AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 29821/96

                      by T.C.

                      against Norway

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 20 May 1998, the following members being present:

           MM    J.-C. GEUS, President

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs   G.H. THUNE

           MM    F. MARTINEZ

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Ms    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 15 September 1995

by T.C. against Norway and registered on 16 January 1996 under file

No. 29821/96;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Norwegian citizen, born in 1968 and resident

at K. Before the Commission she is represented by Mr Bent Endresen,

a lawyer in Stavanger.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

      On 15 February 1992 the applicant gave birth to a daughter, T.

The paternity remained unclear and the applicant enjoyed the  parental

rights alone. On 9 June 1992 T was provisionally placed in public care

in a hospital for young children pursuant to section 16 a of the 1993

Child Welfare Act (barnevernloven), apparently having regard to the

applicant's drug abuse. The applicant visited T twice in the hospital

but then apparently broke off contact with her.

      On 2 September 1992 the Client and Patient Committee (klient- og

pasientutvalget) of a Social Welfare Centre in a bigger Norwegian city

confirmed the placement order pursuant to section 19 of the 1953 Act.

T was placed in a foster home with a view to being adopted and the

address was ordered to be kept secret from the applicant. The applicant

was also deprived of her parental and access rights pursuant to

sections 19 and 20 of the 1953 Act.

      Before the Client and Patient Committee the applicant, assisted

by counsel, had consented to T's placement in public care in a foster

home with a secret address as well as to an initial prohibition of

access. The applicant could also accept a deprivation of parental

rights and putting T up for adoption, on condition that the contact

between T and her maternal grandparents would be maintained.

      The Client and Patient Committee also heard the applicant's

mother, social welfare officials, a psychologist as well as a physician

of the young children's hospital and the manager apparently of the

rehabilitation centre for drug addicts where the applicant was

receiving treatment.

      In its decision the Client and Patient Committee took note, inter

alia, of the applicant's drug abuse which she had acknowledged and

which prevented her from assuming the everyday care of T. The Committee

also noted that out of concern for T's well-being the applicant had

consented to several of the proposed care arrangements. Moreover, as

the applicant was facing lengthy rehabilitation and her contact with

T had already been broken off, the Committee found it to be in the

latter's best interests to deprive the applicant of her parental rights

and thus prepare for an adoption of T at a later stage. For the time

being, the Committee also found it necessary to keep T's whereabouts

secret from her maternal grandparents. Any subsequent contacts between

T and her grandparents would be a matter for the foster parents.

      Subsequent to the Committee's decision T and her grandparents met

on various occasions on neutral premises.   In an appeal lodged on 3

December 1992 the applicant challenged the deprivation of her parental

rights, fearing that it could affect her parents' relationship with T.

It seemed as if the social welfare officials sought to reduce the

grandparents' contact with T as much as possible so as to be able to

proceed to having her adopted. In such a case any continued contact

between T and her grandparents would be in the hands of the adoptive

parents. The applicant therefore objected to having T adopted. Instead

she requested that an access plan be drawn up in order to regulate the

contacts between T and her grandparents. The applicant lodged

supplementary observations in March 1993.

      On 5 October 1993 the competent County Governor (fylkesmannen)

dismissed the applicant's appeal. The Governor found that the

deprivation of parental rights with a view to having T adopted was in

accordance with sections 19 and 20 of the 1953 Act. As T was most

likely going to grow up in her foster home, affording the foster

parents the possibility to adopt her would be in her best interests.

It would then be for the adoptive parents to decide whether there

should be any contact between T and her maternal grandparents.

      On 15 February 1994 the applicant contested the County Governor's

decision by bringing it before the competent City Court (byrett). The

two court-appointed experts submitted their opinions in July and

August 1994, respectively, and the City Court's hearing was held in

October 1994. Six witnesses and the two experts were examined. The

experts supported the appealed decision, though one of them recommended

not to proceed to an adoption within the next few years. Moreover,

according to the Social Welfare Centre, the foster parents had stated

that they would allow contacts between T and her grandparents.

      On 4 November 1994 the City Court dismissed the applicant's

appeal. It noted, inter alia, that although the contact between T and

her grandparents had been reduced earlier on during the proceedings in

order to enable T to root herself in the foster family, the foster

parents intended to allow continued contact between T and her

grandparents. In that respect T's factual situation would therefore not

change much, should she be adopted. However, an adoption would, for

instance, confer on her the same legal status as her de facto sibling,

namely the foster parent's adoptive child. Considering all

circumstances, her adoption by the foster parents would be in her best

interest.

      In her subsequent appeal of 8 January 1995 the applicant again

made clear that she accepted that T remain in public care in the home

of her foster parents. The applicant contended, however, that it would

not be in T's best interest to be adopted by the foster parents.

      On 23 March 1995 the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme

Court (Høyesteretts Kjæremålsutvalg) refused the applicant leave to

appeal. This decision was notified to the applicant on 22 April 1995.

      In July 1994 a second daughter, J, was born to the applicant. In

May 1995 the social welfare authority of K placed J in public care in

a foster home due to the parents' recidivist drug abuse. The parents

have not been deprived of their parental rights and apparently the

local authority does not intend to have J adopted. The applicant and

J meet regularly.     At present T continues to live with her foster

parents but has not yet been adopted by them. She has been seeing her

maternal grandparents four times a year. It is the grandparents'

understanding that this contact will end if the adoption takes place.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains that her daughter T's placement in public

care with a view to being adopted, the deprivation of parental rights

and the secrecy order regarding her daughter's whereabouts effectively

cut all ties between the two,  thereby violating the applicant's rights

under Article 8 of the Convention. The applicant also points to the

arbitrariness of the local authority's decision to place T in public

care (as opposed to that made by the local authority at K in respect

of her second daughter J).

2.    The applicant furthermore complains that she was denied a hearing

within a reasonable time before an independent tribunal within the

meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention. It took over two years

before the deprivation of her parental rights was examined by the City

Court; the first "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1.

This passage of time was allegedly used as an argument against the

applicant.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains that her daughter T's placement in public

care with a view to being adopted, the deprivation of parental rights

and the secrecy order regarding her daughter's whereabouts cut all ties

between the two, thereby violating the applicant's rights under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

(a)   In so far as the complaint concerns T's placement in public care

and the secrecy order regarding her whereabouts the Commission

considers that it is not required to decide whether or not the facts

alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of

Article 8 (Art. 8). The Commission recalls that under Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention, it "may only deal with the matter after

all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally

recognised rules of international law ...".

      The Commission notes that in the domestic proceedings the

applicant, assisted by counsel, did not oppose the aforementioned

public care arrangements. Accordingly, she has not exhausted the

remedies available to her under Norwegian law. Moreover, an examination

of this aspect of the complaint does not disclose the existence of any

special circumstances which might have absolved her, according to the

generally recognised rules of international law, from exhausting the

remedies at her disposal.

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must be rejected for

non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

(b)   The Commission has next considered the complaint in so far as it

pertains to the deprivation of the applicant's parental rights with a

view to putting T up for adoption.

      Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides, in so far as

relevant:

      "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his ... family

      life, ...

      2. There shall be no interference by a public authority

      with the exercise of this right except such as is in

      accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

      society ..., for the protection of health or morals, or for

      the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

      The mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other's company

constitutes a fundamental element of family life and domestic measures

hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the right

protected by Article 8 (Art. 8) (see, e.g., Eur. Court HR, the

McMichael v. the United Kingdom judgment of 24 February 1995, Series

A no. 307-B, p. 55, para. 86).  The impugned measure amounted to an

interference with the applicant's right to respect for her family life

as guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention. Such

an interference constitutes a violation of this Article unless it is

"in accordance with the law", pursues an aim or aims that are

legitimate under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and can be regarded as

"necessary in a democratic society".

      While considering the impugned decision "arbitrary" the applicant

does not specify whether and, if so, why the interference was not "in

accordance with the law". Having regard to sections 19 and 20 of the

1953 Child Welfare Act, the Commission is satisfied that the

interference in question was "in accordance with the law".

      The Commission is, moreover, satisfied that the contested measure

was aimed at protecting the "health" and the "rights and freedoms" of

the applicant's daughter and thus pursued legitimate aims within the

meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).

      Turning to the question whether the interference was "necessary

in a democratic society", the Commission recalls that taking a child

into public care should normally be regarded as a temporary measure to

be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit and that any measures

of implementation of temporary care should be consistent with the

ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parent and the child. In this

regard, a fair balance has to be struck between the interests of the

child in remaining in public care and those of the parent in being

reunited with the child. In carrying out this balancing exercise, the

Court will attach particular importance to the best interests of the

child, which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override

those of the parent (see, e.g., Eur. Court HR, Johansen v. Norway

judgment of 7 August 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions,

1996-III, pp. 1008-1009, para. 78).

      The present applicant was deprived of her parental rights in the

context of a permanent placement of her daughter in a foster home with

a view to adoption by the foster parents. This measure was particularly

far-reaching in that it totally deprived the applicant of her family

life with the child and was inconsistent with the aim of reuniting

them. Such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances

and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding

requirement pertaining to the child's best interests (cf., e.g., the

above-mentioned Johansen judgment, loc. cit.).    In the case in point

the applicant accepted at an early stage that access between her and

her daughter should not take place. Both her appeals on the domestic

level and her application to the Commission concern in essence the

potential effect which T's adoption by her foster parents might have

on T's relationship with her maternal grandparents. In finding that it

would be in the best interests of the child to place T in public care

with a view to her adoption the Client and Patient Committee took into

account, inter alia, that the contact between the applicant and T had

already been broken off and that the applicant would need long-term

rehabilitation against her drug abuse. It is true that initially the

Committee also prohibited the grandparents' access to T but it

transpires from the file that the three have nevertheless met fairly

regularly with the approval of the social welfare authority. In

upholding the Committee's decision the appeal organs noted the foster

parents' intention to allow the contacts between T and her grandparents

to continue.

      In the circumstances of this case the Commission therefore

considers that the reasons adduced to justify the interference in

question were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of Article 8

para. 2 (Art. 8-2) (cf., e.g., Eur. Court HR, the Olsson v. Sweden

judgment of 24 March 1988 (no. 1), Series A no. 130, p. 32, para. 68).

      Nor is there anything to suggest that the decision-making process

leading to the impugned decision was unfair or failed to involve the

applicant to a degree sufficient to provide her with the requisite

protection of her interests (cf., e.g., the aforementioned McMichael

judgment, pp. 55 and 57, paras. 87 and 92).

      Accordingly, there is no indication of any violation of Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention.

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicant also complains that she was denied a hearing within

a reasonable time before an independent tribunal within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. In so far as relevant

this provision reads as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

      ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a

      reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ..."

      The reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed

in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and having

regard to the criteria laid down in the Court's case-law, in particular

the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the

relevant authorities and the importance of what is at stake for the

applicant in the litigation (see, e.g., Eur. Court HR, Duclos v. France

judgment of 17 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions,

1996-VI, pp. 2180-2081, para. 55). In view of the irreversible and

definitive character of the measures concerned, the competent national

authorities were required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) to act with

exceptional diligence in ensuring the progress of the proceedings (see

the above-mentioned Johansen judgment, pp. 1010-1011, para. 88).  The

period to be taken into consideration for the purpose of assessing the

length of the proceedings under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) began with

T's provisional placement in public care in June 1992. It ended in

March 1995, when the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. The

proceedings thus lasted some two years and nine months.

      The Commission notes that the case involved the hearing of

various witnesses and experts and must be considered somewhat complex.

As for the conduct of the authorities, the Commission notes that the

case was pending before the Client and Patient Committee for about

three months. The applicant's appeal to the County Governor was pending

for ten months. The City Court decided the matter within less than

nine months, whereas the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal within

two and a half months. The Commission cannot detect any delay at any

of these four levels for which the authorities could be held

responsible.

      As for the applicant's own conduct, the Commission notes that,

although assisted by counsel, she appealed against the Client and

Patient Committee's decision only some four months later. The same is

true for her appeal against the County Governor's decision.

Accordingly, although the total length of proceedings might at first

sight raise concerns, the delays in the proceedings can reasonably be

held against the applicant due to her counsel's behaviour.

      Nor can the Commission find that the passage of time was used as

an argument against the applicant.

      Making an overall assessment, the Commission therefore considers

that the length of the proceedings was not excessive in the specific

circumstances of this case. Accordingly, there is no indication of any

violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

   M.-T. SCHOEPFER                              J.-C. GEUS

      Secretary                                  President

to the Second Chamber                      of the Second Chamber