THE FACTS

A. Whereas the facts presented by the parties and apparently not in

dispute between them may be summarised as follows:

The applicant is a German citizen, born in 1925 and at present detained

in prison in Berlin-Tegel.

His present application concerns certain civil proceedings which took

place in the Regional Court (Landgericht) of Berlin following his

conviction and sentence in 1962.

I. As to the applicant's conviction and sentence

1. on 4th June, 1962, the applicant was convicted by the Regional Court

of Berlin on charges of having committed an indecent assault against

a child and of having inflicted serious bodily harm upon her. According

to the finding of the Court, the crime was committed on 23rd December,

1961, between 14.30 and 16.00 hours. The child suffered such serious

injuries that an immediate operation was necessary to save her life.

In his defence before the trial court the applicant stated that he had

been drinking alcohol at a public house and that he could not remember

what had happened after he had left about 14.00 hours. He also

submitted that an unknown person must have taken advantage of the child

in his, the applicant's flat.

The Court found these allegations to have been refuted and sentenced

the applicant to ten years' penal servitude. His appeal (Revision) was

dismissed by the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) as manifestly

ill-founded on 23rd October, 1962.

2. On 11th January, 1963, the applicant filed a petition for retrial

(Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens). He referred, inter alia, to the

Regional Court's finding that the crime had been committed between

14.30 and 16.00 hours and stated that, between 14.00 and 15.15 hours,

he had been in East Berlin. There he had visited his mother's flat and,

as she was not at home, he had left a note.

The applicant's above petition for retrial was refused by the Regional

Court on 5th March, 1963, on the ground that it did not disclose any

new facts or evidence which might be considered as sufficient to upset,

or put into doubt, the findings of the trial court on which his

conviction was based. His appeal (Beschwerde) against this decision was

dismissed by the Court of Appeal (Kammergericht) of Berlin on 17th May,

1963.

3. In his first application (No. 2081/63) which was declared

inadmissible by the Commission on 10th December, 1965, under Article

27, paragraphs (2) and (3), of the Convention, the applicant complained

of his conviction and sentence and of the above decisions refusing his

petition for retrial. The Commission held that, with regard to his

conviction an sentence, the applicant had failed to observe the six

months' time-limit laid down in Article 26 of the Convention and it

further found that his complaints relating to his petition for retrial

and the court proceedings concerned were incompatible with the

provisions of the Convention.

4. A second petition for retrial lodged by the applicant was rejected

by the Regional Court on 19th December, 1966, and, on appeal, by the

Court of Appeal on 22nd March, 1967.

II. As to the civil proceedings against the applicant

1. In August 1964, the child, who had been the victim of the

above-mentioned indecent assault, filed with the Regional Court a

petition for free legal aid in order to claim compensation for the

injuries suffered. Her representative referred to the case-file of the

criminal proceedings against the applicant and gave "23rd December,

1961, around 10.00 hours" as the time when the assault had been

committed.

In pursuance of Article 118a of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(Zivilprozessordnung), this petition was communicated to the applicant

for any observations which he wished to make in reply. In his

submissions of 14th August and 11th September, 1964, he requested the

Court to refuse the child's petition or, alternatively, also to grant

him legal aid and to appoint Rechtsanwältin X. to represent him. Having

learned that Mrs. X. objected to her appointment, the applicant

proposed another barrister, Dr. Y. The latter declared himself prepared

to accept the brief provided the applicant's petition for free legal

aid was granted.

By a decision of 1st April, 1965, the Court granted free legal aid to

the child plaintiff and appointed a barrister to represent her. The

Court also invited Dr. Y. to state and substantiate the applicant's

defence and to offer supporting evidence.

Dr. Y. replied that he had agreed to act as counsel only if the

applicant were granted free legal aid. As this had not yet been the

case, he was unable to accept any service of process.

The writ was then served on the applicant personally who, in June 1965,

denied liability and renewed his petition for free legal aid and for

the appointment of Dr. Y.

On 12th July, 1965, this petition was refused by the Regional Court on

the ground that the applicant's defence failed to show a "sufficient

prospect of success" within the meaning of Article 114, paragraph (1),

of the Code of Civil Procedure. This provision states as follows:

"A party who is not in a position to meet the costs of an action

without sacrificing the necessary means of support for himself or his

family shall, on his application, be granted free legal aid, provided

that the proposed claim or defence offers sufficient prospects of

success ..."

("Einer Partei, die ausserstande ist, ohne Beeinträchtigung des für sie

und ihre Familie notwendigen Unterhalts die Kosten des Prozesses zu

bestreiten, ist auf Antrag das Armenrecht zu bewilligen, wenn die

beabsichtigte Rechtsverfolgung oder Rechtsverteidigung eine

hinreichende Aussicht auf Erfolg bietet ...")

In its decision, the Regional Court referred to the findings of the

criminal proceedings and stated that the submissions made by the

applicant in support of his petition for free legal aid did not contain

anything which might show that the plaintiff would not succeed in

proving the applicant's liability. As to the amount of compensation

claimed, it did not appear that the applicant intended to make any

observations.

The applicant lodged an appeal (Beschwerde) against this decision and

invoked Article 6, paragraph (1), of the Convention and Article 103,

paragraph (1), of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic

of Germany which states that, in the courts, everyone is entitled to

a hearing in accordance with the law ("Vor Gericht hat jedermann

Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör"). He also referred to the indication

in the statement of claim that the assault had been committed "around

10.00 hours" and pointed out that this differed from the finding of the

criminal judgment that it occurred "between 14.30  and 16.00 hours".

He further complained that the Regional Court had failed to examine his

alibi.

On 14th September, 1965, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's

appeal. It considered the plaintiff's statement that the assault had

been committed "around 10.00 hours" as a "patent error"

("offensichtliches Versehen") and observed, with regard to the

applicant's alibi, that it had already been considered carefully by

courts of two instances in his unsuccessful proceedings for retrial

(see I 2 above). The Court of Appeal also quoted the jurisprudence of

the Federal Constitutional Court concerning Article 103, paragraph (1),

of the Basic Law in connection with the right to free legal aid as

defined in Article 114, paragraph (1), of the Code of Civil Procedure.

It followed from this jurisprudence that the refusal of legal aid could

not be considered to be unconstitutional where, as in the present case,

the proposed defence did not offer a sufficient prospect of success.

By letter of 21st September, the applicant lodged a new appeal against

the Regional Court's decision of 12th July, 1965, by which his petition

for free legal aid has been refused. He referred again to his alibi and

submitted an affidavit (Versicherung an Eides Statt) by his mother of

24th August, 1965. This appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on

9th December, 1965, as unfounded. The Court stated that the affidavit

could not be regarded as sufficient to upset, or to put into doubt, the

detailed findings in the criminal proceedings against the applicant as

these findings had been based on the comprehensive evidence which had

been before the trial court.

By a letter of 27th December the applicant lodged a third appeal

against the decision of the Regional Court of 12th July, 1965. This

appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal on 28th January, 1966, as

inadmissible.

2. In the meanwhile, the hearing concerning the plaintiff's claim for

damages had taken place before the Regional Court on 30th September,

1965. In these proceedings, Article 78, paragraph (1), of the Code of

Civil Procedure applied which states as follows:

"Before the Regional Courts .... the parties must be represented by

counsel authorised to act on their behalf; such counsel must be

entitled to practise before the court in question (Counsel's

proceedings)"

("Vor den Landgerichten ... müssen die Parteien sich durch einen bei

dem Prozessgericht zugelassenen Rechtsanwalt als Bevollmächtigten

vertreten lassen [Anwaltsprozess]")

In accordance with this provision, the child plaintiff was represented

by counsel at the hearing. The applicant, whose petition for free legal

aid had been refused, was present but not represented by counsel and,

consequently, he could not address the Court and had to be treated as

if he had failed to appear.

Counsel for the plaintiff referred to his written submissions and moved

that judgment by default should be given against the defendant and

present applicant in accordance with Article 331 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. This provision states as follows:

"(1)  Where a plaintiff applies for judgment by default against a

defendant who has failed to appear at the hearing, the fact as stated

in Court by the plaintiff shall be deemed to have been admitted.

(2)  Insofar as the fact stated by the plaintiff justify his statement

of claim, judgment shall be given in accordance with the statement of

claim ..."

("(1) Beantragt der Kläger gegen den im Termin zur mündlichen

Verhandlung nicht erschienenen Beklagten das Versäumnisurteil, so ist

das tatsächliche mündliche Vorbringen des Klägers als zugestanden

anzunehmen.

(2)  Soweit es den Klageantrag rechtfertigt, ist nach dem Klageantrag

zu erkennen ....")

When making the above motion, counsel for the plaintiff did not state

the exact amount of damages claimed but left its determination to the

discretion of the Court.

In accordance with Article 331 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the

Court gave a judgment by default on 30th September, 1965, ordering the

applicant to pay 12,000 DM to the plaintiff. When fixing the amount of

damages, the Court took into account the facts alleged by the plaintiff

and the financial situation of both parties. It also had regard to the

jurisprudence of the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) in similar

cases. The judgment was served on the applicant on 8th November. 1965.

Under Articles 338 and 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a party

against whom a judgment by default has been given may lodge an

objection (Einspruch) within a time-limit of two weeks. In proceedings

before the Regional Courts, objections must, in accordance with Article

78 of the Code, be lodged by counsel. Article 342 provides that, where

the objection is admissible, the proceedings shall recommence at the

stage in which they were before the default occurred.

On 12th November, 1965, the applicant lodged with the District Court

(Amtsgericht) of Berlin-Wedding an objection against the Regional

Court's above judgment by default. He was aware that his objection had

to be filed by counsel but he apparently did not find a barrister who

was prepared to act on his behalf. Pointing out that he was destitute,

he also made a new petition for free legal aid.

By a letter of 27th December, 1965, from the Presiding Judge of the

Regional Court, the applicant was informed that his objection could not

be taken into consideration because it had not been filed by counsel.

B. Whereas the arguments of the parties may be summarised as follows:

I. The applicant refers substantially to Article 6 and also to Article

14 of the Convention. He submits that, without the assistance of a

lawyer, he was unable properly to defend himself against the child

plaintiff's claim for compensation in the civil proceedings before the

Regional Court and that, consequently, he was not given a fair hearing

in the determination of his alleged civil obligation. He further

considers that the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal discriminated

against him by granting free legal aid only to the plaintiff.

1. With regard to the main proceedings before the Regional Court which

led to the judgment by default of 30th September, 1965, the applicant

complains that he was not heard at all. Indeed, in these proceedings,

the Court was bound under Articles 78 and 331 of the Code of Civil

Procedure to leave his submissions out of consideration and to treat

the facts alleged by the plaintiff as being admitted. This situation

was not altered by the fact that the defendant and present applicant

was present at the hearing, having in his written submissions expressly

contested his liability and offered to produce evidence to refute the

plaintiff's allegations.

2. In the applicant's opinion, it is irrelevant for the determination

of his above complaint which related to the main proceedings that his

defence against the plaintiff's claim was in fact considered by the

Regional Court, and by the Court of Appeal, in connection with his

petition for free legal aid. He states that, under German law,

proceedings concerning applications for legal aid are separate from the

main proceedings and argues that the summary character of the former,

in particular as regards the taking of evidence, excludes any

comparison with the latter. The summary character of legal aid

proceedings is clear, in particular, from Article 118a, paragraph (1),

of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:

"The Court may require the applicant to establish the probability of

his statements of fact. It shall, before granting free legal aid, hear

the opposing party unless, for special reasons, this should appear

inexpedient. The Court may also make enquiries, so far as this does not

entail serious delay, and, in particular, require the production of

documents and obtain information from public authorities. Witnesses and

experts shall only be heard where the facts, insofar as this is

necessary for the decision on the application for free legal aid,

cannot otherwise be sufficiently ascertained; they shall not be

examined on oath."

("Das Gericht kann verlangen, dass der Antragsteller seine Angaben

glaubhaft macht. Es soll, wenn dies nicht aus besonderen Gründen

unzweckmässig erscheint, vor der Bewilligung des Armenrechts den Gegner

hören. Es kann auch, soweit dies ohne erhebliche Verzögerung möglich

ist, Erhebungen anstellen, insbesondere die Vorlegung von Urkunden

anordnen und von Behörden Auskünfte einholen. Die Vernehmung von Zeugen

oder Sachverständigen ist nur zulässig, wenn der Sachverhalt, soweit

dies zur Entscheidung über das Armenrechtsgesuch erforderlich ist, auf

andere Weise nicht hinreichend geklärt werden kann; eine Beeidigung

findet nicht statt.")

3. In general, the applicant also points out that, under German law,

the civil courts are not bound by findings made in criminal

proceedings. He argues that, consequently, his defence against the

plaintiff's claim for compensation in the civil proceedings of 1965

should not have been rejected on the ground that his guilt had already

been established at his trial in 1962.

The applicant further submits that the provisions of the German Code

of Civil Procedure concerning judgments by default should be

interpreted in accordance with the requirements of Article 6, paragraph

(1),  and Article 14 of the Convention. Such interpretation would

exclude a judgment by default where, as in the present case, the

defendant's default was due only to his lack of means to pay a

barrister's fees.

Finally, the applicant complains that the guarantee of a "public"

hearing in Article 6, paragraph (1), of the Convention was not observed

in the above civil proceedings against him before the Regional Court.

II. The respondent Government submits that neither Article 6 nor

Article 14 of the Convention was violated in the civil proceedings

against the applicant.

1. The Government argues generally that, in interpreting these

provisions, regard must be had to the legal systems of the Contracting

States. Such a comparison shows that both the obligation for parties

to be represented by counsel before certain courts and the possibility

of proceedings by default in the absence of such representation are a

common feature of several countries. Similarly, free legal aid is

granted in such cases to parties unable to pay a barrister's fees

provided that their case offers a reasonable chance of success.

Reference is made in this connection to:

-  Articles 133, paragraph (1), 138, 153, 406, paragraph (4), 76 and

855 et sqq. of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van

Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering) and to the Dutch Law of 4th July, 1957;

-  Articles 27, 396, 63, paragraph (1), and 73, paragraph (2), of the

Austrian Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung);

-  Articles 61, No. 1, 75 and 150 of the Belgian Code of Civil

Procedure (Code de procédure civile) and to the Belgian Law of 29th

June, 1929.

In the Government's opinion, if follows from the above legal provisions

that such procedural rules are considered by more than one Contracting

Party to be in harmony with the Convention. Otherwise the states

concerned would have made a reservation in accordance with Article 64.

As regards the right to free legal aid in civil proceedings, the

Government further refers both to the Commission's jurisprudence

according to which this right is not as such guaranteed by the

Convention, and also to Article 6, paragraph (3), sub-paragraph (c).

It points out that this provision, which recognises expressly a right

to free legal aid in criminal proceedings, nevertheless limits this

right to cases where "the interests of justice so require". A fortiori

a limitation of the right to legal aid in civil proceedings, must be

considered compatible with Article 6, even if regarded under the

general "fair hearing" clause of paragraph 1.

2. The Government further refers to the concrete circumstances of the

present case and submits that, in any event, Article 6, paragraph (1),

of the Convention was not violated, the applicant's right to a "fair

hearing" in the determination of his civil obligation having been fully

observed by the German courts. In accordance with the relevant

provisions of German law, his submissions could not be considered in

the main proceedings. However, in the proceedings concerning his

petition for free legal aid, he was granted a full hearing at two

instances.

In this connection, the Government refers to the above provisions of

Articles 114 and 118a of the German Code of Civil Procedure setting out

the conditions in which legal aid may be granted and regulating the

procedure to be followed by the Court in order to ascertain whether

these conditions are fulfilled. Reference is further made to the

general rule of Article 139, paragraph (1), of the Code of Civil

Procedure, which states as follows:

"The President shall endeavour to ensure that the parties state their

case fully with respect to all material facts and make all applications

appropriate to their case and, in particular, that they complete any

inadequate statement of facts and indicate the evidence they propose

to adduce. For this purpose he shall, so far as necessary, discuss the

subject-matter and the issue with the parties, from the points of view

of the facts and the law, and put questions."

("Der Vorsitzende had dahin zu wirken, dass die Parteien über alle

erheblichen Tatsachen sich vollständig erklären und die sachdienlichen

Anträge stellen, insbesondere auch ungenügende Angaben der geltend

gemachten Tatsachen ergänzen und die Beweismittel bezeichnen. Er hat

zu diesem Zwecke, soweit erforderlich, das Sach- und Streitverhältnis

mit den Parteien nach der tatsächlichen und der rechtlichen Seite zu

erörtern und Fragen zu stellen.")

In the Government's opinion, if follows from these provisions that the

poor person's right to a "fair hearing" is fully observed as a result

of the thorough examination which has to be undertaken in the

proceedings concerning his petition for free legal aid; indeed, the

arguments submitted by the present applicant in his defence against the

plaintiff's claim for compensation were carefully considered by the

courts in these proceedings.

THE LAW

As to Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention

Whereas Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention provides

that, in the determination of his civil rights and obligations,

everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by a tribunal

established by law; whereas the applicant submits that, his petition

for free legal aid having been refused in the preliminary proceedings,

his right to a fair and public hearing was violated in the main

proceedings before the Regional Court when the Court determined the

question of his liability and his resultant obligation to compensate

the victim of the indecent assault of 23rd December, 1961; whereas the

Government argues that the applicant's right to a fair and public

hearing was fully observed by the competent German courts in the course

of the proceedings as a whole;

Whereas the Commission, in examining the applicant's above complaint,

has first had regard to its constant jurisprudence according to which

the right to free legal aid in civil cases, as opposed to criminal

cases, is not as such included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed

by the Convention; whereas, in this respect, reference is made to the

Commission's decision on the admissibility of Application No. 3011/67

(Collection of Decisions, Vol. 25, pages 70 [73-74]);

Whereas, however, it follows from the text of its above decision that

the Commission, when dealing with complaints concerning the refusal of

free legal aid in civil proceedings, also considers the general clause

of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention in order to

determine whether such refusal constituted, in the particular

circumstances of the case, a violation of the right of a person

concerned to be granted a fair hearing; whereas, indeed, the Commission

also regards this further aspect when examining the issue of legal aid

in criminal proceedings; and whereas the Commission has previously held

that the right to a fair hearing, both in civil and criminal

proceedings, contemplates that everyone who is a party to such

proceedings shall have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case

to the Court under conditions which do not place him at a substantial

disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent; whereas, in this respect, the

Commission refers to its decisions on the admissibility of Applications

No. 434/58 and 1092/61, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human

Rights, Vol. 2, pages 354 (370, 372), and Vol. 5, pages 210 (212), and,

further, to its reports, and the decisions of the Committee of

Ministers, in the cases of Ofner, Hopfinger, Pataki and Dunshirn;

Whereas accordingly, with regard to the present complaint, the

Commission is called upon to consider whether the specific

circumstances of the proceedings against the applicant amounted to a

denial of his right to a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6,

paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; whereas, in this

connection, it is not the task of the Commission to examine in general

whether the relevant provisions of the German Code of Civil Procedure

are in conformity with the Convention;

Whereas the question to be determined is solely whether the application

of these provisions in the present case violated Article 6, paragraph

(1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; and whereas the Commission holds

that this question cannot properly be determined on the basis of an

isolated consideration of the main civil proceedings against the

applicant which led to the judgment by default of 20th September, 1965,

but that regard must be had to all the relevant proceedings;

Whereas, with respect to these proceedings, the Commission observes

that the civil proceedings of which the applicant complains were the

sequel to the criminal proceedings against him in which he had been

convicted and sentenced; whereas, following this conviction and

sentence, the applicant attempted on several occasions to obtain

retrial; and whereas he again contested the findings of the criminal

courts when applying for free legal aid and in the above civil

proceedings against him;

Whereas it is true that the applicant was not heard by the Regional

Court in the main civil proceedings on 30th September, 1965, when a

judgment by default was given against him; whereas, however, it is

clear, both from the decisions rendered by the criminal courts in the

proceedings concerning his petitions for retrial and from the decisions

of the civil courts regarding his petition for free legal aid, that the

arguments submitted by the applicant in the civil proceedings in his

defence against the plaintiff's claim for compensation were carefully

examined by these courts at two instances and found not to be

sufficient to upset, or to put into doubt, the findings of the criminal

courts that he had committed the assault in question; whereas, further,

as to the amount of damages, the applicant, although invited to do so,

did not make any submissions on this point in the proceedings

concerning his petition for free legal aid;

Whereas, in conclusion, having regard to the proceedings as a whole,

the Commission finds that the applicant was accorded an adequate

hearing by the Courts before the civil judgment of 30th September,

1965, was given against him; whereas, in particular, it does not appear

that he was placed at such a disadvantage vis-à-vis the infant

plaintiff as to have prejudiced him in the effective exercise of his

defence against the plaintiff's claim; whereas, therefore, the

applicant's right to a fair hearing in the determination of his civil

obligation to compensate the victim of his alleged assault was not

violated in the proceedings concerned;

Whereas, finally, the Commission has also considered the applicant's

further complaint under Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the

Convention, that he was not heard in public as to the child's claim for

compensation;

Whereas, in this respect, the Commission notes that the main

proceedings before the Regional Court were public; whereas, in

particular, the judgment of 30th September, 1965, was pronounced at a

public session of the Court; whereas, in conclusion, the Commission,

again having regard to the course of the proceedings as a whole, does

not find that the applicant's right to a public hearing was violated

by the German courts;

As to Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6, paragraph (1)

(Art. 14, 6-1), of the Convention

Whereas the applicant also alleges a violation of Article 14 (Art. 14)

of the Convention, complaining that the Regional Court granted free

legal aid only to the plaintiff and that consequently he himself, being

equally without means to pay a barrister's fees, was not represented

by counsel in the main proceedings before the Regional Court;

Whereas, according to Article 14 (Art. 14), the enjoyment of the rights

and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured without any

discrimination on the ground of property; whereas, in this respect, the

Commission has already stated above that the right to free legal aid

in civil cases is not as such guaranteed by the Convention; that,

nevertheless, the refusal of such aid may be considered under the "fair

hearing" clause of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1); but that there

was no violation of this clause in the present case; whereas, in

particular, it is clear from the decisions of the German courts that

the refusal of the applicant's petition for free legal aid was not

based on any consideration of property but solely on an appreciation

of the prospects of his defence against the plaintiff's claim;

Whereas, therefore, the decisions concerned do not as such violate

Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention;

Whereas, finally, it is true that, as a result of the decisions

refusing his petition for free legal aid on the ground that his defence

failed to show a sufficient prospect of success, the applicant, being

without means to pay a barrister's fees, was prevented from pleading

his case in the main proceedings before the Regional Court, while a

person with sufficient means could have done so irrespective of the

prospects of his case; whereas, however, the Commission holds that such

inequality does not violate the Convention; whereas, indeed, it follows

from Article 6 paragraph (3) sub-paragraph (c) (Art. 6-3-c), that even

in criminal proceedings, where a right to free legal aid is guaranteed

by the Convention, this right is limited to cases "where the interests

of justice so require";

Whereas this limitation has also been held by the Commission to apply

to its consideration under Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the

Convention, of complaints concerning the refusal of free legal aid in

criminal cases; whereas, consequently, a reasonable limitation of the

right to free legal aid in civil cases, which is itself not guaranteed

by the Convention, can a fortiori not be regarded as violating the

"fair hearing" clause of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1);

Whereas, similarly, such reasonable limitation cannot be considered as

being contrary to the provisions of Article 14 (Art. 14); and whereas,

in the present case, the limitation of the right to free legal aid

under Article 14 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, which led to

the above formal inequality, must nevertheless be considered as

reasonable;

Whereas, in conclusion, the Commission finds that an examination of the

applicant's complaints under Articles 6 and 14 (Art. 6, 14) does not

disclose the appearance of a violation of the Convention; whereas it

follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission declares this application inadmissible.