AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 24430/94

                      by Bernhard LANZ

                      against Austria

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 21 May 1998, the following members being present:

           MM   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, President

                N. BRATZA

                E. BUSUTTIL

                A. WEITZEL

                C.L. ROZAKIS

           Mrs  J. LIDDY

           MM   L. LOUCAIDES

                B. MARXER

                B. CONFORTI

                I. BÉKÉS

                G. RESS

                A. PERENIC

                C. BÎRSAN

                K. HERNDL

                M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mrs  M. HION

           Mr   R. NICOLINI

           Mrs  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 23 March 1992 by

Bernhard LANZ against Austria and registered on 17 June 1994 under file

No. 24430/94;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is an Austrian citizen, born in 1949 and presently

detained at the Graz prison.

     The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the

applicant, may be summarised as follows.

A.   Particular circumstances of the case

1.   Preliminary investigations against the applicant and his

     detention on remand

     On 25 October 1991 the Investigating Judge at the Graz Regional

Court (Landesgericht) issued a warrant of arrest against the applicant

on suspicion of having committed fraud and falsification of documents.

The suspicion related to the applicant's business activities, and in

particular two real estate investment projects.  The Investigating

Judge also issued a search warrant ordering a house search at the

premises of the SDBV company, a private company (Gesellschaft mit

beschränkter Haftung) for which the applicant acted as general manager

and to seize documents relating to the real estate investment projects.

The applicant was arrested, the house search was carried out in the

presence of the Investigating Judge and numerous documents were seized.

Later in the day the Investigating Judge questioned the applicant on

the suspicion against him.  The Investigating Judge ordered the

applicant's detention on remand as he found that there existed a danger

of the applicant's absconding and of collusion.  The Investigating

Judge found that the applicant frequently travelled abroad, had close

connections with the United States and an apartment in New York at his

disposal.  There was also the risk that the applicant would attempt to

influence the employees of the SDBV company and to remove documents

which had not been found at the house search.

     On 27 October 1991 the applicant requested his release from

detention on remand.

     On 5 November 1991, after having questioned the applicant again,

the Investigating Judge ordered his detention on remand also on the

ground of danger of his committing offences. He found that there was

the risk that the applicant, if released, would continue to realise the

investment project at issue or other projects, using financial sources

not yet detected.  The applicant appealed against this decision

claiming that he had not committed any criminal offence.

     On 6 November 1991 the Judges' Chamber (Ratskammer) of the Graz

Regional Court, after an oral hearing in the presence of the applicant,

his defence counsel and the Public Prosecutor, dismissed the

applicant's request for release from detention on remand.  The Judges'

Chamber found that no danger of absconding existed.  However, the

danger of collusion continued to exist as there was the risk that the

applicant would try to influence witnesses not yet heard and to remove

traces of the offence.  There was also the danger of his committing

offences.

     On 11 November 1991 the Investigating Judge ordered that the

applicant's contacts with his defence counsel should take place under

the surveillance of the court because of the existence of a danger of

collusion.  The Investigating Judge found that this measure was

necessary because co-suspects were still at large and several witnesses

had not yet been heard and there was a risk that the applicant could

influence them.  The Investigating Judge stated that the validity of

this order would expire at the latest when the two months statutory

time limit for detention on remand based on the risk of collusion would

end.  The applicant appealed against this decision.  He submitted that

he did not oppose this measure in principle, however the measure

constituted an unnecessary limitation of his defence rights and the

Investigating Judge had failed to order this measure within 14 days as

prescribed by law.

     On 20 November 1991 the applicant appealed against the refusal

of the Judges' Chamber to release him from detention on remand.

     On 21 November 1991 the Judges' Chamber dismissed the applicant's

appeal against the Investigating Judge's search warrant and the order

for surveillance of the applicant's contacts with his defence counsel.

As regards the complaint about the house search, the Judges' Chamber

found that this measure had been carried out in a lawful manner.  As

regards the complaint about the surveillance of the applicant's

contacts with his defence counsel, the Judges' Chamber found the

Investigating Judge's decision to be correct.  This order did not

involve any criticism of the defence counsel or any reproach against

them of conduct contrary to law or the disciplinary rules of the

members of the bar, but merely had the purpose of preventing any

contacts whatsoever with third persons in order not to endanger the

success of the criminal investigations.  The present case concerned

complicated business relations of the SDBV company managed by the

applicant and several other companies managed by him and the flow of

money between them.

Further witnesses could be identified only after all the documents

seized had been examined and the applicant should be prevented from

influencing them.  Furthermore, the decision had been taken within the

time limit prescribed by S. 193 para. 3 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure.  The Judges' Chamber also found the applicant complaint that

he did not have sufficient access to his case file as unfounded.  The

Investigating Judge had granted access to the file to the official

receiver of the SDBV company and to the applicant's defence counsel and

the latter had also been given the possibility of making copies of the

documents in the file.  The applicant's defence counsel had visited him

repeatedly and could have given him copies if he so wished.  Moreover

when questioned by the Investigating Judge the applicant had been

informed of the contents of the file and about the statements of

witnesses already heard.

     On 28 November 1991 the Graz Senior Public Prosecutor's Office

commented on the applicant's appeal against the Judges' Chamber's

decision of 6 November 1991.

     On 12 December 1991 the Graz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht)

decided on the appeals by the applicant and the Public Prosecutor's

Office against that decision.  It found that a serious suspicion

existed against the applicant and referred to the details of the

criminal investigations.  In particular there also existed the danger

that the applicant would abscond.  He had close connections abroad, in

particular with the United States.  His financial situation in Austria

was desperate and there were also reasons to assume that the applicant

had financial sources which had not yet been detected.

     On 15 January 1992 the Judges' Chamber, after an oral hearing in

the presence of the applicant, his defence counsel and the Public

Prosecutor, dismissed a further request of the applicant for release

from detention on remand after an oral hearing.  The Judges' Chamber

referred to its previous decision of 6 November 1991 and the Court of

Appeal's decision of 12 December 1991.

     On 13 February 1992 the Court of Appeal, after having heard the

Senior Public Prosecutor's Office, dismissed the applicant's appeal

against the above decision.

     On 11 March 1992 the Judges' Chamber, after having heard the

Public Prosecutor's Office, dismissed a further request by the

applicant for release from detention on remand.

     After his conviction on 21 June 1992 the applicant filed further

requests for release from detention on remand.  Such requests were

refused by the Judges' Chamber on 3 February 1993 and 6 April 1993.

Appeals were dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 18 February 1993 and

29 April 1993 respectively.

2.   The trial against the applicant

     On 14 February 1992 the Graz Public Prosecutor's Office filed a

bill of indictment against the applicant.  The Public Prosecutor's

Office stated that the applicant had between 1987 and 1991,

misappropriated funds paid by investors for two real estate development

projects.  Although he had promised to the investors to refurbish two

buildings owned by the investment scheme no significant construction

had been carried out and the money had disappeared.  The applicant did

not file objections against the bill of indictment.

     On 4 March 1992 the Graz Regional Court dismissed the applicant's

request for legal aid.  It noted that the applicant was already

assisted by two defence counsel chosen by himself namely Mr. K. and Mr.

D. and that in particular the former had intensively prepared the

applicant's defence and contacted the applicant almost daily.  Since

both defence counsel were still representing the applicant it could not

be seen that the applicant needed a third one.

     On 10 March 1992 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof)

dismissed the applicant's challenge for bias of all the judges of the

Graz Court of Appeal.  The Supreme Court found that the applicant had

failed to show any elements which would indicate bias of all judges of

the Court of Appeal.

     On 24 March 1992 Judge Grygar issued the summons for the

applicant's trial (Ausschreibung der Hauptverhandlung).  He scheduled

the beginning of the trial for 21 April and summoned 15 witnesses.  He

also instructed the court appointed expert for book-keeping to make an

exhaustive list of the documents used for the expert report.

Subsequently, on 7 April 1992, the Judge informed the applicant's

defence counsel thereof and invited him to inspect these documents at

the court.  In view of the large number of documents he asked the

defence counsel to specify after inspection of the file the documents

of which he wished to receive a copy.  Since the applicant did not make

any requests the Judge ordered on 15 April 1992 that copies of all

documents be made.  On 17 April 1992 the copies were sent to the

applicant.

     Meanwhile, on 8 April 1992 the applicant requested that he be

given the possibility to meet his defence counsel also on Saturdays and

Sundays.  On 10 April 1992 the Presiding Judge of the trial court

informed the applicant that this request could not be granted for

organisational reasons.  Meetings with defence counsel had to take

place between 7 and 17 hours from Monday to Friday.

     On 9 April 1992 the Graz Court of Appeal dismissed the challenge

for bias of all judges of the Graz Regional Court.  The Court of Appeal

noted that the applicant had argued that the judges of the Regional

Court interpreted the law in an arbitrary manner.  The applicant,

however, had failed to give elements which would indicate bias of all

judges.  The mere allegation that the courts interpreted the law in an

arbitrary manner was not sufficient.

     On 16 April 1992 the President of the Graz Regional Court

dismissed a challenge of bias of Judge Grygar, the trial judge.  He

noted that according to the applicant a tendency of bias could be seen

in the way the judge dealt with the applicant's request that the

transcript of the trial should be taken by a parliamentary shorthand

writer.  However, no subjective reasons for bias could be seen.

Insofar as the applicant had challenged all judges in the area of the

Graz Court of Appeal for bias the President referred to the Court of

Appeal's decision of 9 April 1992.

     On 16 April 1992, the last Thursday before Easter, the

applicant's defence counsel Mr. D. and Mr. K. revoked the power of

attorney given to them by the applicant.

     On 17 April 1992 Judge Grygar appointed an ex-officio defence

counsel for the applicant and requested the Bar Association to nominate

such a defence counsel.

     On 21 April 1992 Mr. Ku. was nominated as the applicant's ex-

officio defence counsel.

     On 21 April 1992 the trial against the applicant started.  The

Regional Court established the applicant's identity and the bill of

indictment was read out.  The applicant objected to the appointment of

Ku. as his ex officio defence counsel because Ku. had allegedly

represented in the past third persons in civil proceedings against the

applicant and the firms he managed.  Ku. stated that he was not aware

of such proceedings but requested the adjournment of the trial in order

to find out about these circumstances and to prepare the applicant's

defence.  Thereupon the applicant requested that the trial should not

be adjourned.  The Regional Court, however, decided to adjourn.  From

23 April 1992 on the applicant was represented again by Mr. K. as

defence counsel.  Further court hearings were held on 4, 5, 11, 12, 13,

14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26 and 27 May and on 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,

20 and 21 June 1992.

     In the course of the trial the Regional Court heard 52 witnesses,

some of them repeatedly on the applicant's request.  Furthermore 5

experts, on book-keeping, building and construction matters, real

estate assessment, medicine and psychiatry were heard.

     The applicant challenged the Presiding Judge for bias on various

occasions.  These requests were dismissed on 16 April 1992, 11 June

1992, 25 September 1992 and 1 March 1993.  The President of the Graz

Regional Court consistently found that no reasons for bias could be

made out.  The Presiding Judge had dealt correctly with the applicant's

unusual request that a parliamentary shorthand writer should take the

transcript of the trial.  The Presiding Judge furthermore had never

acted as Investigating Judge; the mere fact that during breaks of the

trial he had phoned witnesses requested in order to find out whether

they had any information at all on the subject of the trial and

communicating this information to the parties did not make him an

investigating judge. Also the fact that after the trial had ended the

applicant had filed a private prosecution for defamation against the

Presiding Judge was irrelevant.

     At the trial the applicant requested the hearing of altogether

180 witnesses and the appointment of five further experts.  On 11, 12

and 13 May 1992 and also on 15 June 1992 the Regional Court granted the

requests by the applicant for the hearing of witnesses.  Between 4 May

1992 and 22 May 1992 the defence requested on each day of the trial the

hearing of between one and four witnesses.  On 25 May 1992 the

applicant requested 21 witnesses to be heard and on 16 June 1992 he

requested 127 witnesses.  These requests were refused by the Regional

Court, which found that the statements of the witnesses requested were

not relevant to the proceedings.  The proceedings concerned two central

questions namely whether the applicant had carried out substantial

construction works on the apartment houses to which the investment

projects related and what had happened to the money of the investors

which had been transferred to the SDBV company.  While the applicant

had consistently refused to give any valid explanation on these two

questions his requests for evidence related to different issues, namely

whether he had made unreported payments to his partners and whether the

investment project was a viable one.  He had also requested the court

to hear all the investors on the question whether they felt cheated by

the applicant.

     The applicant also repeatedly requested that the trial be

adjourned for lengthy periods and, towards the end of the trial,

requested that the trial be repeated or that the case be remitted to

the investigating judge.

3.   The judgment

     On 21 June 1992 the Graz Regional Court convicted the applicant

of aggravated fraud and sentenced him to four and a half years of

imprisonment.  The Regional Court also acquitted the applicant of one

additional charge of fraud raised by the Public Prosecutor's Office at

the trial.  The Regional Court found that in or about the beginning of

1986 the applicant had contacted two medical practitioners, F. and R.,

and proposed to them a real estate investment project which would

reduce their tax burden.  The purpose of the project was to buy

apartment houses, to refurbish them and to rent out the apartments

therein.  The applicant had used F. and R. as a front to give more

weight to his project.  Initial losses could be subtracted by the

investors from their income tax. F. and R. agreed and in January 1987

the F.R.KG was founded.  In November 1987 a further company was founded

relating to another real estate project.  The applicant was the general

manager of these companies. The companies collected some 23 000 000 ATS

of investment in 1987.  The projects, however, failed.  The Tax Offices

refused to recognise the losses recorded by the investors in their tax

declarations, as the project was based on a model which had already

years before been considered as not being in conformity with tax

regulations.  Moreover, no refurbishing works had been carried out on

the buildings. The money invested in the scheme had disappeared and,

because of the applicant's chaotic book-keeping, could not be traced.

The applicant had deceived the investors by omitting crucial

information on the project in the prospectus explaining the investment

scheme and, on the other hand, had not kept undertakings vis-a-vis the

investors.  He had stated that if the whole sum for the projects could

not be raised the investment would be reimbursed.  However, when it

became apparent that the subscriptions by investors were not

sufficient, he added fictitious investments, transferred payments to

the SDBV company, where, due to the applicant's chaotic book-keeping

and his habit of concluding only oral contracts, it disappeared.

     On 9 September 1992 the judgment of some 150 pages and the

transcript of the trial of some 1400 pages were served on the parties.

4.   The appeal proceedings

     On 1 October 1992 the Public Prosecutor's Office filed a plea of

nullity and appeal against the part of the sentence concerning the

applicant's acquittal.

     On 5 October 1992 the applicant filed a plea of nullity and

appeal.  He complained, inter alia, that he had not been represented

properly by counsel on 21 April 1992, the first day of the trial; that

he had not been granted sufficient access to the case-file, otherwise

he would have been able to find further exonerating documents

concerning payments made by the SDBV company; that the court appointed

experts had been incompetent, biased and their fees had been too high;

that the defence had not been granted the possibility to consult with

the applicant during the night and at week ends during the trial; that

the court had refused to take evidence requested by the applicant; that

the evidence had been assessed incorrectly.

     On 14 October 1992 the Presiding Judge dismissed a request by the

applicant for an amendment of the transcripts of the trial.  He found

that the applicant had made the statements precisely as they were

recorded in the transcript and, in effect, his answers had been quite

ambiguous.  However, he could not change their meaning retroactively

by amending the transcript.

     On 22 October 1992 the applicant commented on the plea of nullity

lodged by the Public Prosecutor's Office. He submitted, inter alia,

that until the expiration of the time limit for filing his plea of

nullity the defence had had no sufficient possibility to inspect the

file, the contact between the applicant and the defence counsel having

been limited to the time between 8.00 and 16.30 hours on week days and

no meetings during the week end having been allowed.

     On 17 November 1992 the Supreme Court requested the Presiding

Judge Grygar to inform it whether during the period for filing the plea

of nullity and appeal the defence had not had full access to the whole

of the case file.

     On 27 November 1992 Judge Grygar submitted the following

statement to the Supreme Court:  On 9 September 1992 the judgment was

served on the defence counsel and on 13 October 1992 the plea of

nullity and appeal of the public prosecutor.  During the whole period

the defence had full access to the file.  The file had been kept at the

disposal of the court, the applicant and the official receiver.  From

further file notes it could be seen that the applicant and the defence

counsel had made use of this possibility.  The applicant himself had

been granted access only during office hours and in case the file was

not needed by the Presiding Judge himself; these restrictions, however,

had not applied to his defence counsel.

     On 24 December 1992 the Supreme Court decided that the applicant

should be granted a new time limit for filing his plea of nullity and

appeal since it could not be ruled out with certainty that the defence

had not had full access to the case file.  On 7 January 1993 the Graz

Regional Court granted the applicant a new time limit of four weeks for

filing his plea of nullity and appeal.

     On 11 January 1993 Judge Grygar laid a criminal information with

the Public Prosecutor's Office.  He noted that one of the elements

which had persuaded the Supreme Court to grant a new time limit for

filing the plea of nullity and appeal by its decision of

24 December 1992 was that in a statement of the applicant's defence

counsel of 22 December 1992 the latter had complained that the

Presiding Judge had never dealt with some requests by the applicant.

As evidence he had submitted a request for inspection of the file dated

24 September 1992 which had allegedly remained unanswered.  In the file

at the prison, however, the original of this request had been found and

there it was also noted that on 25 September 1992 the judge had granted

the request.  The only explanation was that the applicant had succeeded

in secretly passing on a copy of this request to his defence counsel

before it had been put on the file.

     On 3 February 1993 the Judges' Chamber dismissed a complaint by

the applicant that he had not had sufficient access to his case file.

The Judges' Chamber noted that on 8 January 1993 the applicant had been

granted access to the file and that on the same day the case file had

been brought to his cell at the prison.  As the applicant had

complained on 11 January 1993 that the file had not been complete since

its index had been missing an inspection of the applicant's cell had

been carried out on 15 January 193 by Judge Grygar in the presence of

five witnesses.  The result had been that the case file was complete

and in particular that the index of the case file had not been missing.

The complaint was therefore unfounded. On 18 February 1993 the Court

of Appeal dismissed the applicant's complaint against the Judges'

Chamber's decision of 3 February 1993.

     On 19 February 1993 the applicant again filed a plea of nullity

and an appeal against the sentence.  The writ repeated in substance the

arguments raised earlier.

     On 25 February 1993 the Public Prosecutor's Office submitted the

following statement to the Regional Court:

     "after examination returned with the statement that no

     submissions are made on the applicant's "new" plea of nullity and

     appeal.

           for the use of the attorney general's department a copy of

     the judgment should be attached to the file."

     On 30 March 1993 the Graz Public Prosecutor's Office withdrew its

plea of nullity.

     On 27 April 1993 the Procurator General (Generalprokurator)

submitted the following comments on the applicant's plea of nullity:

     "In the view of the Procurator General the plea of nullity of the

     accused Bernhard Lanz can be dealt with under Section 285d of the

     Code of Criminal Procedure.  The transmission of a decision is

     requested.  The plea of nullity lodged by the Public Prosecutor's

     Office has been withdrawn by the attached declaration of

     30 March 1993."

5.   The Supreme Court's decision on the applicant's plea of nullity

     On 9 June 1993 the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible the

applicant's plea of nullity.

     As regards the applicant's submission that the Presiding Judge

had been excluded from presiding over the trial because he had carried

out the function of an investigating judge, the Supreme Court noted

that the Presiding Judge had never acted as investigating judge.  The

Supreme Court noted that in the course of the preparation of the trial

he had contacted one of the experts to find out whether the expert's

report had to be supplemented.  He had also contacted in the course of

the trial a person in order to find out if this person had any relevant

knowledge before summoning this person as witness.  These steps were

taken by the Presiding Judge in the exercise of his duty to gather

evidence ex officio and were not the exercise of the functions of an

investigating judge.

     As regards the complaint that the applicant had not been properly

represented by counsel on the first day of the trial, the Supreme Court

noted that on 21 April 1992 the Regional Court had postponed the

opening of the trial until the ex-officio defence counsel had appeared.

Once the ex-officio defence counsel had requested the adjournment of

the trial this request had been granted.  As from 23 April 1992 the

applicant was again represented by Mr. K.  The applicant was therefore

assisted by a defence counsel throughout the trial.

     As regards the applicant's submissions that the court appointed

experts were biased, the Supreme Court found that arguments against the

independence of an expert could not be based merely on the unfavourable

contents of an expert's report.  No other arguments had been raised by

the applicant.

     As regards the applicant's complaint about the Regional Court's

refusal to hear certain witnesses, the Supreme Court noted that the

numerous and repeated requests for taking evidence towards the end of

the trial had given the Regional Court the impression of an intention

to delay proceedings.  This impression was strengthened by the quality

of some requests for evidence, such as the request for obtaining a

report by an expert for law in order to verify whether the Presiding

Judge was competent under the Code of Criminal Procedure to take

certain decisions.  Even if the decisions taken by the Regional Court

on the applicant's requests for evidence might have been influenced by

the concern to avoid unnecessary prolongation of the trial, scrutiny

of the decisions given showed that the trial court had acted correctly

in refusing the applicant's requests.

     The Supreme Court examined one by one the applicant's requests

for taking evidence and the reasons for their dismissal by the Regional

Court one by one.  It found that most of the requests were not concrete

enough as regards the issue to be proved and therefore amounted to

inadmissible "fishing expeditions", e.g. the applicant's request to

hear more than a hundred investors in order to find out whether they

felt deceived by the applicant. Furthermore, some of the requests were

irrelevant as they did not bear on the charge laid against the

applicant.  It had therefore been irrelevant to take evidence relating

to the feasibility of the project because the charge against the

applicant consisted in the reproach that he did not have the serious

intention to realise the project according to the undertakings given.

Also the applicant's request to have the real property evaluated again

because any possible increase in the value without the applicant's

contribution had nothing to do with the charge that he had used funds

contrary to the undertakings given.

     Several of the applicant's requests for taking evidence had been

made towards the end of the trial.  In such circumstances there could

be the impression that the applicant's defence and the modification of

his position was merely an adaption to the results of the evidence

already taken.  In such a situation a request for evidence must also

include arguments as to reasons why  the evidence, if taken, would

prove the assertions of the applicant.  This applied in particular to

requests to hear again witnesses already heard by the court.  Thus the

request to hear again witness R. who would state that he had received

the purchase price for the real property was irrelevant as the

applicant merely alleged at a very late stage that he had made a

payment in cash without recording it in the book-keeping and without

giving any details as to time and place of payment.  The Supreme Court

therefore found that the Regional Court had correctly rejected the

applicant's requests for taking evidence.

     Also the requests for repeating the trial because the transcripts

of the trial had not been ready were irrelevant as the law did not

provide for a repetition of the trial on this ground and a repetition

could not remedy the alleged failure complained of.

     The Supreme Court also found that during the trial the applicant

had sufficient possibility to comment on the statements of the

witnesses.

     The Supreme Court also rejected the applicant's complaints about

the assessment of evidence by the trial court as the Regional Court's

judgment did not give rise to any doubts as to the logic of the court's

argumentation or its formal completeness.

6.   The Court of Appeal's decision on the applicant's appeal

     On 30 August 1993 the Graz Court of Appeal, after an oral hearing

in which the applicant and his defence counsel participated, granted

the Public Prosecutor's appeal against sentence and increased the

sentence of imprisonment to five and a half years.  It referred the

applicant as regards his appeal to the decision on the Public

Prosecutor's appeal.  The Court of Appel weighed mitigating and

aggravating circumstances and found that a higher sentence had to be

imposed on the applicant.

7.   The applicant's contacts with his relatives and his defence

     counsel

     During the applicant's detention on remand, including the period

after the proceedings at first instance had been terminated, the

judicial authorities took numerous decisions, mainly following requests

and complaints by the applicant concerning his contacts with his

family, defence counsel and the official receiver.

a.   Visits

     On 17 December 1991 the Investigating Judge ordered that the

applicant could receive three visits of 15 minutes each per week, not

including his escorted leaves to the official receiver.  He found that

in the past the applicant had received so many visits at the prison

that the high number of these visits had caused difficulties to the

prison administration.

     On 11 March 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed several complaints

lodged by the applicant. As regards the complaint concerning the

insufficient possibility to receive visits at the prison the Judges'

Chamber noted that the applicant had been allowed to receive visits

three times a week which was more than what was provided for in S. 187

para. 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e. two visits of fifteen

minutes per week.

     On 21 October 1992 the Judges' Chamber again dismissed a

complaint by the applicant that visits allowed to him were insufficient

and referred to its decision of 11 March 1992.

b.   Correspondence

     According to a file note of the Investigating Judge of

14 January 1992, the applicant had complained that prison officers had

checked his outgoing mail.  The Judge noted that according to prison

rules letters had to be handed to the prison officers unsealed in order

to verify that they did not contain any hidden messages.  He also noted

that the applicant had admitted to smuggled out three letters with the

assistance of his defence counsel.

     On 15 January 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed various

complaints by the applicant.  As regards a complaint by the applicant

about interference with the correspondence with his defence counsel,

the Judges' Chamber noted that according to S. 188 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure the censoring of the correspondence of a person kept

in detention on remand was the sole competence of the Investigating

Judge.  The applicant complained that the staff of the prison read his

letters.  However the Investigating Judge had no competence to give

instructions to the prison staff, this being the task of the prison's

director.  The Investigating Judge had informed the director of the

prison of the applicant's complaint and the latter had denied that

prison officers had ever read letters by or to the applicant.

     On 11 March 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed complaints lodged

by the applicant concerning, inter alia, delays caused by the

Investigating Judge in forwarding letters written by the applicant.

The Judges' Chamber found that no significant delays in dispatching the

applicant's letters had occurred taking into account that the applicant

wrote numerous letters which had to be censored by the Investigating

Judge.  Insofar the applicant had complained that letters to his

defence counsel had not been accepted sealed and that letters from his

defence counsel had been opened, the Judges' Chamber found that the

Investigating Judge had not been responsible for allegedly unlawful

acts of the prison staff.  The applicant should have filed a complaint

under the Enforcement of Sentences Act (Strafvollzugsgesetz).

     On 16 December 1992 the Administrative Court

(Verwaltungsgerichtshof) dismissed the applicant's complaint against

the Independent Administrative Panel's (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat)

decision of 6 October 1992 by which a complaint of the applicant

concerning interference with the correspondence with his defence

counsel had been rejected.  The Administrative Court noted that on

9 July 1992 a prison officer had refused to accept a closed letter

addressed to the defence counsel.  On 19 July 1992 a letter had been

given to the applicant only after it had been opened.  This complaint

was refused by the Independent Administrative Panel because it had not

been competent to deal with such a complaint.  The Administrative Court

found that the Independent Administrative Panel had correctly rejected

the applicant's complaint.

c.   Escorted leave

     Following several orders by the Investing Judge and later on by

the Presiding Judge the applicant was granted escorted leave on a daily

basis to meet the official receiver.  These visits were necessary for

the official receiver to organise the bookkeeping of the companies

controlled by the applicant.  These visits, which initially had also

been granted on Sundays, were subsequently only granted for weekdays

because the prison authorities complained that daily escorted leave

created serious problems for the organisation of the duties of the

prison officers.  During the applicant's trial escorted leave was

suspended but it continued after the trial finished.  According to a

decision by the Judges' Chamber of 14 December 1992, by which a

complaint by the official receiver was dismissed, escorted leave had

been reduced for organisational reasons while the official receiver had

been granted the right to visit the applicant daily at the prison.

d.   Defence lawyer

     On 11 March 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed several complaints

lodged by the applicant.  As regards the complaint that the applicant

had been hindered from meeting his defence counsel the Judges' Chamber

noted that the applicant only had a right to confer with his defence

counsel in the premises of the court but not when he happened to meet

him on the occasion of escorted leave to the official receiver.

     On 8 April 1992 the applicant requested that he be given the

possibility to meet his defence counsel also on Saturdays and Sundays.

On 10 April 1992 the director of the prison at the Graz Regional Court

informed the Presiding Judge that it was not possible to organise

visits of defence counsel during weekends.  Meetings with defence

counsel had to take place between 7 and 17 hours from Monday to Friday.

On 10 April 1992 the Presiding Judge of the trial court informed the

applicant that this request could not be granted for organisational

reasons.  The applicant could therefore meet his defence counsel only

during working hours.

     On 22 April 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed several complaints

of the applicant.  As regards the complaint that prison wardens had

prevented him from contacting his defence counsel it noted that this

contact had occurred on the occasion of an escorted leave.  However,

under the Code of Criminal Procedure contacts with defence counsel

without any surveillance were only allowed in the prison.

     On 13 May 1992 the Court of Appeal rejected several complaints

by the applicant.  Concerning measures taken by the Investigating

Judge, e.g. regulation of the applicant's contacts with his defence

counsel, it found that he should have filed a complaint with the

Judges' Chamber.

     On 2 October 1992 the applicant requested authorization to meet

his defence counsel also on weekends at the prison. On 21 October 1992

the Judges' Chamber dismissed this and several other complaints.

e.   Press conference

     On 22 April 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed several complaints

by the applicant.  As regards his complaint about the refusal of a

press conference in the prison it found that the provisions of the Code

of Criminal Procedure did not grant a detained accused the right to

hold press conferences.

B.   Relevant domestic law

     The following account of the relevant provisions of the Code of

Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung) is based on the law as in force

until 1 January 1994 when the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act

(Strafprozeßänderungsgesetz 1993) entered into force.

     According to S. 12 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the

Judges' Chamber at the First Instance Court supervises all measures

taken by the Investigating Judge at the First Instance Court in the

course of preliminary investigations.

     According to S. 45 para. 3 a person taken into detention on

remand may meet his defence counsel in the absence of the Investigating

Judge.  However, if detention on remand has been ordered on the ground

of danger of collusion the Investigating Judge may, during the first

14 days of the detention, be present when the remand prisoner meets his

defence counsel.  If due to specific circumstances a danger exists that

contact with the defence counsel may interfere with evidence the

Investigating Judge may order that the surveillance of the contact with

the defence counsel be extended until the bill of indictment is served.

Surveillance of contact with the defence counsel may only be exercised

as long as the detention on remand is based on a danger of collusion

(S. 180, S. 193 para. 3).

     S. 113 provides in particular that anybody affected by a decision

of the Investigating Judge or by a delay in the course of preliminary

investigations or in the proceedings after indictment, may apply for

review by the Judges' Chamber, which decides in private after having

heard the Investigating Judge and the Public Prosecutor. According to

S. 114 there is a further appeal against decisions of the Judges'

Chamber to the Court of Second Instance, if these decisions concern the

severance of proceedings, the institution or discontinuation of the

preliminary investigation, bail, or detention on remand without a

hearing concerning release having taken place.

     Under S. 180 paras. 1 and 2 a person may be held in detention on

remand if he is seriously suspected of having committed a criminal

offence and if there is a risk of his absconding, of collusion or that

the person might commit offences. According to S. 193, detention may

not last more than two months where its sole justification is the risk

of collusion; it may not last more than six months where one of the

other grounds is relied on. The Court of Appeal may, however, if so

requested by the Investigating Judge or the Public Prosecutor and if

the difficulty or the scope of the investigations makes it necessary,

extend the detention. In such cases the maximum duration of detention

is three months where the measure is based on a risk of collusion

alone, and one year, or even two years, if the term of imprisonment

which the suspect risks is ten years or more, in the other

circumstances provided for.

     By virtue of SS. 194 and 195, it is open to the suspect to apply

for release at any time. Such an application and any appeal against a

decision ordering detention on remand must be examined by the Judges'

Chamber at a private hearing in the presence of the accused or his

defence counsel.

     Under S. 285 (d) para. 1 a plea of nullity may be rejected by the

Supreme Court after deliberation in private if the Supreme Court

unanimously finds that the complaint should be dismissed as manifestly

ill-founded without any need for further deliberation.

     Under Section 120 para. 1 of the Enforcement of Sentences Act

prisoners can file a complaint concerning any decision or measure

affecting their rights or any conduct of the prison staff affecting

their rights.  Such complaints have to be filed within fourteen days.

They have to be decided upon by the director of the prison or if the

complaint is directed against the director by the Ministry of Justice

(S. 121 para. 1).

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant raises numerous complaints about his detention on

remand, his conviction and the proceedings leading thereto.  In these

respects he invokes Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 13 of the

Convention, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, Article 1 of Protocol No. 4

and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7.

     He submits in particular that the Regional Court refused to hear

the witnesses and to take other evidence requested by him; that on the

first day of the trial he was not properly represented by a defence

counsel; that he did not have sufficient access to his case file, and

that he did not have computer facilities at his disposal for preparing

his defence; that the judges dealing with his case were biased against

him; that also the experts appointed by the court were biased,

incompetent and had submitted reports which were incorrect and of

insufficient quality; that he could not effectively prepare his defence

because his defence counsel had only been allowed to visit him in the

prison during office hours but not in the evening and at week-ends;

that not all documents were read out by the court at the trial; that

the authorities did not allow him to hold a press conference; and that

he had not been heard by the Supreme Court on his plea of nullity.

     The applicant also complains under Article 6 of the Convention

that the Procurator General's comments on his plea of nullity were not

served on him and that the Senior Public Prosecutor also made written

submissions on his appeal against sentence which were not served on

him.

     Invoking Article 5 of the Convention the applicant complains

about his detention on remand and submits in particular that there had

neither been a concrete suspicion against him nor sufficient reasons

for ordering his detention on remand; that he was not informed promptly

and in detail on the suspicion against him as the questioning by the

Investigating Judge on 25 October 1991 did not relate to any precise

element of suspicion and that he received the bill of indictment only

four months after his arrest; that his detention on remand lasted

unreasonably long and that the hearings on his requests for release

from detention on remand were not held publicly.

     The applicant also complains that while kept in detention on

remand the contacts to the outside world, his family, his defence

counsel and the official receiver were unduly restricted.  He was not

granted enough visits from his family. He was hindered in meeting his

defence counsel and he had not been brought often enough to the

official receiver.  He also complains that his correspondence,

including the one with his defence counsel was censored by the

authorities.  His correspondence with his defence counsel, although

marked by a stamp "no censoring", was opened, the contents checked and

outgoing letters to his defence counsel were only accepted unsealed.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention that in the criminal proceedings against him the Procurator

General submitted comments on his plea of nullity to the Supreme Court

of which he was not informed and to which he could not react.  Also the

Senior Public Prosecutor made written submissions on the applicant's

appeal against sentence which were not served on him.

     He further complains that his contacts with his defence counsel

were kept under surveillance by the Investigating Judge during the

first two months of his detention on remand.

     The applicant also complains that in the proceedings concerning

his requests for release before the Judges' Chamber the Public

Prosecutor's Office made submissions to which he had no possibility to

reply.

     The Commission considers that it cannot, on the basis of the

file, determine the admissibility of these complaints and that it is

therefore necessary in accordance with Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules

of Procedure, to give notice of this part of the application to the

respondent Government.

2.   The applicant raises several complaints about his conviction and

the proceedings leading thereto.

     Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (Art. 6-1, 6-3) of the Convention,

insofar as relevant, read as follows:

     "1.   In the determination ... of any criminal charge against

     him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

     reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

     established by law.  ...

     3.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

     minimum rights:

           a.   to be informed promptly, in a language which he

     understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the

     accusation against him;

           b.   to have adequate time and facilities for the

     preparation of his defence;

           c.   to defend himself in person or through legal

     assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means

     to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the

     interests of justice so require;

           d.   to examine or have examined witnesses against him and

     to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his

     behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ..."

     The Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19

(Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance

of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In

particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging

that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,

except where it considers that such errors might have involved a

possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the

Convention (see No. 21283/93, Dec. 5.4.94, D.R. 77, pp. 81, 88 and Eur.

Court HR, Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands judgment of 19 April 1994,

Series A no. 288, p. 20, para. 61; Klass v. Germany judgment of 22

September 1993, Series A no. 269, p. 17 para. 29).

     It seems, in the Commission's view, appropriate to look at the

applicant's complaints about the taking of evidence form the points of

view of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 6 (Art. 6-1+6-3) taken together,

especially as the guarantees on paragraph 3 represents aspects of the

concept of a fair trial contained in paragraph 1 (Eur. Court HR,

Unterpertinger v. Austria judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no.

110, p. 14, para. 29).

a.   The applicant submits in particular that the Regional Court

refused to hear the witnesses and to take other evidence requested by

him.

     The Commission recalls, however, that, as a general rule, it is

for the national courts to assess the evidence before them as well as

the relevance of the evidence which the defendant seeks to adduce.

More specifically, Article 6 para. 3 (d) (Art. 6-3-d) leaves it to

them, again as a general rule, to assess whether it is appropriate to

call witnesses, in the "autonomous" sense given to that word in  the

Convention system; it does not require the attendance and examination

of every witness on the accused's behalf (cf. Eur. Court HR, Bricmont

v. Belgium judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 158, p. 31, para. 89,

Vidal v. Belgium judgment of 22 April 1992, Series A no. 235-B, pp. 32-

33, para. 33). In respect of witnesses on behalf of the accused, only

exceptional circumstances could lead the Convention organs to conclude

that a refusal to hear such witnesses violated Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention (Eur. Court HR, Bricmont v. Belgium judgment, loc.

cit.).  Thus, the complete silence in a judgment as to why the court

rejected the hearing of a witness for the defence is not consistent

with the concept of a fair trial which is the basis of Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention (Eur. Court HR, Vidal v. Belgium judgment,

loc. cit.).

     The Commission observes that the Regional Court convicted the

applicant on 21 June 1992 after having heard, apart from the applicant

himself, 52 witnesses and 5 experts.  The Regional Court granted

several requests by the applicant for the hearing of witnesses for the

defence and the taking of other exonerating evidence.  It did, however,

dismiss numerous requests by the applicant for the hearing of evidence

or obtaining expert opinions and explained why it considered the

hearing of the witnesses and the taking of the other evidence requested

by the applicant as irrelevant to the proceedings.  Also the Supreme

Court in its decision of 9 June 1993 on the applicant's plea of nullity

explained in detail why the Regional Court had acted correctly in

refusing the evidence proposed by the applicant.

     The Commission finds no sufficient grounds to form the view that

the failure to hear the witnesses concerned was incompatible with

Article 6 (Art. 6) as it did not unduly restrict the rights of the

defence and thus did not render the proceedings unfair.

b.   The applicant also submits that on the first day of the trial he

had not been properly represented by a defence counsel

     However, the Commission observes that on 16 April 1992, shortly

before the trial started, both defence counsel chosen by the applicant

withdrew from representing him.  On the first day of the trial,

21 April 1992, the applicant was represented by an ex-officio defence

counsel who immediately asked for an adjournment of the trial in order

to prepare the applicant's defence.  At the trial the applicant even

opposed an adjournment of the trial.  On 23 April 1992 Mr. K., one of

the defence counsel who had previously represented the applicant, again

took over the applicant's defence.  On that first day of the trial the

Court, apart from establishing the applicant's identity, took no steps

in the proceedings.  Moreover Mr. K. was familiar with these events as,

according to the judgment of the Regional Court, he had been amongst

the audience.

     In such circumstances the Commission cannot find that the

applicants rights under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention were

infringed in this respect.

c.   The applicant complains that not all documents were read out at

the trial.

     The Commission observes, however, that the applicant did not give

his consent to having documents in the file treated as having been read

out, which appears to be a normal court practice in criminal cases in

Austria.  On the contrary he insisted that the documents be read out

and accordingly the court sessions on 18, 19 and 20 June 1992 were

spent in reading out numerous documents.

     The Commission finds that the applicant has not specified which

documents if any were not read out and such a failure could have

rendered the proceedings against him unfair.

d.   The applicant also complains that he did not have sufficient

access to his case file.

     It appears, however, from the material before the Commission,

that in the criminal proceedings the applicant and his defence counsel

were repeatedly granted access to the voluminous case file.  Moreover,

before the beginning of the trial, not only the applicant's defence

counsel but also the applicant himself were provided, on 17 April 1992,

with photocopies of the file.  At the stage of the second instance

proceedings the Supreme Court, on 24 December 1992, granted the

applicant a new time limit for filing his plea of nullity and appeal

as it could not be ruled out with certainty that he had not at all

times had unhindered access to his case file.

     In such circumstances it would appear that the applicant was in

fact granted sufficient access to his case file.

e.   The applicant also complains that the judges dealing with his

case were biased against him.

     The Commission recalls that when the impartiality of a tribunal

for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is

being determined, regard must be had not only to the personal

conviction of a particular judge in a given case - the subjective

approach - but it must also be considered whether there were sufficient

guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect - the

objective approach (cf. Eur. Court HR, Piersack v. Belgium judgment of

1 October 1982, Series A no. 53, p. 14, para. 30; Bulut v. Austria

judgment of 22 February 1996, Reports 1996-II, p. 356, para. 31).  As

to the subjective test, the personal impartiality of a judge must be

presumed until there is proof to the contrary (Bulut v. Austria

judgment, op. cit., para. 32; Padovani v. Italy judgment of 26 February

1993, Series A no. 257-B, p. 20, para. 26).  As regards the objective

test, it must be determined whether there are ascertainable facts which

may raise doubts as to a judge's impartiality. What is at stake is the

confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the

public. In deciding whether in a given case there is a legitimate

reason to fear that a particular judge lacks impartiality appearances

may be of certain importance, although the opinions of the persons

concerned are not in themselves decisive.  What is decisive is whether

such fears can be regarded as objectively justified (Piersack judgment,

loc. cit.; Kraska v. Switzerland judgment of 19 April 1993, Series A

no. 254-B, p. 50, para. 32).

     The Commission observes that the applicant, on various occasions

challenged for bias judges and even whole courts dealing with his case.

Most of these challenges, in particular those concerning entire courts

such as the ones dismissed by the Supreme Court on 10 March 1992 and

the Graz Court of Appeal on 9 April 1992, in which it was merely

alleged in a general manner that the courts concerned had incorrectly

applied the law, do not disclose any substantiated elements of bias

based on subjective or objective considerations.  As regards the

challenges of Judge Grygar, the presiding judge at the trial, the

Commission observes that the applicant essentially argued that this

Judge had also acted as investigating judge.  However, according to the

decisions of the President of the Graz Regional Court Judge Grygar had,

in intervals during the trial merely enquired with persons requested

to be heard as witnesses whether they had any relevant information to

give before summoning them.  Having regard to the Convention organ's

case law on this matter, the Commission cannot find that such a conduct

gives rise to legitimate doubts as to the impartiality of that judge

(see Eur. Court HR, Fey v. Austria judgment of 24 February 1993,

Series A no. 255-A, p. 13-14, para. 35; Bulut v. Austria judgment, op.

cit., para. 34).

f.   The applicant complains that the Supreme Court did not hold a

hearing on his plea of nullity.

     The Commission recalls, however, that in case a public hearing

has been held at first instance, the absence of "public hearings" at

second or third instance may be justified by the special features of

the proceedings at issue.  Also the nature of proceedings whereby a

plea of nullity is rejected as inadmissible by the Supreme Court

(S. 285d of the Code of Criminal Procedure) can be compared to that of

proceedings for leave to appeal which do not necessitate the holding

of a public hearing (Bulut v. Austria judgment, op. cit., p. 358,

paras. 41-42).

     In the present case a public hearing had been held at first

instance before the Graz Regional Court.  The Supreme Court, on

9 June 1993, rejected the applicant's plea of nullity as inadmissible.

     Accordingly the Commission does not find that the fact that the

Supreme Court did not hold a hearing on the applicant's plea of nullity

discloses a violation of the applicant's rights under Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   The applicant complains further about his detention on remand and

invokes Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention, which, insofar as

relevant, reads as follows:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.

     No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following

     cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

     ...

           c.   the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected

     for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal

     authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence

     or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his

     committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

     2.    Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a

     language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and

     of any charge against him.

     3.    Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the

     provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought

     promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to

     exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a

     reasonable time or to release pending trial.  Release may be

     conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.

     4.    Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or

     detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the

     lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court

     and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. ..."

a.   The applicant submits that at no stage did there exist a serious

suspicion against him of having committed a criminal offence and that

there were no grounds for ordering and upholding his detention on

remand.

     The Commission recalls that the reasonable suspicion required by

Article 5 para 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of the Convention need not be based

on facts of the same level as those necessary to justify a conviction

or even the bringing of a charge as it is precisely the purpose of the

official investigation, which the detention is intended to facilitate,

to prove the reality and nature of the offences charged (see Eur. Court

HR, Murray v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 October 1994, Series

A no. 300-A, p. 27, para. 55; No. 10803/84, Dec. 16.12.87, D.R. 54,

p. 35).

     In the present case the Investigating Judge, when ordering the

applicant's detention on remand on 25 October 1991, relied on the

strong suspicion against the applicant that he had committed fraud and

falsification of documents in relation with two real estate investment

projects. The Investigating Judge also found that there existed a

danger of the applicant's absconding and of collusion. The

Investigating Judge found that the applicant frequently travelled

abroad, had close connections to the United States and an apartment in

New York at his disposal.  There was also the risk that the applicant

would attempt to influence the employees of the SDBV company and to

remove documents which had not been found in the house search. In a

subsequent decision the Investigating Judge also found that there was

the risk that the applicant would commit offences if released, since

there were reasons to assume that he would continue to realise the

investment project at issue or other projects, using financial sources

not yet detected.  These decisions were, upon an appeal by the

applicant, examined by the Judges' Chamber of the Graz Regional Court

on 6 November 1991 and by the Graz Court of Appeal on 12 December 1992.

     Having regard to the above decisions and subsequent decisions by

the Judges' Chamber of 15 January 1992 and 11 March 1992, the

Commission finds that there were sufficient and relevant grounds

justifying the applicant's detention on remand throughout the period

of his detention.

     Accordingly there is no appearance of a violation of Article 5

para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention.  It follows that this part of the

application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

b.   The applicant further complains about the length of his detention

on remand.

     The Commission finds that this complaint falls to be considered

under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.

     As regards the period to be taken into consideration for the

purposes of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, the

Commission notes that this period started on 25 October 1991, when the

applicant was arrested and ended on 21 June 1992, when the applicant

was convicted by the Graz Regional Court.  The period following the

applicant's conviction at first instance cannot be taken into account

for the purpose of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention (Eur.

Court HR, B. v. Austria judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 175,

p. 14, para. 36).  Thus, the period of detention on remand  to be

considered by the Commission is 7 months and 3 weeks.

     According to the relevant case-law of the Convention organs, two

elements must be taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of

the length of pre-trial detention.  On the one hand, compelling reasons

which make the detention on remand necessary must exist throughout the

period of detention.  On the other hand, the authorities and courts

must conduct the criminal investigations and proceedings expeditiously

during this period (see for instance Eur. Court HR, Letellier v. France

judgment of 26 June 1991, Series A no. 207, p. 18, para. 35; W. v.

Switzerland judgment of 26 January 1993, Series A no. 254, p. 15,

para. 30).

     As regards the first element, the Commission recalls its finding

above that there were sufficient and relevant grounds justifying the

applicant's detention on remand throughout the period of his detention

(see point 3.a. above).

     It remains to be examined whether the domestic authorities

displayed special diligence in the conduct of the proceedings

(Letellier v. France judgment, loc cit.; W. v. Switzerland judgment,

loc. cit.).

     The Commission notes that on 25 October 1991 the applicant was

taken into detention on remand, on 14 February 1992 the Graz Public

Prosecutor's Office filed a bill of indictment against the applicant

and between 21 April 1992 and 21 June 1992 the applicant's trial took

place during which period 22 court hearings were held.

     Having regard to these circumstances the Commission finds that

the period of the applicant's detention on remand did not exceed a

reasonable time within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of

the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

c.   The applicant also complains that he was not informed promptly

and in detail of the suspicion against him as the questioning by the

Investigating Judge on 25 October 1991 did not relate to any precise

element of suspicion and he received the bill of indictment only four

months after his arrest.

     The Commission finds that this complaint falls to be considered

under Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention.  It recalls that

Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention contains the elementary

safeguard that any person arrested should know why he is being deprived

of his liberty (Eur. Court HR, Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United

Kingdom judgment of 30 August 1990, Series A no. 182, p. 19, para. 40).

The further purpose behind the guarantee in Article 5 para. 2

(Art. 5-2) is to enable the arrested person to challenge the

reasonableness of the suspicion against him because this is a

substantive requirement for detaining him under Article 5 para. 1 (c)

(Art. 5-1-c).  The arrested person should be informed sufficiently

about the facts and the evidence which are proposed to be the

foundation of a decision to detain him (No. 8098/77, Dec. 13.12.78,

D.R. 16, p. 111).

     From the material before it the Commission finds that the

applicant, on the occasion of his arrest on 25 October 1991, was

informed sufficiently by the Investigating Judge of the charges against

him for the purpose of Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention.

The fact that the bill of indictment was served on the applicant four

months later is of no relevance in this context as neither the

Convention nor domestic Austrian law require the information under

Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention to be given in the form

of a bill of indictment.

     Accordingly there is no appearance of a violation of Article 5

para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention.  It follows that this part of the

application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.   The applicant complains that while being kept in detention on

remand he was not granted sufficient possibility to meet his family.

     The Commission finds that this complaint falls to be considered

under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which reads as follows:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

     family life, his home and his correspondence.

     2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with

     the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

     the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

     of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

     of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

     protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

     rights and freedoms of others."

     The Commission observes, however, that at no time was the

applicant deprived of the possibility to meet his family.  Rather it

appears from the decisions taken by the Investigating Judge on

17 December 1991 that the applicant was allowed to receive three visits

of 15 minutes each per week.  The Judges' Chamber, in its decision on

the applicant's appeal noted that the number of visits granted to the

applicant per week was more than what was provided for in the relevant

provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Commission further

observes that the applicant had the possibility to correspond with his

family.

     In these circumstances the Commission cannot find that the

Investigating Judges' decision to allow the applicant three visits per

week exhibits any lack of respect for the applicant's private or family

life.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.   The applicant also complains that his correspondence with his

defence counsel was interfered with by the prison staff in that letters

from his defence counsel, although marked by a stamp "no censoring",

were opened, the contents checked and outgoing letters to his defence

counsel were only accepted unsealed.

     However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not

the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a

violation of Article 6 or Article 8 (Art. 6, 8) of the Convention as,

under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention it may only deal with a

matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the

generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period

of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.

     In this respect the Commission observes that the applicant has

not filed a complaint with the prison director under S. 121 of the

Enforcement of Sentences Act or a further complaint with the

Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court.  Rather the

applicant filed a complaint with the Judges' Chamber which on

15 January 1992 and 11 March 1992 declared that it was not competent

to examine complaints against prison staff, given that the

Investigating Judge had not ordered the censoring of the applicant's

correspondence with his defence counsel.  He also filed a complaint

with the Independent Administrative Panel which likewise declared that

it was not competent to deal with the applicant's complaint about

interference with his correspondence.  It follows that the applicant