Lexploria

EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Application No. 15484/89

Edward Wynne

against

the United Kingdom

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

(adopted on 4 May 1993)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

I. INTRODUCTION

(paras. 1-18). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-2

A. The application

(paras. 2-4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

B. The proceedings

(paras. 5-13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-2

C. The present Report

(paras. 14-18). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

(paras. 19-39) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-6

A. Particular circumstances of the case

(paras. 19-24). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-4

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

(paras. 25-39). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-6

III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

(paras. 40-52) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-9

A. Complaint declared admissible

(para. 40). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

B. Point at issue

(para. 41). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

C. Article 5 para. 4 of the Convention

(paras. 42-51). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-9

CONCLUSION

(para. 52) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. S. TRECHSEL, E. BUSUTTIL,

MRS. G.H. THUNE, SIR BASIL HALL AND MR. B. MARXER . . . .10-11

APPENDIX I HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . 12

APPENDIX II DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY. . . . . . .13-18

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the

European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the

Commission.

A. The application

2. The applicant is a British citizen born in 1939 and currently

serving two sentences of life imprisonment in HM Prison Gartree. He

is represented by Mr. Edward FitzGerald, counsel, and by

Mr. Richard Devine, solicitor.

3. The application is directed against the United Kingdom. The

respondent Government are represented by their Agent,

Mrs. Audrey Glover of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

4. The case concerns the applicant's complaint under

Article 5 para. 4 of the Convention that he was unable to have the

continued lawfulness of his detention reviewed by an independent

tribunal.

B. The proceedings

5. The application was introduced on 15 June 1989 and registered on

13 September 1989.

6. On 2 March 1991, the Commission decided to invite the Government

to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits.

7. The Government submitted their written observations on

10 July 1991. The applicant submitted his observations on 11 May 1992,

having been granted legal aid by the Commission on 8 April 1992.

8. On 19 May 1992, the Commission decided to invite the parties to

make further submissions at an oral hearing.

9. On 21 September 1992, the Government submitted further documents.

On 29 September 1992, the applicant submitted further written

observations.

10. At the hearing which was held on 15 October 1992, the Government

were represented by Ms. Diana Brookes, as Agent, Mr. D. Pannick Q.C.

and by Mr. H. Carter, Mrs. V. Harris and Ms. S. Rex, advisers. The

applicant was represented by Mr. Edward FitzGerald, counsel and

Mr. Richard Devine, solicitor.

11. On 15 October 1992, the Commission declared the application

admissible insofar as it raised issues under Article 5 para. 4 of the

Convention. The remainder of the application was declared inadmissible.

The parties were then invited to submit any additional observations on

the merits of the application.

12. On 23 October 1992 and 18 March 1993, the applicant submitted

further material.

13. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in

accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, placed itself

at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly

settlement of the case. Consultations with the parties took place

between 22 October 1991 and 1 September 1992. In the light of the

parties' reactions, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on

which a friendly settlement can be effected.

C. The present Report

14. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in

pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and

votes, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

S. TRECHSEL

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

Mr. F. MARTINEZ

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. L. LOUCAIDES

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

15. The text of the Report was adopted by the Commission on

4 May 1993 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in

accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.

16. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of the

Convention, is

1) to establish the facts, and

2) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose

a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under

the Convention.

17. A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the

Commission is attached hereto as APPENDIX I and the Commission's

decision on the admissibility of the application as APPENDIX II.

18. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the

documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the

Commission.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

A. Particular circumstances of the case

19. The applicant was convicted of murder in 1964 and sentenced to

mandatory life imprisonment. At that time, the doctor who examined the

applicant found no signs of mental illness or abnormality. He was

released on licence in May 1980.

20. In January 1982 he was convicted of manslaughter. He had been

found to be suffering from an abnormality of mind and not responsible

for his actions. A discretionary sentence of life imprisonment was

imposed. The trial judge considered a life sentence was appropriate

in view of the extreme danger to the public which the applicant

represented. The applicant's life licence was also revoked by the

trial judge. The applicant submits, inter alia, that he was informed

in 1983 by prison officers at H.M. Prison Wormwood Scrubs that he was

subject to the regime for discretionary life sentences.

21. In December 1985 the applicant was transferred to the hospital

wing of Parkhurst prison. Since then he has been transferred to

Gartree Prison where he is held as a "Category A" prisoner.

22. The applicant was considered for parole by the Parole Board in

January 1989. The Board recommended that his case be referred again

to the local review committee in 1994. The applicant's Member of

Parliament wrote on the applicant's behalf to the Home Secretary. By

letter dated 14 August 1989, the Home Office gave the following

information:

"In accordance with paragraph 4, the trial judge and Lord

Chief Justice were consulted in September 1987. In the

light of their views, it was decided that [the applicant's]

case should be referred to the local review committee, as

the first stage in a formal review by the Parole Board, in

June 1988.

The local review committee considered the case at that time

and the Parole Board considered it in January

1989. The Board did not feel able to recommend

applicant's> release and recommended instead that it should

be referred to the local review committee (as the first

stage in a further formal review) in January 1994. This

recommendation was accepted and was

informed accordingly. He should have been told in

February, but owing to an oversight at Gartree I am afraid

that he was not informed until last month. You will

appreciate that I cannot forecast what the outcome of the

next review will be or say when might be

released. When the Parole Board consider

case in 1994 tariff will have been satisfied and the

question of risk will be the overriding consideration.

Indeed, the Parole Board will have borne the question of

risk in mind in making their recommendation as to the date

of the next review. As you know, the safety of the public

is paramount and no life sentence prisoner will be released

if the assessment of risk is unsatisfactory, no matter how

long he has been detained."

23. The applicant was informed that his trial judge had fixed his

tariff at June 1991.

24. In a Home Office Memorandum dated 5 June 1992 the applicant was

informed that "the tariff in respect of that original offence [the 1964

conviction] has now been served and your continued detention is based

on the risk you represent."

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

Life sentences

25. The sentence for murder is fixed by law as a mandatory sentence

of life imprisonment (Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965).

26. Discretionary life sentences of imprisonment may be passed in

respect of a number of other offences, e.g. manslaughter.

27. The principles underlying the passing of a discretionary sentence

of life imprisonment are:

(i) that the offence is grave and

(ii) that there are exceptional circumstances which demonstrate

that the offender is a danger to the public and that it is not possible

to say when that danger will subside.

Release on licence and revocation of a licence

28. Under Section 61 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (the 1967 Act)

the Secretary of State could only release on licence a person sentenced

to life imprisonment if recommended to do so by the Parole Board, and

after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice and the trial judge if

he was available. By virtue of Section 62(1) the Secretary of State

could revoke the licence of a person whose recall to prison was

recommended by the Parole Board.

29. Section 59 of the 1967 Act set out the role of the Parole Board:

"59. (1) For the purposes of exercising the functions

conferred on it by this part of this Act as respects England and

Wales there shall be a body known as the Parole Board ...

consisting of a chairman and not less than four other members

appointed by the Secretary of State.

...

(3) It shall be the duty of the Board to advise the

Secretary of State with respect to:

(a) the release on licence under section 60 (1) or 61, and

the recall under section 62, of this Act of persons whose cases

have been referred to the Board by the Secretary of State ..."

30. Under Section 62(7) of the 1967 Act, if a person subject to a

licence is convicted on indictment of an offence the court by which he

is convicted may, whether or not it passes any other sentence on him,

revoke the licence.

31. The effect of revocation of the licence, in whichever way it

comes about, is that the person is liable to be detained in pursuance

of his sentence (Section 62(9) of the 1967 Act).

The procedure for review

32. Section 61 of the 1967 Act, which provides the statutory

framework for the release of life sentence prisoners, does not

distinguish between mandatory and discretionary life sentences. The

policy for the review and release of life sentence prisoners is the

responsibility of the Home Secretary who is answerable to Parliament.

33. In November 1983 the Home Secretary in a written answer to the

House of Commons stated that a life sentence contained two periods -

first the "tariff period" necessary for retribution of deterrence and

then a further period if the Parole Board or Secretary of State

considered the prisoner to pose an unacceptable risk to the public if

he were released.

34. The applicable procedures were the subject of examination in

judicial review proceedings in the Handscomb case (R. v. Secretary of

State for Home Department, ex parte Handscomb and others (1988) 86 Cr.

App. R. 59 at p. 74-75). The Divisional Court found that :

"...the Lord Chief Justice and the trial judge are being asked

to provide ... a figure (the tariff) representing a term of years

during which a prisoner should be detained to serve only the twin

purposes of retribution and deterrence. They are in other words

asked to say what would have been an appropriate tariff in the

circumstances of the case if a determinate and not a life

sentence could have been and had been passed when the prisoner

was sentenced, without considering risk. The risk element is of

course present in the judicial mind when a discretionary life

sentence is passed. The element of continuing risk, I should

add, is the concern of the prison authorities and doctors, the

local review committee, the Parole Board and finally the Home

Secretary. Fourthly, the views of the judges as to tariff are

intended to have a decisive bearing in all cases upon the

decision as to when the first reference to the local review

committee will take place, i.e. three years before the end of the

tariff period. Special circumstances may serve to bring forward

that time."

35. After the decision of the Divisional Court, the Home Secretary

announced that he would consult the judiciary as soon as practicable

following the imposition of a discretionary life sentence. He also

announced that he would apply that procedure in relation to mandatory

life sentences.

36. With effect from 1 October 1987, in relation to all life sentence

cases, the practice was as follows: immediately after sentence the

trial judge wrote to the Home Secretary, through the Lord Chief

Justice, giving his views on the length of detention necessary to meet

the requirements of retribution and deterrence - the so-called "tariff"

period. The Lord Chief Justice added his own view. In the light of

this advice the Home Secretary set the date on which the case was to

be referred to the Local Review Committee as the first stage in the

first formal review of the case by the Parole Board. The date set for

the first formal review was normally three years before the expiry of

the period thought necessary to mark the seriousness of the offence,

or 17 years, whichever was the sooner. In the case of a discretionary

life sentence the date of the first formal review was to be fixed

strictly in accordance with the judicial view of the requirements of

retribution and deterrence for the offence.

37. As regarded mandatory life sentences, the Home Secretary in a

statement to the House of Commons on 23 July 1987 announced:

"... In cases of prisoners serving life sentences for murder,

where the sentence is not at the discretion of the court, the

question of the notional equivalent determinate sentence does not

arise. I shall continue to take into account the view of the

judiciary on the requirements of retribution and deterrence in

such cases as a factor amongst others (including the need to

maintain public confidence in the system of justice) to be

weighed in the balance in setting the first review date. I shall

ensure that the timing of the first formal review in such cases

is fixed in accordance with my overall policy for ensuring that

the time served by prisoners serving life sentences for the worst

offences of violence fully reflects public concern about violent

crime."

38. In the debate in the House of Commons on 16 July 1991 concerning

the proposed Criminal Justice bill, the Minister of State for the Home

Office made the following statement concerning the differences between

mandatory and discretionary life sentences:

"Mandatory life sentence cases, however, raise quite different

issues and the Government do not agree that it is appropriate to

extend a similar procedure to these cases. In a discretionary

case, the decision on release is based purely on whether the

offender continues to be a risk to the public. The presumption

is that once the period that is appropriate to punishment has

passed, the prisoner should be released if it is safe to do so.

The nature of the mandatory sentence is different. The element

of risk is not the decisive factor in handing down a life

sentence. According to the judicial process, the offender has

committed a crime of such gravity that he forfeits his liberty

to the state for the rest of his days. If necessary, he can be

detained for life without the necessity for a subsequent judicial

intervention. The presumption is, therefore, that the offender

should remain in custody until and unless the Home Secretary

concludes that the public interest would be better served by the

prisoner's release than by his continued detention. In

exercising his continued discretion in this respect, the Home

Secretary must take account not just of the question of risk, but

of how society as a whole would view the prisoner's release at

that juncture. The Home Secretary takes account of the judicial

recommendation, but the final decision is his."

Recent legislation

39. Under Section 34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, which has come

into force on 1 October 1992, a discretionary life prisoner may require

that his case be referred to the Parole Board after he has served the

"tariff" part of his sentence. The Board has the power to direct the

prisoner's release and the Secretary of State is then under a duty to

release the prisoner on licence. These new release provisions are

stated not to effect a person who is serving, in addition to a

discretionary sentence of life imprisonment, a mandatory term of life

imprisonment.

III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

A. Complaint declared admissible

40. The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaint

that he was unable to have the continued lawfulness of his detention

reviewed by a court.

B. Point at issue

41. The issue to be determined is whether there has been a violation

of Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention.

C. Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention

42. Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) provides that:

"Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention

shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of

his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his

release ordered if the detention is not lawful."

43. The case-law of the Commission and Court establishes that

prisoners serving a sentence of discretionary life imprisonment are

entitled under the above provision to take proceedings at reasonable

intervals to have the lawfulness of their detention decided by a court

where the punitive or "tariff" period of their sentence has expired

(see Eur. Court H.R., Weeks judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 114

and the Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell judgment of 25 October 1990,

Series A no. 190-A).

44. In the Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell case (loc. cit. p. 30,

para.79), the Court stated:

"Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) does not guarantee a right to

judicial control of such scope as to empower the 'court' on all

aspects of the case, including questions of expediency, to

substitute its own discretion for that of the decision-making

authority; the review should, nevertheless, be wide enough to

bear on those conditions which, according to the Convention, are

essential for the lawful detention of a person subject to the

special type of deprivation of liberty ordered against these

three applicants..."

45. In light of the above, the Court held that neither the Parole

Board nor judicial review satisfied the requirements of Article 5

para. 4 (Art. 5-4). It based itself on its findings in the Weeks case

(loc. cit. pp. 30-33, paras. 62-69) in which it found, inter alia, that

the Parole Board lacked the power of decision and procedural guarantees

required by that provision and that the scope of control afforded by

judicial review was not wide enough to include an examination of

whether the detention was consistent with and therefore justified by

the objectives of the indeterminate sentence imposed.

46. The present applicant has been sentenced to a term of

discretionary life imprisonment. He continues however also to be

subject to a term of mandatory life imprisonment, following the

revocation of his licence in 1982.

47. The Government submit that since the applicant is still detained

pursuant to the mandatory sentence the requirements of Article 5

para. 4 (Art. 5-4) are fulfilled by the original trial and appeal

procedure (see eg. Eur. Court H.R., De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment

of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12, p. 40, para. 76). They refer to the

distinction drawn by the Court between mandatory and discretionary life

sentences, the former being imposed because of the gravity of the

offence and the latter influenced by factors of instability and

dangerousness (Weeks judgment, loc. cit. p. 29, para. 58 and Thynne,

Wilson and Gunnell judgment, loc. cit. p. 29, paras. 73-74). They

further state that mandatory life sentences are not subject to the same

review procedure as discretionary ones since, in respect of the former,

risk is only one of the relevant criteria and the factor of maintaining

public confidence in the criminal justice system comes into play.

48. The applicant submits that the mandatory life sentence has in

reality been overtaken by subsequent events - the imposition of the

discretionary life sentence which was based on a finding of diminished

responsibility - and that the justifications for both sentences have

merged. The applicant's position is therefore to all intents and

purposes identical to that of a discretionary life prisoner. The

applicant also submits that in any case mandatory life sentences should

attract the same procedural protection as discretionary ones since in

practice the two categories are treated in the same way. In particular,

both are divided into a tariff period covering the punitive and

deterrent part of the sentence and the remaining period where the

justification for the continued detention is the factor of risk.

49. The Commission has had regard to the Court's case-law in the

Weeks case and the Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell case. It notes that the

Court's reasoning was based on the special character of the

discretionary life sentences, which it found had developed as a measure

to deal with mentally unstable and dangerous offenders. In the Weeks

case, where a sentence of life imprisonment had been imposed for a

robbery in which 35 pence had been stolen, the Court equated the

measure to the placing of a recidivist or habitual offender at the

disposal of the Government as in the Van Droogenbroek case (Eur. Court

H.R., Van Droogenbroek judgment of 24 June 1982, Series A no. 50). In

such cases, the causal link between detention initially justified under

Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) and continued detention could be broken

where a decision not to release or to re-detain was based "on grounds

that were inconsistent with the objectives of the sentencing court"

(Weeks judgment loc. cit. p. 26, para. 49).In those circumstances a

detention that was at its outset lawful would be transformed into a

deprivation of liberty that was arbitrary and consequently incompatible

with Article 5 (Art. 5).

50. Since the grounds relied on by judges in passing discretionary

life sentences are by their nature susceptible of change with the

passage of time, new issues of lawfulness may therefore arise which

require the possibility of recourse to a body satisfying the

requirements of Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention. These

factors do not arise in the context of mandatory life sentences. The

Commission notes that the mandatory life sentence is a determinate

sentence fixed by law and based solely on the perceived gravity of the

offence of murder. The fact that for purposes of release on licence

discretionary and mandatory life prisoners are subject to a similar,

though not identical, review procedure is not sufficient to bring the

mandatory life sentence within the category of special type of

deprivation of liberty identified above.

51. The Commission does not accept the submission of the applicant

that his mandatory sentence has ceased to be operative. Following the

applicant's conviction for manslaughter in 1982, the trial judge

revoked his licence. Pursuant to Section 62(9) of the 1967 Act, he

therefore has continued to be detained under the original mandatory

sentence. The intervening event of the imposition of an additional

discretionary life sentence does not break the causal link between the

earlier conviction and his continued detention. To hold otherwise would

have the bizarre result of rendering it advantageous for a prisoner

held under a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment to commit a

subsequent offence attracting a discretionary life sentence.

Consequently, the Commission finds that in the circumstances of the

present case the requirements imposed by Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4)

as to the supervision of lawfulness of the applicant's detention were

satisfied by the original trial procedure.

CONCLUSION

52. The Commission concludes, by 10 votes to 5, that there has been

no violation of Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention.

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)

(Or. English)

DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. S. TRECHSEL, E. BUSUTTIL,

MRS. G.H. THUNE, SIR BASIL HALL AND MR. B. MARXER

We regret that we are unable to agree with the opinion of the

majority of the Commission that in this case there has been no

violation of Article 5 para. 4 of the Convention.

The present applicant has been sentenced to a term of

discretionary life imprisonment. The majority of the Commission

however base their conclusion on the fact that the applicant continues

also to be subject to a term of mandatory life imprisonment, following

the revocation of his licence in 1982.

We note that the Court in the cases of Weeks and Thynne, Wilson

and Gunnell (loc. cit.) drew a distinction between mandatory and

discretionary life sentences on the basis that the first category was

based on the gravity of the offence committed rather than other special

factors, namely, the special character of the discretionary life

sentences, which it found had developed as a measure to deal with

mentally unstable and dangerous offenders. It appears however that

following the decision in the Handscomb case (see paras. 34-37)

mandatory life sentences were treated in the same way as the special

category of discretionary sentences in that both sentences were divided

into two distinct parts - the "tariff" part serving the purpose of

deterrence and retribution and the remainder in which the

consideration of risk to the public was the crucial factor.

While the Government contend that an additional factor, namely,

the consideration of the maintenance of public confidence in the

criminal justice system, is operative in mandatory cases, we note that

in the 1987 policy statement (para. 37 above) this was relevant to the

stage of deciding as to the appropriate length of the tariff and was

not stated to be a factor which could require the continued detention

of a person who had served his tariff and was no longer considered a

risk. We further have doubts as to whether the criterion of maintaining

public confidence is not merely a restatement of the risk principle.

We finds it unnecessary however to decide in the present case

whether a mandatory life sentence can legitimately be distinguished

from discretionary life sentences for the purposes of

Article 5 para. 4. The present applicant is held under a discretionary

life sentence which was imposed on him because of the existence of

special factors of mental instability and dangerousness. This

intervening event has, in our view, broken the causal link between the

original mandatory life sentence and his continued detention. The

punitive or "tariff" part of both sentences has expired. We have found

nothing in the Government's submissions to indicate that, contrary to

the information given to the applicant by the Home Office, his

continued detention is not based on the risk which he continues to

represent. Since this is a factor which is subject to change, the

applicant is entitled under the provisions of Article 5 para. 4 to

judicial control of the continued justification of his detention.

The majority draw attention to the result that a mandatory life

prisoner who commits an offence attracting an additional discretionary

life sentence would appear to benefit therefrom. We would merely reply

that it would be for the domestic courts to determine whether the

subsequent offence disclosed the special factors of mental instability

which would warrant the imposition of a discretionary life sentence.

As regards whether the available remedies satisfy the

requirements of Article 5 para. 4, we recall that since the expiry of

his tariff the applicant has been subject to the same regime which was

under consideration in the Weeks and Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell cases

(loc. cit.: see paras. 43-45 above). While the powers and procedures

of the Parole Board have changed with the implementation of new

legislation, these changes are not in issue in the present case.

Consequently, in light of the above case-law, we conclude that,

under the then prevailing legislation, the applicant was not able to

have the lawfulness of his continued detention reviewed at reasonable

intervals by a body satisfying the requirements of Article 5 para. 4

of the Convention. There has therefore been a violation of this

provision.

APPENDIX I

HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Date Item

________________________________________________________________

15.06.89 Introduction of the application

13.09.89 Registration of the application

Examination of admissibility

02.03.91 Commission's decision to invite the parties to submit

observations on the admissibility and merits

10.07.91 Government's observations

01.10.91 Commission's decision to refer the case to a Chamber

08.04.92 Commission's grant of legal aid

11.05.92 Applicant's observations

12.5.92 Chamber's decision to relinquish jurisdiction to the

Plenary

19.05.92 Commission's decision to invite the parties to an oral

hearing

15.10.92 Hearing on admissibility and merits

15.10.92 Commission's decision to declare the application

partly admissible, partly inadmissible.

Examination of the merits

15.10.92 Commission's deliberations on the merits

23.10.92 Applicant's submissions

18.03.93 Applicant's further submissions

13.02.93 Commission's consideration of the state of proceedings

04.05.93 Commission's deliberations on the merits, final votes

and adoption of the Report

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WYNNE v. the UNITED KINGDOM

WYNNE v. the UNITED KINGDOM

LEXI