Lexploria

Application No. 12794/87

Jutta HUBER

against

SWITZERLAND

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

(adopted on 10 April 1989)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION

(paras. 1-12) .................................... 1

A. The application

(paras. 2-4) ............................. 1

B. The proceedings

(paras. 5-7) ............................. 1

C. The present Report

(paras. 8-12) ............................ 2

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

(paras. 13-33) ................................... 3

A. The particular circumstances of the case

(paras. 13-24) ........................... 3

B. Relevant domestic law

(paras. 25-33) ........................... 6

III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

(paras. 34-49) ................................... 8

Conclusion

(para. 49) ............................... 10

CONCURRING OPINION OF Mr. H. VANDENBERGHE ................. 11

DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. F. MARTINEZ ..................... 12

DISSENTING OPINION OF Mrs. J. LIDDY ....................... 14

APPENDIX I: HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS ............... 15

APPENDIX II: DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY ............ 16

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The following is an outline of the case, as submitted to the

European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the

Commission.

A. The application&_

2. The applicant, born in 1958, is a Swiss citizen residing

in Zurich. Before the Commission, she is represented by

Messrs. E. Schönenberger and K. Mäder, lawyers practising in Zurich.

The application is directed against Switzerland whose

Government are represented by their Agent, Mr. O. Jacot-Guillarmod,

Head of the Division of International Affairs of the Federal Office of

Justice.

3. The application relates to a warrant of arrest, issued against

the applicant by the Zurich District Attorney (Bezirksanwalt) D.J., on

suspicion of having taken part in a prostitute ring and having given

false testimony. A bill of indictment was subsequently issued against

the applicant by D.J. on the ground, inter alia, of false testimony in

court proceedings. The applicant was subsequently acquitted by the

Zurich District Court (Bezirksgericht), though the Zurich Court of

Appeal eventually convicted her of attempted false testimony and

sentenced her to a fine of 4,000 SFr.

4. The applicant complains that, contrary to Article 5 para. 3 of

the Convention, the same District Attorney decided on her detention

and later indicted her. Thus, the District Attorney could not be

regarded as having been independent, as required by that provision.

B. The proceedings&_

5. The application was introduced on 27 February 1987 and

registered on 13 March 1987.

On 7 October 1987 the Commission decided in accordance with

Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure to give notice of the

application to the respondent Government and to invite them to present

their observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the

application. The Government submitted their observations on

18 December 1987, the applicant her reply on 13 April 1988.

6. On 9 July 1988 the Commission declared the application

admissible.

Further observations were submitted by the Government on

6 October 1988.

7. After declaring the application admissible, the Commission,

acting in accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, also

placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a

friendly settlement of the case. Consultations with the parties took

place between 11 July and 5 October 1988. In the light of the

parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis

upon which a settlement can be effected.

C. The present Report&S

8. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in

pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberation and

votes, the following members being present:

MM. J. A. FROWEIN, Acting President

S. TRECHSEL

G. SPERDUTI

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A. WEITZEL

H. G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

H. VANDENBERGHE

Mrs. G. H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

MM. F. MARTINEZ

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

9. The text of this Report was adopted on 10 April 1989 and

is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of

Europe in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.

10. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of

the Convention, is:

i) to establish the facts, and

ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found

disclose a breach by the State concerned of its

obligations under the Convention.

11. A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before

the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's

decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.

12. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the

documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the

Commission.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

A. The particular circumstances of the case&_

13. In connection with criminal investigations against one Mr. K.

in Hamburg and one Mr. B. in Zurich concerning procuring (Zuhälterei)

and pandering (Kuppelei), the Zurich District Attorney's Office

(Bezirksanwaltschaft) issued an order against the applicant to

appear on 8 August 1983 as witness (Vorführungsbefehl). The order was

signed by the District Attorney D.J.

14. On 11 August 1983 the applicant was brought by the Zurich Town

Police before the District Attorney's Office where she was interrogated

by District Attorney D.J. Thereby she admitted having lived of the

proceeds of prostitution. However, she stated that she had known

Messrs. K. and B. only by name and that she did not hand over to

anybody part of her income as a prostitute. As a result, the District

Attorney D.J. remanded the applicant in custody on the same day.

15. According to the warrant of arrest (Verhaftsverfügung) signed

on 11 August 1983 by the District Attorney D.J., there was the urgent

suspicion that members of the group "Hell's Angels" of Zurich and

Hamburg had brought German prostitutes to Zurich. There, in return

for payment, some had married Swiss men. These women had been urged,

partly under threat, to commit professional prostitution whereby the

"Hell's Angels" had protected the women who in turn had given them

part of the proceeds. The applicant was urgently suspected of having

been one of these women.

The warrant of arrest stated that as a witness and under

threat of punishment on account of false testimony she had denied any

connection with the "Hell's Angels". The warrant referred in

particular to a danger of collusion and the danger that evidence would

be destroyed. It also stated that an appeal against the order of

arrest could be filed within 48 hours with the Public Prosecutor's

Office (Staatsanwaltschaft) of the Canton of Zurich.

16. The applicant was released from detention on remand on

19 August 1983.

17. On 12 October 1984 the Zurich District Attorney's Office

indicted the applicant before the Judge in Criminal Cases at the

Zurich District Court (Einzelrichter in Strafsachen am Bezirksgericht)

on the grounds of false testimony in court proceedings and

alternatively (eventualiter) of the hindrance of criminal proceedings

and requested a punishment of 5,000 SFr. The bill of indictment was

signed by the District Attorney D.J. who had also signed the warrant

of arrest.

18. The trial took place on 10 January 1985. According to the

minutes of the trial, the applicant's representative stated as

follows:

"In this case the first thing to note is a violation

of the human right embodied in Article 5 para. 3 of the

European Convention on Human Rights which states that anyone

who is arrested or detained in accordance with the

provisions of Article 5 para. 1 (c) of the Convention has to

be brought promptly before a judge or other officer

authorised by law to exercise judicial power. This never

happened in the present case. Rather, the person who

remanded the accused in custody, District Attorney J., is

today at the same time the author of the bill of

indictment."

"Vorliegend wurde zunächst das in Art. 5 Ziff. 3 der

Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und

Grundfreiheiten (EMRK) statuierte Menschenrecht verletzt,

wonach jede nach der Vorschrift von Art. 5 Ziff. 1 c) EMRK

festgenommene oder in Haft gehaltene Person

unverzüglich einem Richter oder einem anderen, gesetzlich zur

Ausübung richterlicher Funktionen ermächtigten Beamten

vorgeführt werden muss. Eine solche Vorführung hat

vorliegend nie stattgefunden; vielmehr ist derjenige, der

die Angeklagte in Haft genommen hat, heute gleichzeitig

Ankläger, nämlich der Bezirksanwalt J."

19. On 10 January 1985 the Zurich District Court acquitted the

applicant on the grounds that she had never been invited (vorgeladen)

to an interrogation for which reason her testimony was invalid and

could not be considered. The judgment does not refer to the issues

raised at the trial by the applicant's lawyer under Article 5 para. 3

of the Convention.

20. Upon appeal (Berufung) by the Public Prosecutor's Office the

Zurich Court of Appeal (Obergericht) on 13 September 1985 convicted

the applicant of attempted false testimony and sentenced her to a fine

of 4,000 SFr. The Court found that her testimony was not invalid and

could be used. It further referred to the monitoring of telephone

conversations between the applicant and Mr. K. which had been lawfully

undertaken by the authorities in Germany and the minutes of which had

been transmitted by way of legal cooperation to Switzerland. The

Court concluded on the basis of these minutes that the applicant had

in fact known Messrs. K. and B.

21. The judgment of the Court of Appeal also refers to the issue

under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention:

"Finally it must be noted that the applicant's

lawyer unjustifiably put forward the objection that in the

context of her arrest and in contravention of Article 5

para. 3 of the Convention the accused had not been brought

before a judge or other officer authorised by law to

exercise judicial power. For, according to the case-law of

the Federal Court, the Zurich District Attorney exercises in

the procedural stage of investigation also judicial power

within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention

(ATF [Arrêts du Tribunal Fédéral] 102 Ia 179)."

"Schliesslich ist festzuhalten, dass der Einwand der

Verteidigung, die Angeklagte sei im Zusammenhang mit ihrer

Verhaftung in Verletzung von Art. 5 Ziff. 3 EMRK keinem

Richter oder einem anderen gesetzlich zur Ausübung

richterlicher Funktionen ermächtigten Beamten vorgeführt

worden, zu Unrecht erfolgte. Nach der Rechtsprechung des

Bundesgerichtes übt nämlich der zürcherische Bezirksanwalt

im Verfahrensstadium der Untersuchung auch richterliche

Funktionen im Sinne von Art. 5 Ziff. 3 EMRK aus (BGE 102 Ia

179)."

22. The applicant filed a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeits-

beschwerde) which was dismissed by the Zurich Court of Cassation

(Kassationsgericht) on 1 July 1986. The Court found that the issue

under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention was irrelevant for the

present case. If the applicant therefore challenged the District

Attorney she should have done so already during the investigation.

23. The applicant then lodged a public law appeal with the Federal

Court (Bundesgericht) in which she complained, inter alia, that,

contrary to Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention, the Zurich District

Attorney had not only remanded the applicant in custody but also

indicted her.

24. The Federal Court dismissed the applicant's public law appeal

on 24 November 1986. The decision was served on the applicant on

18 December 1986. In respect of the applicant's complaint under

Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention the Federal Court held:

"As the applicant has long since been released from

detention on remand, she no longer has an actual practical

interest in a response to this complaint for which reason

the Court can no longer deal with it. The objection would in

any event be unfounded since both the Federal Court (ATF 102

Ia 179 et seq.) and the European Court of Human Rights

(judgment of 4 December 1979 in the Schiesser case) have

declared that the Zurich District Attorney qualifies in the

procedural phase of the investigation as an 'officer authorised

by law to exercise judicial power' within the meaning of

Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention."

"Nachdem die Beschwerdeführerin längst aus der

Untersuchungshaft entlassen worden ist, hat sie jedoch kein

aktuelles praktisches Interesse mehr an der Behandlung

dieser Rüge, weshalb darauf nicht einzutreten ist. Der

Vorwurf wäre übrigens unbegründet, da sowohl das

Bundesgericht (BGE 102 Ia 179ff.) als auch der Europäische

Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (Urteil vom 4. Dezember 1979

in Sachen Schiesser) erklärt haben, der zürcherische

Bezirksanwalt sei im Verfahrensstadium der Untersuchung ein

'gesetzlich zur Ausübung richterlicher Funktionen

ermächtigter Beamter' im Sinne von Art. 5 Ziff. 3 EMRK."

B. Relevant domestic law and practice&S

25. According to S. 32 of the Judiciary Act (Gerichtsverfassungs-

gesetz, GVG) of the Canton of Zurich of 1976 the District Court

examines as a criminal court all matters not falling within the

jurisdiction of another court. S. 44 and 57 GVG state the various

offences which the Court of Appeal and the Jury Court, respectively,

are competent to deal with; they do not include the charges brought

against the applicant.

26. S. 72 GVG provides that the District Attorney's Office acts as

the indicting authority (Anklagebehörde) at the level of the District

Court, and the Public Prosecutor's Office before the Court of Appeal

and the Jury Court (Geschworenengericht). S. 73 GVG states that the

investigation of offences is conducted by the District Attorney's

Office and the Public Prosecutor's Office. In practice, most

investigations are carried out by the District Attorney. As a rule,

District Attorneys are elected for office by the people for four years

(S. 86 para. 2 GVG).

27. S. 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung,

StPO) of the Canton of Zurich of 1919 authorises the District Attorney to

issue a warrant of arrest. Against the latter an appeal may be filed.

S. 64 StPO obliges the District Attorney to hear an arrested suspect

within twenty-four hours. According to S. 65 StPO, the suspect must

thereby be clearly informed of the reasons prompting the suspicion held

against him and must be given the opportunity to invalidate these

reasons. S. 31 StPO generally obliges the investigating officer to

consider exculpating and inculpating circumstances with equal care.

28. Detention on remand ordered by the District Attorney may not

exceed 14 days, except if continuation is ordered by the President of

the District Court or of the Prosecuting Chamber (Anklagekammer) of

the Court of Appeal, depending on the jurisdiction of the respective

Court (S. 51 StPO).

29. Once the investigation has been closed and the District

Attorney's Office does not intend to prosecute the accused, the

investigation is discontinued (S. 39 StPO). Otherwise, the indicting

authority, i.e. the District Attorney's Office or the Public

Prosecutor's Office, commences the main proceedings (Hauptverfahren)

by submitting the bill of indictment (S. 161 StPO). The President of

the District Court or of the Prosecuting Chamber of the Court of

Appeal will then decide whether or not to admit the bill of indictment

(S. 165 StPO).

30. S. 178 StPO states:

"The indicting authority is a party to the main

proceedings. It has as such all the rights and duties of a

party.

In his statement the indicting officer should not

one-sidedly confine himself to stressing items that tell

against the accused, but should also take into account items

in his favour."

"Die Anklagebehörde ist im Hauptverfahren Prozesspartei.

Sie hat alle einer solchen zustehenden Rechte und Pflichten.

Der Ankläger soll bei seinen Vorträgen nicht einseitig

nur dasjenige hervorheben, was den Angeschuldigten beschweren

kann, sondern auch das berücksichtigen, was zu seinen Gunsten

spricht."

31. The District Attorney remains under the control of the Public

Prosecutor's Office (S. 86 GVG), and the latter is authorised to issue

directives to him (S. 27 StPO). In practice District Attorneys

receive no special orders or instructions from the Public Prosecutor's

Office concerning their powers of placing individuals in detention.

32. Apart from the power to order arrest and detention and to

interrogate the arrested suspect, the District Attorney has the power

to issue a summons order (Strafbefehl) if the accused has confessed

and admitted his guilt, and if a fine (Busse) or prison sentence of a

maximum of one month is considered to be adequate (S. 317 StPO).

33. After conviction, S. 419 StPO allows an appeal to the Court

of Appeal in which complaints may be raised alleging defects

(Mängel) both of the investigation and of the procedure (Verfahren) and

the decision of the first instance court.

III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

34. The issue to be determined in the present case is whether there has

been a violation of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, in that the

applicant, upon her arrest and detention, was not brought before an "officer

authorised by law to exercise judicial power".

Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) states:

"3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the

provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article shall be

brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised

by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to

trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.

Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for

trial."

35. The Commission recalls that the "officer" referred to in

Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, while not identical with a

"judge", must nevertheless have some of the latter's attributes.

First, he must be independent of the executive and of the parties.

Secondly, he must be under an obligation to hear the individual

brought before him. Thirdly, he must review the circumstances

militating for or against detention (see Eur. Court H.R., Schiesser

judgment of 4 December 1979, Series A No. 34, p. 13 et seq. para. 31).

36. In the present case the second and third criteria have not

been called in question. However, there is disagreement between the

parties as to whether the District Attorney met the requirement of

independence. In this respect, his independence of the executive is

not disputed. In fact, as the Court found in the Schiesser case, the

Zurich District Attorney acts without instructions, supervision or

advice, from the Department of Justice or the Public Prosecutor's

Office of the Canton of Zurich (ibid. p. 15 para. 35).

37. Rather, in the present case the issue arises whether the

District Attorney can be considered as having been independent of

the parties.

38. The applicant submits that the District Attorney was not

independent within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3), since he later

also indicted her.

39. The Government submit that for purposes of Article 5 para. 3

(Art. 5-3) the decisive moment must be the time of arrest. At that stage, the

District Attorney's status and powers are not affected by the fact

that he may later draw up the bill of indictment. The Government fail

to see what advantage there would be for the accused if the indictment

was drawn up by an officer other than the District Attorney ordering

the arrest of the accused. Indeed, the applicant did not claim during

the domestic proceedings to have suffered any specific injury as a

result of the complaints she is now raising before the Commission.

40. The Commission and the Court were confronted with a similar

issue in the Schiesser case. There the Court found:

"the District Attorney intervened exclusively in his

capacity as an investigating authority, that is in

considering whether Mr. Schiesser should be charged and

detained on remand and, subsequently, in conducting

enquiries with an obligation to be equally thorough in

gathering evidence in his favour and evidence against him

(Article 31 StPO). He did not assume the mantle of

prosecutor: he neither drew up the indictment nor

represented the prosecuting authorities before the trial

court... He therefore did not exercise concurrent

investigating and prosecuting functions" (ibid. p. 15

para. 34).

41. Subsequently, in the Skoogström case the Commission found that

the officer who decided on the applicant's continuing detention on

remand was not independent of the parties since she could have been

called upon to perform tasks of a prosecutor. The Report continues:

"The fact that Mrs. M did not herself perform the subsequent

prosecution in court could not retroactively make her

independent of the parties at the time when she took the

detention decision. It was a mere coincidence that all the

tasks were not performed by the same prosecutor". (Comm.

Report 15.7.83, Eur. Court H.R., Series A No. 83, p. 16

para. 78).

42. In two cases concerning military arrest and detention in the

Netherlands, the Court found that the auditeur-militair concerned was

liable to act in one and the same case also as the prosecuting

authority after the case had been referred to trial. He could

therefore not be regarded as being independent of the parties at the

preliminary stage (see Eur. Court H.R., de Jong, Baljet and van den

Brink judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A No. 77, p. 24 para. 49; van

der Sluijs, Zuiderveld and Klappe judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A

No. 78, p. 19 para. 44).

43. Recently in the Pauwels case the Court concluded that the

impartiality of the Belgian auditeur militaire was called in question

as he combined, with regard to the same applicant, the functions of

both investigation and prosecution (see judgment of 26 May 1988,

Series A No. 135, p. 19 para. 38).

44. With regard to the present case the Commission observes that

according to S. 31 StPO the District Attorney, when undertaking the

investigations and in particular remanding a person in custody, must

consider with equal care exculpating and incriminating circumstances.

Subsequently, according to S. 178 para. 1 StPO, the District Attorney

as the indicting authority becomes a party to the trial proceedings.

45. The Commission further considers that, as under Article 6 para. 1 (Art.

6-1) of the Convention, also under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) the "officer

authorised by law to exercise judicial power" must inspire in the public

confidence in his independence, and that in such areas even appearances may be

important (see Eur. Court H.R., Piersack judgment of 1 October 1982, Series A

No. 53, p. 14 et seq. para. 30).

46. In the Commission's opinion, if an accused is heard by a District

Attorney, who may order detention, and later in the trial risks again to be

confronted with the same person, now as the opponent who is prosecuting the

accused, the public are entitled to fear that, when remanding the accused into

custody, the District Attorney does not offer sufficient guarantees of

independence, as required by Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.

47. In the present case, the District Attorney concerned was likely to, and

indeed did, become one of the parties to the proceedings. It follows that he

lacked the required independence when hearing the applicant upon her arrest.

48. Consequently, the Commission finds that the District Attorney cannot be

considered an "officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" within the

meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.

Conclusion

49. The Commission concludes, by 12 votes to 2, that there has been a

violation of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention in that the

applicant, upon her arrest and detention, was not brought before an "officer

authorised by law to exercise judicial power" within the meaning of this

provision.

Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (J.A. FROWEIN)

&-OPINION CONCURRENTE DE M. H. VANDENBERGHE&S

Pour arriver à la conclusion de la violation de l'article 5

par. 3 de la Convention, la Commission, se référant à la jurisprudence

développée par la Cour dans l'arrêt Schiesser et suivie

ultérieurement, constate aux par. 44 et svts que le procureur de

district zurichois qui a ordonné l'arrestation de la requérante a,

par la suite, également dressé l'acte d'accusation. Elle en déduit

que le procureur manquait d'indépendance envers la requérante au

moment de l'arrestation et ne répondait donc pas aux critères exigés Ã

l'article 5 par. 3.

Je suis au regret de constater que je ne puis suivre cette

argumentation a posteriori. Il me semble que c'est au moment de

l'arrestation qu'on doit pouvoir contrôler si la décision a été prise

par un magistrat qui satisfait aux conditions posées par l'article 5

par. 3. Une circonstance de fait dépendant du déroulement postérieur

de la procédure pénale, circonstance qui n'est donc pas accessible au

moment de la décision de l'arrestation, ne me semble pas rentrer en

ligne de compte pour ce contrôle.

A l'instar de la Commission, je suis d'avis qu'il y a

violation de l'article 5 par. 3. En ce qui concerne la motivation, je

me réfère à l'opinion dissidente exprimée par le Président Ryssdal

dans l'arrêt Schiesser où il déclare : "Un principe fondamental

commande de séparer poursuite et pouvoir judiciaire. Selon moi, il

vaut également pour l'interprétation de l'article 5 par. 3 et au sens

de ce texte un magistrat qui agit comme autorité de poursuite ne peut

passer pour un 'magistrat habilité par la loi à exercer des fonctions

judiciaires' "(Cour eur. D.H., arrêt Schiesser du 24 octobre 1989,

Série A no 34, p. 19 et svt).

Je voudrais ajouter que dans la mesure où le parquet est uni

et indivisible, la réponse à la question de savoir si c'est la

même personne qui a ordonné l'arrestation et a, par la suite, prononcé

l'acte d'accusation, ne me semble pas pertinente sur le point organique.

&-OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. F. MARTINEZ&S

1. A mon très grand regret je ne peux pas suivre la majorité de

la Commission dans son raisonnement.

La Commission trouve que le cas d'espèce se distingue de

l'affaire Schiesser dans le fait que le procureur de district qui a

ordonné l'arrestation a, par la suite, également dressé l'acte

d'accusation. Et elle en déduit que la détention provisoire qu'il a

ordonnée n'aurait pas été conforme à l'article 5 par. 3 de la

Convention.

Je ne saurais être d'accord avec une telle analyse.

2. Mon point de départ est l'arrêt Schiesser, dans lequel la Cour

européenne examine le statut du procureur de district zurichois pour

conclure qu'il répond bien à la notion de "magistrat habilité par la

loi" prévue par l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention.

Certes, la Cour dit, en examinant le rôle du procureur dans

l'affaire Schiesser, qu'il n'avait ni rédigé l'acte d'accusation ni

exercé la poursuite devant les juges du fond. Mais je ne pense pas

que, dans les circonstances de notre cas d'espèce, le simple fait que

le procureur ait dressé l'acte d'accusation puisse avoir le poids

nécessaire pour faire adopter une position autre que celle prise par

la Cour dans son arrêt.

D'une part, je crois que la doctrine de l'arrêt Schiesser

demeure solide sans le soutien du membre de phrase "he neither drew up

the indictment" (par. 34 de l'arrêt), que la Commission a estimé être

la clef de voûte. A mon avis cette seule circonstance ne suffit pas Ã

contrecarrer l'ensemble de tous les autres éléments pris en

considération par la Cour.

D'autre part, il me semble important de souligner certaines

circonstances concrètes qui - je le pense - enlèvent beaucoup de poids

au fait que le même procureur a dressé l'acte d'accusation. Ce sont

les suivantes :

a) Le procureur accorde la mise en détention provisoire le

11 août 1983, la révoque le 19 août 1983 et ne dresse l'acte

d'accusation que le 12 octobre 1984, soit quatorze mois plus

tard.

b) Il n'a jamais été requis contre la requérante une peine

privative de liberté, mais seulement une amende.

c) Le procureur en question n'a pas exercé l'accusation pendant

la procédure au fond.

d) On ne peut imaginer aucun avantage que la requérante aurait pu

tirer du fait que l'acte d'accusation aurait été signé d'un

autre procureur, par exemple celui qui a exercé l'accusation

pendant la procédure par devant les juges du fond.

3. Cela dit, il me faut constater qu'il existe une certaine

analogie entre la position qu'a prise le procureur de Zurich et celle

d'un juge d'instruction français. Celui-ci statue sur la détention

provisoire et dresse aussi l'acte d'accusation. Car il n'y a pas de

différence fondamentale entre l'acte d'accusation du procureur

zurichois et l'ordonnance de renvoi du juge d'instruction français.

Et personne n'a songé à contester que le juge d'instruction français

peut remplir le rôle mentionné à l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention.

4. La conclusion de la Commission rend extrêmement difficile la

structure juridique de la violation qu'elle trouve, parce qu'Ã

l'origine existe un acte valable selon l'arrêt Schiesser :

l'intervention du procureur de district du 11 août 1983. Ce n'est que

plus d'une année aprés - le 12 octobre 1984 - que l'acte, valable

à l'origine, devient violateur de la Convention, parce que le même

procureur - et non l'un de ses collègues - dresse l'acte d'accusation

pour requérir une peine d'amende.

Mais comment envisager à bon droit cet effet rétroactif ?

S'agirait-il dès l'origine d'un acte constituant une violation

soumise à la condition suspensive que le même procureur dresse plus

tard l'acte d'accusation ? S'agirait-il d'un acte en principe

conforme à la Convention mais sous condition résolutoire ?

5. Serait-il raisonnable d'avoir un délai d'incertitude -

quatorze mois dans notre cas - sans vraiment savoir s'il existera ou

non une violation de l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention ?

Il ne me semble pas que cette situation puisse se concilier

avec le principe de sécurité juridique.

Et pourtant la sécurité juridique est inhérente au

fonctionnement de la Convention.

Une publication de la Convention préparée au sein du Conseil

de l'Europe est assortie d'un avant-propos dans lequel on peut lire

ceci:

"La Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme constitue la

garantie collective sur le plan européen de certains des principes

énoncés dans la Déclaration universelle des Droits de l'Homme,

renforcée par un contrôle international judiciaire dont les décisions

doivent être respectées par les Etats." (C'est moi qui souligne).

Ainsi les arrêts de la Cour européenne guident les Etats

membres pour leur dire ce qu'ils peuvent faire et ce qu'ils doivent

éviter pour respecter leurs engagements vis-à-vis de la Convention.

La Cour européenne a dit à la Suisse dans l'arrêt Schiesser

que la détention ordonnée par le procureur de Zurich était conforme Ã

l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention. La Suisse a ainsi reçu un gage

de sécurité de la part de la Cour européenne, au point que le Tribunal

fédéral a fait état de cette sécurité dans l'arrêt qu'il a rendu le

24 novembre 1986 sur le recours de droit public introduit par la

requérante.

Je pense donc que notre Cour européenne, pour ébranler la

sécurité qu'elle-même a donné à la Suisse, aurait besoin d'un argument

beaucoup plus fort que la simple signature de l'acte d'accusation

(pour requérir une peine d'amende) par le même procureur qui, quatorze

mois auparavant, avait ordonné la détention provisoire et ensuite la

mise en liberté de la requérante.

&-DISSENTING OPINION OF Mrs. J. LIDDY&S

I consider that the course which the proceedings actually took

at domestic level in relation to the District Attorney's exercise of

his powers and consequently the facts as established in the present

Report provide an insufficient basis for distinguishing the present

case from the Schiesser case (Judgment of 4 December 1979, Series A

no. 34), particularly taking account of the considerations set out in

Mr. Martinez' dissenting opinion. Accordingly, I was unable to join

the majority and have voted for no violation of Article 5 para. 3 of

the Convention.

.IG

***

&-APPENDIX I&S

HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS

Date Item

----------------------------------------------------------------------

27 February 1987 Introduction of the application

13 March 1987 Registration of the application

Examination of admissibility

7 October 1987 Commission's decision to invite

the Government to submit observations

on the admissibility and merits of the

application

18 December 1988 Government's observations

13 April 1988 Applicant's observations in reply

9 July 1988 Commission's decision to declare

the application partly admissible

Examination of the merits

6 October 1988 Government's supplementary observations

10 December 1988 Commission's consideration of the state

of proceedings

10 April 1989 Commission's deliberations on the merits

and final vote and adoption of the Report

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HUBER v. SWITZERLAND

HUBER v. SWITZERLAND

LEXI