THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the Applicant may be summarised

as follows:

The Applicant is a stateless person, born in ... in Lithuania and

at present living in A.  His Application concerns three different

proceedings before the Swedish courts.

1. On ... 1947, the Applicant took out an annuity with the insurance

company Y, in A.  The Applicant maintains that it was on his part

a condition sine qua non that a gold clause was inserted in the policy.

The representative of the company denied this during the subsequent

proceedings which the Applicant instituted and which he eventually

lost by decisions of the A Court of first instance and of the Svea

Hovrätt on ... 1954 and ... 1955 respectively.  An application by

the Applicant to lodge an appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court

on ... .  The Applicant has lodged unsuccessful applications for a

revision of his case on the following dates:

... 1956, rejected ... 1956;  ... 1956, rejected ... 1956;  ... 1957,

rejected ... 1957;  ... 1957, rejected ... 1957;  ... 1958, rejected

... 1958;  ... 1960, rejected ... 1960;  ... 1960, rejected ... 1961;

... 1962, rejected on an unknown date;

All applications were rejected on the ground that the facts submitted

did not warrant a rehearing of the case.  In respect of the latest

applications, no reasons were given.

He submits that he is entitled to an annulment of the contract as

it does not correspond to the express condition which he made.  He

states that, having lived in Germany in the 1920's, experience has

told him that in inflationary periods only gold clauses keep intact

the value of annuities and pensions and that the shares which he sold

in order to pay the company were of high value and have trebled in

price during the last years;  further, that it is close to fraud to

pay out annuities and pensions in a depreciated currency, the more

so as pensions for civil servants are regulated according to the

fluctuations of the price index.

The Applicant complains that the witnesses for the Respondent Party

committed perjury and that the tribunals were biased against him.

Details are set out in his various submissions to the Commission.

2. In March 1954 and March 1955, the Applicant instituted proceedings

against three shipping companies, S, T and U and also against Mr V

in his private capacity.  The Applicant claimed, in respect of events

which occurred in 1942 - 46, broker's fees for the sale of a vessel

and fees for arranging charter parties for other vessels with the

International Red Cross, the International Refugee Organisation and

the International Committee for European Emigration.

The first case (against S and V), was heard by the Court of A

on ... 1954 and, during the hearing the Applicant's lawyer waived all

the Applicant's claims against the manager of the company and part

of his claims against Mr. V.  The Applicant does not now recognise

the validity of these waivers.

On ... 1955, the Court of A dismissed the Applicant's case.

On ...1955, the Svea Hovrätt dismissed his appeal and an application

to lodge a further appeal was rejected on ... 1956 by the

Supreme Court.

The Applicant's second case against the three companies was dismissed

by the same instances on ... 1956, ... 1957 and ... 1958 respectively.

The Applicant's requests for a revision were rejected on ... 1958

and ... 1961.  A request that criminal proceedings should be instituted

against his opponent's lawyer for demanding excessive fees was

likewise unsuccessful.

The Applicant alleges that the courts disregarded the evidence brought

by him as a result of their pronounced xenophobic sentiments and that

his opponents committed perjury.  He sets out in detail his complaints

in his submissions to the Commission.

Apparently, the Applicant refused to pay his lawyer the fees which

were due to him and, indeed, accused him of neglecting his

professional duties.  On ... 1961 and on ... 1962, the Court of A and

the Svea Hovrätt respectively held that the Applicant was obliged to

pay 6.500 Swedish kronar as lawyer's fees.  This judgment was executed

by the retention of a sum due to the Applicant from the above

insurance company.

His appeal against this decision was rejected by the Svea Hovrätt

on ... 1962 and by the Supreme Court on ... 1963.

4. In 1963, stating that he was reduced to poverty and completely

ruined, the Applicant attempted to repurchase the insurance policy,

the surrender value of which was 139.000 Swedish kronar.  The Applicant

finally complains that the taxation authorities of A assessed taxes

of ca 46.000 Swedish kronar to be paid by him.

Whereas the Applicant, in respect of all these proceedings, claims

damages of 5 million Swedish kronar, at which sum he estimates

his losses.  He does not indicate the Articles of the Convention upon

which he relies.

THE LAW

Whereas, with regard to the Applicant's complaints concerning the

proceedings in the civil actions brought by him against the insurance

company Y, against three shipping companies and against Mr V in his

private capacity, Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention  provides that

the Commission may only deal with a matter "within a period of six

months from the date on which the final decision was taken";

Whereas the Commission has already held in a number of previous cases

that the "final decision" within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26)

refers solely to the final decision involved in the exhaustion of all

domestic remedies according to the generally recognised rules of

international law;

Whereas in the present case, the Applicant has on several occasions

lodged petitions for the re-opening (resting) of the above proceedings

in accordance with Chapter 58 of the Swedish Code of Procedure

(Rättegangsbalk);

Whereas it appears from the title of Chapter 58 (Särskilda rättsmedel)

that the remedies mentioned are extraordinary remedies;

Whereas the proceedings relating to these remedies do not until

successful affect the validity of the final decision; whereas the

Applicant's petitions, under the provisions of Swedish law, for a

reopening of his cases were not effective and sufficient remedies and

do not, therefore, constitute domestic remedies under the generally

recognised rules of international law; whereas it follows that the

decisions regarding these petitions cannot be taken into consideration

in determining the final decision for the purpose of applying the

six-months time-limit laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26);

Whereas, therefore, the final decision regarding the Applicant's above

civil actions is the decision of the Supreme Court which was given

on ... 1956;  whereas the present Application was not submitted to the

Commission until 14th December 1962, that is more than 6 months after

the date of decision; whereas, furthermore, an examination of the case

does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which

might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period;

Whereas it follows that the Applicant, insofar as he complains of the

proceedings before the Court of A, the Svea Hovrätt and the Supreme

Court, has not satisfied the six-months time-limit laid down

in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention; whereas, therefore, this

part of the Application must be rejected in accordance with Article 27,

paragraph (3) (Art. 27-3), of the Convention; whereas in regard to the

Commission's finding concerning the nature of the domestic remedies in

the present case, it should be recalled that the Commission has

frequently stated in the case of criminal proceedings that a request

for revision, being an extraordinary remedy, can similarly not be taken

into account for the calculation of the six-months time-limit.

Whereas, in regard to the proceedings concerning his refusal to pay

his lawyer's fees and, in regard to his dispute with the Swedish

taxation authorities an examination of the case as it has been

submitted, including an examination made ex officio, does not disclose

any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in

the Commission and in particular in Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention or Article 1 of the First Protocol (P1-1) whereas it follows

that this part of the Application is manifestly ill-founded and must

be rejected in accordance with Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2)

of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission declares this Application inadmissible.