into account, for example, the

possible negative effects on the applicants of the media attention

which the case had attracted. Moreover, in passing sentence, the Court

of Appeal had regard to aggravating and extenuating circumstances which

related to the case and the person and company concerned.

     With regard to the first applicant, the Government argue that it

was established during the proceedings that numerous offences had been

committed within the Zegwaard companies. Although the Court of Appeal

explicitly did not conclude that these offences had been committed by

the first applicant, it was nevertheless able to deduce from what

emerged from the hearings that the power of decision and the

responsibilities for the Zegwaard companies had been his. By holding,

therefore, that the commission of these offences was to a large extent

attributable to the first applicant, the Court of Appeal was able to

conclude that although the first applicant was not criminally liable

these circumstances should nevertheless be taken into account in the

determination of the sentence to be passed.

     Similarly, with regard to the applicant company, the Government

submit that the Court of Appeal concluded from what emerged at the

hearings that numerous activities had taken place within the Zegwaard

companies which could be considered to constitute criminal offences.

Again, the Court of Appeal did not find that the applicant company had

committed these offences itself, but it merely took into account all

kinds of facts relating to the circumstances.

     According to the Government, the most important aspect of the

principle of presumption of innocence relates to the basis for

conviction. They argue in this respect that in the present case the

applicants were convicted on the basis of legally recognised evidence

submitted during the trial by the prosecuting authorities which the

applicants were given every opportunity to refute.

     The applicants agree with the Government that a court may take

into account all conceivable facts and circumstances in passing

sentence provided that in doing so it does not violate the principle

of presumption of innocence. In their opinion, a court goes beyond what

can be accepted in this respect if, as in the present case, when

stating its reasons for imposing a particular sentence, it describes

as offences matters of which it has previously acquitted the accused,

in respect of which it had held the indictment to be null and void or

with which the accused had not been charged.

     They further submit that the first applicant was acquitted of the

great majority of the offences with which he was charged precisely

because he could not be held responsible in legal terms as the person

actually in charge under Section 51 para. 2 of the Criminal Code. Yet

in the determination of the sentence the Court of Appeal nevertheless

held the first applicant responsible for these offences.

     Having regard to the parties' submissions and the case-law of the

Convention organs, the Commission considers that this part of the

application raises complex questions of fact and law which require an

examination of the merits. The Commission concludes, therefore, that

this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other

grounds for declaring this part inadmissible have been established.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the

     applicants' complaint that the principle of presumption of

     innocence was violated when the Court of Appeal in the

     determination of the sentence took into account offences with

     which they had not been charged, in respect of which the

     indictment had been declared null and void or of which they had

     been acquitted;

     DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

   M.-T. SCHOEPFER                              G.H. THUNE

      Secretary                                  President

to the Second Chamber                      of the Second Chamber