THE FACTS

A. Whereas the following documents were before the Commission:

I. By letter of 3 May 1967 (1), the Permanent Representative of Greece

to the Council of Europe informed the Secretary General of the Council

of Europe as follows:

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

(1) Document 18.312 of the Council of Europe. The original French text

of this letter is reproduced at Appendix I to the present decision.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

"Acting on instructions from the Greek Government, and in accordance

with Article 15, paragraph (3), of the European Convention on Human

Rights, I have the honour to inform you that by Royal Decree No 280 of

21 April last, the application of Articles 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 20,

95 and 97 of the Greek Constitution has been suspended in view of

internal dangers which threaten public order and the security of he

State.

I wish to point out that the suspension of the application of the

aforementioned articles of the Greek Constitution does not prejudice

paragraph (2) of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

It may be noted, Mr Secretary General, that as His Majesty the King of

the Hellenes has emphasised, and as His Excellency, the Prime Minister

has reiterated on many occasions, Greece will revert to normal

political and parliamentary life as soon as circumstances will allow.

Greece will, of course, not fail to inform you, in accordance with

paragraph (3) of Article 15, of the date when these exceptional

measures cease to operate and the provisions of the European Convention

on Human Rights are again being fully executed.

II. By letter of 25 May 1967, the Greek Permanent Representative

transmitted to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the texts

of Royal Decree No 280 of 21 April 1967, and also of the articles of

the Greek Constitution which had been suspended.

The text of Royal Decree No 280 (1) was as follows:

--------------------------------------------

(1) Document No 18.804 of the Council of Europe, Annex 2. The French

text received from the Greek Permanent Representative is reproduced at

Appendix II to the present decision.

---------------------------------------------

"Article 1

On the proposal of the Council of Ministers, we hereby bring into

effect throughout the territory the Martial Law Act .... of 8 October

1912, as amended by Section 8 of Legislative Decree 4234/1962, by Act

2839/1941 and by the Legislative Decree of 9 - 11 November 1922.

Article 2

1. From the date of publication of this Decree we suspend throughout

the territory the application of Articles 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 20,

95 and 97 of the Constitution.

2. Military tribunals which are already in existence, military

tribunals as may be set up as an extraordinary measure, and the

competent military authorities shall exercise the jurisdiction provided

for by Act ..., as amended, and, in particular, in accordance with the

decisions of the Minister of National Defence.

Article 3

Cases pending before the Criminal Courts shall not be transmitted to

the Military Tribunals, unless the Military Judicial Authority sees fit

to request transmission thereof.

Article 4

This Decree shall enter into force as from the date of its publication

in the Official Gazette."

IV. The provisions of the Constitution of Greece (1) which were

suspended by Article 2, paragraph 1, of the above Decree, state as

follows:

-----------------------------------------

(1) As reproduced in Annex A of the Netherlands' Application of 27

September 1967. The French text received from the Greek Permanent

Representative is reproduced at Appendix III to the present decision.

-----------------------------------------

"Article 5

With the exception of persons taken in the act of committing an

offence, no one shall be arrested or imprisoned without a judicial

warrant stating the reasons which must be served at the moment of

arrest or imprisonment pending trial. Any person taken in the act or

arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest shall without delay be

brought before the competent examining magistrate within 24 hours of

his arrest at the latest, or, if the arrest was made beyond the seat

of the examining magistrate, within the time absolutely necessary for

his conveyance. Within at the most 3 days from such appearance, the

examining magistrate must either release the person arrested or deliver

a warrant for his imprisonment. This time limit shall be extended for

up to 5 days at the request of the person arrested or in the event of

force majeure, which shall be certified forthwith by a decision of the

competent judicial council. Should both these time limits expire

without such action, every jailer or other officer, civil or military,

charged with the detention of the person arrested shall release him

forthwith. Transgressors of the above provisions shall be punished for

illegal confinement and shall be obliged to make good any loss

sustained by the injured party and further to give satisfaction to said

party by such sum of money as the law provides. The maximum term of

imprisonment pending trial, as well as the conditions under which the

State shall indemnify persons unjustly imprisoned pending trial or

sentenced, shall be determined by law.

Article 6

In the case of political offenses, the court of misdemeanours may

always, on the request of the person detailed, allow his release on

bail fixed by a judicial order, which shall admit of appeal.

In the case of such offenses, imprisonment pending trial shall under

no circumstances be extended beyond 3 months.

Interpretation Clause

The introduction in the future of general or special laws abolishing

or restricting the term of imprisonment pending trial or rendering

release on bail mandatory for the judge is by no means precluded. It

is further understood that the maximum term of 3 months set in the

second paragraph for imprisonment pending trial shall include the

duration of both the entire investigation and the procedure before the

judicial councils prior to the final hearing.

Article 8

No person shall be withdrawn without his consent from the jurisdiction

of his lawful judge. The establishment of judicial committees and

extraordinary courts under any name whatsoever is prohibited.

Article 10

Greeks have the right to assemble peaceably and unarmed. The police may

be present only at public gatherings. Open air assemblies may be

prohibited if danger to public security is imminent therefrom.

Article 11

Greeks have the right of association, with due adherence to the laws

of the State which, however, shall under no circumstances render this

right subject to previous permission of the government. As association

shall not be dissolved for violation of the law except by judicial

decision. The right of association in the case of civil servants and

employees of semi-governmental agencies and organisations may by law

by submitted to certain restrictions. Strikes of civil servants and

employees of semi-governmental agencies and organisations are

prohibited.

Article 12

Each man's house is inviolable. No house searches shall be made except

when and as the law directs. Offenders against these provisions shall

be punished for abuse of authority and shall be obliged to indemnify

fully the injured party and further to give satisfaction to said party

by such sum of money as the law provides.

Article 14

Any person may publish his opinion orally, in writing or in print with

due adherence to the laws of the State. The press is free. Censorship

and every other preventive measure is prohibited. The seizure of

newspapers and other printed matter, either before or after

publication, is likewise prohibited. By exception, seizure after

publication is permitted (a) because of insult to the Christian

religion or indecent publications manifestly offending public decency,

in the cases provided by law, (b) because of insult to the person of

the King, the successor to the Throne, their wives or their offspring,

(c) if the contents of the publication, according to the terms of the

law, are of such a nature as to (1) disclose movements of the armed

forces of military significance or fortifications of the country, (2)

be manifestly rebellious or directed against the territorial integrity

of the nation or constitute an instigation to commit a crime of high

treason; but in these cases, the public prosecutor must, within 24

hours from the seizure, submit the case to the judicial council which,

within a further 24 hours, must decide whether the seizure shall be

maintained or withdrawn, otherwise the seizure shall be ipso jure

lifted. Only the publisher of the item seized shall be allowed to

appeal against the judicial order. After at least 3 convictions of a

press offence which admits of seizure, the court shall order the

permanent or temporary suspension of issue of the publication and, in

grave cases, shall also prohibit the exercise of the profession of

journalist by the person convicted. Such suspension or prohibition

shall commence from the time that the court decision becomes final.

No person whatsoever shall be permitted to use the title of a suspended

newspaper for 10 years from the date of the permanent suspension

thereof. Press offenses shall be deemed offenses whose author is taken

in the act.

Only Greek citizens who have not been deprived of their civic rights

shall be allowed to publish newspapers.

The manner of rectifying through the press erroneous publications as

well as the preconditions and qualifications for exercising the

profession of journalist shall be determined by law.

Enforcement by law of special repressive measures directed against

literature dangerous to the morals of youth shall be permitted.

The provisions on the protection of the press contained in the present

article shall not be applicable to motion pictures, public shows,

phonograph records, broadcasting and other similar means of conveying

speech or of representation. Both the publisher of the newspaper and

the author of a reprehensible publication relating to one's private

life shall, in addition to being subject to the penalty imposed

according to the terms of the penal law, also be civilly and jointly

liable to redress fully any loss suffered by the injured party and to

indemnify him by a sum of money as provided by law.

Article 20

The secrecy of letters and correspondence by any other medium

whatsoever shall be completely inviolable.

Article 95

Trial by jury shall be given to criminal and political offenses as well

as offenses of the press, whenever such offenses do not concern one's

private life, and to any other offenses which may by law be made liable

to trial by jury. For the trial of the said offenses of the press,

mixed courts may be established by law composed of regular judges and

jurors, the latter constituting the majority. Criminal offenses which

have thus far been brought within the jurisdiction of the Courts of

Appeal by special laws and resolutions shall continue to be tried by

such courts provided they are not by law again made liable to trial by

jury.

Article 97

The details regarding courts martial of the army, navy and air force,

piracy, barratry and prize courts shall be regulated by special laws.

Civilians may not be brought under the jurisdiction of courts martial

of the army, navy or air force except for punishable acts affecting the

security of the armed forces."

V. On 19 September 1967, the Permanent Representative of Greece

addressed the following letter (1) to the Secretary General of the

Council of Europe:

--------------------------------

(1) Document D 20.330 of the Council of Europe. The original French

text of this letter is reproduced at Appendix IV to the present

decision.

--------------------------------

"On 3 May 1967, I had the honour to write to you, in accordance with

Article 15 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms, informing you that the Greek Government had

suspended the application of certain provisions of the Greek

Constitution and had in consequence found it necessary to take measures

derogating from certain of the obligations laid down in the said

Convention in view of dangers which threatened public order, the

security of the State and the life of the nation.

The purpose of this letter, Mr Secretary General, is to provide you,

insofar as considerations of State security permit at this stage, and

in the spirit of Article 15 of the Convention, with certain details

regarding the public emergency which threatened the life of the nation.

At the same time, and in the same spirit, I explain hereunder that the

measures taken are strictly limited to what was made absolutely

necessary by the situation which prevailed in Greece prior to 21 April

1967.I. Starting in July 1965, a situation had been created in Greece which

was manifestly directed towards the abolition of all the institutions

of the political system and regime, bringing my country to the brink

of anarchy.

By way of example I mention the following:

a. The anarchist demonstrations in July 1965, in which cars were set

on fire, barricades erected in the streets, and houses under

construction burnt down in the centre of Athens.

b. The daily strikes, fomented for political reasons unrelated to the

interests of the working class, which were paralysing the country's

economic life. The demonstrations leading to yet more serious

incidents, as for example the violent clashes between groups of farmers

and the police in Salonica, and those between the forces of law and

order and building workers who had infiltrated as agitators into

student demonstrations.

c. The political scene was dominated by the activities of the Centre

Union and EDA parties. While the EDA affected to be a political group

independent of the Greek Communist Party (banned in Greece under a law

passed following the communist armed insurrection), Mr Iliopoulos, an

EDA Member of Parliament and member of the Executive Committee of that

party, admitted during the party's congress in 1966 that the EDA was

simply a substitute for the Communist party in Greece and faithfully

followed the latter's line. Another EDA leader, Emmanuel Glezos, stated

unequivocally at the party's 6th Congress that the aim of the EDA was

to seize power. Identical statements were made by Kalliyannis, a member

of the Steering Committee of the Greek Communist Party, and by the

notorious communist Fillinis, whose declaration was published in the

periodical "The Greek Left". In it he spoke explicitly of revolution

and threatened to seize power by force. An article on exactly the same

lines was published by the well-known communist Stringos.

d. The Centre Union Party aligned its policy on what constituted the

basis of the EDA policy.

This comes through clearly from the anarchist speeches against the

regime which Mr Georges Papandreou and Mr André Papandreou made

repeatedly both in Parliament and elsewhere. The latter had no

compunction in saying that, should the elections result in deadlock,

a government would be formed in "place of the Constitution" without

respect to the relevant constitutional provisions. In other words, here

was a politician contemplating bloodshed among Greek citizens who might

disagree on politics.

e. The attempt by the ASPIDA organisation to infiltrate and undermine

the armed forces of the country. This plot was brought before the

courts and resulted, well before the revolution of 21 April 1967, in

the conviction of 15 officers and the committal by the examining

magistrate of M A Papandreou for trial on charges of secret and

subversive activities.

f. The contempt of the Centre Union and the EDA for the lawful

Government of the country and their instigation of mass anarchist

demonstrations.

The parties in question, along with foreign communists and leftist

sympathizers, sought to exploit the "Marathon peace march" to assert

their power and incite the masses to take part in anarchist

demonstrations, so creating conditions of mob rule in the country. The

Communist paper AVGI, despite the fact that the Government had

forbidden the march, on 8 April 1967, called on all its supporters to

take part in the 5th "Marathon march". Then there are the distinctly

subversive and anarchist articles which were published daily in the

same paper.

On 23 April 1967, the leader of the Centre Union Party proposed to

visit Salonica on the occasion of a political meeting. Mr G Papandreou

intended, with the help of EDA supporters, to foment disorder and

bloodshed, thus officially consecrating the popular front which had

already been formed by the Centre Union and the EDA. It has been

established that shock brigades of the extreme Left and its most

aggressive leaders had foregathered at Salonica a week before the date

of the meeting. It has likewise been established that these shock

brigades, after listening to an incendiary speech from Mr G Papandreou,

were going to try to overthrow the authority of the State by seizing

the headquarters of the Governor of Northern Greece, the headquarters

of the 3rd Army Corps (which covers Greece's northern frontier) and

other public buildings.

On 6 April 1967, the Centre and the Left, in accordance with a

preconcerted plan, tried to use the students in order to occupy the

University of Salonica. This was meant as a dress rehearsal for future

application of the plan on a wider scale. Similar incidents occurred

6 days later, that is on 11 April 1967, within the precincts of the

same University, where the idea of the State's authority was thoroughly

trampled under foot.

The next day, on 12 April 1967, 3,000 building workers, under the

instigation of Centre Union agitators, tried to seize the centre of

Athens. Two hundred people, including 51 police officers, were injured

in the violent clashes which ensued.

The facts mentioned above are only a few samples of the perils which

threatened the life of the nation. The list is far from being

exhaustive. Our Permanent Delegation is at your disposal to supply

further particulars.

II. The revolution of 21 April 1967 has never dissembled its

anti-communist nature and its determination to rid the Greek nation of

the imminent danger which threatened it.

Consequent on the revolution, application of certain provisions of the

Constitution was suspended and the Delta-Xi-Theta law "on the

proclamation of a state of emergency" was put into effect.

Thus the Greek Government found itself obliged to exercise its right

as a Contracting Party under Article 15 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to derogate from

certain of the provisions of that Convention.

It is to be noted that the suspended articles of the Constitution are

unconnected with the provisions of Article 15, paragraph (2), of the

said Convention.

In this connection I wish to emphasise that not only has there been no

deviation from Article 2 of the Convention, but nobody has been

deprived of his life in Greece since 21 April 1967 and nobody has been

subjected to torture. This is clear from statements to the Press by MM

G Papandreou, A Papandreou and Mikis Theodorakis, and from photographs

published at the time and recently.

Temporary suspension of constitutional provisions relating to personal

rights and freedoms is an inherent feature of any revolution;

nevertheless, in this instance, and in view of the situation which had

to be met, it constitutes an elementary measure to obviate the danger

of the country's fundamental institutions being overthrown. At all

events, the Government has endeavoured to limit the measures taken as

much as possible, confining itself in the main to the arrest and

removal of a number of communists so as to neutralise any attempted

reaction on their part. The conditions of their detention, moreover,

are decent.

Lastly, I would ask you to note that three-quarters of those originally

arrested were set free as soon as they had given an undertaking not to

engage in activities against the lawful authorities of the country. As

regards the Press, I wish to state that the foreign Press in general

- which is nevertheless unsparing in its accusations against the Greek

Government - enjoys complete freedom of circulation in Greece.

I would also add that correspondence of every kind is free from

censorship, except that of persons under arrest."

B. Whereas the arguments of the Parties may be summarised as follows:

I. In their identical Applications of 20 September 1967, the Applicant

Governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden referred to the change of

Government which had taken place in Greece on 21 April 1967, and

submitted that the above suspension, for an indefinite period of time,

of certain provisions of the Constitution relating to human rights and

fundamental freedoms in Greece affected correspondingly the following

provisions of the Convention: Article 5, guaranteeing the right to

personal liberty and security; Article 6, guaranteeing the right to

fair trial by independent and impartial tribunals in criminal as well

as civil cases; Article 8, guaranteeing the right to respect for a

person's private and family life, his home and his correspondence;

Article 9, guaranteeing the right to freedom of thought, conscience and

religion; Article 10, guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression;

Article 11, guaranteeing the right to the freedoms of peaceful assembly

and association; Article 13, guaranteeing the right to an effective

remedy against violations of the above-mentioned rights and freedoms;

Article 14, providing safeguards to the effect that such rights and

freedoms shall be enjoyed without discrimination on any ground

including that of a person's political opinion.

It was also pointed out that parliamentary elections, which should have

taken place on 29 May 1967, had been cancelled by the new Greek

Government.

The Applicant Governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden further

referred to various official and unofficial statements which, in the

opinion of these Governments, showed the grave situation in Greece with

regard to human rights and fundamental freedoms. In particular, they

stated that political parties and ordinary political activities had

been prohibited and that a state of siege was maintained upholding

court martials and similar extraordinary courts; that thousands of

persons had been imprisoned for a long period without being brought

before a competent legal authority and many persons sentenced by court

martial or extraordinary penal commissions for their political opinion;

that the rights to assemble or to associate freely with others had been

abolished as was demonstrated by the criminal charges and resultant

harsh sentences in certain cases; that the right to freedom of

expression had been suppressed as was illustrated by an order of the

Army Chief of Staff of 14 June 1967; lastly, that censorship had been

applied to the press and private communications.

The Applicant Governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden alleged that

the Government of Greece had, by the above legislative and

administrative measures, violated Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and

14 of the Convention. They reserved the right to extend their

Applications to other provisions of the Convention should subsequent

information so require.

The Applicant Governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden also referred

to Resolution 346 (1967) of 23 June 1967, by the Consultative Assembly

of the Council of Europe in which the Assembly expressed "its grave

concern at the present situation in Greece and at the many serious

reported violations on human rights and fundamental freedoms" and also

expressed the wish that "The Governments of the Contracting Parties to

the European Convention on Human Rights refer the Greek case either

separately or jointly to the European Commission of Human Rights in

accordance with Article 24 of the Convention".

With regard to the notice of derogation given by the Greek Government

under Article 15 of the Convention, the Applicant Governments of

Denmark, Norway and Sweden submitted that the Respondent Government had

failed to show that the strict requirements of this provision were

satisfied, namely that the measures concerned were taken "in time of

war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation" and

were "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". The intent

of Article 15 could not possibly be to grant to any state the right to

derogate by a stroke of the pen from all basic human rights and

fundamental freedoms as was done by the Greek Government in the present

situation and for an unspecified period of time. Reference was also

made in this connection to the terms of Articles 17 and 18 of the

Convention. Finally, it was alleged that the Respondent Government had

not fulfilled its obligations under Article 15, paragraph (3), of the

Convention to keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

"fully informed of the measures it has taken and the reasons therefor".

The Applicant Governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden concluded in

their written Applications that the legislative and administrative

measures complained of were incompatible with the Convention regardless

of any individual or specific injury. They further submitted that the

provisions of Article 26 of the Convention concerning the exhaustion

of domestic remedies did not apply to the present case and referred,

in this respect, to the Commission's decision on the admissibility of

Application No 176/56 (Greece v. United Kingdom, see Yearbook of the

European Convention on Human Rights, Volume 2, pages 182, 184).

II. The submissions made by the Applicant Government of the Netherlands

in its Application of 27 September 1967, corresponded in substance to

the above statements of the Applicant Governments of Denmark, Norway

and Sweden.

III. In its observations of 16 December 1967, on the admissibility of

the Applications, the Respondent Government contested the competence

of the Commission in the present case. It argued that any right of

control by the Commission presupposed a legal Government constituted

according to the Constitution. The present Greek Government, however,

was the product of a revolution. Admittedly a revolutionary government

was bound by the international obligations entered into by its

predecessors. But the actions by which it maintained itself in power,

and which were also the original objects of the revolution, could not

logically be subject to the control of the Commission, any more than

the reasons justifying the revolution.

The Respondent Government submitted that, in most cases, a

revolutionary government would find itself obliged to suspend

temporarily, if not all, the rights protected by the Convention, at

least the greater part of them. Generally speaking, a revolution

created such a disturbance in the life of a State that it seemed

meaningless to try to assess the actions of a revolutionary government

by the same criteria as would be applicable in normal circumstances or

in the case of a simple public emergency threatening the life of the

nation within the meaning of Article 15. Any control exercised by the

Commission would be equivalent, in the last resort, to an expression

of approval or disapproval of the revolution itself. Clearly, this

would no longer be "control" in the proper sense of the term but would

constitute an interference in a State's internal affairs.

The Respondent Government also referred to the first Cyprus case

(Application No 176/56 - Greece v. United Kingdom) and to the case

of Lawless against Ireland (Application No 332/57). It pointed out that

the Governments cited before the Commission in those cases were legally

constituted Governments. Furthermore, the Commission, when applying

Article 15 of the Convention, had recognised the right of those

Governments to enjoy a "margin of appreciation" in deciding whether or

not a public emergency existed that did in fact threaten the life of

the nation and what, if any, exceptional measures were required. In the

Lawless Case, a member of the Commission had remarked that a government

was the best placed to decide what measures should be taken to deal

with an emergency. In the opinion of the Respondent Government this

observation, which concerned a constitutional Government, applied a

fortiori to a Government that had come to power through a revolution.

The Respondent Government, while not itself wishing to comment on a

situation in a friendly and allied country, further referred in this

connection to the attitude of the Consultative Assembly in regard to

the serious events following the revolution in Turkey on 27 May 1960.

The former Prime Minister, Mr Menderes, the President of the Republic,

Mr Bayar, and the great majority o the Ministers and Members of

Parliament belonging to the Democratic Party had been arrested and a

purge carried out in the Army and the universities. Fifteen persons,

including Bayar, Menderes and Zorlou, were sentenced to death, 31

persons to penal servitude for life and 56 to periods of imprisonment

of up to 15 years; 23 persons were acquitted.

The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, however, merely

stated its concern as to the arrest and treatment of the Turkish

Parliamentarians who had sat in the Assembly. It expressly recognised

that it had no right to interfere in Turkish domestic politics and the

various statements by members of the Assembly showed that this body

intended to do nothing which might offend the Turkish Government.

The Respondent Government also submitted that the failure of the

Applicant Governments to bring a case against the Turkish Government

under Article 24 of the Convention showed that they realised that they

had no right to seize the Commission of a matter which would involve

the control of the measures taken by a revolutionary government.

In this letter of 16 December 1967, transmitting the Respondent

Government's above observations to the Commission's Secretary, the

Permanent Representative of Greece made certain further comments,

requesting that they be put before the Commission. In particular, he

referred to the letters of 21 September, 27 September and 3 October

1967, respectively, from the Governments of Iceland, Belgium and

Luxembourg to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. In these

letters the above Governments stated that they supported, without

formally associating themselves with this move, the Applications lodged

with the Commission by the Governments of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and

the Netherlands.

The Permanent Representative also quoted point 8 of the Consultative

Assembly's Resolution 351 (1967) of 26 September 1967, according to

which the Assembly "holds itself ready to make a declaration at the

appropriate time on the possibility of the suspension of Greece from,

or her right to remain a Member of, the Council of Europe". He

submitted that the resolution, as well as certain statements made by

the Rapporteur of the Assembly's Legal Committee, constituted an

anticipated condemnation of Greece by the Assembly. This was bound to

influence the Commission unfavourably and seriously to affect its

independence in the examination of the present case. It would, apart

from any other reason, justify the Respondent Government's refusal to

submit its actions to the control of the Commission.

IV. At the hearing before the Commission on 23 and 24 January 1968, the

acting Agent of the Respondent Government stated that, as already

indicated in his letter of 20 January 1968, his Government did not wish

to add anything to the written observations previously submitted.

V. The Applicant Governments generally developed the substance of their

written submissions. Further, in reply to the Greek Government's

arguments, they contended that the Commission was competent to examine

the Applications and that the present Greek Government, even if a

revolutionary Government was clearly bound by the whole Convention.

The Applicant Governments cited the generally recognised principle of

international law that successor governments were required to perform

the obligations undertaken on behalf of the state by their

predecessors. The rule pacta sunt servanda continued to apply even

where the new government had come to power in a manner unforeseen in

the constitution and it was valid both for recognised and for

unrecognised governments. Reference was made in this connection to the

writings of Professors Castberg, Castrén, Kelsen, Lauterpacht,

O'Connell and Schwarzenberger.

The Applicant Governments concluded that the present Greek Government

was bound by the whole Convention of Human Rights to which Greece had

been a Party since 1953. It followed that the Commission was competent,

under Articles 19 and 24 of the Convention, to examine the

Applications. Such examination would not concern the justification or

otherwise of the Greek revolution but would relate to the question

whether legislative measures and administrative practices of the new

Greek Government were compatible with the Convention. In this

connection, it was clear that the Greek Government considered itself

bound by the Convention at the time as it had itself invoked Article

15 in its above communications of 3 May and 19 September 1967, to the

Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The Applicant Governments

submitted that it would be for the Commission, when dealing with the

merits of the Applications and not before, to state an opinion as to

whether or not the measures and practices complained of were justified

under Article 15.

The Applicant Governments further argued that it was irrelevant to the

present proceedings that no Application under Article 24 of the

Convention had been brought against the Turkish Government following

the Turkish revolution of 1960. They equally considered that the

Commission was in no way bound or influenced by the action, or lack of

action, on the part of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of

Europe in the Turkish case, on the one hand, and, on the other hand,

in the present case of Greece which, in any event, was different from

the Turkish case.

At the hearing before the Commission the Applicant Governments also

referred to certain alleged facts and pieces of information which might

raise issues under provisions of the Convention and the Protocol which

had not been invoked in their written Applications of 20 and 27

September 1968. In reply to a question by the Acting President of the

Commission as to the exact scope of their pleadings, the Agent of the

Norwegian Government, on behalf of the 4 Applicant Governments, made

the following declaration:

"In ... the Scandinavian Applications express reservations to this

effect have been made in the following words:

'Reservation is made for a possible later extension of the allegation

with regard to other provisions of the Convention.'

For the present state of the proceedings, namely the question of

admissibility, it is sufficient for our purpose to refer to Articles

5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15, paragraphs (1) and (3), of the

Convention. These provisions have all been mentioned in the

Applications. When the distinguished Agent for the Government of Sweden

and when I as Agent for the Government of Norway mentioned additional

Articles as well, it was with a view to further indicating the

seriousness of the problems with which we are faced in regard to the

situation in Greece, and to stress the importance of having our

Applications declared admissible so as to have all facets and aspects

of the case examined on their merits in accordance with the provisions

of the Convention.

Our present pleadings have been confined to the question of

admissibility of our Applications, and what we now ask for is to have

our Applications as they stand declared as admissible."

THE LAW

As to the competence of the Commission

Whereas the present Applications were brought under Article 24

(Art. 24) of the Convention which states that any High Contracting

Party may refer to the Commission any alleged breach of the Convention

by another High Contracting Party; whereas it is not disputed that

Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands, whose Governments

introduced the present Applications, are Parties to the Convention; and

whereas Greece ratified the Convention on 28 March 1953;

Whereas the Respondent Government submits that the Commission is not

competent to examine the Applications because they concern the actions

of a revolutionary Government; whereas the Government does not contest,

however, that it is bound by the international obligations entered into

by its predecessor Governments; whereas, in particular, it does not

suggest that, following the change of Government on 21 April 1967,

Greece has ceased to be a Party to the Convention;

Whereas, nevertheless, in the view of the Respondent Government, the

Commission is not competent under the Convention to control the acts

of a revolutionary government and, particularly, has no right to

examine the situation in relation to Article 15 (Art. 15) of the

Convention; whereas the Respondent Government suggests that the

Commission, in considering these Applications, would inevitably be

bound to review the revolutionary origin of the Government and that

such review would be outside the Commission's competence; whereas the

Respondent Government submits that the above interpretation of the

Convention is supported by the attitude adopted by the Contracting

Parties, as well as by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of

Europe, in the case of the Turkish revolution of 1960;

Whereas the submissions relating to Article 15 (Art. 15) of the

Convention will be dealt with later in the present decision;

Whereas the Commission was established under Article 19 (Art. 19) of

the Convention with the task to ensure, together with the Court, the

observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting

Parties in the Convention; whereas the Assembly has no such functions

under the Convention; whereas it follows that its action, or lack of

action, in one case cannot be relevant before the Commission in

proceedings instituted under the Convention in another case; whereas

it is clear, therefore, that the Commission's competence in respect of

the present Applications cannot be considered in relation to the

attitude adopted by the Consultative Assembly in 1960 and 1961 with

regard to the Turkish revolution;

Whereas it is further to be observed that the failure of a Contracting

Party to make an application under Article 24 (Art. 24) of the

Convention in one case does not preclude its right to seize the

Commission of another case in accordance with this Article; whereas,

in this connection, it is again quite irrelevant whether or not the

cases concerned are in fact comparable; whereas, consequently, the

Commission's competence in respect of the present Applications again

cannot be considered in relation to the attitude adopted by the

Contracting Parties in the case of the Turkish revolution of 1960;

Whereas, finally, there is no other basis, either in international law

in general or under the terms of the Convention in particular, which

could support the Respondent Government's thesis that the Commission

cannot examine its acts as being those of a revolutionary Government;

Whereas, on the contrary, it is clear from Article 15 (Art. 15) of the

Convention, read together with Articles 19, 24 and 25

(Art. 19, 24, 25), that the Commission is competent to examine the acts

of governments also in political situations of an extraordinary

character, such as after a revolution;

Whereas, indeed, as stated by the Commission's Principal Delegate

before the Court in the Lawless Case, it is often "in times of

disturbance and danger which may well have their source in political

tension" that the most fundamental guarantees of the Convention assume

their greatest importance (Lawless Case, ECHR, Series B, 1960 - 61,

page 395); whereas, consequently, the Respondent Government's above

objection to the competence of the Commission must be rejected as

unfounded;

Whereas the Commission has also noted an observation made by the Greek

Permanent Representative in his letter of 16 December 1967;

Whereas in that letter the Representative submitted that the

Consultative Assembly's Resolution 351 (1967) of 26 September 1967

constituted an anticipated condemnation of Greece which was bound to

influence the Commission unfavourably and seriously to affect its

independence;

Whereas, in this respect, the Commission recalls that the Consultative

Assembly has no competence to deal with applications alleging

violations of the Convention; whereas it is also clear that the

Commission, in the exercise of its functions under Article 19 (Art. 19)

of the Convention, is limited to a consideration of the substance of

the case-file before it and thus acts in complete independence as

regards any outside body;

Whereas, furthermore and in particular, there is no basis for the

suggestion that, in the carrying out of its task, the Commission might

be subject to influence as a result of any declarations of the

Assembly;

Whereas it follows that the above submission of the Greek Permanent

Representative is equally unfounded;

As to other questions of admissibility

Whereas the Commission has examined ex officio whether there are any

other grounds for declaring the present Applications inadmissible;

Whereas, in determining the question of admissibility, the provisions

of Article 26 and Article 27, paragraph (3) (Art. 26, 27-3), of the

Convention concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies according to

the generally recognised rules of international law do not apply to the

present Applications, the object of which is to determine the

compatibility with the Convention of legislative measures and

administrative practices in Greece;

Whereas, in this respect, the Commission refers to its decision, given

in the first Cyprus Case, on the admissibility of Application No 176/56

(Yearbook, Volume 1, pages 182, 184);

Whereas the provisions of Article 27, paragraphs (1) and (2)

(Art. 27-1, 27-2), of the Convention refer only to petitions submitted

under Article 25 (Art. 25) and not to applications made by Governments

and are therefore inapplicable to the present case;

Whereas, in particular, an application under Article 24 (Art. 24)

cannot be rejected in accordance with paragraph (2) of Article 27

(Art. 27-2) as being manifestly ill-founded; whereas it follows that

the question whether such an application is well-founded or not is

solely a question relating to the merits of the case; whereas,

therefore, the effects of derogations made by the Government of Greece

under Article 15 (Art. 15) of the Convention cannot be considered at

the present stage of admissibility (see Application No 176/56 loc cit);

whereas, consequently, the Commission is bound to reserve for an

examination of the merits of this case the question whether the

legislative measures and administrative practices in Greece, which form

the subject of the present Applications, were or are justified under

Article 15 (Art. 15);

Whereas no other ground for declaring the Applications inadmissible has

been found;

As to the reservation made by the Applicant Governments

Whereas the Commission has noted the declaration by the Applicant

Governments reserving their right to extend their original allegations

should new information so require; and whereas it reserves itself the

right to decide on the admissibility of any subsequent extension of the

original Applications;

Now therefore the Commission

Declares admissible:

1. the Application of the Government of Denmark of 20 September 1967;

2. the Application of the Government of Norway of 20 September 1967;

3. the Application of the Government of Sweden of 20 September 1967;

4. the Application of the Government of the Netherlands

   of 27 September 1967.