AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 31145/96

                      by Mark Anthony WILKINSON

                      against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 1 July 1998, the following members being present:

           MM    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, President

                 N. BRATZA

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

           Mrs   J. LIDDY

           MM    L. LOUCAIDES

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mrs   M. HION

           Mr    R. NICOLINI

           Mrs   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 13 April 1996 by

Mark Anthony WILKINSON against the United Kingdom and registered on

24 April 1996 under file No. 31145/96;

     Having regard to:

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the observations received from the respondent Government on

     11 April 1997 and the observations in reply received from the

     applicant on 5 June 1997;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a British citizen born in 1969 and resident in

Feltham, the United Kingdom. He is represented before the Commission

by Mr. John Mackenzie, a solicitor practising in London.

     The facts as represented by the applicant may be summarised as

follows.

A.   Particular circumstances of the case

     On 24 October 1990 the applicant, a soldier in the regular forces

of the British Army, was serving in Northern Ireland when a permanent

vehicle checkpoint was blown up by a bomb placed by the Irish

Republican Army (IRA) as a result of which five members of the

applicant's unit were killed. The applicant claims that he was deeply

traumatised by this incident and he went absent from his unit.

     He gave himself up to the army authorities at Hounslow, England

in April 1995 and on 28 April 1995 he met the officer who was to be his

defending officer. On 29 May 1995 the applicant was returned to his

former barracks in Northern Ireland. A certificate, dated 29 May 1995

and signed by the applicant, confirms that he was provided with the

information booklet, issued by the army and entitled "The Rights of a

Soldier Charged with an Offence under the Army Act 1955".

     In or around early June 1995 he was served with the abstract of

evidence by the Unit Adjutant (who was later appointed Prosecutor in

the case). In or around 4 June 1995 the applicant was formally remanded

for trial by court-martial by his commanding officer. On 4 June 1995

the case was referred by the accused's commanding officer to a higher

authority with a recommendation for trial by court-martial on a charge

of absence without leave. The form B116 by which the case was referred,

noted that the accused did not desire legal aid. On 6 June 1995 the

Convening Officer signed the charge sheet charging the applicant on one

count of absence without leave (contrary to section 38(a) the Army

Act 1955) between 23 November 1990 and 27 April 1995. On 6 June 1995

the applicant returned to Hounslow barracks in England.

     On 9 June 1995 the applicant was tried by district court-martial.

The prosecutor and defending officers were not legally qualified. The

applicant pleaded guilty to the charge and the proceedings were

adjourned to allow a psychiatric report to be obtained. The applicant

was remanded in custody. The psychiatric report confirmed that the

applicant was suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and advised

against a custodial sentence. In the section dealing with the

applicant's fitness to plead, the psychiatrist answered in the

affirmative the standard questions as to whether the accused was able

to understand the charges against him, to object to any member of the

court-martial and to instruct defending counsel, a legal representative

or a defending officer. At the resumed hearing on 17 July 1995 the

applicant was convicted of being absent without leave and was sentenced

to 140 days imprisonment and to dismissal from the army.

     On 31 July 1995 the Confirming Officer confirmed the finding but

reduced the sentence to 14 days imprisonment and dismissal. On

2 August 1995 the conviction and sentence were promulgated and, having

already served 14 days imprisonment, the applicant was immediately

released from custody. The applicant then retained his present

representative. By letter dated 31 October 1995 the applicant's

representative was informed of the decision, taken by the Army Board,

to quash the sentence of detention and to uphold the applicant's

dismissal.

B.   Relevant domestic law and practice

     The principal law and procedures applicable are contained in the

Army Act 1955 ("the 1955 Act") prior to its amendment by the Armed

Forces Act 1996 ("the 1996 Act"), which latter Act came into force on

1 April 1997. Accordingly, and apart from section 8. below, the

following is an outline of the pre-1996 Act law and practice.

     Subject to the sentencing power of a court-martial, a person

convicted of absence without leave shall be liable to imprisonment for

a term not exceeding two years (section 38(a) of the 1955 Act). A

district court-martial was competent to impose such a sentence.

1.   General

     Depending on their gravity, charges under the 1955 Act could be

tried by district, field or general court-martial. These were not

standing courts: they came into existence in order to try a single

offence or group of offences. At the time of the events in question,

a district court-martial consisted of a President, who could not be

under the rank of Field Officer and was appointed by name by the

Convening Officer, and at least two other officers, appointed either

by name by the Convening Officer or, at the latter's request, by their

commanding officer. Each member of the court-martial had to swear the

following oath:

     "I swear by almighty God that I will well and truly try the

     accused before the court according to the evidence, and that I

     will duly administer justice according to the Army Act 1955,

     without partiality, favour or affection, and I do further swear

     that I will not on any account at any time whatsoever disclose

     or discover the vote or opinion of the president or any member

     of this court-martial, unless thereunto required in the due

     course of law."

2.   Legal Aid

     The provision of legal aid is regulated by paragraphs 6.094-6.095

of the Queen's Regulations for the Army 1975 together with Chapter 6,

Annex D to those Regulations. Legal aid by way of civilian professional

assistance is available to members of the armed forces of all ranks who

are to be tried by court-martial. Legal aid can only be applied for

once the accused has been remanded for trial by court-martial by his

commanding officer. A grant of legal aid is subject to the accused

undertaking to make such financial contribution and/or down payment

prior to the trial as may be assessed as appropriate.

     The general principles followed in deciding whether a case

justifies legal aid is that legal aid should be granted if it would

have been granted had the case been brought before the criminal courts

of the United Kingdom or, where an applicant is being brought to trial

by court-martial, if an officer with legal qualifications is to

prosecute, or points of legal difficulty are involved, or the expert

examination of witnesses is required. The accused may alternatively ask

for representation by a legally qualified member of the armed forces

or can himself instruct a lawyer at his own cost.

     A booklet entitled "The Rights of Soldiers Charged with an

Offence under the Army Act 1955" is produced by the army and provides

in the booklet that the commanding officer or a subordinate commander

is to ensure that a copy of the booklet is given to a soldier charged

with an offence. The information outlined above as regards legal aid

is detailed in the information booklet and the first paragraph of that

booklet points out that if it becomes likely that an accused is to be

brought to trial by court-martial, he may choose some suitable and

available person in the army to advise him and that, if necessary, the

commanding officer will appoint an officer for this purpose.

3.   The Convening Officer

     Before the coming into force of the 1996 Act, the Convening

Officer of a district court-martial had to be a "qualified officer" or

an officer not below the rank of Colonel to whom the qualified officer

had delegated his or her powers. To be a "qualified officer", an

officer had to be not below the rank of Field Officer or corresponding

rank and in command of a body of the regular forces or of the command

within which the person to be tried was serving.

     The Convening Officer assumed responsibility for every case to

be tried by court-martial. He would decide upon the nature and detail

of the charges to be brought and was responsible for convening the

court-martial. He would draw up a convening order, which would specify,

inter alia, the date, place and time of the trial, the name of the

President and the details of the other members, all of whom he could

appoint. He ensured that a judge advocate was appointed by the Judge

Advocate General's Office and, failing such appointment, could appoint

one. He also appointed, or directed a commanding officer to appoint,

the prosecuting officer.

     Prior to the hearing, the Convening Officer was responsible for

sending the abstract of the evidence to the prosecuting officer and to

the judge advocate, and could indicate the passages which might be

inadmissible. He procured the attendance at trial of all witnesses to

be called for the prosecution. When charges were withdrawn, the

Convening Officer's consent was normally obtained, although it was not

necessary in all cases, and a plea to a lesser charge could not be

accepted from the accused without it.

     Rule 22(1)(m) of the Rules of Procedure (Army) 1972 provides that

the Convening Officer also had to ensure that the accused had a proper

opportunity to prepare his defence in accordance with Rule 25 of those

Rules. In accordance with this latter provision, a defending officer

or legally qualified counsel was appointed to defend an accused once

remanded for trial by court-martial unless the accused stated in

writing that he did not wish such an appointment to be made. However,

if the accused asked for an officer by name (even an officer from

another service) this officer was to be provided to the accused if it

was possible and if the officer had no other essential military duties

to perform.

     The Convening Officer was also to ensure that the accused had

legal assistance if required and the opportunity to contact defence

witnesses, and he was responsible for ordering the attendance at the

hearing of all witnesses "reasonably requested" by the defence. The

Convening Officer could dissolve the court-martial either before or

during the trial, when required in the interests of the administration

of justice (section 95 of the 1955 Act). The Convening Officer usually

also acted as Confirming Officer.

4.   The Judge Advocate General and judge advocates

     The Judge Advocate General at the time of the events in question

was appointed by the Queen in February 1991 for five years. He was

answerable to the Queen and removable from office by her for inability

or misbehaviour. He had the role of adviser to the Secretary of State

for Defence on all matters touching and concerning the office of Judge

Advocate General, including advice on army law and the procedures and

conduct of the court-martial system. He was also responsible for

advising the confirming and reviewing authorities following a court-

martial.

     Judge advocates are appointed to the Judge Advocate General's

Office by the Lord Chancellor. They must have at least seven and five

years experience respectively as an advocate or barrister.

     At the time of the events in question, a judge advocate was

appointed to each court-martial, either by the Judge Advocate General's

Office or by the Convening Officer. He was responsible for advising the

court-martial on all questions of law and procedure arising during the

hearing and the court had to accept this advice unless there were

weighty reasons for not doing so. In addition, in conjunction with the

President, he was under a duty to ensure that the accused did not

suffer any disadvantage during the hearing. At the close of the

hearing, the judge advocate would sum up the relevant law and evidence.

     Prior to the coming into force of the 1996 Act, the judge

advocate did not take part in the court-martial's deliberations on

conviction or acquittal, although he could advise it in private on

general principles in relation to sentencing. He was not a member of

the court-martial and had no vote in the decision on conviction or

sentence.

5.   The court-martial hearing

     At the commencement of the trial, the accused could object to

individual members of the court-martial, such objection being

considered in closed court.

     The accused was then asked to plead in respect of the charge. If

a plea of not guilty was entered the procedure was similar to that

followed in the (civilian) Crown Court. After the prosecution had made

its case, the defence could enter a submission of no case to answer.

If this submission was not accepted, the judge advocate would advise

the accused on the alternatives open to him and the defence would

proceed with its case. Witnesses could be called for the prosecution

and the defence and both sides could make a closing submission, the

defence submission being the last.

     During the trial the court-martial could adjourn to consult the

Convening Officer on points of law; the latter then had to take legal

advice from the Judge Advocate General. The members of the court-

martial retired (without the judge advocate) to deliberate on their

findings, returned and pronounced those findings. Their votes and

opinions were private and it was not disclosed whether the decision had

been by a majority.

     In the event of a conviction or a plea of guilty, the prosecuting

officer put in evidence the defendant's service record and other

evidence having a bearing on the sentence to be imposed. The defence

made a plea in mitigation and could call witnesses in support. The

members of the court-martial then retired (this time with the judge

advocate) to consider the sentence.

     The sentence was announced in open court. There was no provision

for the giving of reasons by the court-martial for its decision on

guilt or sentence.

6.   Confirmation and post-hearing reviews

     Until the amendments introduced by the 1996 Act, the findings of

a court-martial were not effective until confirmed by a "Confirming

Officer". Prior to confirmation, the Confirming Officer used to seek

the advice of the Judge Advocate General's Office, where a judge

advocate different from the one who acted at the hearing would be

appointed. The Confirming Officer could withhold confirmation or

substitute, postpone or remit in whole or in part any sentence.

     Once the sentence had been confirmed, the defendant could present

a petition of appeal against conviction and/or sentence to the

"reviewing authority", which was usually the Army Board in cases

involving army personnel. It had the power to quash a finding and to

exercise the same powers as the Confirming Officer in relation to

substituting, remitting or commuting the sentence. A petitioner was not

informed of the identity of the Confirming Officer or of the reviewing

authority. No statutory or formalised procedures were laid down for the

conduct of the post-hearing reviews and no reasons were given for

decisions delivered subsequent to them. Neither the fact that advice

had been received from the Judge Advocate General's Office nor the

nature of that advice was disclosed.

7.   Courts-Martial Appeal Court

     The Courts-Martial Appeal Court ("CMAC") was established by the

Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951 and was confirmed by the Courts-

Martial (Appeals) Act 1968. The CMAC had the same status and, in

essence, the same procedure as the (civilian) Court of Appeal, Criminal

Division. Its judges included ordinary and ex officio judges of the

Court of Appeal and judges of the High Court nominated by the Lord

Chief Justice.

     If an appeal petition was rejected by the Army Board an appellant

could apply to a single judge of the CMAC (and, if necessary, also to

the full court) for leave to appeal against conviction. There was no

provision for an appeal against sentence only, although certain powers

of revising sentences, pursuant to an appeal against conviction, were

available to the CMAC.

8.   The Armed Forces Act 1996

     Under the 1996 Act, the role of the Convening Officer ceases to

exist and its functions are split among three different bodies: the

higher authority, the prosecuting authority and court administration

officers (Schedule I to the 1996 Act).

     The higher authority, a senior officer, decides whether any case

referred to him by the accused's commanding officer should be dealt

with summarily, referred to the new prosecuting authority, or dropped.

Once the higher authority has taken this decision, he has no further

involvement in the case. The prosecuting authority is the legal branch

of the relevant Service. Following the higher authority's decision to

refer a case to it, the prosecuting authority has an absolute

discretion, applying similar criteria to those applied in civilian

cases by the Crown Prosecution Service, to decide whether or not to

prosecute, what type of court-martial would be appropriate and what

charges should be brought. It also conducts the prosecution (the

1996 Act, Schedule I, Part II).

     Court administration officers have now been appointed in each

Service. They are independent of both the higher and the prosecuting

authorities and are responsible for making the arrangements for courts-

martial, including arranging venue and timing, ensuring that a judge

advocate and any court officials required are available, securing the

attendance of witnesses and selection of members. Officers under the

command of the higher authority will not be selected as members of the

court-martial (the 1996 Act, Schedule I, Part III).

     Each court-martial now includes a judge advocate as a member. His

advice on points of law is binding on the court and he has a vote on

sentence (but not on conviction). The casting vote, if needed, rests

with the president of the court-martial, who gives reasons for the

sentence in open court. The Judge Advocate General no longer provides

general legal advice to the Secretary of State for Defence (the

1996 Act, Schedule I, Part III).

     Findings by a court-martial are no longer subject to confirmation

or revision by a Confirming Officer (whose role is abolished).

A reviewing authority has been established in each Service to conduct

a single review of each case. Reasons are now given for the decision

of the reviewing authority. As part of this process, post-trial advice

received by the reviewing authority from a judge advocate (different

from the one who officiated at the court-martial) is disclosed to the

accused. A right of appeal against sentence to the CMAC has been added

to the existing right of appeal against conviction (the 1996 Act,

section 17 and Schedule V).

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention

that he did not receive a fair and public hearing by an independent and

impartial tribunal established by law.

     He also complains under Article 6 para. 3(b) that he did not have

adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence and under Article 6

para. 3(c) about the lack of legal aid and the identity of his

defending officer. He further complains under Article 13 that he had

no effective domestic remedy as regards these alleged violations of

Article 6 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 13 April 1996 and registered

on 24 April 1996.

     On 27 November 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government.

     The Government's written observations were submitted on

11 April 1997 after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that

purpose.  The applicant replied on 5 June 1997.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention that he did not have a fair and public hearing by an

independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Article 6 para.

1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

     "1. In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him,

     everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

     reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

     established by law"

     The Government have no observations as regards the admissibility

of these complaints. As to the independence and impartiality of the

court-martial, the Commission recalls the judgments of the Court in the

Findlay and Coyne cases (Eur. Court HR, Findlay v. the United Kingdom

judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I

and Coyne v. the United Kingdom judgment of 24 September 1997, Reports

of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V). The Court in those cases found that

an army general court-martial and an air force district court-martial,

respectively did not constitute independent or impartial tribunals. As

to the fairness of the proceedings, the Commission also recalls its

finding in its Report in the Findlay case that a court-martial found

to lack independence and impartiality could not guarantee a fair trial

(Eur. Court HR, Findlay v. the United Kingdom judgment, loc. cit.,

Comm. Report, para. 108).

     The Commission notes that, in the present case, a district army

court-martial was convened pursuant to the Army Act 1955 to try the

applicant and that he pleaded guilty to a charge of absence without

leave contrary to section 38(a) of the Army Act 1955.

     In such circumstances, the Commission considers that these

complaints of the applicant raise complex and serious issues under

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which require

determination on the merits. It follows that these complaints of the

applicant cannot be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other

ground for declaring the complaints inadmissible has been established.

2.   The applicant also complains under Article 6 para. 3(c)

(Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention about the lack of legal aid for court-

martial proceedings, pointing out that his defending officer was not

legally qualified. He also complains under Article 6 para. 3(c)

(Art. 6-3-c) that his defending officer was not independent as he was

a member of the applicant's unit and an accused's unit is responsible

for the initial prosecution of a case. In addition, he invokes Article

6 para. 3(b) (Art. 6-3-b) complaining that he did not have adequate

time or facilities to prepare his defence. Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 6-3)

of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

     "3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

     minimum rights: ...

           b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation

           of his defence;

           c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance

           of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to

           pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the

           interests of justice so require; ..."

(a)  As regards the availability of legal aid, the Government note

that the applicant could have applied for legal aid under the military

legal aid scheme when he was remanded for trial by court-martial, that

he was fully informed of this possibility but that he did not make any

such application. He was supplied on 29 May 1995 with the booklet

published by the army on an accused's rights and the Government submit

that the applicant confirmed that he did not wish to so apply referring

to the form B116 dated 4 June 1995. Accordingly, the applicant cannot

now claim a breach of Article 6 para. 3(c) (Art. 6-3-c) on the basis

that he lacked legal representation (No. 8821/70, Comm. Report 8.12.83,

D.R. 64, p. 5).

     The applicant points out that it is not the practice to grant

legal aid to those accused of absence without leave. The form B116 was

not signed by the applicant but by his Commanding Officer who formed

part of the prosecution. The applicant was unable to take "an

independent line in arranging his defence" due to his psychiatric

condition, his lack of education and his low rank. He submits that his

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder only came to light following the court-

martial's request for a psychiatric report and that, if the applicant

had applied for legal aid at that stage, he would have been likely to

have been granted it. However, without this additional complicating

factor having been accepted at an earlier stage, no legal aid would

have been granted. The applicant submits a letter from the Ministry of

Defence addressed to his representative in another case which states

that "straightforward cases involving purely military offences seldom

justify the provision of legal aid".

     Moreover, the applicant points out that once a complicating

factor such as the apparent psychiatric impairment of the defendant

comes to light in a civilian court, the court will of its own motion

urge the defendant to seek legal representation if he is not

represented. No such suggestion was made to the applicant by the court-

martial or the army authorities or the defending officer (who was, in

any event, in an ambiguous position). Without such prompting, it is

hard for an accused to identify that he has any say in the making of

other arrangements.

     The Commission notes the potential sentence for the offence of

absence without leave which is two years imprisonment. It further

recalls that, although the applicant pleaded guilty, the determination

of sentence constitutes a part of the determination of the charge (Eur.

Court HR, Findlay v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 February 1997,

Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I). Accordingly, the Commission

considers that the proceedings involved the determination of a criminal

charge within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention (Eur. Court HR, Garyfallou AEBE v. Greece judgment of

24 September 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V, paras.

32-33, with further references).

     The Commission also recalls that an accused has a right to be

given free legal assistance if he has insufficient means to pay for

legal assistance and if the "interests of justice" so require (see, for

example, Eur. Court HR, Quaranta v. Switzerland judgment of

24 May 1991, Series A no. 205, p. 16, para. 27). However, where a

system of legal aid exists which an accused could have used and where

the accused did not use that system or show that he wished to, the

accused cannot complain in respect of this part of the proceedings of

a violation of Article 6 para. 3(c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention as

the individual himself is considered responsible for the consequences

of failing to exercise a right (No. 8821/70, Comm. Report 8.12.83, D.R.

64, p. 5).

     The Commission observes that, even assuming that the applicant

had insufficient means to engage a lawyer at the time, he could have

applied for legal aid from the military legal aid scheme immediately

after his remand for trial and he did not do so. Although he suggests

that it would have been most unlikely that he would have obtained legal

aid for this charge, legal aid is not excluded in such circumstances.

Neither was it excluded that the applicant could have based such an

application on his wish to raise his Post Traumatic Stress Disorder

before the court-martial, an issue he accepts increases the chances of

obtaining military legal aid.

     The Commission further considers that the applicant was

specifically informed of the possibility to apply for legal aid at

least by being given the information booklet on 29 May 1995 prior to

his remand for trial. In addition, the Commission does not consider

that the applicant has demonstrated, by his reference to his education,

rank and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, that he was unable to form a

view as to his wish for a legal representative or to make the relevant

application for, or inquiry regarding, legal aid to his Unit Adjutant.

In this latter respect, the Commission has had regard, in particular,

to the contents of the psychiatric report which was requested by the

court-martial. The consultant confirmed that the applicant suffered

from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder but, nevertheless, also confirmed

in the context of the applicant's fitness to plead that the applicant

was able to understand the charges against him, to object to any member

of the court-martial and to instruct defending counsel, a legal

representative or a defending officer.

     Moreover, although the applicant could not have obtained legal

aid prior to his remand for court-martial, he does not submit that

legal representation after remand would have been insufficient to

address any pre-remand issue or incident which he considered

prejudicial. In this latter respect, it is noted that the applicant

does not dispute that he was absent without leave or the psychiatrist's

view that he was fit to plead in that respect.

(b)  As to the applicant's complaint under Article 6 para. 3(c)

(Art. 6-3-c) that his defending officer not independent, the Commission

observes that Article 6 para. 3(c) (Art. 6-3-c) applies to the pre-

trial stage of proceedings (Eur. Court HR, Quaranta v. Switzerland

judgment of 24 May 1991, Series A no. 205). However, whether or not the

applicant's unit was responsible for the prosecution of the charge

against him, the Commission observes that the applicant was not

confined to the choice of defending officer made by the Convening

Officer. Pursuant to Rules 22 and 25 of the Rules of Procedure (Army)

1972 he could have requested any officer from any unit in any service

by name to represent him, subject to it being possible and to the

officer not having other essential military duties to perform. The

applicant did not make that request and, in this respect, the

Commission again refers to the fitness to plead section of the above-

described psychiatric report.

(c)  Finally, the applicant complains under Article 6 para. 3(b)

(Art. 6-3-b) that he had inadequate time and facilities to prepare his

defence. However, other than his submissions as regards his defending

officer and the availability of legal aid which the Commission has

considered above under Article 6 para. 3(c) (Art. 6-3-c), the applicant

has not further specified his complaint under Article 6 para. 3(b)

(Art. 6-3-b) of the Convention.

     In such circumstances, the Commission considers the applicant's

complaints under Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 6-3) of the Convention

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.   Finally, the applicant also invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention arguing that he did not have an effective domestic remedy

as regards his complaints under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

Article 13 (Art. 13), insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

     "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

     Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a

     national authority ... "

     As to the applicant's complaint under Article 13 in conjunction

with Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 13+6-3), the Commission recalls that

Article 13 (Art. 13) requires a remedy under domestic law if the

applicant can be said to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of the

Convention (Eur. Court HR, Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom

judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52). However,

in view of its conclusions above as to the applicant's complaints under

Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 6-3) of the Convention, the Commission does not

consider that the applicant can be said to have an "arguable claim" of

a violation of those rights.

     As to the applicant's complaint under Article 13 in conjunction

with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 13+6-1), the Commission recalls that the

requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13) are less strict than, and are

absorbed by, those of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention,

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) being the lex specialis (see, for example,

No. 24142/94, Dec. 6.4.95, D.R. 81, p. 108). In such circumstances, the

Commission considers it unnecessary to examine this complaint of the

applicant under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,

     the applicant's complaint that he did not receive a fair and

     public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal

     established by law; and

     DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

       M.F. BUQUICCHIO                            M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

          Secretary                                 President

     to the First Chamber                       of the First Chamber