AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 28356/95

                      by Stanislaw STYK

                      against Poland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 16 April 1998, the following members being present:

           MM    J.-C. GEUS, President

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs   G.H. THUNE

           MM    F. MARTINEZ

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Ms    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 30 May 1995 by

Stanislaw Styk against Poland and registered on 29 August 1995 under

file No. 28356/95;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant, a Polish citizen born in 1926, is a retired

military academy teacher, residing in Warsaw.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows:

Particular circumstances of the case

      On 25 November 1992 the Veterans' and Persecuted Persons' Office

(Urz*d do Spraw Kombatantów i Osób Represjonowanych) informed the

applicant that on the same date the Office was instituting ex officio

proceedings pursuant to the February 1991 Act on Veterans and

Persecuted Persons in order to verify whether under this legislation

he was entitled to maintain his veteran status.  The applicant was

asked to furnish information relating to the grounds on which he had

acquired this status in 1985 on the basis of the 1982 Veterans' Act.

      By a decision of 26 February 1993 the Director of the Veterans'

and Persecuted Persons' Office (Kierownik Urz*du ds. Kombatantów i Osób

Represjonowanych) took away the applicant's veteran status.  This

decision was taken in accordance with Article 25 read together with

Article 21 of the Act on Veterans and Persecuted Persons of February

1991 which provided, inter alia, that a person who had served in the

former internal security services ("aparat bezpieczenstwa publicznego")

was not entitled to veteran status.  As in 1944 the applicant had

served in the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczenstwa

Wewn*trznego), he fell into the category of persons who, under those

provisions, were to be deprived of this status.

      The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the

Supreme Administrative Court, submitting that he had not obtained

veteran status exclusively for his service in the security services,

but also due to the fact that he had previously served in the anti-Nazi

resistance, the People's Army (Armia Ludowa) and, subsequently, in the

regular Polish Army.  He had only served in the security services for

a short period in 1944 as his army unit had been incorporated therein.

He had had no influence on this decision.  He submitted that his

service in the Army had been exemplary throughout his career, that he

had served the independence of Poland and had never been subject to any

disciplinary or criminal conviction until his retirement in 1973.  The

applicant finally submitted that the impugned decision was unfair, that

it amounted to a form of collective liability and that it was in breach

of the rule of law as it had deprived him of his validly acquired

rights.

      In its reply of 14 April 1994, the Veterans' and Persecuted

Persons' Office submitted that the circumstances relied on by the

applicant as to  his service were of no relevance to the case.  It was

not in dispute between the parties that the applicant had served in the

internal security forces from July to November 1944.  This circumstance

was confirmed by the curriculum vitae which the applicant had prepared

in 1989, in which he had further stated that he had participated in the

fight with "reactionary underground" ("reakcyjne podziemie"). As under

the legislation of February 1991 persons having served in the security

services lost their veteran status, the decision contested by the

applicant was lawful.

      In a judgment of 20 February 1995 the Supreme Administrative

Court (Najwyzszy S*d Administracyjny) dismissed the applicant's appeal.

The Court considered that its jurisdiction was limited to examining

whether the impugned decision was in conformity with applicable

substantive law and with the procedural provisions insofar as any

procedural irregularities could have adversely affected the outcome of

the proceedings.  In the present case it clearly transpired from the

applicant's curricula vitae prepared in 1978 and 1985 that in 1944 he

had been a member of the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczenstwa

Wewn*trznego).  Therefore the administrative authority had had

sufficient grounds for a finding that the applicant had in fact served

therein.  The assessment of the evidence in this respect was not

arbitrary.  The relevant provisions of the 1991 Veterans' Act provided

that persons having served in the former internal security services

were not eligible to acquire veteran status and that those who had

acquired it were to be stripped thereof, regardless of their function

and grade within those services.  This interpretation had been

reinforced by the Constitutional Court which in its judgment of

15 February 1994 had ruled that  service in the former internal

security services, in the light of the latter's activities directed

against independence organisations, had to be assessed negatively,

regardless of the actual status of persons having served therein.

Thus, under the relevant legislation the very fact of the applicant's

service in the Internal Security Corps, whose purpose was to suppress

organisations fighting for the national independence of Poland, must

have entailed the loss of his veteran status.  The Court concluded that

the impugned decision was in conformity with the law.

Relevant domestic law

      The February 1991 Act on Veterans and Persecuted Persons took

away  entitlement to the veteran status accorded by virtue of the

Veterans' Acts of 1982 from certain categories of persons who had

served in the 1940s and 1950s in various organisations and State organs

whose purpose was to combat the political opponents of the communist

regime.  In particular, Article 25 of the Act provides, inter alia,

that a person who had served in the internal security services ("aparat

bezpieczenstwa publicznego") was not entitled to acquire veteran

status, and those persons who had acquired it, were to lose it.

      Under the Veterans' Acts of 1982, which was subsequently replaced

by  the February 1991 Act on Veterans and Persecuted Persons, veteran

status gives rise to various special employee and social insurance

entitlements.  The periods of veteran service are taken into account

in  calculating the periods giving rise to seniority.  The same periods

are multiplied by two in calculating periods giving rise to a

retirement pension.  The veterans who remain in employment are entitled

to ten days' additional paid leave per year.  The veterans are entitled

to retire earlier than other employees: women at the age of 55, and men

at the age of 60, if they have satisfied another requirement for the

acquisition of a retirement pension, i.e. if they have worked for

periods set out in the Retirement Pensions Act.  The retired veterans

are further entitled to the special veterans' benefit, paid together

with their retirement pension as a certain fixed sum.

      Article 26 of the Veterans' Act provides that persons who have

lost their veteran status retain their social insurance benefits to

which they are entitled pursuant to the generally applicable social

insurance laws, in particular the laws governing retirement pensions.

Pursuant to Article 25 para. 4 of the February 1991 Act, if a decision

is appealed against to the Supreme Administrative Court, the rights

stemming from the veteran status  are suspended until a final judgment

is taken.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains under Article 6 that he was denied a fair

hearing as the decisions concerned deprived him of his status of a

veteran.  He complains that this decision was unfair and to his

detriment.  He complains under Article 14 of the Convention that he was

deprived of this status, whereas members of other armed forces and

organisations were not.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention that the decisions concerned deprived him of his veteran

status.

      Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention in its relevant part reads:

      "1.  In the determination of his civil rights and

      obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing

      ... ."

      The Commission must first ascertain whether Article 6 (Art. 6)

of the Convention is applicable to the proceedings concerned and

whether there was a dispute over a "right" which can be said, at least

on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law.  The dispute

must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual

existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its

exercise.  Finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly

decisive for the right in question (Eur. Court HR, Kerojärvi v. Finland

judgment of 19 July 1995, Series A no. 322, p. 12, para. 32).

      In the present case the Commission observes that under Polish law

the veteran status had a direct bearing on the applicant's pecuniary

interests in that the persons having such a status enjoy certain

special employment and social insurance benefits.  The decision which

took this status away from the applicant automatically deprived him of

those benefits.  The Commission concludes that the dispute at issue was

decisive for the scope of the applicant's civil rights and that,

consequently, Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is applicable in the

instant case.

      However, the Commission observes that the applicant does not

allege any particular shortcomings in the procedure followed, but

challenges the outcome of the proceedings.  The Commission recalls in

this respect that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the

Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the

obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention.  In

particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging

that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,

except where it considers that such errors might have involved a

possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the

Convention.  The Commission refers, on this point, to its established

case-law (see e.g. No. 25062/94, Dec. 18.10.95, D.R. 83, p. 77).

      The applicant's complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6) is therefore

in this respect manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    Insofar as the applicant could be understood as complaining that

the result of the above proceedings amounted to an interference with

his property rights as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

to the Convention, the Commission observes that Poland ratified this

Protocol only on 10 October 1994.  The first-instance administrative

decision which deprived the applicant of his veteran status was taken

on 26 February 1993.  Pursuant to Article 25 para. 4 of the February

1991 Act, if a decision is appealed against to the Supreme

Administrative Court, the rights stemming from the veteran status are

suspended until a final judgment is taken.  Thus, the Commission is

competent ratione temporis to examine this complaint, regard being had

to the fact that the final decision in the case, the judgment of the

Supreme Administrative Court, was taken on 20 February 1995 and that

it was only this decision which definitely deprived the applicant of

his veteran status and his social insurance rights stemming therefrom.

      It is true that, according to the Convention organs' case-law,

the making of contributions to a pension fund may, in certain

circumstances, create a property right in a portion of such fund and

such right may be affected by the manner in which the fund is

distributed (No. 4130/69, Yearbook 14, pp. 224 and 240 et seq.;

No. 5849/72, Dec. 16.12.74, D.R. 1, p. 46; No. 9776/82, Dec. 3.10.83,

D.R. 34, p. 153; No. 12264/86, Dec. 13.7.88, D.R. 57, p. 131).  The

Commission further recalls that the rights stemming from paying

contributions to social insurance system are pecuniary rights for the

purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention (Eur.

Court HR, Gaygusuz v. Austria judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports

1996-IV, no. 14, p. 1142, paras. 39-41).  However, even if it is

assumed that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) guarantees persons who

have paid contributions to a social insurance system the right to

derive benefits from the system, it cannot be interpreted as entitling

that person to a pension of a particular amount (5849/72, Müller v.

Austria, Comm. Report 1.10.75, D.R. 3, p. 25; No. 10671/83,

Dec. 4.3.85, D.R. 42, p. 229).

      In the present case the applicant lost only his entitlement to

the social insurance benefits due to veterans, but, in accordance with

Article 26 of the Act on Veterans and Persecuted Persons of February

1991, he retained his rights to the ordinary retirement benefits due

under the general social insurance system.  Thus, it was only the

special privileged status which the applicant lost, his principal

social security entitlements having remained intact.  The Commission

observes that the February 1991 Act on Veterans and Persecuted Persons

was partly intended as a condemnation of the political role which the

communist security services had played in establishing the communist

regime and in repression of political opposition thereto.  This

legislation was based on the consideration that the members of these

services, whose function was to combat the political or armed

organisations fighting for the independence of Poland in the 1940s and

1950s, did not merit the special privileges which were accorded to them

by the 1982 Veterans Act.  The Commission considers that such

considerations of public policy, even if the operation of laws

resulting therefrom entails a reduction in social insurance benefits,

do not affect the property rights stemming from the social insurance

system in a manner contrary to  Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      Insofar as the applicant complains under Article 14 (Art. 14) of

the Convention that he was deprived of veteran status whereas members

of other armed forces were not, the Commission, having regard to its

findings concerning the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) to the Convention,  considers that the present complaint does

not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 14 (Art. 14) of

the Convention.   It follows that this complaint is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

      M.-T. SCHOEPFER                               J.-C. GEUS

        Secretary                                   President

   to the Second Chamber                      of the Second Chamber