SECOND SECTION

CASE OF L. v. LITHUANIA

( Application no. 27527/03 )

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

11 September 2007

FINAL

31/03/2008

In the case of L. v. Lithuania ,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section) , sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Jean-Paul Costa , President , András Baka , Rıza Türmen , Mindia Ugrekhelidze , Elisabet Fura -Sandstr ö m, Danutė Jočienė , Dragoljub Popović , judges , and Sally Dollé , Section Registr ar ,

Having deliberated in private on 17 October 2006 and 3 July 2007 ,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopt ed on the last- mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1 . The case originated in an application (no. 27527/03) against the Republic of Lit h uania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Mr L . (“the applicant”) , on 14 August 2003. The President of the Chamber acceded to the applicant ’ s request not to have his name disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).

2 . The applicant alleged violations of Articles 3, 8, 12 and 14 of the Convention in respect of the lack of legal regulation regarding transsexuals in Lithuania, and particularly the absence of any l awfu l possibility of undergo ing full gender reassignment surgery , which in turn had resulted in other hardships and inconveniences.

3 . By a decision of 6 July 2006 , the Court declared the application partly admissible.

4 . A hearing on the merits took place in public in the Human Rights Building , Strasbourg , on 17 October 2006 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government M s E. BaltutytÄ— , Agent , M s L. UrbaitÄ— , Assistant to the Agent ;

(b) for the applicant Mr H. Mickevičius , Counsel , M s A. Radvilaitė , Assistant to Coun sel .

The Court heard addresses by Mr Mickevičius an d M s Baltutytė, as well as replies by Mr Mickevičius, Ms Baltutytė and Ms Urbaitė to questions from its members .

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5 . The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in KlaipÄ—da .

6 . At birth the applicant was registered as a girl with a clearly female name under the rules of the Lithuanian language.

7 . The applicant submit ted that from an early age he had bec o me aware that his “ mental sex ” was male , thus acknowledging the conflict between his mental and genital gender.

8 . On 18 May 1997 the applicant consulted a microsurgeon about the possib ilities of gender reassignment . The doctor proposed that the applicant first consult a psych iatrist .

9 . From 4 to 12 November 1997 the applicant attended Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital for tests on his physical and psychological condition.

10 . On 16 December 1997 a doctor at the Vilnius University Hospital of Santariškės confirmed the applicant ’ s chromosomal sex as female, and dia gnosed him as a transsexual. Th e doctor also advised that the applicant consult a psych iatrist .

11 . On 23 January 1998 the Vilnius University Hospital of Raudonasis Kryžius opened a medical file on the applicant . The applicant gave his name in a masculine form under the rules of the Lithuanian language, and his medical file referred to him as being of male gender. An entry of 28 January 1998 in the medical file included a recommendation that the applicant pursue hormone treatment with a view to eventual gender reassignment surgery. Thereafter , a two-month course of hormone treatment was officially prescribed for the applicant. Moreover, i t was recommended that the applicant consult a neurosurgeon , wh o subsequently performed breast removal surgery on him (see paragraph 19 below).

12 . On 12 November 1998 the applicant, using his original name and surname, wrote a l etter to the Ministry of Health seeking clarification of the legal and medical possibilities for gender reassignment . He stated that he was determined to undergo this procedure.

13 . On 17 December 1998 an official of the Ministry of Health replied that a working group had been set up by the Minister of Health with a view to analysing the questions pertaining to gender reassignment , and that the applicant would be duly informed about the conclusions of that group.

14 . Before the Court, t he applicant claimed that he had received no further communication from the Ministry of Health.

15 . On 13 May 1999 a doctor at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital confirmed that the applicant, referred to by his original name, h ad attended the hospital from 4 to 12 November 1997, and that he had been diagnosed as a transsexual.

16 . The applicant submit ted that in 1999 his general medical practitioner had refused to prescribe hormone therapy in view of the legal uncertain t y as to whether full gender reassignment could be carried out , leading to the new identity of a transsexual being registered in accordance with domestic law. Thereafter the applicant continued the hormone treatment “unofficially” , as it was considered at that time that such treat ment should be followed for two years before the full surg ical procedure could be performed .

17 . On an unspecified date in 1999 the applicant requested that his name on all official documents be changed to reflect his male identity; that request was refused.

18 . On an unspecified date in 1999 the applicant enrolled at Vilnius University . Upon the applicant ’ s request, the university administration agreed to register him as a student under the male name chosen by him (bearing the initials P.L.). The applicant assert ed before the Court that the decision of the University was exceptional and purely humanit arian , as the laws applicable at the material time clearly required his registration under his original female name, as indicated o n his birth certificate and passport.

19 . From 3 to 9 May 2000 the applicant underwent “partial gender reassignment surgery” ( breast removal ) . The applicant agreed with the doctors that a further surgical step would be carried out upon the enactment of subsidiary laws governing the appropriate conditions and procedure.

20 . On an unspecified date in 2000, with the assistance of a Lithuanian m ember of p arliament, the applicant ’ s birth certificate and passport were changed to indicate his identity as P.L. The fore name and surname chosen by the applicant for this new identity were of Slavic origin, and thus did not disclose hi s gender. The applicant could not choose a Lithuanian name or surname as they are all gender-sensitive. However, the applicant ’ s “personal code” o n his new birth certificate and passport – a numerical code comprising the basic information about a person in accordance with the Lithuanian civil - registration rules – remain ed the same , start ing with the number 4, thus disclosing his gender as female (see paragraphs 28 ‑ 29 below).

21 . The applicant stressed that he therefore remain ed female under domestic law. This wa s confirmed , inter alia , by the fact that, on the Vilnius University degree certificate he had received after successfully graduating in 2003, his “personal code” remain ed the same and denote d him as a female. As a result, he claimed that he face d considerable daily embarrassment and difficulties, as he was unable , for example, to apply for a job, pay social security contributions, consult medical institutions, communicate with the authorities, obtain a bank loan or cross the State border without disclosing his female identity .

22 . The applicant submitted a copy of an article by the Baltic News Agency (BNS) of 17 June 2003 , quoting a statement by the Speaker of the Seimas on the Gender Reassignment Bill ( put before Parliament on 3 June 2003 – see paragraph 3 0 below). It was mentioned in the article that certain members of parliament had accused the Minister of Health , who was a plastic surgeon, of having a personal interest in the enactment of the law . The article also mentioned that certain members of the Social Democratic Party had urged the enactment of the law as it was required by the imminent entry into force of the provisions of the new Civil Code on 1 July 2003. The article referred to the opinion of experts that there were about fifty transsexuals liv ing in Lithuania . It was mentioned that certain Vilnius and Kaunas surgeons were properly equipped and qualified to carry out gender reassignment surgery, the cost of which c ould be between 3,000 and 4,000 Lithuanian litai ( approximately 870 to 1,150 euros ), excluding the cost of hormone therapy. The article stated that a number of persons had already applied for gender reassignment , but that the surgery could not be fully completed in the absence of adequate legal regulation. It was presumed that some of the Lithuanian transsexuals had thus been obliged to go abroad for treatment.

23 . In an article by the BNS on 18 June 2003 about a meeting between the Prime Minister and the heads of the Lithuanian Catholic Church, the Prime Minister was quoted as saying that it was too early for Lithuania to enact a law on gender reassignment , and that there was “no need to rush” or “copy the principles that exist in one country or another ” . The article stated that the Catholic Church had been among the most ardent opponents of such l egislation . At the same time, the Prime Minister conced ed that the g overnment were obliged to prepare a Gender Reassignment Bill in view of the entry into force of Article 2.27 § 1 of the new Civil Code on 1 July 2003.

24 . The applicant submitted that since 1998 he ha d been in a stable relat ionship with a woman and that they ha d live d together since 1999.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

25 . There were no provisions pertaining to the question of transsexuals in Lithuanian law until the adopt ion of the new Civil Code on 18 July 2000. The Civil Code came into force on 1 July 2001. The first paragraph of Article 2.27 (which only came into force on 1 July 2003) provides that an unmarried adult has the right to gender reassignment surgery ( pakeisti lyt į ) , if this is medically possible. A request by the person concerned must be made in writing. The second paragraph of this provision states that the conditions and procedure for gender reassignment surgery are established by law.

26 . On 27 December 2000 the g overnment adopted a decree specifying the measures needed for the implementation of the new Civil Code. The preparation of a Gender Reassignment Bill was mentioned in it.

27 . Rule 109.2 of the Civil Registration Rules, approved by an order of the Minister of Justice o n 29 June 2001 (in force from 12 July 2001), permits a change in civil - status documents if there is a need to change a person ’ s gender, fore name and surname, following gender reassignment .

28 . Under the Residents ’ Register Act and other relevant domestic laws, every Lithuanian resident has a numerical “personal code” ( asmens kodas ), which denotes certain basic items of information, inclu ding his or her gender. Section 8 ( 2 ) of the Residents ’ Register Act provides that the first num ber of the personal code denotes the person ’ s gender. A personal code starting with the number 3 denotes that the person is male, wh ereas a code starting with number 4 means that the person is female.

29 . Section 5 of the Passport Act 2003 provides that a citizen ’ s passport must be changed if the citizen changes his or her fore name, surname, gender or personal code.

30 . The Gender Reassignment Bill was prepared by a working group of the Ministry of Health in early 2003. On 3 June 2003 the g overnment approved the Bill, sending it for consideration to the Seimas (Parliament). In an explanatory note to Parliament dated 4 June 2003 , the Minister of Health indicated , inter alia , that, at present , no legal instrument regulate d the conditions and procedure for gender reassignment . The Bill was initially scheduled for a plenary session of Parliament on 12 June 2003, but it was not examined that day. It was res cheduled for 17 June 2003, but was then omitted from Parliament ’ s agenda. On the same date the Speaker of Parliament circulated an official memorandum on the Bill stating , inter alia :

“The Speaker of the Seimas ... strongly denounces gender reassignment surgery and the further consideration of a bill on the subject at a parliamentary hearing.

[At a time] when the demographic situation in Lithuania is becom ing threatened, the Seimas should not make matters worse by considering such a controversial law, which may be taken by society as an insult to the far more impor tant problems facing the health- care system.”

31 . The order of the M inister of H ealth , issued on 6 September 2001 , specifies the conditions under which patients in Lithuania ca n be referred for treatment abroad, in cases where the necessary treatment for a certain illness is not available in Lithuania . The decision is taken by a special commission of experts appointed by the Minister of Health , and the cost of such t reatment is covered by the C ompulsory Health Insurance Fund.

32 . On 8 August 2006 the Constitutional Court rul ed that the courts were empowered to fill the gaps left in the legislat i o n where this was necessa ry , inter alia , for the protection of the rights and freedoms of a particular individual .

THE LAW

I. THE GOVERNMENT ’ S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

33 . The Government alleged that the applicant ha d failed to exhaust domestic remedies as regards his complaints that he had been unable to complete the course of gender reassignment . They assert ed that the applicant had had the opportunity to bring a claim – by way of civil or administrative proce edings – seeking damage s for the alleged inactivity of the administr ative an d health- care authorities and/or doctors when dealing with his gender reassignment needs . The Government maintained that such an action would have enabled the courts to fill the legislative lacuna e . In this connection , t he Government referred to the Constitutional Court ruling of 8 August 2006, in which a certain law-making role of the courts had been acknowledged ( see par agraph 3 2 above ). Alternatively, the domestic courts could have sought the opinion of the Constitutional Court as to whether the existence of the legal gap s in issue was in conformity with the Constitution. While the Government c onc eded that there was no particular domestic case-law regarding transsexuals , they argued that this factor alone was not sufficient to raise doubts about the effectiveness of a civil action as a remedy or to presume the lack of any prospects of success.

34 . The applicant contested the Government ’ s submissions .

II . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

37 . The applicant complained that he had been unable to complete gender reassignment surgery owing to the lack of legal regulation on the subject . He relied on Article 3 of the Convention , which provides:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A. The parties ’ submissions

1 . The applicant

38 . The applicant alleged that his continuing inability to complete gender reassignment surgery had left him with a permanent feeling of personal inadequacy and an inability to accept his body, leading to great anguish and frustration. Furthermore, owing to the lack of recognition of his perceived , albeit pre operati ve, identity , the applicant con s t ant ly faced anxiety, fe ar, embarrassment and humiliation in his daily life . He ha d had to face severe hostility and taunts in the light of the general public ’ s strong opposition , rooted in traditional Catholicism , to gender disorders . Consequently, h e ha d had to pursue an almost underground lifestyle, avoiding situations in which he might have to disclose his original identity , particularly when having to provide h is personal code (see paragraph 28 above). This ha d left him in a permanent state of depression with suicidal tendencies .

39 . In the applicant ’ s view, the State ’ s inactivity was the main cause of his suffering. S ince the entry into force of the new Civil Code, the applicant ha d had reasonable hopes of complet ing t h e treatment and register ing his new identity. By that stage, he had already been duly diagnosed as a transsexual, had been following hormon e treatment since 1998, and had undergone breast - removal surgery. However, the Gender Reassignment Bill – put before the legislature in June 2003 – had been withdrawn from the parliamentary agenda without any objective reason or explanation being given . The Government ha d therefore failed to fulfil their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention to protect the applicant from the impossible situation in which he found himself (described in the preceding paragraph ).

40 . Referring to the Court ’ s case - law, the applicant considered that Parliament ’ s inaction was to be seen as a concession to the negative attitude of the population, revealing the bias of a hostile majority towards the transsexual minority , which in itself should be seen as falling within the scope of Article 3. The applicant contended that the State ’ s failure to adopt the necessary legislation on gender reassignment surgery , which would allow him to complete his treatment and have his new gender legally recognised , amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.

2 . The Government

41 . The Government argued that neither the Convention in general nor Article 3 in particular could be interpreted as laying down a general obligation to provide full gender reassignment surgery for transsexuals . N or could it be maintained that such irreversible surgery was indispensable for the treat ment of gender - identity disorders. In particular, general medical practice had show n that hormone therapy and partial gender reassignment surgery, such as breast removal, might in certain cases be sufficient to help a female-to-male transsexual pursue his life experience in the role of the desired gender. The applicant had not substantiated his claim that he needed the full procedure.

42 . The Government pointed out that transsexuality was a rare disorder, the scale of which was difficult to assess, particularly since freedom of movement within the European Union had encouraged many people to leav e the country. T here had certainly been no intention on the part of the State to humiliate or debase transsexuals. They maintained tha t transsexuality as a disease was by no means neglected. Indeed, t he applicant had been afforded due medical assistance in the form of medical consultations and hormon e treatment . The applicant was also entitled to seek confirmation of the medical necessity of full gender reassignment surgery, which might h ave enabled him to be referred for medical treatment abroad , financed by the State ( paragraph 3 1 above).

43 . Whilst recognising that transsexuals might encounter some difficulties in their daily lives, the Government asserted that th o se difficulties were not intentionally created n or inflicted by the State. On the contrary, steps had been taken to alleviate the problems, such as allowing the applicant to change his name. A change in the entries f or all official documents, including the personal code, could be effected on completion of a transsexual ’ s gender reassignment surgery.

44 . Furthermore, the State could not be held responsible for the alleged deterioration of the applicant ’ s health, as he had chose n – on his own initiative and disregarding the warnings of doctors – to continue his hormon e treatment unofficially, beyond that prescribed for two months in 1998.

45 . In sum , the Government maintained that the allege d ill-treatment did not attain the minimum level of severity in order to f all within the scope of Article 3. They considered that the issue of the regulation of gender reassignment surgery and the recognition of transsexuals ’ identity fell to be dealt with under Article 8 of the Convention alone . In any case , the Government asserted , the State ha d fulfilled its positive obligation s under both Article s 3 and 8 by providing adequate health care for the treatment of disease and avoidable death, including appropriate treatment f or transsexuals – psychiatric, surgical, hormonal , and so on .

B. The Court ’ s assessment

46 . The Court observes that the prohibition under Article 3 of the Convention is of an absolute nature, but that the kind of treatment qualified as inhuman and degrading will depend upon an examination of the facts of the specific case in order to establish whether the suffering caused was so severe as to fall within the ambit of this provision. Moreover, according to its established case-law, Article 3 entails a positive obligation on the part of the State to protect the individual from acute ill- treatment, whether physical or mental, whatever its source . Thus if the source is a naturally occurring illness , the treatment for which could involve the responsibility of the State but is not forthcoming or is patently inadequate, an issue may arise under this provision ( see, for example, D. v. the United Kingdom , 2 May 1997 , §§ 51-54 , Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III, and, mutatis mutandis , Pretty v. the United Kingdom , no. 2346/02, § § 4 9-52, ECHR 2002 ‑ III ).

48 . Consequently , the Court finds no violation of Article 3 of the Convention .

I I I . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

49 . The applicant alleged that the State ha d failed to fulfil its positive obligation s under Article 8 , which provides , in so far as relevant :

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

A. The parties ’ submissions

1. The applicant

50 . Referring to his arguments under Article 3 ( see paragraphs 38 ‑ 40 above ), t he applicant repeated that the State had failed to provide him with a l awful opportunity to complete his gender reassignment and obtain full recognition of his post-operative gender . He reiterated that the right to gender reassignment surgery had been envisaged b y the new Civil Code since 2003 , but no subsidiary legislation ha d been passed to implement that right . The applicant further emphasised that , although he had been able to change his name to a gender-neutral f o rm , the law did not provide for a change in the personal code of pre operative transsexuals (see paragraph 28 above) . As a result he ha d forgone numer ous opportunities in many areas , such as , employment, health care, social security, freedom of movement , business transactions , socialising and personal development in order to avoid hostility and taunts . He ha d thus been condemned to legal and social ostracis m because he look ed male but his personal documents identif ied him as a woman.

51 . The applicant argued that there w as no public interest whatsoever militating against the interest s of medically recognised transsexuals in complet ing their gender change and hav ing it legally entrenched . F urthermore, the absence of necessary legislation was disproportionate to the protection of a ny purported countervailing interest of the community as a whole . Accordingly, the State had failed in its pos itive obligations under Article 8 to complete the measures it had already envisaged to protect the applicant ’ s human dignity and prevent intrusion into his private life .

2. The Government

52 . Further to their pleadings under Article 3 ( see paragraphs 4 1 ‑ 4 5 above ) , t he Government maintained that a wide margin of appreciation should be afforded to States in regulating gender reassignment and deciding whether to recognise a person ’ s new identity where the required surgery was incom plete. In that connection they cited , inter alia , the cultural specific ities and religious sensitivities of Lithuanian society regard ing the gender reassignment debate .

53 . In so far as the regulation of gender reassignment surgery was concerned, the Government reiterated their claim that the medical treatment afforded to transsexuals in Lithuania was capable of guaranteeing respect for private life. Moreover, Lithuanian law entitled transsexuals to have the entries in official documents changed , including their personal code, after full gender reassignment .

54 . As regards the pre operative recognition of a diagnosed gender, the Government argued that there was an over riding public interest in ensur ing legal certain t y as to a person ’ s gender and the various relations hips between people . In this connection, t hey pointed out that the applicant had indeed been able to make a gender-neutral change in his name.

55 . T he Government again stressed that the applicant had failed to provide evidence as to the necessity and feasibility of full gender reassignment surgery in his case. They had recently suggested to the applicant that he undergo a comprehensive psychiatric and physical examination of his current state of health with a view to assessing his present possibilities and need s , but the applicant ha d declined that offer . The Government expressed a certain concern about the level of expertise available in Lithuania for such rare and specialised surgery at pres ent , whereas surgery performed by practising experts abroad might be an appropriate temporary solution to the problem s faced by transsexuals , for which the State could provide financial assistance (paragraph 3 1 above).

B. The Court ’ s assessment

60 . In the light of the above considerations, t he Court concludes that t h ere has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

I V . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE CONVENTION

61 . The applicant complained that his inability to complete his gender reassignment ha d prevent ed him from marrying and founding a family, in violation of Article 12 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.”

A. The parties ’ submissions

62 . The applicant submitted that he had been living as a man for some ten years now and had been diagnosed with a gender- identity disorder nine years ago. He ha d been in a stable relationship with a woman since 1998 and they ha d been living together since 1999 (paragraph 2 4 above) . They wish ed to legalise their long-lasting relationship, marr y and establish a family through adoption.

63 . The Government argued that the applicant could not be considered a victim or even a potential victim of the alleged violation, in that the relevant rules of civil law d id not prevent a transsexual from marrying in his new identity following gender reassignment surgery . The key issue was still that of gender recognition and, as such, it was more appropriately dealt with under Article 8 of the Convention.

B. The Court ’ s assessment

64 . The Court observes that the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 12 is premature in that, should he complete ful l gender reassignment surgery, his status as a man would be recognised together with the right to marry a woman. In thes e circumstances, the Court agrees with the Government that the key issue is still that of the gap in legislati on, which has been analysed under Article 8 above. Consequently, it finds it unnecessary to examine this aspect of the case separately under Article 12 of the Convention.

V . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 3 AND 8

65 . The applicant argued that the lack of legal regulation in Lithuania regarding the treatment an d status of transsexuals disclosed a discriminatory attitude on the part of the Lithuanian authorities, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention , which provides as follows :

“The enjoyment of the ri ghts and freedoms set forth in [ the ] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

A. The parties ’ submissions

66 . The applicant allege d that the failure of the State to pass the necessary legislation on gender reassignment was essentially due to the prejudices and hostile attitudes of the majority of the Lithuanian population towards transsexuals as a minority group, and served no legitimate aim . No objective and reasonable justification had been put forward by the Government for the indefinite postponement of the enactment of the subsidiary legislation required by the Civil Code . As a result, the applicant had been denied vital opportunities as a transsexual, p articular ly as regards the treatment of his gender - identity disorder and the effective legal recognition of his status .

67 . The Government contested th o se allegations . They claimed that no separate issue arose under this provision that had not already been dealt with under Article s 3 and 8.

B. The Court ’ s assessment

68 . T h e Court again finds that, in the circumstances of the present case, the applicant ’ s complaint of discrimination is essentially the same, albeit seen from a different angle, as that which i t has considered above under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention ( see Van Kück , cited above, § 91). Consequently, it finds it unnecessary to examine this aspect of the case separately under Article 14 of t he Convention.

VI . APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

69 . Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

70 . The applicant claimed 33,589.46 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 9, 728 euros (EUR) ) for pecuniary damage , which represented:

( a) his loss of earnings , given his limited employment prospects in order to avoid drawing attention to his status (LTL 26,391);

( b) compensation for private and unofficial medical treatment , which was more costly than State health care, but did not require him to reveal his identity (LTL 4,318 .46 ) ; and

( c) compensation for his prolonged hormon e treatment , while awaiting the legal possibility of complet ing the gender reassignment procedure (LTL 2 , 880).

71 . The applicant further claimed EUR 47,680 to cover the cost of the eventual completion of gender reassignment surgery. In this connection , the applicant argued that , even if the legal gaps in Lithuanian law were eventually filled , there would still be no prospect o f complet ing the g ender reassignment surgery in Lithuania within a reasonable time. He therefore contended that th is sum was needed to carry out the surgery abroad.

72 . Finally, t he applicant claimed EUR 200,000 for the non-pecuniary damage resulting from the stress, anxiety, fear and humiliation which he ha d suffered, as well as his inability to enjoy his rights .

73 . The Government considered the se claims to be unsubstantiated and speculative . They noted that, before the Civil Code had come into force on 1 July 2003, the applicant had had no right to treatment for his disorder under domestic law. Moreover, in relation to further surgery, the applicant had not submitted any evidence of his cu rrent needs and state of health .

75 . As regards the applicant ’ s claim for non-pecuniary damage , the Court, deciding on an equitable ba sis as required by Article 41 o f the Convention, awards the applicant EUR 5 ,000.

B. Costs and expenses

76 . The applicant claimed EUR 9,403 for legal costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court. The c ost s of travel to the Court hearing, together with accommodation and other related expenses , were claimed in the amount of EUR 603.

77 . The Government submitted that the claim f or legal costs and expenses appeared excessive and unjustified , particularly as t he applicant had received legal aid from the Council of Europe.

78 . The Court notes that the applicant had the benefit of legal aid from the Council of Europe for his representation in the total amount of EUR 2 , 071.81 in the present case . It con cludes that this amount is sufficient in the circumstances .

C. Default interest

79 . The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1. Dismisse s by six votes to one the Government ’ s preliminary objection;

2. Holds by six votes to one that the re has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention ;

3 . Holds by six votes to one that the re has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention ;

4 . Holds by six votes to one that the re is no need to examine separately the applicant ’ s complaints under Articles 12 and 14 of the Convention ;

5. H o ld s by five votes to two that the respondent State , in order to satisfy the applicant ’ s claim for pecuniary damage, is to pass the required subsidiary legislation to Article 2.27 of its Civil Code on gender reassignment of transsexuals within three months of the present judgment becoming final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention ;

6 . H o ld s by six votes to one that , alternatively, should those legislative measures prove impossible to adopt within three months of the present judgment becoming final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention , the respondent State is to pay the applicant EUR 40,000 ( forty thousand euros) in respect of pecuniary damage ;

7 . H o ld s by six votes to one that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within the a bove- mentioned three - month period , EUR 5,000 ( five thousand e uros) in r espect of non-pecuniary damage;

8. H o ld s by six votes to one

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within the a bove- mentioned three - month period , any tax which may be chargeable on the above amounts , and that the sums due are to be converted into Lithuanian litai at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

( b ) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

9 . Dismisse s unanimously the remainder of the applicant ’ s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 September 2007 , pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

S ally Dollé J ean -P aul Costa Registrar President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of the Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment :

(a) partly dissenting opnion of Judge Fura-Sandström ;

(b) dissenting opinion of Judge Popović .

J.-P. C . S.D.

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE FURA-SANDSTR Ö M

I voted against holding that the respondent State, in order to satisfy the applicant ’ s claim for pecuniary damage, should pass the required subsidiary legislation, pursuant to Article 2.27 of its Civil Code on the gender reassignment of transsexuals, within three months of the judgment becoming final (see paragraph 74 and point 5 of the operative provisions ). In all other aspects I agree with the majority.

My principal concern is that, by adopting such a solution, the Court risks acting ultra vires . The Convention clearly sets out a division of competences. Under Article 41 of the Convention, it falls to the Court, when a violation of the Convention or its Protocols has been found, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, to afford just satisfaction to the injured party, if necessary. Article 46 § 2 of the Convention states that “ [ t ] he final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution”.

Looking at the case at hand, I would make the following observations. The applicant claimed the amount of 57,408 euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage in respect of medical fees, loss of earnings, ho rmone treatment and the cost o f the eventual completion of gender reassignment surgery abroad (see paragraphs 70-71 of the judgment). The applicant further alleged that, even if the legal gaps in Lithuanian law were eventually filled, there would still be no pr ospect of completing the gender reassignment surgery in Lithuania within a reasonable time (see paragraph 71 of the judgment). So I wonder whether the imposition of an obligation upon the respondent Government to pass the required legislation would be “affording just satisfaction to the injured party”, strictly speaking. The applicant does not seem to believe this to be the case.

I am aware of the possibility for the Court to prescribe general measures in order to prevent the recurrence of similar violations in the future (see, for example, Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, ECHR 2004 ‑ V , and Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], no. 35014/97, ECHR 2006 -VIII, where the violations originated in a systemic problem connected with the malfunctioning of domestic legislation, and there were many other similar cases pending before the Court as well as a great number of potential applicants). However, the present application can be distinguished from such cases, as here the Court prescribes a general measure to redress an individual complaint. Only as an alternative, should those legislative measures prove impossible to adopt within the said time-limit, is the respondent State ordered to pay EUR 40,000 in respect of pecuniary damage (see paragraph 74 and point 6 of the operative provisions ). For me, this does not afford just satisfaction to the applicant, as required by Article 41.

For these reasons I would have preferred the Court simply to order a payment in respect of pecuniary damage, and only as a secondary measure to indicate the need to pass new legislation.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE POPOVIĆ

I respectfully disagree with the opinion of the majority of the judges, for the following reasons.

Although I voted along with my colleagues in favour of the admissibility of the application in this case , I have subsequently reconsidered my opinion in the light of the parties ’ submissions at the oral hearing.

On the one hand, the applicant submitted that he had never availed himself of any domestic remed ies because of their alleged ineff ectiveness . On the other hand, the Government submitted that there ha d been a recent , convincing ruling of the Const itutional Court of Lithuania on national judicial remedies.

Faced with such facts , my approach is twofold: either one returns to the question of admissibility, or one raises of one ’ s own motion the issue under Article 13 of the Convention read in conjunction with either Article 8 or Article 3, thus thoroughly reconsidering the matter and determining whether there is an effective remedy under domestic law.

My preference would be to return to the admissibility issue with reference to paragraph 1 of “T he L aw ” part of the admissibility decision in this case, taken on 6 July 2006, which refers to the decision in Vala š inas v. Lithuania ( (dec.), no. 44558/98 , 14 March 2000 ) as the only authority. However, this precedent is clearly distinguishable from the present case. The decision on admissibility in Vala š inas in favour of an applicant who had not exhausted domestic remedies was taken after the Court had made an on- the-spot investigation into the applicant ’ s conditions of detention. In the present case the Court has merely agreed with the applicant ’ s allegation that no effecti ve domestic remedy existed. The present applicant ’ s only argu ment was founded on a legal gap in the national legal system, stemming either from a failure of the g overnment to pass subsidiary legislation or to introduce a bill to that end . However, there was, and still is, under Lithuanian law primary legislation (Article 2.27 § 1 of the Civil Code 2001) which unequivocally meets the applicant ’ s aspirations.

The applicant appears to have sought redress from the Ministry of Health, which failed to respond. In such circumstances, the applicant should have tried t o bring an action against the a dministration for failure to act, but despite being represented by a lawyer, he failed to do so .

Alleging the ineff ectiveness of domestic remedies, without any attempt to turn to the domestic judiciary, the applicant apparently relies on the idea that the courts would somehow be unwilling to find in his favour despite the existence of a clear legal provision in the Civil Code.

One can only speculate that this submission is borne of the view that the judiciary is still a relic of the former authoritarian communist regime. Such c ourts would refuse to take a constructive approach to a legal provisi on, because of the mentality of the judges, who work ed in fear of the political authorities for decades. They would therefore tend to stick to a strictly literal interpretation of the text of the written law. The applicant therefore apparently fear ed that, in the absence of specific subsidiary legislation, the national courts of law might refuse to apply primary legislation.

However, although social develop ments and adjustment take time, there is nothing to support the view that, nowadays, an applicant should be allowed by this Court to neglect the judiciary of a High Contracting Part y to the Convention by claiming its prima facie ineff ectiveness . Such an approach is wholly unjustified. On the contrary, national judges should be en couraged to take a bolder stand in interpreting domestic l egal provisions, and applicants should not be allowed to circumvent their national courts. Applicants must apply to the domestic courts before lodg ing an application with this Court.

Moreover, the Government submitted that there had been some evolutio n in the domestic case-law. It was to be found in the ruling of the Co nstitutional Court of Lithuania as regards the general issue of remedies before domestic courts of law. The Constitutional Court stated , inter alia : “ ... the courts ... which administer justice ... have to construe law so that they are able to apply it.” Further on, the Constitutional Court found that if the courts of law were not to interpret the law “it would mean that law is treated only in its textual form and is identified with the latter” (Constitutional Court of Lithuania, case 34 /03, d ecision of 8 August 2006, § 6.2.3.3) .

The majority of judges seem to be c onvinced, in the absence of any evidence whatsoever, that the courts in Lithuania would be willing to apply future legislation, if enacted after the introduction of the g overnment ’ s bill, although they might fail to apply the exis ting law. Such a belief appears groundless, especially if one takes account of the fact that the applic ant has never tried to apply to the domestic courts .

The position of the parties is as follows: t he applicant failed to exhaus t domestic remedies, preferring merely to allege their ineffectiveness , although he was unable to substantiate that all egation, whereas the Government relied on the evol ution of the domestic case-law concerning remedies.

I agree with the Government ’ s preliminary objection of non-e xhaustion of domestic remedies, and consider the application premature and , therefore, inadmis sible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.