THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the applicant may be summarised as

follows:

The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1923 and

residing in Coventry. He is the leader of the British Z. Movement. When

lodging his application he was detained in prison at Aylesbury.

On .. November, 1966, the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having

committed offenses under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act, 1965. The

said Section reads as follows:

"A person shall be guilty of an offence under this Section if, with

intent to stir up hatred against any section of the public in Great

Britain distinguished by colour, race, or ethnic or national origins

- (a) he publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening,

abusive or insulting; or (b) he uses in any public place or at any

public meeting words which are threatening, abusive or insulting, being

matters or words likely to stir up hatred against that section on

grounds of colour, race or ethnic or national origins."

On .. January, 1967, at Devon Assizes the applicant was convicted on

two counts of conspiracy to contravene and one count of inciting to

contravene the provisions of the said Section 6 of the Race Relations

Act and sentenced to a total term of eighteen months' imprisonment. The

applicant, who pleaded not guilty, conducted his own defence. At the

same time , one Y., a discharged Navy rating and 19 years of age, was

convicted on charges of incitement to racial hatred and conspiracy to

commit such offence.

The applicant's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal

against his conviction and sentence was refused by a single judge on

.. March, 1967. The applicant complains that it was not within the

judge's discretion to refuse his application, since it was based on a

point of law, namely that the trial judge had misdirected the jury. In

particular, the applicant alleged that the judge had advised the jury

to disregard the criterion of "insult", one of the vital elements of

Section 6 of the Race Relations Act. The applicant considers that the

refusal is only understandable as an act of political discrimination

contrary to Article 14 of the Convention. He maintains that the finding

of the single judge that he had not indicated with clarity the alleged

point of law was wrong as he had adequately described it. On the other

hand, he had not been able to give precise references to or quote the

transcript of the trial since he had not received a copy in time

despite his request for such a copy. Having been informed that this

application could only be decided by the judge himself, at the same

time as he decided his application for leave to appeal, he notified the

Court that he wished to purchase a copy. He was then told that, as he

had applied of a free copy, he had to await the decision on this,

before he would be able to purchase a copy.

The applicant did not renew his application for leave to appeal to the

Full Court. He submits that he abandoned his application in view of a

statement on the back of the form by which he was given notice of the

refusal of the single judge. According to the applicant, this statement

advised the appellant not to persevere with his application to the Full

Court in disregard of the single judge's refusal, as this, if

unsuccessful, was likely to result in substantial loss of remission

time for good conduct. Rather than allow the likelihood that further

political prejudice would uphold the refusal and, as a result, by

causing forfeiture of remission in effect increase his sentence, he did

not renew his application.

In May 1967, the applicant addressed himself to a Member of Parliament

who made representations to the Home Secretary. On .. July, 1967, the

Home Office replied, however, that the Home Secretary could not re-try

a case or act as a further court of appeal either as regards conviction

or sentence nor did he think it proper to comment on the sentence

passed in a particular case. The Home Secretary found no grounds which

could justify any interference with the trial court's decision.

In November 1967, the Member of Parliament concerned again made

detailed representations to the Home Secretary specifically regarding

the alleged misdirection of the jury and alleged denial of the

applicant's right to appeal, but without success. The applicant himself

petitioned the Home Secretary on these particular grounds but again the

Home Secretary refused to take any action. This refusal was notified

to the applicant on .. December, 1967.

On .. December, 1967, the applicant was notified that the Lord

Chancellor to whom he had similarly applied would take no action to

remedy the alleged injustices in his case.

The applicant's specific complaints .- besides the above-mentioned

alleged violation of Article 14 of the Convention - can be summarised

as follows:

(a)  Section 6 of the Race Relations Act in its interpretation and

application in the applicant's case violates the right to freedom and

expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. He submits that

the two leaflets and the pamphlet concerned, although factually

critical of coloured immigration and Jewish influence, were devoid of

any abusive or threatening language, or advocacy or provocation of

violence, but insisted on a parliamentary solution of the problems

involved.

The applicant complains that Section 6 of the Act prohibits even fair

and factual criticism of certain racially differentiated sections of

the public, thereby providing for some the privilege of immunity from

criticism at the price of the loss to others of legitimate free speech.

The said Section cannot, in the applicant's opinion, be justified under

Article 10, paragraph (2), of the Convention.

(b)  The applicant alleges that, in consequence of his conviction being

contrary to Article 10, he has been wrongfully deprived of his liberty

while serving his sentence in violation of Article 5 of the Convention.

He further alleges violation of Article 4 by having been subjected to

compulsory labour while wrongfully deprived of his liberty.

(c)  Even if Section 6 of the Race Relations Act should be deemed

consistent with Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant submits

that the process of his conviction under it violated Article 5 of the

Convention since he was denied the right to appeal prescribed by the

law of the United Kingdom.

(d)  In the outcome of the applicant's case, the authorities of the

United Kingdom have failed to implement Article 13 of the Convention

which provides that a victim of a violation of the Convention shall

have an effective remedy before a national authority.

THE LAW

Whereas, in regard to the applicant's complaints regarding his

conviction under the Race Relations Act and the court proceedings

concerned, it is to be observed that, under Article 16 (Art. 16) of the

Convention, the Commission may only deal with a matter after all

domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally

recognised rules of international law;

Whereas the applicant had the possibility of renewing his application

for leave to appeal to the Full Court but failed to avail himself of

this possibility; whereas the mere fact that the applicant subsequently

submitted his case to the Home Secretary does not constitute a remedy

for the purpose of Article 16 (Art. 16) of the Convention; whereas,

therefore, he has not exhausted the remedies available to him under

English law;

Whereas, moreover, an examination of the case as it has been submitted,

including an examination made ex officio, does not disclose the

existence of any special circumstances which might have absolved the

applicant, according to the generally recognised rules of international

law, from pursuing his application for leave to appeal; whereas, in

particular, the alleged cautionary note on the form whereby the

applicant was informed of the single judge's refusal to grant him leave

to appeal could not be considered as absolving him from exhausting the

remedy available to him;

Whereas, therefore, the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic

remedies laid down in Articles 26 and 27, paragraph (3) (Art. 26, 27-3)

of that Convention has not been complied with by the applicant;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains separately that Section 6

of the Race Relations Act, both generally and as applied to him,

violates the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 (Art. 10)

of the Convention, the Commission first recalls that it has frequently

stated that it is not its task to examine in abstracto the conformity

of domestic legislation with the provisions of the Convention (see e.g.

application No. 290/57 - X. v. Ireland, Yearbook, Vol. 3, p. 214);

Whereas the question, therefore, which remains to be determined is

whether or not the application of the above statutory provision to the

applicant in the present case was inconsistent with the Convention;

Whereas, again having regard to the rule concerning the exhaustion of

domestic remedies, it is true that the applicant could not specifically

rely on Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention in order to appeal

against his conviction under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act;

whereas, however, the Commission refers to its previous jurisprudence

according to which an applicant's omission to use, on a particular

point, one of the remedies available to him, is sufficient to

constitute non-exhaustion of domestic remedies provided that, by

raising this point, and this point alone, before the domestic courts,

he would have had some chance of winning his whole appeal (Application

No. 712/60 - Retimag S.A. v. the Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook,

Vol. 4, p. 384);

Whereas the Commission has already rejected the applicant's complaint

under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act on the ground of

non-exhaustion of domestic remedies; whereas it follows that the

condition as to exhaustion of domestic remedies laid down in Articles

26 and 27, paragraph (3) (Art. 26, 27-3), of the Convention has again

not been complied with by the applicant with regard to this part of

this application;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains of having been wrongfully

deprived of his liberty, it is clear that the applicant had been

convicted by the judgment of a competent court which had become res

judicata, and was therefore lawfully detained in accordance with the

provisions of Article 5, paragraph (1) (a) (Art. 5-1-a) of the

Convention;

Whereas the applicant further complains that he was subjected to

compulsory labour while serving his sentence; whereas it is true that

Article 4, paragraph (2) (Art. 4-2), of the Convention stipulates that

"No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour";

Whereas, however, paragraph (3) of the said Article (Art. 4-3) states

that for the "purpose of this Article the term 'forced or compulsory'

labour shall not include ... any work required to be done in the

ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of

Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention".

Whereas the Commission has already found that the applicant's detention

was imposed by the competent court in a lawful manner; whereas,

accordingly, the work performed during his detention is covered by

Article 4, paragraph (3) (a) (Art. 4-3-a), taken in conjunction with

Article 5 (Art. 5) (see the Commission's decision on the admissibility

of applications Nos. 3134/67, 3172/67 and 3188 to 3206/67, Twenty-one

detained persons v. the Federal Republic of Germany, Collection of

Decisions, Vol. 27, p. 97);

Whereas, in conclusion, t he Commission finds that an examination of

these parts of the application, including an examination ex officio,

does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and

freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in Articles 4

and 5 (Art. 4, 5); whereas it follows that, in this respect, the

application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the applicant finally complains that the United Kingdom

Government was responsible for a breach of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention in that it failed to provide him with an effective remedy

before a national authority; whereas, however, this provision relates

exclusively to a remedy in respect of a violation of one of the rights

and freedoms set forth in the Convention (see the Commission's

decisions on the admissibility of Application No. 472/59 - X. v.

Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook, Vol. 3, p. 207, No. 655/59 - X.

v.the Federal Republic of Germany, ibid. p. 280, and No. 3325/67 X.,

Y., Z., V. and W. v. the United Kingdom, Collection of Decisions, Vol.

25, p. 117); whereas the applicant, not having established even the

appearance of a violation of one of the other rights invoked by him,

there is in the present case no basis for the application of Article

13 (Art. 13) of the Convention; whereas it follows that this part of

the application is incompatible within the meaning of Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE