E. VAN WIJK B.V. v. THE NETHERLANDS
Doc ref: 12856/87 • ECHR ID: 001-45520
Document date: July 7, 1992
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
SECOND CHAMBER
Application No. 12856/87
E. van WIJK B.V.
against
the NETHERLANDS
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 7 July 1992)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION
(paras. 1-18) ......................................... 1
A. The application
(paras. 2-5) .................................. 1
B. The proceedings
(paras. 6-13) ................................. 1
C. The present Report
(paras. 14-18) ................................ 2
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
(paras. 19-26) ........................................ 3
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
(paras. 27-43) ....................................... 5
A. Complaint declared admissible (para. 27) ..... 5
B. Point at issue (para. 28) ..................... 5
C. Applicability of Article 6 para. 1
of the Convention (paras. 29-33) .............. 5
D. Compliance with Article 6 para. 1
(paras. 34-42) ................................. 5
E. Conclusion (para. 43) .......................... 7
APPENDIX I : HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS .................. 8
APPENDIX II : DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY ............... 10
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the
European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the
Commission.
A. The application
2. The applicant, E. van Wijk B.V., is a Dutch private company with
limited liability having its seat at Genderen, the Netherlands.
3. In the proceedings before the Commission, the applicant company
was represented by Mr. W.J. Wortelboer, succeeded by Mr. L. de Jong and
Mr. R.B.H.M. Casander, who are lawyers practising in Amsterdam.
4. The application is directed against the Netherlands. The
Netherlands Government were represented by their Agent,
Mrs. D.S. van Heukelom, succeeded by Mr. K. de Vey Mestdagh, both of
the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
5. The applicant company complains that it did not have access to
an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of its
civil rights since the Crown, which dealt with its case, does not meet
these requirements.
B. The proceedings
6. The application was introduced on 31 March 1987 and registered
on 15 April 1987.
7. On 2 May 1989 the Commission decided to give notice of the
application to the respondent Government, and to invite them to
present, before 8 September 1989, their written observations on the
admissibility and merits of the application.
8. After an extension of the time-limit, the observations of the
Government were submitted on 13 September 1989.
9. The applicant company was invited to submit observations in reply
before 3 November 1989. Following an extension of the time-limit, it
submitted its observations in reply on 24 November 1989.
10. On 2 September 1991 the Commission referred the application to
a Chamber.
11. On 10 September 1991 the Commission (Second Chamber) declared the
application admissible. The parties were invited, should they so
desire, to submit further evidence and observations on the merits of
the application.
12. After an extension of the time-limit, the Government submitted
their further observations on 18 December 1991, followed by the
applicant's on 23 December 1991.
13. In their observations of 18 December 1991 the Governement,
referring to the Oerlemans judgment (Eur. Court H.R., Oerlemans
judgment of 27 November 1991, Series A no. 219), maintained the view
that the domestic remedies were not exhausted. However, the Commission
found no basis for declaring the application inadmissible under
Article 29 of the Convention.
14. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in
accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, placed itself at the
disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement
of the case. In the light of the parties' reactions, the Commission
now finds that there is no basis upon which a friendly settlement can
be effected.
C. The present Report
14. The present Report was drawn up by the Commission (Second
Chamber) in pursuance of Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention and after
deliberations and votes, the following members being present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. WEITZEL
J.C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
MM. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ
L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
15. The text of this Report was adopted by the Commission on
7 July 1992 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the
Convention.
16. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of the
Convention, is
1) to establish the facts, and
2) to state an opinion as to whether the facts
found disclose a breach by the State concerned
of its obligations under the Convention.
17. A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the
Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I, and the Commission's
decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.
18. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the
documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the
Commission.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Particular circumstances of the case
19. On 13 May 1982, the applicant company applied to the Municipal
Authorities for a licence under the Nuisance Act (Hinderwet) to
construct, to bring into operation and to exploit storage space, a
repair device for motor vehicles and three underground oil tanks, all
of which it had apparently been using for a number of years.
20. By letter of 5 August 1982 the Waterworks Company "Noord-West-
Brabant" raised objections (bezwaar) against the application and the
draft decision of the Municipal Authorities.
21. On 17 February 1983 the Municipal Authorities granted the licence
subject to certain conditions.
22. The Waterworks Company lodged an appeal against the decision of
the Municipal Authorities with the Crown in March 1983. In a public
hearing before the Administrative Litigation Division of the Council
of State (Afdeling voor de geschillen van bestuur van de Raad van
State), the applicant company submitted that it had a right to
compensation if the Crown would take a decision which would cause
damages to the applicant company.
23. On 1 October 1986 the Crown, in accordance with the advice of
the Administrative Litigation Division of the Council of State, decided
that the Municipal Authorities had rightly granted the licence under
the Nuisance Act, but amended several of the attached conditions. It
provided that the oil should be stored above ground and that part of
the company's site should be provided with a non-porous soil covering
in order to protect the water-supply.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
24. Pursuant to the Benthem judgment (Eur. Court H.R., judgment of
23 October 1985, Series A no. 97), in which the Court held that the
Crown is not a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention, the Dutch legislation has been amended by the Provisional
Act on Crown Appeals (Tijdelijke Wet Kroongeschillen). This Act came
into force on 1 January 1988. In order to comply with the Benthem
judgment before 1 January 1988, the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) has
decided that, pursuant to a well-established rule under Dutch law, the
interested party may file an appeal with the civil courts after a
decision of the Crown. The civil court has the right to conduct an
independent examination of the case, including the contentious issue
already decided by the Crown (Hoge Raad 12 December 1986, NJ 1987/381).
This case-law has been confirmed by subsequent judgments (e.g. Hoge
Raad 6 February 1987, NJ 1988/926).
25. The above-mentioned rule is derived from the traditional
competence of the Dutch civil courts to grant relief against the
administration where no other relief is available. This competence is
based on the Constitution and on the Act on the Organisation of the
Judiciary of 1827 (Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie).
26. An extensive case-law was developed by the Supreme Court over the
last decades, supported by several authorities, to the effect that
where an administrative appeal would not offer sufficient guarantees
of a fair procedure, the civil courts are competent to examine the
lawfulness of the administrative decision against which the appeal
lies.
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Complaint declared admissible
27. The Commission has declared admissible the applicant company's
complaint that its case was not judged by an independent and impartial
tribunal.
B. Point at issue
28. Accordingly, the issue to be determined is whether there has been
a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
C. Applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention
29. The first issue to be decided is whether Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention applies to the proceedings at issue.
30. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention states, insofar
as relevant:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time
by an independent and impartial tribunal ..."
31. The parties agree that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies to
the proceedings at issue.
32. The Commission recalls the findings of the Court in the Benthem
case (Eur. Court H.R., Benthem judgment of 23 October 1985,
Series A no. 97, para. 36) that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention applies to proceedings concerning applications for a licence
under the Nuisance Act.
33. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is therefore applicable to the
proceedings in the present case.
D. Compliance with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
34. The Commission must therefore examine whether the applicant
company had access to an independent and impartial tribunal for the
determination of its civil rights.
35. The applicant company submits that it did not have access to a
court for the determination of its civil rights, the appeal procedure
before the Crown not involving an independent and impartial tribunal
within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). It did not bring
an action before the civil courts after the Crown's decision, since the
entire duration of the proceedings would not be "within a reasonable
time" and the high costs attached to these proceedings, which are never
fully covered by legal aid, deprived them of their effectiveness. In
addition, when the Crown proceedings were instituted in the present
case, the possibility of starting civil proceedings did not yet exist,
or at least it could not yet be considered as a clearly defined appeal
procedure at that time. Moreover, one single decision of the Supreme
Court does not amount to well-established case-law. The Supreme
Court's first decision in this sense was only published on 9 May 1987.
36. The Government submit that according to the Benthem judgment the
administrative appeal to the Crown could no longer be considered to
offer sufficient guarantees of a fair procedure. However, in the
Oerlemans judgment (Eur. Court H.R., Oerlemans judgment of
27 November 1991, Series A no. 219, para. 56) the Court has accepted
that under Dutch law a civil court can carry out a full examination of
any administrative decision coming within the scope of Article 6
(Art. 6) against which an appeal to the Crown lies, but which is
considered not to satisfy the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6).
Therefore the applicant company could and still can submit its dispute
to the civil courts for examination. As the applicant company did not
seize the civil courts, its complaint about the total length of the
proceedings is one in abstracto and should therefore be rejected. In
any event, it could have applied for legal aid under the Dutch legal
aid scheme. Moreover, the applicant company could have submitted these
complaints for examination to the civil courts.
37. The Commission observes that the applicant company claims to have
been a victim of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in the
past, in that it did not have access to an independent and impartial
tribunal for the determination of its civil rights; this situation
prevailed during the first part of the national proceedings starting
on 13 May 1982 and ending on 23 October 1985 when the European Court
of Human Rights rendered its judgment in the Benthem case. Then it
became clear that the Crown could not be considered as a lawful court.
This meant that after the Crown's decision further proceedings before
the civil courts became possible, as held by the Supreme Court in two
judgments invoked by the Government (Hoge Raad 12 December 1986,
NJ 1987/381 and Hoge Raad 6 February 1987, NJ 1987/926).
38. The Commission notes that under the Supreme Court's new case-law
the applicant company could institute new proceedings which would start
before a civil court of first instance.
39. The Commission notes that, prior to the Benthem judgment, several
legal writers in the Netherlands had already argued that the Crown
proceedings did not meet the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention. If this proposition was right, the consequence would be (1)
that the appeal to the Crown could no longer be said to be an
administrative appeal which "offers sufficient guarantees" as to a fair
procedure and (2) that accordingly the civil courts would be free to
examine the lawfulness of any decision of the administration coming
within the province of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention against
which an appeal to the Crown lies. After the Benthem judgment this
view was generally accepted and was confirmed by the decision of the
Supreme Court of 12 December 1986 in which it held that the civil
courts are able to examine the lawfulness of any administrative
decision coming within the scope of Article 6 (Art. 6) against which
an appeal lies to the Crown.
40. The European Court of Human Rights has accepted this rule in its
Oerlemans judgment (ibid., para. 56):
"Under Netherlands law a civil court can carry out a full
examination of all acts of the administration in the light, inter
alia, of principles of administrative law, can award damages for
torts committed and can grant injunctions against the
administration (...)".
41. The applicant company could therefore have seized the civil
courts after the Royal Decree of 1 October 1986.
42. It follows that the applicant company did have access to an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of its civil
rights.
E. Conclusion
43. The Commission concludes by 9 votes to 1 that there has been no
violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
Secretary to the Second Chamber President of the Second Chamber
(K. ROGGE) (S. TRECHSEL)
APPENDIX I
HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS
Date Item
_______________________________________________________________________
31 March 1987 Introduction of application
15 April 1987 Registration of application
Examination of admissibility
2 May 1989 Commission's decision to
invite the Government to
submit their observations on
the admissibility and merits
of the application
4 September 1989 Time-limit extended until
18 September 1989 at
Government's request
13 September 1989 Government's observations
31 October 1989 Time-limit extended until
24 November 1989 at
applicant's request
24 November 1991 Applicant's observations in
reply
2 September 1991 Commission's decision to
refer the application to the
Second Chamber
10 September 1991 Commission's decision to
declare the complaint under
Article 6 para. 1 admissible
3 October 1991 Parties invited, should
they so desire, to submit
further observations on the
merits of the application
Examination of the merits
6 November 1991 Time-limit extended until
31 December 1991 at
Government's request
18 December 1991 Further observations by the
respondent Government
23 December 1991 Further observations by the
applicant on the merits of
the application
12 March 1992 Applicant's request for
leave to comment on
Government's further
observations
2 April 1992 Request granted
23 April 1992 Applicant requests extension
time-limit until 28 May 1992
28 April 1992 Extension until 16 May 1992
7 July 1992 Commission's deliberations
on the merits, final vote
and adoption of the Report
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