Lexploria

Application No. 12366/86

Antero RIEME

against

SWEDEN

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

(adopted on 2 October 1990)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

I. INTRODUCTION (paras. 1-14) ........................... 1

A. The application

(paras. 2-4) .................................... 1

B. The proceedings

(paras. 5-10) .................................... 1

C. The present Report

(paras. 11-14) ................................... 2

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS (paras. 15-37) ............ 3

A. The particular circumstances of the case

(paras. 15-28) ................................... 3

B. Relevant domestic law

(paras. 29-37) ................................... 8

III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (paras. 38-67) ............. 11

A. Complaint declared admissible (para. 38) ......... 11

B. Point at issue

(para. 39) ....................................... 11

C. Article 8 of the Convention

(paras. 40-66) ................................... 11

a. Complaints and submissions (para. 41) ........ 11

b. Whether there was an interference with

the applicant's right to respect for his

family life (paras. 42-45) .................. 11

c. Whether the interference was in accordance

with the law (paras. 46-52) ................. 12

d. Whether the interference pursued a legitimate

aim (para. 53) .............................. 13

e. Whether the interference was "necessary in a

democratic society" (paras. 54-66) .......... 13

D. Conclusion (para. 67) ........................... 17

Dissenting opinion of Mr. H. Danelius joined by

MM. J.A. Frowein, E. Busuttil and F. Martinez ............ 18

Dissenting opinion of Mr. H. G. Schermers ................ 19

Concurring opinion of Mrs. G. H. Thune .................... 20

Concurring opinion of Mrs. J. Liddy ....................... 21

Concurring opinion of Mr. L. Loucaides .................... 22

APPENDIX I : HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS .................. 23

APPENDIX II: DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY ............... 25

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the

European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the

Commission.

A. The application

2. The applicant is a Finnish citizen, born in 1940 and resident

at Tumba. He is represented before the Commission by Mr. Lennart

Hane, a lawyer practising in Stockholm.

3. The application is directed against Sweden. The Government

are represented by their Agent, Mr. Hans Corell, Ambassador,

Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm.

4. The case relates to the public care and the prohibition on

removal from the foster home of the applicant's daughter and it raises

issues under Article 8 of the Convention.

B. The proceedings

5. The application was introduced on 28 July 1986 and registered

on 1 September 1986. The Commission decided on 6 October 1987, in

accordance with Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give

notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite

them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of

the application with regard to the complaints under Article 8 of the

Convention.

The Government's observations were dated 26 February 1988 and

the applicant's observations in reply were dated 26 April 1988.

6. On 4 December 1988 the Commission decided to invite the parties

to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.

At the hearing, which was held on 5 July 1989, the applicant

was represented by Mr. Lennart Hane. The applicant and his wife were

also present at the hearing.

The Government were represented by their Agent, Ambassador

Hans Corell and as advisers Mr. Leif Lindgren, legal adviser at the

Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, and Mr. Pär Boqvist, legal

adviser at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

7. Following the hearing the Commission, on 5 July 1989, declared

the application inadmissible with regard to certain complaints under

Article 6 of the Convention and admissible with regard to the

remaining complaints, mainly under Article 8 of the Convention.

8. On 10 October 1989 the text of the decision on admissibility

was communicated to the parties who were invited to submit any

additional observations or further evidence they wished to put before

the Commission. The applicant submitted observations by letter dated 20

November 1989 and the Government by letters dated 24 November 1989 and

9 January 1990.

9. On 17 March 1989 the Commission decided that legal aid

should be granted to the applicant.

10. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in

accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, placed

itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a

friendly settlement of the case. In the light of the parties'

reactions the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which a

friendly settlement can be effected.

C. The present Report

11. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in

pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and

votes in plenary session, the following members being present:

MM. J.A. FROWEIN, Acting President

F. ERMACORA

E. BUSUTTIL

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

J.C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

MM. F. MARTINEZ

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

Mr. L. LOUCAIDES

The text of the Report was adopted by the Commission on

2 October 1990 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in

accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.

12. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1

of the Convention, is

(1) to establish the facts, and

(2) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found

disclose a breach by the State concerned of its

obligations under the Convention.

13. A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before

the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's

decision on the admissibility of the application forms Appendix II.

14. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the

documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

A. The particular circumstances of the case

15. The applicant has a daughter, Susanne, together with Mrs. AJ.

Susanne was born on 28 October 1976. Mrs. AJ had the legal custody of

Susanne from her birth. When Susanne was eleven months old, the

Southern Social District Council (södra sociala distriktsnämnden;

hereafter "the Social Council") of Södertälje, on 26 September 1977,

decided that the daughter should be taken into care pursuant to

Sections 25(a) and 29 of the 1960 Child Welfare Act (barnavårdslagen).

Shortly thereafter Susanne was placed in a foster home. She lived in

this foster home until the autumn of 1989. Thereafter she has lived

with the applicant.

16. On 30 November 1981 the applicant instituted civil proceedings

before the District Court (tingsrätten) of Södertälje requesting that

the custody of Susanne be transferred to him. By a judgment of

28 September 1983 the District Court ordered that the legal custody of

Susanne be transferred to the applicant.

In the judgment the Court stated inter alia as follows:

"As a background to the reasoning which will follow, the

Court expresses the opinion that there appear to be very

strong reasons not now - nor maybe in the reasonably near

future - to move Susanne from the home where she has stayed

in good conditions since a tender age. It is apparent that

Susanne is well settled in the foster home, and that she is

secure and at home there and regards the foster family as

her own home. Consequently, the placement in the home appears

to be compatible with her best interests ...

...

(The applicant) shows an active interest in Susanne. In any

case during the last years he has endeavoured to keep

contact with her and to meet her. It cannot be denied that

(the applicant's) endeavours may appear unwise for an

outsider in view of her best interests. However, the

District Court considers that unreasonably high demands on

insight cannot be put in this respect. (The applicant's)

wish to take care of the girl himself appears nevertheless

natural and his attitude is certainly shared by many

although it does not fully correspond to a modern view on

children and their needs.

As has been said before, a transfer of the custody of

Susanne to (the applicant) would not lead to the termination

of the placement in the foster home. On the other hand, he

would be given a possibility to have the issue legally

examined in the light of the changes in the child's and his own

conditions which may occur in the future. Furthermore, a

transfer could stimulate further contacts between (the

applicant) and his daughter which, in the long run, would be

valuable to her. The Social Council can see to it that such

contacts do not conflict with the child's best interests."

17. Mrs. AJ appealed against the judgment to the Svea Court of

Appeal (Svea hovrätt), which on 21 June 1984 confirmed the judgment of

the District Court. This judgment acquired legal force.

18. On 19 October 1983 the applicant submitted a request to the

Social Council that the public care of Susanne be terminated. The

Social Council held a hearing at which the applicant, his wife and his

representative were present. The applicant claimed that the Council

should decide about the applicant's right of access to his daughter

at regular intervals. On 16 October 1984 the Social Council

decided to terminate the public care of Susanne and, pursuant to

Section 28 of the Social Services Act (socialtjänstlagen), to prohibit

the applicant from taking Susanne away from the foster home, on the

ground that there was a risk which was not of a minor character that

Susanne's mental health would be harmed if she were separated from the

foster home. No decision was made with regard to the claim for

access regulation.

19. The decision of the Council was based on a report, submitted

to it by the social welfare officers responsible for the matter. A

psychiatric opinion by an authorised psychologist, Jarkko Rantanen,

and a senior physician, Dr. Sari Granström, both at the Institution

for Child and Youth Psychiatry in Stockholm (PBU), is appended to the

report. It contains the following statement :

"A change of home for Susanne would mean many anguishing

changes for her, for instance the loss of objects of

security (her foster parents and foster siblings), loss of

friends at home and at school, loss of a familiar

environment and daily routines, etc. At the same time it

would mean that all the new things she would need to be

acquainted with, for instance new friends, a new school and a

new physical environment, new daily routines, etc. would be

heavy stress factors that her insufficient inner structure

would scarcely be able to cope with in a satisfactory way.

She would also lose the ego support from secure adults (her

foster parents) that she still needs. She has not yet been

able to develop an equivalent relationship with her natural

father and his wife. Her chances of mastering everyday life

and of being able to develop would thus be rendered more

difficult in two ways: on the one hand her insufficient

ego functions would be confronted with an unreasonable

adaptation task through too many changes at one time and, on

the other, much support required for her ego development

would be taken away from her immediately when facing such

strains. Susanne has shown that she has a tendency to react

with her body to significant changes. A probable consequence

of a move would be that the psychosomatic problems she has

today, enuresis, would be aggravated, for example by her

starting to wet herself during the day too. Another

probable consequential psychosomatic symptom is recurring

stomach pains. There is also a risk of increased reserve

and depression.

A move to Susanne's natural father requires that the

relationship between him, his present wife and Susanne be

developed and deepened. Furthermore, it requires that

Susanne be sufficiently mature for the move to be discussed

with her, with its advantages and disadvantages and related

feelings of loss and sorrow, which has as yet proved

impossible in her case according to the investigation at

PBU. As a consequence, Susanne should be allowed to

continue to develop and mature within the family frame that

has been her home for more than six years. This also means,

in our opinion, that she should not be subjected to new

examinations connected with her return home within the next

few years, but Susanne's contact with her father needs to be

continued and developed in collaboration with her foster

parents. The regular contact between Susanne and her

natural father has meant that Susanne has been able

to create psychological childhood ties with her biological

origin. If this development, which has already begun, shall

have a chance to continue, Susanne's natural father needs a

great deal of support in order to be capable of maintaining

and further developing his contact with his daughter based on

the daughter's needs."

20. The applicant appealed against the prohibition on removal to

the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of

Stockholm. The Court held a hearing in camera on 22 January 1985 at

which hearing the applicant and his wife were present and represented

by counsel. The foster parents were heard as witnesses at the request

of the applicant. Furthermore, at the request of the Social Council,

the chief doctor Sari Granström and the psychologist Jarkko Rantanen

were heard. In the judgment dated 25 January 1985, the County

Administrative Court rejected the applicant's appeal and stated as

follows in its reasons:

"The Social Council has decided to terminate the care of

Susanne. It follows that (the applicant's) personal

circumstances do not as such constitute an obstacle to

sending the girl home. (The applicant) is of the opinion

that Susanne is not at ease in the foster home which is

sometimes expressed in her bashful attitude towards other

children.

The Social Council has alleged that a removal of Susanne

would involve a risk of harm to her mental health which is

not of a minor character. The Council has relied on a child

psychiatric opinion by Sari Granström and Jarkko Rantanen.

The information given in the opinion has been confirmed by

them at the hearing. It suggests that an immediate removal

of Susanne would involve the serious consequences alleged by

the Social Council, i.e. that Susanne - who is a sensitive,

fragile, and vulnerable girl - will lose her security and

show psychosomatic symptoms such as enuresis - bedwetting -

and stomach pains as well as depressive tendencies. In

addition, it must be recalled that the placement in the

foster home - where Susanne apparently feels safe and at

home in all respects - must be assessed to be entirely

compatible with her best interests. Against this

background, bringing the child home must at present be

considered to involve a risk which is not of a minor

character. When balancing this risk against the interests of

the custodian - for which the Court, as such, has great

sympathy - the County Administrative Court finds the

preponderant reasons to be in favour of letting Susanne,

until further notice, stay in the (foster home)."

21. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the

Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Stockholm.

22. In submissions to the Administrative Court of Appeal dated 3

June 1985 the Social Council stated inter alia:

"The Council has the greatest understanding and respect for

(the applicant's) longing for Susanne. However, it is first

and foremost Susanne's best interest we must see to and we

consider it to be (the applicant's) right and duty towards

Susanne, by way of a slowly and successively developed

contact, to create a close relation to her which will make

them feel a really mutual security together. Thereafter

Susanne should of course return home. It is impossible to

calculate how long this will take. It would create great

legal insecurity for Susanne if a fixed time limit were

set."

23. In a memorandum of 14 June 1985 also addressed to the

Administrative Court of Appeal, the responsible social secretary

stated that Susanne, at her own request, stayed over night with the

applicant three times during the last two months and that Susanne had

said that she wished to continue to meet her father every second week

and stay over night only one night to begin with.

24. By a judgment of 2 August 1985, the Administrative Court of

Appeal rejected the appeal. In its reasons, the Court stated as

follows:

"The aim of the provisions of Section 28 of the Social

Services Act is to safeguard the best interests of the

child. Among the circumstances which must be considered

in that context are the age of the child, its abilities and

emotional ties. Furthermore regard must be had, inter

alia, to the child's own wishes and the time that the

child has been cared for in the home from which it is

supposed to be removed.

(Susanne) has been cared for in the foster home since

October 1977 and thus for the major part of her life.

She is considered to be a sensitive child and has had

certain psychosomatic symptoms. After the County

Administrative Court's examination of the question of

the removal of Susanne, it appears that the relationship

between Susanne and (the applicant) has developed in a

favourable manner. The Administrative Court of Appeal

finds, however, that an enforced removal still involves

a risk of harming Susanne's mental health, a risk which

is not of a minor character. The request to lift the

prohibition against taking Susanne away from the foster home

cannot therefore be granted. The question as to when

the prohibition can be lifted is dependent upon how the

contacts between (the applicant) and Susanne will develop in

the future. The Administrative Court of Appeal finds that

the prohibition cannot at present be limited in time."

25. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court

(regeringsrätten) which, on 26 March 1986, refused leave to appeal.

26. As from May 1986 Susanne stayed overnight every second

week-end with the applicant and his wife. In the summers of 1986 and

1987 she spent parts of her holidays with them. She also stayed with

the applicant about one week during Christmas 1987, Easter 1988 and

New Year 1988-1989. In a memorandum dated 15 December 1987 the Social

Council stated as follows:

"The measures which have been taken to bring about more

frequent contacts and a possible transfer have essentially

been to support Susanne and the foster home in order to make

the visits and the holidays with the father as natural as

possible. In addition, the foster home ... has received

support to take initiative to better contact with the

father. Susanne's own will is considered to be of great

importance and her feelings of the contact with the father

have been monitored regularly. Susanne is mature for her

age and has more and more been able to express her own will

to the foster home and the father. Consequently, her own

wishes about how the contact with the father should be

arranged have been decisive. More frequent contacts and a

possible transfer to the father are allowed to develop in

the girl's speed. Antero Rieme has since the autumn of 1985

declined contact with the social authorities. As the father

has previously said that he is prepared to cut off the

contact with the daughter, the social authorities have found

it of great importance to point out that it is important

that he maintains the contact with Susanne, not least

for her own sake. As the social authorities have no contact

with Antero Rieme there are obstacles to work actively for a

better relation between him and the foster home, which with

the support of the social authorities invite the father to

talks and contacts. In view of Susanne's age and maturity

the social authorities have paid the greatest attention to

her own will. Susanne has since the age of one year stayed

in the foster home and has strong emotional bonds with the

foster parents. The continued development of the contacts

between Susanne and the father must therefore follow her own

speed and a transfer shall take place when she so wishes."

27. On 1 September 1989 the applicant requested that the

prohibition on removal be terminated. An investigation was made by

the Social Administration. In the report dated 25 October 1989 to the

Social Council the following is said:

"Susanne is a sensitive child who earlier showed

psychosomatic symptoms such as bed wetting, stomach pains

and head ache. These troubles have disappeared some years

ago.

In 1985 Susanne started to stay over night with her father

some night and from 1986 she has regularly stayed with him

every second week-end. She has also been on holiday with

the father and his wife and has spent some school holidays

with them. Susanne has said that she has been satisfied

with the contact she has had and that she wished to stay

with (the foster parents). The contact with the father has

developed in the girl's own speed. She herself indicated

when she has felt herself ready to stay over night and go on

holiday with the father. This summer Susanne has been on

holiday with the Rieme couple and has, as from the

school-start in August 1989, on probation, stayed with them

after agreement between the father, the foster home and

Susanne. She still attends her school in Södertälje, which

according to herself is very important for her.

The contact between (the foster parents) and (the applicant)

has been very tense over the years and they have for long

periods not had any contact at all. Susanne has had a

difficult task to go between the families. She seems to

have managed and shows that she is attached to both her

couples of parents. The two families now co-operate in

Susanne's best interests about her living and the future

contacts with the foster home. Susanne has no contact with

her natural mother.

...

Antero and Anita Rieme have shown that they take great

account of Susanne's wishes and they have great

understanding for the girl's difficulties to move from the

foster home where she has grown up...

Summary and assesment

Susanne is a 13 year old girl who has been in a foster home

since she was one year old. She has had frequent, and

successively increasing contacts with her father, Antero

Rieme, and his wife, Anita. Since the end of August 1989

Susanne is staying with the Riemes and she sees her foster

parents as often as she wishes. Both families co-operate in

her best interests. It is important that Antero Rieme is

now also given the factual care of Susanne. Both families

have every possibility to plan in the best interests of

Susanne. The present status of the girl is good, she is

attached to both families and attention is being paid to her

wishes. Therefore, the prohibition on removal ought to be

terminated."

28. On 20 November 1989 the Social Council terminated the

prohibition on removal.

B. Relevant domestic law

29. Provisions regulating the custody of a child appear in the

Parental Code (föräldrabalken). A decision on the taking of a child

into public care does not affect the legal status of the parent or

parents as custodians, even though they cannot exercise all their

rights and obligations as custodians in the same way as other parents.

Similarly, a decision on the custody of a child does not affect a

public care order or a prohibition on removal. A care order or a

prohibition on removal can only be issued by the social authorities

and the administrative courts. A decision to alter a parent's legal

status as a custodian can only be made by a court order issued by an

ordinary court.

30. Since 1 January 1982 the basic rules on public responsibility

for young persons are laid down in the Social Services Act. This Act

contains provisions regarding supportive and preventive measures taken

with the approval and consent of the individuals concerned. Decisions

which had been taken under the 1960 Child Welfare Act, and which were

still in force on 31 December 1981, were considered to be decisions

taken under the new legislation, whether it be the Social Services Act

or the 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons

(lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga; hereinafter "the

1980 Act"). As from 1 July 1990 the relevant legislation has been

amended (cf. para. 37 below). The following account concerns the law

as it was in force at the relevant time.

31. The 1980 Act is concerned with cases where the parents do not

give their consent to the necessary measures. Under Section 1 paras. 1

and 2 of the 1980 Act compulsory care may be provided for a young

person, inter alia, if the lack of care for him or any other

condition in the home entails a danger to his health or development.

32. According to Section 5 of the 1980 Act, the Social Council is

obliged to monitor carefully the care of young persons who are in care

under the Act and "the Council shall decide to terminate care under the

Act when such care is no longer necessary".

33. The Social Council may issue a prohibition on removal under

Section 28 of the Social Services Act, which reads as follows:

(Swedish)

"Socialnämnden får för viss tid eller tills vidare förbjuda

den som har vårdnaden om en underårig att ta denne från ett

hem som avses i 25 §, om det finns risk som inte är ringa för

att barnets kroppsliga eller själsliga hälsa skadas om det

skiljs från hemmet.

Om det finns sannolika skäl för att en sådan risk föreligger

men den behövliga utredningen inte har kunnat slutföras,

får ett tillfälligt förbud meddelas att gälla i avvaktan

på att ärendet kan slutligt avgöras, dock högst fyra veckor.

Ett förbud enligt denna paragraf hindrar inte att barnet

skiljs från hemmet på grund av ett beslut enligt 21 kap.

föräldrabalken."

(English translation)

"The Social Council may for a certain period of time or

until further notice prohibit the guardian of a minor

from taking the minor from a home referred to in Section 25

(i.e. a foster home), if there is a risk, which is not of

a minor nature, of harming the child's physical or mental

health if the child is separated from that home.

If there are reasonable grounds for assuming that there is

such a risk, although the necessary investigations have

not been completed, a temporary prohibition may be issued

for a maximum period of four weeks, pending the final

decision in the matter.

A prohibition issued under this Section does not prevent

a removal of the child from the home on the basis of a

decision under Chapter 21 of the Parental Code."

34. Section 28 of the Act does not apply to children who are being

cared for in foster homes under Section 1 of the 1980 Act. As long as

such care continues, the right of the guardian to determine the

domicile of the child is suspended. That right is in principle

returned to the guardian if the public care of the child is

terminated. However, that right may be further suspended by a

prohibition on removal under Section 28 of the Social Services Act.

35. The travaux préparatoires of the Act (Government Bill 1979/

80:1, p. 541) state that only a passing disturbance or other

occasional disadvantage to the child is not a sufficient ground for

issuing a prohibition on removal. Among the elements which shall be

considered are the age of the child, the degree of development,

character and emotional ties. The time the child has been cared for

away from the parents must also be taken into account as well as the

living conditions the child has and the conditions it will come to,

and parents' contacts with the child during the period they have been

separated. An important element which must be considered in connection

with a possible decision on the prohibition on removal is the child's

own preference. If the child has reached the age of 15 years, its

preference must not be opposed without good reasons. The child's

preferences can be of importance in considering the risk of harm to

the child as a result of a removal.

36. The Standing Social Committee of the Parliament stated in its

report (SoU 1979/80:44, p. 78), inter alia, that a prohibition might

be issued if removal could involve a risk of damage to the child's

physical or mental health. The Committee stressed that the provision

was aimed at safeguarding the best interests of the child and that

those interests must prevail whenever they conflict with the

guardian's interest in deciding the domicile of the child. The

Committee pointed out that a separation generally involves a risk of

harm to the child. Repeated transfers and transfers which take place

after a long time, when the child has developed strong links with the

foster home, should thus not be accepted without good reasons. The

child's need for secure relations and living conditions must be

decisive in any decision on these questions.

37. On 1 July 1990 a new Act with Special Provisions on the Care

of Young Persons entered into force. The provisions relating to

prohibitions on removal have been transferred from the Social Services

Act to the new Act. The County Administrative Court shall, at the

request of the Social Council, decide on issues concerning a

prohibition on removal. The conditions for issuing a prohibition are

said to be the same as in Section 28 of the Social Services Act (para.

33) although the text now reads that "a prohibition may be issued if

there is an apparent risk (påtaglig risk) that the young person's

health and development will be harmed if he is separated from the

home". The Social Council shall, at least every three months, examine

whether the prohibition is still required. It may also decide on

questions of the parents' access to the child during the prohibition

on removal.

III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

A. Complaint declared admissible

38. The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's

complaint that he has been the victim of a violation of his right to

respect for family life as a result of the long duration of the

prohibition for him from removing his daughter from the foster home.

B. Point at issue

39. The issue to be determined is whether there has been a

violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

C. Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention

40. Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads as follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private

and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority

with the exercise of this right except such as is in

accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

society in the interests of national security, public safety

or the economic well-being of the country, for the

prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others."

a. Complaints and submissions

41. The applicant alleges a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention on the ground that his reunification with his daughter has

been unreasonably delayed. He submits that he initiated proceedings

in 1981 to obtain custody of his daughter and only recently has his

daughter been returned. The protracted proceedings and in particular

the maintenance in force of the prohibition on removal from 16 October

1984 until 20 November 1989 were not justified under Article 8 (Art. 8).

The applicant also invokes Article 17 (Art. 17) of the Convention

in support of his application. The Government submit that, although

the prohibition on removal constituted an interference with the

applicant's right under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1), it was justified

under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

The development of the case and the return of the daughter show that

the measures taken by the social authorities have achieved their aim.

b. Whether there was an interference with the applicant's right

to respect for his family life

42. The Commission recalls that the mutual enjoyment by parent and

child of each other's company constitutes a fundamental element of

family life and that the family relationship is not terminated by

reason of the fact that the child has been taken into public care or is

in a foster home under a prohibition on removal (see e.g. Eur. Court

H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A. no. 130, p. 29,

para. 59, and Eriksson judgment of 22 June 1989, Series A. no. 156, p.

24, para. 58). Furthermore, in proceedings which relate to a parent's

future relations with his child and concern a fundamental element of

family life, an effective respect for family life requires that the

questions involved are determined solely in the light of all relevant

considerations and not by the mere passage of time (cf. Eur. Court

H.R., H. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no

120-B, p. 64, para. 90).

43. The Commission recalls that the applicant obtained the legal

custody of his daughter on 28 September 1983 following the District

Court's judgment. In principle, the applicant was then entitled to

take care of his daughter. However, at that time the daughter was in

the foster home under a care order which remained in force until 16

October 1984 when the Social Council - following the applicant's

request of 19 October 1983 - lifted the care order. On the same day

the Social Council issued a prohibition on removal which remained in

force until 20 November 1989, i.e. for over five years and one month.

44. The Commission finds that these facts constitute an

interference with the applicant's right to respect for his family life

guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (cf.

above-mentioned Eriksson judgment, p. 24, para. 58).

45. Consequently, it must be examined whether the interference was

justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention. In order to be justified under this provision an

interference must satisfy three conditions: it must be "in accordance

with the law", it must pursue one of the aims enumerated in Article 8

para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and it must be "necessary in a democratic society"

for that aim.

c. Whether the interference was "in accordance with the law"

46. The phrase "in accordance with the law" has been analysed by

the Convention organs on several occasions. The Commission recalls

the following general principles.

47. The word "law" covers both written and unwritten law. It

refers primarily to domestic law and the phrase means that any

interference must be based on such law. However the phrase includes

two requirements which go beyond simple compliance with the domestic

law. These requirements relate to the quality of the law and can be

summarised under the headings "accessibility" and "foreseeability".

Moreover, there must be a measure of legal protection in domestic law

against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights

safeguarded by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1). A law which confers a

discretion on the authorities must indicate the scope and manner of

exercise of any such discretion with sufficient clarity to afford the

necessary protection (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Sunday Times judgment of

26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, pp. 30-33, paras. 47 - 52 and the

above-mentioned Eriksson judgment, p. 24, para. 59).

48. The applicant submits that the interference was not "in

accordance with the law", whereas the Government submit that it was in

accordance with Swedish law.

49. The Commission first notes that under the case-law of the

Convention organs the relevant provisions of the 1980 Act and the

Social Services Act regarding public care and prohibition on

removal must be considered to satisfy the requirements under Article 8

para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention as to accessibility and

foreseeability (see above-mentioned Olsson judgment, p. 30, para. 62

and Eriksson judgment, p. 24, paras. 59-60).

50. Consequently, the issue which arises regarding conformity with

the law does not concern the quality of the applicable Swedish law but

is limited to the question whether the prohibition on removal was

consistent with that law. Here, it is recalled that the Commission's

power to review compliance with domestic law is limited : it is in the

first place for the national courts to interpret and apply that law

(see above-mentioned Eriksson judgment, p. 25, para. 62).

51. The Commission notes that the prohibition on removal was

imposed by the Social Council without any limitation in time. On the

applicant's appeal this decision was confirmed first by the County

Administrative Court and then by the Administrative Court of Appeal.

The decision to prohibit removal was consequently taken after a full

examination carried out successively by the Social Council, the County

Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal. The

Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.

52. Having examined, in particular, the judgments of the County

Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal, the

Commission finds no indication that the issuing of the prohibition on

removal and the maintenance in force of that prohibition was contrary

to Swedish law. It is satisfied that the prohibition was "in

accordance with the law" for the purpose of Article 8 para. 2

(Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

d. Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim

53. The Commission finds that the prohibition on removal was aimed

at protecting the interests of the child, which interests fall within

the expressions "the protection of health" and "the protection of the

rights and freedoms of others", which are both legitimate aims under

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).

e. Whether the interference was "necessary in a democractic society"

54. "Necessary" in this context requires that the interference

corresponds to a "pressing social need". It is for the national

authorities to make the initial assessment of the necessity of a given

interference. In the Court's view the national authorities have a

"margin of appreciation" in making this assessment but the decisions of

the domestic authorities are subject to a review by the Convention

organs (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976,

Series A no. 24, pp. 22-24, paras. 48-50).

55. Furthermore, an interference with a Convention right cannot be

regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" unless it is

proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R.,

Leander judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p. 25, para. 58).

When deciding whether an interference is necessary the Convention

organs cannot confine themselves to considering the impugned decisions

in isolation, but must look at them in the light of the case as a

whole. They must determine whether the reasons adduced to justify the

interference are "relevant and sufficient" (cf. above-mentioned Olsson

judgment, pp. 31-32, paras. 67-68). When examining these questions

they should take into account that Article 8 (Art. 8) includes a procedural

requirement that in child-care cases the parents must have been

sufficiently involved in the decision-making process (see Eur. Court

H.R., W. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A

no. 121, p. 29, para. 64).

56. The Convention organs have previously been seised with cases

concerning the necessity of a prohibition on removal, notably the

above-mentioned Eriksson case and the Nyberg case (Comm. Report 15.3.90,

Nyberg v. Sweden to be published in Eur. Court H.R., Series A

no. 181-B). In the Eriksson case the Court made the following

statement (pp. 21-22, paras. 70-71):

"70. The original decision to prohibit Mrs Eriksson from

removing her daughter from the foster home may well, in the

circumstances of the case and having regard to the margin of

appreciation accorded to the Contracting States in this

area, be said to satisfy this requirement.

71. In cases like the present a mother's right to

respect for family life under Article 8 (Art. 8) includes a right to

the taking of measures with a view to her being reunited with

her child. The care order had been lifted, and there was no

doubt as to the suitability of Mrs Eriksson to take care of

children or of the conditions in her home (see paragraph 20

above). The Social Council's decision of 21 January 1983

(see paragraph 12 above (c) above) made it clear that once

the care order was no longer in force, the aim was the

reuniting of parent and child. Furthermore the Supreme

Administrative Court stated, in its judgment of 11 October 1984

(see paragraph 22 above), that '[i]rrespective of the

duration of the prohibition the [Social Council] is obliged

to see to it that appropriate measures aimed at reuniting

parents and child are taken without delay'.

However, it appears that under Swedish law Mrs Eriksson did

not, after the lifting of the care order, have any

enforceable visiting rights while the prohibition on removal

was in force. Furthermore, and in particular on account of

the restrictions on access, she was in fact denied the

opportunity to meet with her daughter to an extent and in

circumstances likely to promote the aim of reuniting them or

even the positive development of their relationship. In

this situation she has not been able to have the prohibition

on removal lifted. The resulting stress on the relations

between the applicants and the uncertainty with regard to

Lisa's future have already continued for more than six

years, causing great anguish to both applicants.

The Government admitted that the system as implemented had

failed on this occasion, but argued that situations such as

the present could not be prevented whatever system would

have been applied, as all depended on the persons involved.

The Court recognises that difficulties may arise in

consequence of the termination of public care of young

children, especially where the child has been taken into

care at a very young age and has spent many years away from

his natural parents' home. However, the unsatisfactory

situation that has ensued in the present case seems to a

large extent to stem from the failure to ensure any

meaningful access between mother and daughter with a view to

reuniting them.

Having regard to the foregoing and notwithstanding Sweden's

margin of appreciation, the Court concludes that the severe

and lasting restrictions on access combined with the long

duration of the prohibition on removal are not proportionate

to the legitimate aims pursued."

57. In the same case, the Commission made the following general

statements (Comm. Report 14.7.88, Eriksson v. Sweden, Eur. Court H.R.,

Series A no. 156, pp. 43, 44 and 46):

"207. The Commission recalls that a prohibition on removal

is a measure which may be applied in a situation where no

reproaches are levelled against the natural parents, but

where the interests of the child, who may have lived for a

long time in a foster home, militate in favour of a

transitional period before the child is actually returned to

its natural parents. A prohibition on removal is thus meant

to be a temporary measure. The temporary nature of a

prohibition on removal may also explain that there are no

legal provisions allowing for regulations of the parent's

right of access. According to the Government the legislator

has not foreseen that a prohibition on removal will remain

in force for a long period.

...

211. The Commission considers that once a decision to

return a child to its natural parents has been taken it must

be in the interests of all parties involved that such a

decision is implemented as quickly as possible. A

prohibition on removal temporarily suspends the removal of

the child and is therefore, although it may be justified

during a transitional period, a measure which by its very

nature is likely to increase the tension between those

involved in the transfer of the child, notably the child,

the foster parents and the natural parents. If such a

situation prevails for a long time there is a great risk

that, as time goes by, the conflicts will increase and that

it gradually will become more difficult to establish the

close relationship between the child and his or her natural

parent which is a necessary condition for the transfer.

...

220. Moreover, the Commission considers that the

uncertainty about Lisa's future which has prevailed ever

since January 1983, when it was decided to terminate the

care order and to issue a prohibition on removal, was in

itself unsatisfactory and potentially harmful to all the

parties concerned, in particular to Lisa. The Commission is

of the opinion that it was not in Lisa's interests to leave

the question of her future open and uncertain for so many

years."

58. As to the present case, the Commission has already noted that

the prohibition on removal was based on successive examinations by the

Social Council, the County Administrative Court and the Administrative

Court of Appeal. The applicant was, in the Commission's view,

sufficiently involved in the decision-making process for the purposes

of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

59. With regard to the reasons on which the prohibition on removal

was based, the Commission notes the courts' finding that there was a

risk which was not of a minor nature that Susanne's health and

development would be jeopardised if she were to move from the foster

home immediately. This reason for the decision to prohibit the

applicant from removing the daughter from the foster home was, in the

Commission's opinion, clearly "relevant" and, having regard to the

margin of appreciation of the Contracting States and to the procedures

followed, the Commission finds that the courts had, in March 1986,

"sufficient" reasons for considering that it was necessary to maintain

the prohibition on removal.

60. The Commission must however also examine whether it was

necessary to maintain the prohibition on removal in force until 20

November 1989. In this respect, it is recalled that Article 8

(Art. 8) includes a right for the applicant to the taking of measures

with a view to being reunited with his child (cf. above-mentioned

Eriksson judgment, p. 21, para. 71). It should also be recalled that

the Social Council was under a duty to see to it that appropriate

measures were taken without delay with a view to reuniting the

applicant and his daughter.

61. In the Eriksson and Nyberg cases a significant feature was

that the social authorities did not actively, through access

arrangements, promote a reunification of the parent and child, but

rather acted against such a reunification. The present case is

similar in that the social authorities have not actively promoted a

reunification, but it is different in that there is no indication that

the social authorities have actively acted against a reunification;

nor is there any specific complaint that the access arrangements have

been inadequate. There are also other similarities. Thus, in the

present case as well tense relations between the foster parents and

the natural parent contributed to making the reunification more

difficult. Moreover, as in the Eriksson case, heavy reliance has been

placed on the child's wishes.

62. As regards the length of the present prohibition on removal,

the Commission recalls that it remained in force for five years and

one month. In the Nyberg case it applied for one year and two and a

half months while, in the Eriksson case, the prohibition had been

maintained for more than six years and four months when the European

Court delivered judgment.

63. The Commission further recalls that the prohibition on removal

is a temporary measure intended to apply only during a transitional

period. The daughter had lived in the foster home since she was one

year old. The care order was lifted when she was eight years and

replaced by a prohibition on removal which applied until she was 13

years of age. To issue and maintain such a prohibition in force for

five years in regard to a child of that age can only be justified in

very special circumstances. The fact that the child has been in a

foster home as long as seven years and from such an early age are

elements weighing in favour of a longer transitional period than

otherwise.

64. Nevertheless, account must also be taken of the fact that,

during the long prohibition on removal, the applicant has not had

any possibility of securing a regulation and increase of his access to

Susanne, other than by asking for a termination of the prohibition.

It is understandable if the applicant has not wished to engage himself

and Susanne in further proceedings having already been involved in

different proceedings from November 1981 until March 1986. As a

result the applicant has been left at the discretion of the social

authority without being able to obtain a legal determination of his

right of access. It is recalled that no decision was made in respect

of his claim for access regulations (cf. para. 18).

65. In sum, the present case is characterised by a lack of

activity by the Social Council. This inactivity can hardly be

reconciled with the legal duty of the Social Council to actively

promote a reunification as soon as a prohibition on removal has been

issued. In view of the fact that the applicant has in the same period

not had any legal possibility to successively develop his access, the

Commission finds that the lack of activity of the Social Council made

the interference disproportionate to the aim pursued.

66. In all these circumstances, the Commission arrives at the

conclusion that it cannot be said that it was "necessary in a

democratic society", irrespective of Sweden's margin of appreciation,

to maintain the prohibition in force for the whole period of more than

five years.

D. Conclusion

67. The Commission concludes, by 8 votes to 5, that there has been

a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (J. A. FROWEIN)

Dissenting opinion of Mr. H. Danelius

joined by MM. J.A. Frowein, E. Busuttil and F. Martinez

I regret not to be able to share the majority's opinion that

there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the

present case. My reasons are as follows.

As the majority has rightly pointed out (para. 61 of the

Report), the present case differs from the Eriksson and Nyberg cases

in that there is no evidence of the social authorities having acted

against the aim of reunification of parent and child. The question

nevertheless remains whether these authorities took sufficient

measures to promote that aim or whether, by failure to act, they

unnecessarily prolonged the prohibition on removal.

In this respect, I first accept the Commission's finding

(para. 59 of the Report) that in March 1986, when the Supreme

Administrative Court refused leave to appeal, there existed

"sufficient" reasons to consider that it was necessary to maintain the

prohibition on removal.

As to the time thereafter, I note that the applicant had, from

May 1986, continuous and regular contact with Susanne who, as a rule,

spent every second weekend at the applicant's home and who joined him

for longer periods during summer and other holidays. In these

circumstances I find no basis for considering that the social

authorities should have been active in bringing about an even more

extensive access.

I further note that, according to the Social Council's

memorandum of 15 December 1987 (para. 26 of the Report), the applicant

had since the autumn of 1985 declined contact with the social

authorities which, since they had no contact with the applicant, were

unable to work actively for better relations between him and

the foster home. The applicant has contested that the social authorities

had in reality any intention of working for the improvement of these

relations. Nevertheless, the applicant's refusal of contact with

these authorities must be regarded as an element which made it more

difficult for them to promote the aim of reunification, and, in the

absence of any evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that they

would have been prepared to take certain measures for the purpose

indicated in the Social Council's memorandum, which might, if

successful, have facilitated Susanne's transfer to the applicant's

home.

Having regard to these facts, and in the absence of any other

evidence of inadequate action by the social authorities, I find no

basis for any particular criticism against these authorities in the

present case. It is true that it took a long time before Susanne

moved to the applicant's home but, having regard to the State's margin

of appreciation in this sensitive area, I am not prepared to conclude,

on the basis of Article 8 of the Convention, that the reunification

should have been effected earlier.

Consequently, I find that the Swedish authorities could

reasonably consider that the interference with the applicant's right

under Article 8 was necessary in a democratic society for the purpose

of protecting Susanne's health and rights. It follows that in my view

Article 8 has not been violated in the present case.

Dissenting opinion of Mr. H. G. Schermers

1. In the present case I am not convinced that the social

authorities were insufficiently active in promoting a reunification of

father and child (Report para. 61). It is difficult to create bonds

of love between people who hardly know each other and forcing a child

to love a hardly known father might well have had the opposite

effect. Leaving the initiative for visiting and staying overnight

with her father to the child may well have been the wisest possible

approach under the circumstances of the case. I sincerely doubt

whether the social authorities had any real possibility for a more

active policy. I therefore do not share the opinion of the majority

of the Commission, expressed in paragraphs 65 and 66 of the Report,

that the interference in the family life of the applicant was

disproportionate to the aim of protecting the interests of the child.

In my opinion the interference with the applicant's right to respect

for his family life was justified under Article 8 para. 2.

2. Apart from the family life of the applicant, account should

also be taken of the right of the foster parents to respect for their

family life with the child they had educated from her early infancy.

In my opinion both the applicant and the foster parents had strong

ties with the child and for all of them family life with the child was

of great importance. But the father, as well as the foster parents

are adult people who have more interests in life and whose welfare and

happiness should not entirely depend on their relationship to this

particular child. This is different for the child herself. For a

young child the family is the only safe place and family life is a

vital necessity. The most essential issue in the present case is,

therefore, the family life of the child. What is the family life of

the child? She entered the foster home when she was less than a year

old. The District Court of Södertälje found in 1981 "It is

apparent that Susanne is well settled in the foster home, and that

she is secure and at home there and regards the foster family as her

own" (see para. 16 of the Report). For a child aged younger than about

eight, the blood relationship cannot be a clear concept. At that age

family life is identical with the actual family in which the child

lives. Only when the child gets older does it begin to look outside

the actual family and at that time Susanne was helped to develop a

closer relationship to her father. When 13 she agreed to stay with

her father. Under those circumstances I do not find an infringement

with the child's right to family life. But there would have been an

infringement of the child's family life if the social authorities had

forced Susanne into closer family life with her father before she was

ready for it. Would that infringement have been justified under

Article 8, para. 2. Would it have been necessary to force the child

for the sake of the family life of the father? I doubt it. Had the

social authorities interfered more actively they might well have

infringed the rights of the child under Article 8 of the Convention.

Under these circumstances, I find it impossible to blame the

Swedish authorities, let alone to find a violation of a fundamental

human right.

Concurring opinion of Mrs. G. H. Thune

While sharing the opinion of the Commission, I would like to

add the following.

The violation in this case seems to me to be a direct result

of the Swedish legislation regulating the situation when a care order

is lifted.

When a child like Susanne has been living in a foster home

for a number of years, there can only be a question of transfer to the

natural parent home when:

1. objections can no longer be held against the situation

in the parental home, and

2. a transfer is not considered detrimental to the child.

It seems to me extremely unfortunate that Swedish law opts for

the lifting of a care order as soon as the first of these two conditions

is fulfilled. It is obviously not possible to move a child until the

second condition also is complied with.

In the present case, the social authorities, when lifting the

care order, had no intention of a speedy reunification. The available

documents suggest rather the contrary. I here refer to the

psychiatric opinion by Dr. Sari Granström and Jarkko Rantanen. They

state inter alia:

"A move to Susanne's natural father requires that the

relationship between him, his present wife and Susanne be

developed and deepened. Furthermore, it requires that

Susanne be sufficiently mature for the move to be discussed

with her, with its advantages and disadvantages and related

feelings of loss and sorrow, which has as yet proved

impossible in her case according to the investigation at

PBU. As a consequence, Susanne should be allowed to

continue to develop and mature within the family frame that

has been her home for more than six years. This also means,

in our opinion, that she should not be subjected to new

examinations connected with her return home within the next

few years, but Susanne's contact with her father needs to be

continued and developed in collaboration with her foster

parents. "

Accordingly, the prohibition on removal, which is defined and

understood as a temporary short-term measure, was implemented with the

obvious intention, on the part of the social authorities, not to

keep it in force for a short time, but rather the contrary. This, in

my view, is most objectionable in the present case.

When a care order is to be lifted, the authorities must at the

same time take a decision in respect of the child. Steps must be

taken either with a view to the transfer of the custody or adoption in

favour of the foster parents, or active steps must be taken to prepare

a transfer of the child to the natural parents within a fixed time

limit. Such a time limit should normally not exceed one year.

Accordingly, a prohibition on removal which has been enforced for more

than one year will normally amount to a violation of Article 8 of the

Convention. It cannot be defended as showing respect for the natural

parents' family life in the interests of the child to apply a

temporary measure as a more or less permanent measure.

Concurring opinion of Mrs. J. Liddy

I agree with the Commission's opinion but wish to add a word

about the statement in paragraph 61 thereof that, as in the Eriksson

case, heavy reliance has been placed on the child's wishes. I formed

the impression that the present case was characterised by near-total,

if not total, reliance on an initiative to be taken by a very young

child, and a corresponding transfer to her of the burden of decision.

This situtation I found difficult to reconcile with the legal duty of

the Social Council to actively promote a reunification as soon as a

prohibition on removal has been issued (paragraph 65 of the Report).

Concurring opinion of Mr. L. Loucaides

1. I agree with the Commission's opinion, but I wish to add

certain considerations which have been important for me to conclude

that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

2. My starting point is that when the prohibition on removal was

issued in October 1984 the authorities had a duty to see to it that

appropriate measures aimed at reuniting the applicant were taken

without delay (cf. para. 56). Subsequently, regular contact between

the applicant and his daughter was established. But it appears from

the file that the measures and steps taken by the authorities depended

entirely on the wishes of the daughter. At the hearing before the

Commission the Agent of the Government, in reply to a question whether

any efforts were made in the form of advising th child that at some

stage she must join the applicant, stated that that would be to put

pressure on the child and he found "it highly unlikely that they

would try to influence the child." Although I find it important that

the child's interest be given great weight in determining when a

prohibition on removal can be lifted, I cannot accept that the child,

who was at the age of 8 to 13 years during the relevant time, should

in practice decide herself when the transfer should take place. It is

potentially harmful to place such a burden on the child and it is

certainly extremely difficult to establish what is the true wish of a

child of that age. In this respect I must stress that I consider it

the duty of the authorities to advise and encourage the child in

favour of the choice to join her father because of the general

obligation imposed on them by the Convention to protect the family

life of the individuals.

3. Further, I am not prepared to accept the conclusion in para.

59 that the prohibition on removal was justified up to March 1986.

Already at that stage one and a half years had elapsed after the

issuing of the prohibition on removal and no regular contact had been

established between the applicant and his daughter.

4. Finally, I attach importance to the total duration of the

proceedings, from November 1981, when the applicant started

proceedings to gain custody over his child, until March 1986, when the

Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal on the issue of

the prohibition on removal (cf. Decision on admissibility p. 31).

APPENDIX I

HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Date Item

__________________________________________________________________________

28 July 1986 Introduction of the application.

1 September 1986 Registration of the application.

Examination of the admissibility

6 October 1987 Commission's deliberations and decision to

invite the Government to submit observations

in writing.

26 February 1988 Government's observations.

26 April 1988 Applicant's observations in reply.

9 December 1988 Commission's deliberations and decision to

invite the parties to a hearing on the

admissibility and merits of the application.

17 March 1989 Commission's decision to grant legal aid.

5 July 1989 Hearing on admissibility and merits. The

parties were represented as follows:

Government: Mr. Hans Corell

Mr. Leif Lindgren

Mr. Pär Boqvist

Applicants: Mr. Lennart Hane

The applicant and his wife

were also present.

5 July 1989 Decision to declare the application partly

admissible and partly inadmissible

Examination of the merits

5 July 1989 Commission's deliberations on the merits

10 October 1989 Transmission to the parties of the text of the

decision on admissibility

20 November 1989 Applicant's further observations

24 November 1989 Government's further observations

9 January 1990 Government's further observations

10 February and Commission's consideration of the state of

7 July 1990 proceedings

2 October 1990 Commission's deliberations on the

merits, final votes and and adoption of the

Report

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RIEME v. SWEDEN

RIEME v. SWEDEN

LEXI