GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF DENISOV v. UKRAINE

(Application no. 76639/11)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

25 September 2018

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Denisov v. Ukraine ,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Guido Raimondi, President, Angelika Nußberger, Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Ganna Yudkivska, Helena Jäderblom, Robert Spano, Vincent A. De Gaetano, Erik Møse, André Potocki, Yonko Grozev, Carlo Ranzoni, Mārtiņš Mits, Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Alena Poláčková, Georgios A. Serghides, Marko Bošnjak, Péter Paczolay, judges, and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Registrar ,

Having deliberated in private on 18 October 2017 and 13 June 2018 ,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

2 . The applicant was represented by Ms J . Gavron and Mr A. Halban , lawyers practising in London. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna .

3 . The applicant alleged, in particular, that his dismissal from the position of president of a court of appeal had not been carried out in conformity with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and constituted an unlawful and disproportionate interference with his pr ivate life, contrary to Article 8 of the Convention .

4 . On 15 January 2014 the Government were given notice of the application .

5 . On 25 April 2017 , after having consulted the parties, a Chamber of the Fifth Section of the Court, composed of Angelika Nußberger, President, Erik Møse, Ganna Yudkivska, And ré Potocki, Yonko Grozev, Carlo Ranzoni, Mārtiņš Mits, judges, and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar , decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber in the above case, neither of the parties having objected to such relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72 of the Rules of Court).

6 . The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24.

7 . The applicant and the Government each filed written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. In addition, third-party comments were received from the International Commission of Jurists, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3).

8 . A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 18 October 2017.

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government Mr I. Lishchyna , Agent , M s O. Davydchuk , Office of the Government Agent , Ministry of Justice , M s N. Rybachok , Office of the Government Agent , Ministry of Justice, Advisers ;

(b) for the applicant Ms J. Gavron , Mr A. Halban , Counsel .

The Court heard addresses by Mr Lishchyna, Ms Gavron and Mr Halban and their replies to the questions from its members .

9 . At the Court ’ s request, the applicant, in a letter of 24 November 2017, amended his claim s for costs and expenses to take into account the proceedings before the Grand Chamber. The Government submitted their comments on his revised claims on 11 December 2017 .

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

10 . The applicant was born on 6 July 1948 and lives in Kyiv .

11 . The applicant ’ s judicial career started in 1976, when he was first elected to the post of judge of a district court. During his judicial career the applicant held the position of president in several courts.

12 . On 22 December 2005 the applicant was elected to the post of judge of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal by the Ukrainian Parliament.

13 . On 10 November 2006 the applicant was appointed, by the President of Ukraine, as acting president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal. On 6 February 2009 he was appointed president of that court by the Council of Judges of Ukraine (a body of judicial self-governance). He was appointed for a five-year term, it being understood that he would reach the retirement age in July 2013 , before the end of that term .

A. Preliminary inquiry into the applicant ’ s performance as president of the court

14 . In February 2011 the Council of Administrative Court Judges (another body of judicial self-governance) decided, among other issues, to review the functioning of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal. The review was carried out in February and March 2011 and concerned the years 2009 and 2010, as well as the period between January and February 2011.

15 . On 24 May 2011 the Council of Administrative Court Judges, chaired by Judge K., made a submission to the High Council of Justice (“the HCJ”) proposing the applicant ’ s dismissal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal for failure to perform his administrative duties properly. The proposal was based on the results of the aforementioned review.

B. Proceedings before the HCJ

16 . The HCJ scheduled hearings on 30 and 31 May 2011 and the applicant was invited to attend them. However, in view of information received from the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal on 27 May 2011 that the applicant was on annual leave until 8 July 2011, the HCJ adjourned the examination of the case. It sent the applicant a summons for the next hearing, which was scheduled on 14 June 2011. In reply, the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal informed the HCJ once again that the applicant was on holiday until 8 July 2011.

17 . On 14 June 2011 the HCJ examined the case in the applicant ’ s absence and decided to dismiss him from the post of president of the court, relying on section 20 of the Judiciary and Status of Judges Act and section 32-1 of the High Council of Justice Act. The HCJ noted that “significant shortcomings, omissions and errors, and grave violations of the foundations of the organisation and administration of justice set forth by law [had] been found in the organisation of the work of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal”. It stated that “the improper organisation of the court ’ s work was the result of the failure by the president of the court, Mr A. Denisov, to comply with the provisions of the applicable laws concerning the fulfilment of his administrative duties”. It also found that “administrative documents issued by Mr A. Denisov regarding the distribution of duties between the vice-presidents of the court, the setting-up of court chambers and panels and the distribution of cases among judges, as well as personnel-related and other documents in certain cases, [violated] the provisions of [the domestic legislation]”. It lastly stated that the applicant ’ s failures as president of the court involved a “lack of proper planning, control and effective use of human resources”.

18 . The decision was voted on by the HCJ, whose members present on that occasion included Judge K., the Prosecutor General and other judicial and non-judicial members. Out of the eighteen members present, eight were judges. F ourteen vote s were cast in favour of the applicant ’ s dismissal.

19 . According to the applicant, the composition of the HCJ in his case included two members who on earlier occasions had initiated proceedings for his dismissal from the post of judge for an alleged “breach of oath”. Furthermore, the applicant alleged that the President of the HCJ and another member of the HCJ had previously communicated with him, attempting – albeit without success – to influence him in the course of his professional activities.

20 . On 17 June 2011 the President of the HCJ asked the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal to ensure that the HCJ ’ s decision on the applicant ’ s dismissal was executed and that information about its execution was provided to the HCJ immediately. On 23 June 2011 the applicant was dismissed from his administrative position, remaining in office as a judge of the same court.

C. Proceedings before the Higher Administrative Court

21 . The applicant challenged the decision of the HCJ before the Higher Administrative Court (“the HAC”), arguing that the decision on his dismissal was unlawful and unfounded. In his claim the applicant submitted that the HCJ had failed to comply with the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal. He emphasised that those requirements were part of the procedural safeguards provided for by Article 6 of the Convention, which was applicable to his case in its civil limb because the impugned decision had substantially affected his right to work and his professional dignity. The applicant further argued that his right to participate in the hearings had not been secured. He alleged that the decision of the HCJ was worded in general terms and that it did not refer to any specific facts or indicate a specific time when those facts had taken place. The applicant then asked the HAC to take into account the fact that his judicial career had exceeded thirty-five years, that he had held positions of president at several courts for twenty-five years, that he had been given awards for his judicial service and that during the initial period of his presidency of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal that court had moved from a demolished military barracks to premises in the city centre with proper equipment and a sufficient number of hearing rooms.

22 . The applicant also claimed compensation for the pecuniary damage caused by the ensuing reduction in his remuneration, which, at the date of the claim, had amounted to 4,034.33 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) [1] in relation to the period which had elapsed in July and August 2011.

23 . On 25 August 2011 the HAC held a hearing in the presence of the applicant and decided to dismiss his claim in respect of pecuniary damage without considering it. The HAC adopted a decision to that effect, stating that it had no jurisdiction to determine that issue.

24 . On 11 October 2011 the HAC rejected the applicant ’ s claim concerning his dismissal from the administrative position as unsubstantiated. In its decision the HAC specified, in particular, that it had competence to review whether the impugned decision had been taken lawfully, reasonably, proportionately and, among other requirements, impartially. T he HAC stated that the applicant had not contested the facts forming the grounds for his dismissal and therefore those facts had been taken as established. The HAC then reiterated the failings attributed to the applicant and concluded that the HCJ ’ s decision had been lawful and that the applicant ’ s right to participate in the proceedings in person had not been violated because the HCJ had taken all the necessary measures to inform him about the hearings and the applicant had not had any valid reason for being absent from the hearings. The HAC found that the HCJ had acted in accordance with the Constitution, the Judiciary and Status of Judges Act and the High Council of Justice Act. It had also complied with the Rules of the HCJ, which provided that one of the grounds for the dismissal of a judge from an administrative position was a “breach of official duties”. In conclusion, the HAC stated that the HCJ had not violate d the Constitution or the laws of Ukraine.

25 . Following his dismissal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal, the applicant continued to work as a regular judge in the same court until 20 June 2013, when Parliament dismissed him from the post of judge after he had tendered a statement of resignation.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

A. Constitution of 28 June 1996 as worded at the relevant time

26 . The relevant provisions of the Constitution read as follows at the relevant time:

Article 6

“The State power in Ukraine is exercised on the basis of its separation into legislative, executive and judicial branches. ... ”

Article 126

“... A judge shall be dismissed from office by the body which elected or appointed him or her in the event of:

...

(2) the judge ’ s attainment of the age of sixty-five ...;”

Article 131

“The High Council of Justice shall operate in Ukraine. Its tasks shall comprise:

(1) making submissions on the appointment or dismissal of judges;

(2) adopting decisions with regard to the violation by judges and prosecutors of the requirements concerning judicial incompatibility;

(3) conducting disciplinary proceedings in respect of judges of the Supreme Court and judges of higher specialised courts, and considering complaints against decisions imposing disciplinary liability on judges of courts of appeal and local courts and on prosecutors.

The High Council of Justice shall consist of twenty members. The Parliament of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the Assembly of Judges of Ukraine, the Assembly of Advocates of Ukraine, and the Assembly of Representatives of Higher Legal Educational Establishments and Scientific Institutions, shall each appoint three members to the High Council of Justice, and the All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors shall appoint two members to the High Council of Justice.

The President of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General shall be ex officio members of the High Council of Justice.”

B. Code of Administrative Justice of 6 July 2005 as worded at the relevant time

Article 161 – Questions to be determined by a court when deciding on a case

“1. When deciding on a case, a court shall determine:

(1) whether the circumstances referred to in the claim and objections took place and what evidence substantiates these circumstances;

(2) whether there is any other factual information relevant to the case and evidence in support of that information;

(3) which provision of law is to be applied to the legal relations in dispute;

...”

Article 171-1 – Proceedings in cases concerning acts, actions or omissions of the Parliament of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges

“1. The rules set down in this Article shall apply to proceedings in administrative cases concerning:

...

(2) acts of the High Council of Justice; ...

2. Acts, actions or omissions of the Parliament of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges may be challenged before the Higher Administrative Court. For this purpose a separate chamber shall be set up in the Higher Administrative Court.

...

5. Following the consideration of the case, the Higher Administrative Court may:

(1) declare the act of the Parliament of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the High Council of Justice or the High Qualification Commission of Judges unlawful in full or in part;

(2) declare the actions or omissions of the Parliament of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the High Council of Justice or the High Qualification Commission of Judges unlawful and oblige [it or them] to take certain actions. ...”

C. The Judiciary and Status of Judges Act of 7 July 2010 (in force at the relevant time)

28 . The relevant provisions of this Act read as follows at the relevant time:

Section 20 – Procedure for appointing judges to administrative positions

“1. The administrative positions in a court are the positions of president and deputy president(s) of the court.

2. The president of ... the court of appeal ... [appointed for a five-year term from among the judges of the same court] may be dismissed from that position by the High Council of Justice on an application by the relevant council of judges.

...

6. The dismissal of a judge from an administrative position shall not entail removal from his or her judicial post. ...”

Section 29 – President of the court of appeal

“1. The president of the court of appeal shall:

(1) represent the court as a body of State power in relations with other State bodies, local self-government bodies, natural persons and legal entities;

(2) determine the administrative powers of the deputy presidents of the court of appeal;

(3) monitor the efficiency of the non-judicial staff at the court, and make proposals to the Head of the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine regarding the appointment of the head and deputy head of the non-judicial staff at the court, their dismissal from office and any incentives or disciplinary measures to be applied in respect of them in accordance with the law;

(4) issue relevant orders on the basis of decisions on the election or dismissal of a judge;

(5) notify, within ten days, the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine about available vacancies at the court of appeal;

(6) ensure the implementation of decisions taken at meetings of judges of the court of appeal;

(7) oversee the collection and analysis of judicial statistics, organise the examination and summarising of judicial practice, and provide information and analytical support to judges in order to improve the quality of justice;

(8) ensure the ongoing training requirements for judges of the court of appeal;

(9) exercise other powers envisaged by law.”

Section 113 – Objectives of judicial self-governance

“1. Judicial self-governance shall be established in Ukraine as a means of independent collective resolution by judges of issues relating to the internal activity of the courts. ...”

Section 114 – Organisational forms of judicial self-governance

“1. The organisational forms of judicial self-governance shall be the meetings of judges, the councils of judges, the conferences of judges, and the Assembly of Judges of Ukraine. ...”

Section 115 – Meetings of judges

“... 2. Meetings of judges [of a court] shall be convened by the president of the court on his own initiative or at the request of at least one-third of the judicial staff of the court. ...”

Section 122 – Councils of judges

“1. In the period between conferences of judges the functions of judicial self-governance shall be performed by the relevant council of judges. ...

3. The council of judges shall be composed of eleven judges ...

6. The council of judges shall:

(1) oversee the organisation of the functioning of the relevant courts, examine reports on those issues by presidents of courts ...;

...

(3) make submissions to the High Council of Justice on the appointment of judges to administrative positions at the courts and their dismissal from such positions; ...”

D. The High Council of Justice Act of 15 January 1998 (in force at the relevant time)

29 . The relevant provisions of this law read as follows at the material time:

Section 3 – Powers of the High Council of Justice

“ The High Council of Justice shall:

...

(1-1) following the submission of a proposal by the relevant council of judges, ... dismiss judges from the positions of president and deputy president of courts ... ;

...”

Section 32-1 – Dismissal of judges from the positions of president and deputy president of a court

“... The question of dismissing the president or deputy president of a court shall be examined at a hearing of the High Council of Justice, following the submission of a proposal by the relevant specialised council of judges. The president or deputy president of the court concerned shall be invited to attend the hearing. If the president or deputy president of the court cannot participate in the hearing for a valid reason, he or she shall be entitled to make written submissions, which shall be included in the case file. The written submissions by the judge shall be read out at the hearing before the High Council of Justice. A second failure on the part of the president or deputy president of the court to attend a hearing shall be grounds for considering the case in his or her absence.

A decision of the High Council of Justice to dismiss the president or deputy president of a court shall be taken by a majority of the constitutional composition of the High Council of Justice.”

30 . Other relevant provisions of this Act can be found in the judgment in the case of Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine ( no. 21722/11, §§ 65-71, ECHR 2013 ).

E. Rules of the HCJ of 4 October 2010 (in force at the relevant time)

31 . Paragraph 3.2 (1) of the Rules provided that a judge could be dismissed from the position of president or deputy president of a court by the HCJ following the submission of a proposal by the relevant council of judges.

32 . Paragraph 3.2 (2) of the Rules provided the following grounds for the dismissal of a judge from an administrative position: (i) dismissal from the judiciary; (ii) submission of a statement of resignation from the administrative position; (iii) expiry of the period of appointment to the administrative position; (iv) transfer of the judge to another court; (v) breach of official duties.

III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL S

33 . The relevant extract s from the European Charter on the statute for judges (Department of Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe, 8-10 July 1998 , DAJ/DOC (98)23) read:

“ 1. General Principles

...

1.3. In respect of every decision affecting the selection, recruitment, appointment, career progress or termination of office of a judge, the statute envisages the intervention of an authority independent of the executive and legislative powers within which at least one half of those who sit are judges elected by their peers following methods guaranteeing the widest representation of the judiciary.

...

5. Liability

5.1. The dereliction by a judge of one of the duties expressly defined by the statute, may only give rise to a sanction upon the decision, following the proposal, the recommendation, or with the agreement of a tribunal or authority composed at least as to one half of elected judges, within the framework of proceedings of a character involving the full hearing of the parties, in which the judge proceeded against must be entitled to representation. The scale of sanctions which may be imposed is set out in the statute, and their imposition is subject to the principle of proportionality. The decision of an executive authority, of a tribunal, or of an authority pronouncing a sanction, as envisaged herein, is open to an appeal to a higher judicial authority.”

34 . In the conclusions to its “R eport on the Independence of the Judicial System , Part I: The Independence of Judges ” , adopted at its 82nd plenary session on 12 and 13 March 2010 (CDL-AD(2010)004), the Venice Commission found as follows:

“ 82 . The following standards should be respected by states in order to ensure internal and external judicial independence:

...

4. It is an appropriate method for guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary that an independent judicial council have decisive influence on decisions on the appointment and career of judges. While respecting the variety of legal systems existing, the Venice Commission recommends that states not yet having done so consider the establishment of an independent judicial council. In all cases the council should have a pluralistic composition, with a substantial part if not the majority of the members being judges. With the exception of ex-officio members these judges should be elected or appointed by their peers.

...

6. Judicial councils, or disciplinary courts, should have a decisive influence in disciplinary proceedings. The possibility of an appeal to a court against decisions of disciplinary bodies should be provided for. ... ”

35 . The relevant parts of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010 at the 1098th meeting of the Ministers ’ Deputies) read as follows:

“ Chapter IV – Councils for the judiciary

26. Councils for the judiciary are independent bodies, established by law or under the constitution, that seek to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and of individual judges and thereby to promote the efficient functioning of the judicial system.

27. Not less than half the members of such councils should be judges chosen by their peers from all levels of the judiciary and with respect for pluralism inside the judiciary.

28. Councils for the judiciary should demonstrate the highest degree of transparency towards judges and society by developing pre-established procedures and reasoned decisions .

...

Chapter VI – Status of the judge

Selection and career

...

Chapter VII – Duties and responsibilities

...

Liability and disciplinary proceedings

...

69. Disciplinary proceedings may follow where judges fail to carry out their duties in an efficient and proper manner. Such proceedings should be conducted by an independent authority or a court with all the guarantees of a fair trial and provide the judge with the right to challenge the decision and sanction. Disciplinary sanct ions should be proportionate .”

36 . The Consultative Council of European Judges, at its 11th plenary meeting (17-19 November 2010), adopted a Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles) summarising and codifying the main conclusions of the Opinions it had already adopted. Th e s ection entitled “Body in charge of guaranteeing independence” reads as follows:

“13. To ensure independence of judges, each State shall create a Council for the Judiciary or another specific body, itself independent from legislative and executive powers, endowed with broad competences for all questions concerning their status as well as the organisation, the functioning and the image of judicial institutions. The Council shall be composed either of judges exclusively or of a substantial majority of judges elected by their peers. The Council for the Judiciary shall be accountable for its activities and decisions.”

37 . Further relevant international texts can be found in Baka v. Hungary [GC] ( no. 20261/12 , §§ 72-7 3 and 82-86 , ECHR 2016 ) .

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AS REGARDS THE PRINCIPLES OF AN INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL

38 . The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings before the HCJ and the HAC concerning his removal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal had not been compatible with the requirements of independence and impartiality. He complained, in addition, that the HAC had not provided a sufficient review of his case, thereby impairing his right of access to a court.

39 . The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

A. Admissibility

1. The parties ’ submissions

40 . Relying on the principles developed in Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland ([GC], no. 63235/00, § 62, ECHR 2007 ‑ II), the applicant submitted that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applied to his case under the civil limb. The national law did not expressly exclude access to court: his case had been examined by the HCJ performing a judicial function, and had subsequently been reviewed by the HAC, an ordinary court within the domestic judicial system. Therefore, the domestic law did not exclude access to a court for cases of this kind and the first limb of the test set out in Vilho Eskelinen and Others was not satisfied. Furthermore, the applicant ’ s dismissal from his administrative position had caused him pecuniary loss, by way of a reduction in his salary, as well as non-pecuniary loss in view of his demotion in status. In his original application form the applicant submitted that Article 6 was also applicable under the “criminal” limb. However, in his submissions before the Grand Chamber he stated that the applicability of Article 6 was limited to its civil aspect.

41 . The Government submitted that the civil limb of Article 6 was not applicable since there was no “civil” right at issue. The dispute had been entirely within the sphere of public law and the claim submitted by the applicant in respect of pecuniary damage concerned a small amount (see paragraph 22 above), which had not constituted a significant disadvantage for him. On those grounds the Government submitted that the complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention.

2. Third-party intervener

42 . The third party, the International Commission of Jurists, submitted that the principle of independence of the judiciary necessarily implied security of tenure in the office of court president. In order to ensure such security of tenure and to maintain both the independence of individual court presidents and their capacity to uphold the independence of judges in their courts, proceedings for removal from the position of court president had to provide the same guarantees of independence and fairness as those for removal from the office of judge. The third party contended that the applicability of Article 6 in the present case had to be determined on the basis of the Vilho Eskelinen test, which had been applied by the Court in cases concerning judges including Baka (cited above) .

3 . The Court ’ s assessment

( a ) T he general requirements for the applicability of the civil limb of Article 6 § 1

(i) The relevant principles

46 . Although there is in principle no right under the Convention to hold a public post entailing the administration of justice (see Dzhidzheva ‑ Trendafilo v a v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 12628/09, § 38, 9 October 2012, and Harabin v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 62584/00, 29 June 2004), such a right may exist at the domestic level. In Regner ( cited above ) the Court reiterated that t here can be no doubt about the fact that there is a right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 where a substantive right recognised in domestic law is accompanied by a procedural right to have that right enforced through the courts. T he mere fact that the wording of a legal provision affords an element of discretion does not in itself rule out the existence of a right. Indeed, Article 6 applies where the judicial proceedings concern a discretionary decision resulting in interference in an applicant ’ s rights (ibid., § 102). In some cases, national law , while not necessarily recognizing that an individual has a subjective right, confers the right to a lawful procedure for examination of his or her claim, involving matters such as ruling whether a decision was arbitrary or ultra vires or whether there were procedural irregularities. This is the case regarding certain decisions where the authorities have a purely discretionary power to grant or refuse an advantage or privilege, with the law conferring on the person concerned the right to apply to the courts, which, where they find that the decision was unlawful, may set it aside. In such a case Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is applicable, on condition that the advantage or privilege, once granted, gives rise to a civil right (ibid. , § 105). While access to employment and to the functions performed may constitute in principle a privilege that cannot be legally enforced, this is not the case regarding the continuation of an employment relationship or the conditions in which it is exercised (ibid., § 117). In Baka , for instance, the Court recognised the right of the President of the Supreme Court to serve his full term of six years under Hungarian law (see Baka , cited above, §§ 107-11).

(ii) A pplication of these principles to the present case

47 . Applying these principles to the present case, the Court observes , first of all, that there was a “dispute” concerning the exercise of the right to hold the position of president of a court. As regards the issue of whether such a “right” could be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised in domestic law, it has to be noted that the applicant was appointed to the position of president of the Kyiv Administra tive Court of Appeal for a five ‑ year term (see paragraph 13 above) and his appointment for such tenure was not disputed at the domestic level. The applicant was provided with specific remuneration for his service as president of the court and his dismissal from this position was subject to certain substantive and procedural conditions. In the light of the above, and given that there was no dispute between the parties as to the existence of the right in question, there is no ground for considering that the applicant ’ s right to serve in that administrative position was not recognised under domestic law. D espite his appointment for a five-year period, the applicant ’ s right to hold the position of president of the court was limited in time by the fact that he was due to reach the retirement age in 2013, before the expiry of that period (see Article 126 of the Constitution cited in paragraph 26 above).

48 . The Court further observe s that the dispute was “genuine” as the parties differed as to whether the applicant could continue to hold his administrative position. Moreover, the dispute was “serious”, having regard to the role of the president of a court (see section 29 of the Judiciary and Status of Judges Act, cited in paragraph 28 above) and to the direct pecuniary consequences for the applicant resulting from his removal from that administrative position. In that regard the Government ’ s argument that the reduction in salary was insignificant for the applicant is not convincing. The applicant ’ s calculation of pecuniary damage in his domestic claim was limited only to the short period (see paragraph 22 above) which had elapsed at that stage, because the principal purpose of the claim was to secure his reinstatement in the position of president of the court. However, the pecuniary consequences were not insignificant from the perspective of the whole period which remained for the applicant to serve as president.

( b ) As to the “civil” nature of the right in dispute

50 . The Government contested the applicability of Article 6, arguing that the dispute was in the area of public law and that, consequently, there was no “civil” right at issue.

(i) The relevant principles

(ii) Application of these principles to the present case

53 . In the light of the above principles, the Government ’ s argument that the civil limb of Article 6 § 1 is not applicable for the sole reason that the applicant ’ s dispute falls within the field of public law and there is no “civil” right at stake is not convincing. As shown above, a public-law dispute may bring the civil limb into play if the private-law aspects predominate over the public-law ones in view of the direct consequences for a civil pecuniary or non-pecuniary right. Furthermore, the Court follow s the criteria set out in Vilho Eskelinen and Others and appl ies a general presumption that such direct consequences for civil rights exist in “ordinary labour disputes” involving members of the public service, including judges (ibid., § 62 and Baka , cited above, § 104 ) .

55 . Applying the Vilho Eskelinen test further, it is not disputed that domestic law provides for access to a court in the case of claims concerning dismissal from administrative positions in the judiciary. Accordingly, Article 6 applies under its civil head.

56 . It follows that the Government ’ s preliminary objection as to the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be dismissed.

B. Merits

1. The parties ’ submissions

58 . The applicant submitted that the HCJ did not constitute an “independent and impartial tribunal” owing to the manner of its composition, the subordination of its members to other State bodies and the lack of objective impartiality and the existence of personal bias on the part of some of its members. Furthermore, the obligation to provide an “independent and impartial tribunal” had not been satisfied by the HAC either.

59 . The Government submitted that the requirements of Article 6 § 1 had been met and that there was no indication of bias on the part of the national authorities. They emphasised that the HAC ’ s judgment had been based on the parties ’ submissions and had included sufficient reasons.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

( a ) General principles relating to the requirements of an “independent and impartial tribunal” at the stages of the determination and the review of the case

62 . However, there is no watertight division between subjective and objective impartiality, as the conduct of a judge may not only prompt objectively held misgivings as to the tribunal ’ s impartiality from the point of view of the external observer (the objective test) but may also go to the issue of the judges ’ personal conviction (the subjective test) (see Kyprianou v. Cyprus [GC], no. 73797/01, § 119, ECHR 2005 ‑ XIII). Thus, in some cases where it may be difficult to procure evidence with which to rebut the presumption of the judge ’ s subjective impartiality, the requirement of objective impartiality provides a further important guarantee (see Pullar v. the United Kingdom , 10 June 1996, § 32, Reports 1996 ‑ III).

( b ) Application of those principles to the present case

(i) Approach to examining the complaint

66 . The issue of the applicant ’ s performance in the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal was initially raised by the Council of Administrative Court Judges, which, having conducted its inquiry, decided to submit a proposal to the HCJ for the applicant ’ s dismissal from his administrative position. The issue was then examined by the HCJ, which was not bound by the initial proposal from the Council of Administrative Court Judges. On the contrary, the HCJ was empowered to carry out its own assessment of the facts, provide its own legal characterisation of the matter and adopt a binding decision after holding a hearing and assessing the evidence. In the present case the examination of the issue by the HCJ ended with a decision to dismiss the applicant and that decision was executed shortly after its adoption (see paragraph 20 above). Subsequently, following its execution, the decision of the HCJ was reviewed by the HAC.

(ii) Proceedings before the HCJ

68 . In its Oleksandr Volkov judgment (cited above) the Court set out a number of criteria for examin ing whether the HCJ as a disciplinary body of judges complied with the requirements of independence and impartiality. In doing so, the Court relied on its previous case-law and t ook into account relevant international texts, notably the opinions and recommendations of other bodies of the Council of Europe . First, it emphasised the need for substantial representation of judges with in such a body, specifying that where at least half of the membership of a tribunal was composed of judges, including the chairman with a casting vote, this would be a strong indicator of impartiality (ibid. , § 109) . Second, in view of the importance of reducing the influence of political organs on the composition of the disciplinary body, it was relevant to assess the manner in which judges were appointed to th at body, having regard to the authorities wh ich delegated them and the role of the judicial community in that process (ibid. , § 112) . Third, it was relevant to establish whether the members of the disciplinary body work ed on a full-time basis or continue d to work and receive a salary outside ; given that the latter case would inevitably involve their material, hierarchical and administrative dependence on their primary employers , this would endanger their independence and impartiality (ibid. , § 113) . Fourth, attention had to be paid to the participation of representatives of the prosecut ion authorities in the composition of the disciplinary body for judges ; t he inclusion of the Prosecutor General ex officio and the other members delegated by the prosecut ion authorities raise d concerns as to the impartiality of the disciplinary body of judges in view of the functional role of prosecutors in domestic judicial proceedings (ibid. , § 114) . Fifth, where the members of the disciplinary body play ed a role in the preliminary inquiry in a disciplinary case and subsequently participate d in the determination of the same case by the disciplinary body , such a duplication of functions could cast objective doubt on the impartiality of those members (ibid. , § 115).

69 . The Court found in Oleksandr Volkov that the composition of the HCJ , as provided for by the Constitution, had disclosed a number of structural shortcomings which had compromised the requirements of independence and impartiality. U nder these constitutional rules , the majority of the HCJ had consist ed of non-judicial staff appointed directly by the executive and the legislative authorities , with the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General being ex officio members. T he decision to dismiss the applicant in Oleksandr Volkov had been taken by sixteen members of the HCJ, only three of whom were judges. Furthermore, o nly four out of the twenty members of the HCJ worked there on a full-time basis, while the other members continued to work and receive a salary outside the HCJ. The membership and presence of the Prosecutor General and other representatives of the prosecut ion system with in the HCJ raised further concerns in terms of impartiality , given the functional role of the prosecutor ’ s office in domestic court proceedings . Moreover , t here were two members of the HCJ who had brought disciplinary charges against the applicant, based on the results of their own preliminary inquiries, and subsequently decided on the merits of his case (ibid., §§ 110-15).

70 . Those findings are entirely pertinent to the present application. The HCJ was formed and functioned under the same constitutional rules as in Oleksandr Volkov. Therefore, the same concerns arise as regards the compliance of the proceedings before the HCJ with the standards of independence and impartiality. T he applicant ’ s case was heard and determined by eighteen members of the HCJ, of whom only eight were judges . T he non-judicial members therefore constitut ed a majority capable of determining the outcome of the proceedings . Moreover , t here remained issues both with the manner in which the judicial members were delegated to the HCJ by the executive and legislative authorities , limiting the number of judges in the HCJ elected by their peers, and also with the fact that the majority of the HCJ ’ s members were not employed there full time and that the Prosecutor General was a member .

71 . Furthermore, a s regards the applicant ’ s allegations , set out in detail before the Court, that certain members of the HCJ had shown personal bias in his case , it cannot be overlooked that Judge K., who was a member of the HCJ, had initially, in his capacity as chairman of the Council of Administrative Court Judges, played a role in the preliminary inquiry of the applicant ’ s case and in making the proposal to the HCJ for his dismissal (see paragraphs 15 and 18 above). This preliminary involvement cast objective doubt on Judge K. ’ s impartiality when he subsequently took part in the decision of the HCJ on the merits of the applicant ’ s case (compare Oleksandr Volkov , cited above, § 115; Poposki and Duma v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , nos. 69916/10 and 36531/11 , § 48, 7 January 2016; and Sturua , cited above, § 35).

72 . The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the proceedings before the HCJ lacked the guarantees of independence and impartiality in view of the structural deficiencies and the appearance of personal bias.

(iii) Whether the examination by the HAC provided a sufficient review

73 . In order to determine firstly whether a second-level tribunal had “full jurisdiction”, or provided “sufficiency of review” to remedy a lack of independence and impartiality at first instance, the Court has considered that it is necessary to have regard to such factors as the subject matter of the decision appealed against, the manner in which that decision was arrived at and the content of the dispute, including the desired and actual grounds of appeal (see Bryan v. the United Kingdom , 22 November 1995, §§ 44-47, Series A no. 335 ‑ A, and Tsfayo , cited above, § 43).

74 . In Oleksandr Volkov the Court specifically found that the HAC had not provided a sufficient review of a case concerning a judge ’ s dismissal from office. Firstly, the Court observed that the HAC had powers to declare the impugned decisions unlawful, but that it was unable to quash them and take any further appropriate steps if deemed necessary. Even though no legal consequences arose from a decision being declared unlawful, the HAC ’ s inability to quash the impugned decision, together with the absence of rules as to the further progress of the disciplinary proceedings (in particular, the steps that had to be taken by the authorities involved after the impugned decisions had been declared unlawful and the time-limits for those steps to be taken), produced serious uncertainty about the real legal consequences of such judicial declarations. Judicial practice suggested, moreover, that there was no automatic reinstatement in the event of a positive declaration by the HAC, because the judges concerned had to institute new proceedings for reinstatement (ibid., §§ 125 and 126). The Court also examined the manner and the actual scope of the HAC ’ s review and concluded that these were likewise inappropriate to provide a “sufficient review” (ibid., §§ 127 and 128).

75 . The above considerations are equally pertinent to the present case. In reviewing the HCJ ’ s decision, which had immediate effect, the HAC was acting within the same legal framework with the same limited powers and uncertainties as to the eventual legal consequences.

76 . Moreover, looking into the content of the dispute at stake in the present case, there are serious mismatches between the advanced and actual grounds of review. Firstly, in its decision the HAC considered that the applicant had not contest ed the facts forming the grounds for his dismissal and therefore those facts were taken as established. This conclusion is not consistent with the grounds of the applicant ’ s claim before the HAC, in which he clearly contested those facts. The applicant argued in particular that the findings of the HCJ were too general and that in order to substantiate its conclusions the HCJ should have referred to the specific circumstances and the ir time frame.

77 . Secondly, the HAC made no genuine attempt to examine another important argument by the applicant alleging a lack of independence and impartiality in the proceedings before the HCJ (see paragraph 21 above) . Having mentioned its competence to review whether the impugned decision had been taken in a manner compatible with a number of criteria, notably the requirement of impartiality, the HAC reached a general conclusion that the HCJ had not violate d the Constitution or the laws of Ukraine. However, the HAC failed to assess whether the proceedings before the HCJ had complied with the principles of independence and impartiality . It provided no reasons in that regard .

78 . Therefore, the review of the applicant ’ s case by the HAC was not sufficient. Accordingly, it was unable to remedy the defects regarding procedural fairness resulting from the proceedings before the HCJ.

(iv) Whether the HAC complied with standards of independence and impartiality

80 . It follows that the judicial review by the HAC in the present case did not comply with the requirement of independence and impartiality.

(v) Conclusion

81 . Accordingly, the HCJ failed to ensure an independent and impartial examination of the applicant ’ s case, and the subsequent review of his case by the HAC did not put those defects right.

82 . There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

II . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

83 . The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that his right to respect for his private life had been violated by his dismissal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal.

84 . The relevant parts of Article 8 of the Convention provide as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

A . The parties ’ submissions

1. The applicant

85 . The applicant submitted that his right to respect for his private life was engaged because his career, reputation and social and professional relationships had been irreparably damaged. Furthermore, his material well-being had been affected given the reduction in his salary and in the prospective pension benefits. In support of his contention, the applicant relied on Erményi v. Hungary ( no. 22254/14, §§ 30 and 31, 22 November 2016 ), in which the termination of the applicant ’ s mandate as Vice ‑ President of the Supreme Court was found to have interfered with his right to respect for his private life.

86 . As regards reputation, the applicant argued that the position of president of a court of appeal was prestigious and powerful. As he had occupied positions as president of several courts over a period of twenty-five years, the position from which he had been dismissed represented the apex of his legal career and the culmination of decades of personal dedication and professional commitment. His dismissal from that position had damaged his peers ’ perceptions of his personal authority and competence. Furthermore, the reason for his dismissal, namely breaches of laws relating to the organisation of the justice process, had affected his professional standing generally and his future career and promotion prospects. This was particularly relevant in view of the fact that the information about his dismissal had been widely disseminated. In the context of his allegation of serious damage to his reputation, the applicant contended that the interests of his children as trained lawyers had been affected by his wrongful dismissal.

87 . The applicant further submitted , as to the merits of his complaint , that the interference with his right to respect for his private life had not been “in accordance with the law” as the applicable law was too vague and did not provide for procedural safeguards to prevent its arbitrary application. He then submitted that his dismissal had been disproportionate in the circumstances as the manner in which he had been dismissed had not given him any opportunity to remedy his alleged managerial failings.

2. The Government

88 . The Government submitted that the right to exercise administrative functions in a court did not fall within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention. In contrast to the cases of Oleksandr Volkov (cited above) and Özpınar v. Turkey (no. 20999/04, 19 October 2010), the applicant in the present case had not been removed from judicial office. Given this important distinction, the complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention.

89 . The Government further contended that even assuming that Article 8 was applicable, the applicant ’ s removal from his administrative position had had very little impact on his private life. The applicant had probably changed office in the same court building and had received a slightly lower salary. Therefore, he had not suffered a “significant disadvantage” and the complaint had to be declared inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 3 (b) and 4 of the Convention.

90 . As to the merits, the Government submitted that, unlike in the case of Oleksandr Volkov , the applicable domestic law had been sufficiently clear and foreseeable as to its application; the interference had pursued the legitimate aims of public safety, the economic well-being of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime and the protection of the rights of others. They submitted that the applicant ’ s operational failings had threatened the proper administration of justice in the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal, which covered several regions of the country. The interference had been necessary in the circumstances in order to achieve the above-mentioned legitimate aims.

B . The third - party intervener

91 . The third party submitted that the issue of the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention had to be determined with regard to the fact that the position of court president always implied a leadership role in the judiciary and that removal from that position engaged the individual ’ s private life. In particular, such removal affected the professional relationships of the individual concerned, as well as his reputation and standing.

C . The Court ’ s assessment

Admissibility

(a) Preliminary remarks

( b ) G eneral principles

(i) “ Private life” as a broad term

(ii) Right to respect for reputation

99 . On the basis of this case-law, the Court has applied Article 8 to the exercise of professional functions in a number of cases.

(iii) “Private life” in employment-related scenarios

101 . Within the employment-related scenarios involving Article 8, the Court has dealt with different types of cases. In particular, it has dealt with discharge from military service (see Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom , nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, ECHR 1999 ‑ VI), dismissal from judicial office (see Özpınar , cited above; Oleksandr Volkov , cited above; and Kulykov and Others , cited above ), removal from administrative functions in the judiciary (see Erményi , cited above), and transfers between posts in the public service (see Sodan , cited above ). Other types of cases have concerned restrictions on access to employment in the public service (see Naidin v. Romania , no. 38162/07 , 21 October 2014), loss of employment outside the public service (see Obst v. Germany , no. 425/03, 23 September 2010; Schüth v. Germany , no. 1620/03, ECHR 2010; Fernández Martínez , cited above; Åžahin KuÅŸ , cited above ; and Bărbulescu , cited above ), and restrictions on access to a profession in the private sector (see Sidabras and Džiautas , cited above ; Campagnano , cited above ; and Bigaeva , cited above ) .

( α ) Reason-based approach

105 . The Court has applied similar logic from the standpoint of the positive obligations to carry out a careful balancing exercise between the private interests of employees and those of a non-governmental employer when the reasons for the dismissal related directly to the applicants ’ conduct in their private life, such as an extramarital relationship (see Obst , cited above, §§ 43 et seq.) or living with a new partner after separation (see Schüth , cited above, §§ 57 et seq.) . W here a private company dismissed an employee on the basis of monitoring of his correspondence by his employer in the workplace, such a measure fell within the ambit of Article 8 in so far as it concerned the “correspondence” and because it encroached upon the reasonable possibilit y of enjoying any “private life” in the workplace (see Bărbulescu , cited above, §§ 81 and 127).

106 . As can be seen from these examples, the underlying reasons for the impugned measure affecting professional life may be linked to the individual ’ s private life and these reasons themselves may render Article 8 applicable.

( β ) Consequence-based approach

108 . On the basis of that approach, the Court has found that the dismissal of a judge on the grounds of a violation of his professional duties amounting to a breach of the judicial oath affected a wide range of his professional and other relationships. The dismissal also had a negative impact on the applicant ’ s “inner circle” in view of his loss of earnings, and it also affected his reputation (see Oleksandr Volkov , cited above, § 166). The refusal to allow an applicant who was a foreigner to sit for the Bar examinations in Greece fell within the scope of Article 8 because it affected her personal choice as to the way she wished to pursue her professional and private life (see Bigaeva , cited above, §§ 24 and 25). The entry of an applicant ’ s name in the bankruptcy register entailed a series of legal restrictions on the exercise of her professional activities and civil rights. It therefore affected the applicant ’ s opportunities to develop relationships with the outside world and fell within the sphere of her private life (see Campagnano , cited above, § 54). A far-reaching ban on taking up private-sector employment has also been found to affect “private life” (see Sidabras and Džiautas , cited above, § 47).

109 . Where no reason-based approach justifies the applicability of Article 8, an analysis of the effects of the impugned measure on the above-mentioned aspects of private life is necessary to conclude that the complaint falls within the scope of “private life”. Nevertheless, this division does not preclude cases in which the Court may find it appropriate to employ both approaches in combination, examining whether there is a private-life issue in the underpinning reasons for the impugned measure and, in addition, analysing the consequences of the measure (see Fernández Martínez , cited above, §§ 110-12 ).

(iv) Minimum level of severity of the alleged violation

111 . T he concept of threshold of severity has been specifically examined under Article 8. In environmental cases, in particular, an arguable claim under Article 8 may arise where an environmental hazard attains a level of severity resulting in significant impairment of the applicant ’ s ability to enjoy his or her home or private or family life. The Court has ruled that the assessment of this minimum level in such cases is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the intensity and duration of the nuisance and its physical or mental effects on the individual ’ s health or quality of life (see Fadeyeva v. Russia , no. 55723/00, §§ 68 and 69, ECHR 2005 ‑ IV; Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine , no. 30499/03 , § 105, 10 February 2011; and Grimkovskaya v. Ukraine , no. 38182/03, § 58, 21 July 2011 ). This approach has also been applied in nuisance cases under Article 8 with close similarities to the environmental cases mentioned above (see Borysiewicz v. Poland , no. 71146/01, § 51, 1 July 2008, and Udovičić v. Croatia , no. 27310/09, § 137, 24 April 2014).

113 . In the recent case of Erményi the Court found that the applicant ’ s dismissal from the administrative position of Vice-President of the Supreme Court constituted an interference with his right to respect for private life (see Erményi , cited above, § 31) . Even though the Court did not elaborate on this point, in the absence of the parties ’ submissions in that regard, it impl i ed that the impugned measure had seriously affected the applicant ’ s private life. That finding cannot be read as presuming that the applicant ’ s dismissal had “automatically” generated an issue in the sphere of private life. In that regard the Court reiterates that the threshold of severity occupies an importan t pla ce in cases where the existence of a private - life issue is examined according to the consequence-based approach.

(v) Conclusions : t he scope of Article 8 in employment-related dispute s

115 . T he Court concludes from the above case-law that employment - related disputes are not per se excluded from the scope of “private life” with in the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. T here are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected in such dispute s by dismissal, demotion , non-admission to a profession or other similar ly unfavourable measure s . The se aspects include (i) the applicant ’ s “inner circle”, (ii) the applicant ’ s opportunity to establish and develop relationships with others, and (iii) the applicant ’ s social and professional reputation. There are two ways in which a private-life issue would usually arise in such a dispute: either because of the underlying reasons for the impugned measure ( in that event the Court employs the reason-based approach) or – in certain cases – because of the consequences for private life ( in that event the Court employs the consequence-based approach).

( c ) Application of the general principles to the present case

119 . The Court will first examine the way in which a private - life issue could arise in the present employment dispute : whether because of the underlying reasons for the applicant ’ s dismissal or because of the consequences for his private life.

120 . The explicit reasons for the applicant ’ s dismissal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal were strictly limited to his performance in the public arena, namely his alleged managerial failings , which were said to undermine the proper functioning of the court. Those reasons related only to the applicant ’ s administrative tasks in the workplace and had no connection to his private life. In the absence of any such issues in the reasons given for his dismissal, it has to be determined whether, according to the evidence and the substantiated allegations put forward by the applicant, the measure had serious negative consequences for the aspects constituting his “private life”, namely ( i ) his “inner circle”, ( ii ) his opportunities to establish and develop relationships with others, or ( iii ) his reputation.

122 . As to the consequences of the applicant ’ s dismissal for his “inner circle”, he contend ed that his removal had resulted in a reduction in his salary and in his prospective pension benefits. This argument has to be viewed as relating to the worsening of the material well-being of the applicant and his family. Even though the pecuniary element of the dispute has been considered s ignificant for the purpose of the applicability of Article 6 under its civil head, this conclusion does not automatically bring the issue within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention. In the present case the applicant has not provided any evidence to suggest that the ensuing reduction in his monthly remuneration (see paragraph 22 above) seriously affected the “inner circle” of his private life. In the absence of such evidence, it would be speculative to assume the contrary. There are no other indications that the “inner circle” of the applicant ’ s private life was affected by the impugned measure.

126 . In the proceedings at issue, at no point did the domestic authorities examine the applicant ’ s performance as a judge or express any opinion as to his judicial competence and professionalism. The decisions in the applicant ’ s case concerned only his managerial skills, while his professional role as a judge was not touched upon. This limited area of scrutiny and criticism cannot be regarded as relating to the core of the applicant ’ s profession al reputation. In that regard the present case differs in substance from Oleksandr Volkov (cited above), in which the applicant was criticised and received a disciplinary sanction for his performance as a judge.

128 . In particular, the applicant did not substantiate how his dismissal from his position had affected his further career as a judge . The Court notes that the applicant ’ s dismissal did not preclude his reappointment, even though this latter consideration may have been purely theoretical, because of his advanced age. In any event, the measure did not have a significant effect as to its duration because it was limited by the applicant ’ s remaining period of service in the judiciary before he was due to reach the retirement age, about two years later (see Article 125 of the Constitution cited in paragraph 26 above).

129 . As regards social reputation in general, the criticism by the authorities did not affect a wider ethical aspect of the applicant ’ s personality and character . Even though the applicant ’ s dismissal was based on the findings of breaches of official duties in the administration of justice, it did not contain any accusation of intentional mis conduct or criminal behaviour. The applicant ’ s moral values were not called into question and no reproaches of this nature can be identified in the impugned decisions (contrast Lekavičienė v. Lithuania , no. 48427/09, 27 June 2017, and Jankauskas v. Lithuania (no. 2) , no. 50446/09, 27 June 2017 ).

130 . T he applicant ’ s contention that the decision on his dismissal had been disseminated in the mass media and had become known to an unidentified number of persons cannot, as such, demonstrate substantial damage to his professional and social reputation. Moreover, t he applicant failed to substantiate this allegation by providing specific details concerning the persons responsible for publishing such information, the coverage it received and its impact.

132 . The applicant did not put forward , either before the Court or in the domestic proceedings, any other specific personal circumstances indicating that the measure had had a serious impact on his private life.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 1 8 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL N o . 1

Article 18

“The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

136 . The Court notes that the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 18 of the Convention was raised for the first time in 2017, in the applicant ’ s submissions to the Grand Chamber. The complaint was therefore lodged outside the six-month time-limit and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention .

IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

V . APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

140 . Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

141 . The applicant initially submitted a claim in respect of pecuniary damage , which he subsequently withdrew in a letter of 24 November 2017 . The applicant also claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

142 . The Government submitted that the claim for non-pecuniary damage w as unfounded.

143 . The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage which the finding of a violation of the Convention in this judgment does not suffice to remedy. R uling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 3 ,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B. Costs and expenses

144 . In the Chamber proceedings , Mr Denisov and eleven other applicants claimed jointly 15,691.97 pounds sterling (GBP) in respect of costs and expenses. Subsequently, the application by Mr Denisov was dealt with separately, following relinquishment of jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber. Before the Grand Chamber , Mr Denisov , who was represented by two lawyers , claimed GBP 33,600 in respect of legal fees, GBP 1,418.98 and EUR 2,499.79 in respect of administrative and translation costs and other disbursements, and GBP 712, EUR 630 . 2 0 and UAH 8,867 in respect of travel expenses , including the applicant ’ s personal appearance at the hearing before the Court . The applicant asked for the award for costs and expenses to be paid into the UK bank account designated by his representatives.

145 . The Government submitted that the claims were excessive and not sufficiently substantiated. They argued in particular that the claims for legal fees had been exaggerated and the translation costs had not been necessarily incurred. Accordingly, the award under this head had to be decreased substantially if a violation of the Convention were found.

147 . The Court further notes that the personal appearance of the applicant before the Grand Chamber was not required and it could be doubted if the costs and expenses in this regard were incurred necessarily (compare Martinie v. France [GC], no. 58675/00, § 62, ECHR 2006 -VI) . Nevertheless, taking into account the previous case-law (see, in particular, Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], no. 15472/02, § 112, ECHR 2007 ‑ III, Söderman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08 , § 126, ECHR 2013 , and Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 12738/10, § 135, 3 October 2014 ), the Court accepts that the costs and expenses connected with the applicant ’ s participation in the hearing before the Grand Chamber may be granted inasmuch as they are reasonable and properly substantiated.

C. Default interest

149 . The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT ,

1. Declares admissible , unanimously, the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the principles of an independent and impartial tribunal;

2. Declares inadmissible, by a majority, the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention;

3. Declares inadmissible, unanimously, the complaints under Article 18 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention ;

4. Holds , unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the principles of an independent and impartial tribunal;

5. Holds , unanimo usly, that it is not necessary to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints;

6 . Holds , unanimously,

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months , the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 3 ,000 ( three thousand euros) , plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 3 ,000 ( three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses , this amount to be paid into the bank account designated by the applicant ’ s representatives , this amount to be paid into the bank account designated by the applicant ’ s representatives;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

7 . Dismisses , by sixteen votes to one , the remainder of the applicant ’ s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English and in French , and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 25 September 2018 .

             Françoise Elens-Passos Guido Raimondi Deputy Registrar President

[1] 1. About 345 euros at the relevant time