EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

                            SECOND CHAMBER

                       Application No. 20826/92

                             A and Others

                                against

                                Denmark

                       REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

                       (adopted on 24 May 1995)

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                 Page

I.    INTRODUCTION

      (paras. 1 - 15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

      A.   The application

           (paras. 2 - 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

      B.   The proceedings

           (paras. 5 - 10). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

      C.   The present Report

           (paras. 11 - 15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

      (paras. 16 - 71). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

      A.   The particular circumstances of the case

           (paras.16 - 63). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

           a)    The applicants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

                 (paras. 16 - 25)

           b)    Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

                 (paras. 26 - 31)

           c)    The civil court proceedings. . . . . . . . . . . . 5

                 (paras. 32 - 63)

      B.   Relevant domestic law

           (paras. 64 - 71) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

III.  OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

      (paras. 72 - 112) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

      A.   Complaint declared admissible

           (para. 72) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

      B.   Point at issue

           (para. 73) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

      C.   As regards Article 6 of the Convention

           (paras. 74 - 110). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

           1)    Period to be taken into consideration

                 (paras. 76 - 83) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                 Page

           2)    The reasonableness of the length of

                 the proceedings

                 (paras. 84 - 101). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

                 a)   Complexity of the case

                      (paras. 85 - 87). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

                 b)   The applicants' conduct

                      (paras. 88 - 93). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

                 c)   Conduct of the administrative and

                      judicial authorities

                      (paras. 94 - 101) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

           3)    Overall assessment of the case

                 (paras. 102 - 110) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

                 a)   The applicants A to G/G1

                      (paras. 103 - 104). . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

           CONCLUSION

           (para. 105). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

                 b)   The applicants K and L

                      (paras. 106 - 109). . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

           CONCLUSION

           (para. 110). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

      D.   Recapitulation

           (paras. 111 - 112) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

APPENDIX I:      DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO

                 THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION . . . . . .  22

I.    INTRODUCTION

1.    The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the

European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the

Commission.

A.    The application

2.    The applicants are, or were, all Danish nationals, in the

following referred to as A to G/G1, and K to L. In the proceedings

before the Commission the applicants are represented by the Danish

Association of Haemophiliacs (Danmarks Bløderforening) and

Mr. Tyge Trier, a lawyer practising in Copenhagen.

3.    The application is directed against Denmark. The respondent

Government are represented by their Agent, Mr. Laurids Mikaelsen of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4.    The case concerns the length of the proceedings in a liability

and compensation dispute between the applicants and the Ministry of

Health (Sundhedsministeriet), the National Health Board

(Sundhedsstyrelsen), the company Novo-Nordisk Limited and the National

Serum Institute (Statens Seruminstitut). The applicants consider that

the dispute has not been determined within a reasonable time and invoke

Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

B.    The proceedings

5.    The application was introduced on 27 August 1992 and registered

on 21 October 1992.

6.    On 6 April 1994 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to give

notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite

the parties to submit written observations on its admissibility and

merits.

7.    The Government's observations were submitted on 15 June 1994. The

applicants' observations in reply were submitted on 10 October 1994,

following two extensions of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.

8.    On 30 November 1994 the Commission declared the application

admissible.

9.    The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent

to the parties on 14 December 1994 and they were invited to submit such

further information or observations on the merits as they wished.  The

Government submitted further information and observations on 20 and

30 January as well as on 20 and 23 February 1995. The applicants

submitted further information and observations on 20 January and

20 February as well as on 10 and 16 March 1995.

10.   After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in

accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed

itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a

friendly settlement.  In the light of the parties' reaction, the

Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement

can be effected.

C.    The present Report

11.   The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission (Second

Chamber) in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after

deliberations and votes, the following members being present:

           MM.   H. DANELIUS, President

                 C.A. NØRGAARD

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           MM.   G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 S. TRECHSEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

12.   The text of this Report was adopted on 24 May 1995 and is now

transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in

accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.

13.   The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the

Convention, is:

      (i)  to establish the facts, and

      (ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose

           a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under

           the Convention.

14.   The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application

is attached hereto as Appendix I.

15.   The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the

documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the

Commission.

II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

A.    The particular circumstances of the case

      a)   The applicants

16.   A was born in 1975. He resides at St. Heddinge and studies

agriculture. He was infected with the human immunodeficiency virus

(HIV) between 7 July 1985 and 25 May 1986.

17.   B was born in 1950 and resides at Kværndrup. He worked as an

electronics mechanic until 1991 when he was granted an early retirement

pension (førtidspension). B was infected with the HIV between

9 June 1985 and 10 February 1986.

18.   C was born in 1958. He was infected with the HIV between

1 January 1978 and 7 June 1985. C worked as an electronics mechanic

until winter 1991/92 when the first signs of the acquired

immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) appeared. He was then granted an early

retirement pension. C died of AIDS on 14 September 1993 and his widow

pursues the application on his behalf.

19.   D was born in 1963. He resides in Copenhagen. He was infected

with the HIV between 1 January 1978 and 27 April 1985.

20.   E was born in 1946. He resides at Frederiksberg. E was infected

with the HIV between 16 January 1980 and 21 February 1985. He decided

to withdraw from the court proceedings in Denmark on 4 November 1993.

21.   F was born in 1935. He was infected with the HIV between

3 January 1980 and 6 March 1985. The first signs of AIDS appeared in

1988/89. F died of AIDS on 9 September 1992 and his widow pursues the

application on his behalf.

22.   G/G1 are the parents of a haemophiliac who was born in 1941.

Their son was infected with the HIV between 10 May 1986 and

26 March 1987. The AIDS symptoms appeared in June 1992 and G/G1's son

died thereof on 9 August 1992.

23.   K is the widow of a haemophiliac who was born in 1941. K's

husband was infected with the HIV between 1 January 1978 and

12 March 1985. He had received a pension since the age of 15 and AIDS

was diagnosed in 1987. K's husband died of AIDS on 10 August 1987.

24.   L is the mother of a haemophiliac who was born in 1976. L's son

was infected with the HIV between 1 January 1978 and 17 October 1985.

The AIDS symptoms appeared in 1985 and L's son died thereof on

27 August 1986.

25.   The applicants A to F, the sons of G/G1 and L as well as K's

husband had frequently received blood transfusions at Danish hospitals.

      b)   Introduction

26.   In 1982 it became known that inter alia AIDS could be transmitted

through blood and through the use of certain blood products. In 1984

a so-called Blood Products Committee (blodproduktudvalg) was

established in Denmark and in 1985 the question of screening donor

blood in order to avoid the use of contaminated blood arose in this

Committee. Following further discussions on the topic the Danish

Association of Haemophiliacs requested, in March 1985, the Minister of

the Interior to introduce heat treatment of blood products and

screening of donor blood.

27.   On 10 September 1985 the Minister of the Interior requested the

National Health Board to introduce, as soon as possible, a general

requirement of subjecting blood products to heat treatment as well as

screening of donor blood.

28.   The requirement of heat treatment took effect as from

1 October 1985 and the donor blood screening as from 1 January 1986.

However, in certain circumstances it remained possible to use

unscreened blood products. On 11 November 1987 the National Health

Board received a report from the National University Hospital

concerning the possibility of HIV infections caused by unscreened blood

products. On 13 November 1987 the National Health Board informed the

Danish producers of blood products that all unscreened blood products

were to be withdrawn immediately.

29.   In the meantime the Danish Association of Haemophiliacs had drawn

up a report of April 1987 from which it appeared that approximately

90 haemophiliacs had been infected with the HIV. The Association

accordingly urged Parliament (Folketinget) to adopt legislation

allowing for awards of ex gratia compensation in the amount of

450,000 DKK or more.

30.   In pursuance of an Executive Order (bekendtgørelse) of

2 September 1987 the Minister of the Interior was authorised to award

an ex gratia compensation in the amount of 100,000 DKK to haemophiliacs

who had become HIV positive as a result of receiving contaminated blood

in transfusions. This measure was criticised by the Association in a

letter of 15 October 1987 addressed to the Parliamentary Health

Committee (Folketingets Sundhedsudvalg). By Executive Order of

14 June 1988 the ex gratia compensation was increased to 250,000 DKK

and could now also be awarded to certain relatives. Finally, by

Executive Order of 19 November 1992 the award was increased to

750,000 DKK. This amount has been, and will be, granted to

haemophiliacs found to be infected with HIV following treatment with

blood products at Danish hospitals and to other HIV positive persons

who have in all probability been infected through blood transfusions

at Danish hospitals. In certain circumstances the ex gratia

compensation will go to those persons' heirs. The applicants A to E and

K have received the 750,000 DKK. F received 250,000 DKK before he died

on 9 September 1992. His widow has received the remaining 500,000 DKK.

The son of the applicants G/G1 received 250,000 DKK before he died on

9 August 1992. As he did not have any principal heirs (livsarvinger)

the remaining 500,000 DKK have not been paid out. The son of

the applicant L did not receive any money as he died before

2 September 1987. He left no principal heirs.

31.   Following the discussions in Parliament concerning the above ex

gratia payments the Government was requested to take steps in order to

clarify the circumstances related to the use of unscreened

blood products after screening had been introduced on 1 January 1986

(cf. para. 28 above). A judicial inquiry was carried out and its

findings were presented in May 1988. On the basis of these findings the

Ministry of Health opened an official inquiry, in July 1988, against

seven officials and criminal proceedings were instituted against a

producer of blood products. By judgment of 29 November 1989 this

producer was found guilty of a violation of the Medical Drugs Act and

fined 15,000 DKK.

      c)   The civil court proceedings

32.   On 14 December 1987 the Danish Association of Haemophiliacs

instituted proceedings in the High Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre

Landsret) against the Ministry of the Interior (later changed to the

Ministry of Health, defendant 1), the National Health Board

(defendant 2), the company Novo-Nordisk Limited (defendant 3) and the

National Serum Institute (defendant 4). The defendants 1, 2 and 4 were

represented by the Government Solicitor (kammeradvokaten) whereas

defendant 3 retained another practising lawyer as counsel. In the

Association's writ it was alleged that the defendants had acted in an

unjustifiable and irresponsible manner towards the Association's

members by having contributed to the use of products, which might have

contained the AIDS virus, after 1 January 1986. The Association

therefore claimed that the defendants be ordered to acknowledge that

they were liable in damages, jointly and severally, to those of the

suing Association's members in whom antibodies containing HIV had been

found following the use of blood products supplied by the company

Novo-Nordisk Limited and/or the National Serum Institute. The case was

registered in the High Court under file no. Ø.L. III nr. 364/1987.

33.   At the first court session in the case, on 18 February 1988, the

defendants submitted their replies (svarskrift) claiming primarily

dismissal of the plaintiff's claims and alternatively judgment in their

favour. One of the grounds on which the claim for dismissal was based

was that the Association could not, in the defendants' view, act on

behalf of its members. They maintained that the action should only be

allowed if the Association acted as representative (mandatar) for its

members. Furthermore, the defendants requested an adjournment of the

case pending the outcome of the judicial inquiry mentioned above

(para. 31), following which they would be in a position to submit a

more detailed reply.

34.   The Court decided to adjourn the case until 7 April 1988. Further

adjournments were granted on that date and on 5 May 1988, still

awaiting the outcome of the judicial inquiry the result of which became

available in May 1988. At the following court session on 15 August 1988

the defendants did not submit further observations but requested that

their claim for dismissal be heard separately. The Association

requested permission to submit written observations on this point and

the Court accordingly adjourned the case until 8 September 1988.

35.   At the court session on 8 September 1988 the Association

requested the Court to reject the defendants' request to examine their

claim of dismissal of the case separately. The Association further

stated that it was now acting as representative (mandatar) of a member

who wished to remain anonymous. The Association also maintained that

it had an independent legal interest, on behalf of all its members, in

obtaining the Court's decision on whether or not the defendants could

be held liable vis-à-vis those of its members who had become HIV

infected after a certain date. The case was adjourned until

10 November 1988 in order to allow the defendants to submit written

observations in reply.

36.   At the following court session on 10 November 1988 the defendants

maintained their claim for dismissal. They were, however, willing to

reconsider the matter provided the Association agreed that the case

could be regarded as concerning the member of the Association who had

now been mentioned and, thus, a specific loss allegedly caused by acts

of the defendants on the basis of which damages would be claimed. In

accordance with their requests the Court called the parties to a

preliminary court hearing pursuant to section 355 of the Administration

of Justice Act (retsplejeloven) in order to have the above matters

clarified. The hearing was fixed for 9 February 1989 but owing to

illness in December 1988 and January 1989 the Association's

representative was unable to attend. On 2 March 1989 the Court fixed,

in consultation with the parties, 18 May 1989 for the preliminary

hearing pursuant to section 355 of the Administration of Justice Act.

37.   During the court session on that day counsel for the Association

agreed to discuss with the Association and its members whether or not

individual members could be identified and thus specific claims for

damages made. The case was adjourned until 28 September 1989 for that

purpose.

38.   On 28 September 1989 the Association requested an eight week

adjournment. The above issue of identifying individual members had not

yet been clarified. The Court complied and adjourned the case until

23 November 1989. With reference to the discussions during the court

session of 18 May 1989 the presiding judge requested, however, that the

formality questions be settled.

39.   At the subsequent court hearing on 23 November 1989 the

Association submitted that it acted as representative (mandatar) of

seven individuals (the applicants A to F and the son of G/G1) who had

now joined the case. In his written submissions of the same day counsel

for the plaintiffs stated as follows:

      (translation)

      "With reference to the court session of 18 May 1989 during

      which the parties agreed that the Danish Association of

      Haemophiliacs appears as representative (mandatar) for

      those members of the Association who have become infected

      with HIV after 1 January 1985 and that such identification

      of the plaintiffs is provided which will nevertheless

      protect their identity from being made public to other than

      the Court, I hereby submit that the following plaintiffs

      have joined the case (followed by the mentioning of the

      applicants A to F and the son of G/G1) ..."

40.   The case was then adjourned until 18 January 1990 in order to

allow the defendants to submit their final replies. A further

adjournment, until 22 March 1990, was granted by the Court on

18 January 1990.

41.   At the court session on 22 March 1990 an additional four

plaintiffs joined the case, including the applicants K and L. The case

was adjourned once more, until 17 May 1990, pending the submission of

the defendants' final replies.

42.   On 17 May 1990 the case was adjourned until 21 June 1990 in order

to allow the plaintiffs to examine certain documents. On 21 June 1990

the plaintiffs submitted another 21 documents for which reason the case

was adjourned again, until 23 August 1990, pending the defendants'

observations thereon. On that day the case was adjourned until

27 September 1990 still pending the defendants' observations.

43.   During the court hearing on 27 September 1990 the plaintiffs

expressed their agreement with the defendant 3 that a medical expert

opinion ought to be obtained. They furthermore submitted that they

would present relevant documents in this respect. The case was then

adjourned until 25 October 1990 apparently awaiting the other

defendants' view on this question. On 25 October 1990 the case was

adjourned again until 29 November 1990 as the defendants 1, 2 and 4 had

still not replied to the question of obtaining a medical expert

opinion.

44.   This issue was solved on 29 November 1990 when the parties

reached agreement on obtaining a medical expert opinion. The case was

adjourned until 21 February 1991 when another adjournment, until

4 April 1991, was decided as the plaintiffs were in the process of

preparing further medical evidence in respect of six additional

prospective plaintiffs.

45.   On 4 April, 16 May and 6 June 1991 the Court decided on further

adjournments as the parties apparently still discussed questions of

procedure in obtaining a medical expert opinion. On 8 August 1991 a new

preliminary court hearing pursuant to section 355 of the Administration

of Justice Act was held. The plaintiffs submitted their proposals in

respect of obtaining a medical expert opinion whereas the defendants

1, 2 and 4 requested an adjournment to consider the matter further. The

case was adjourned until 12 September 1991 when the parties informed

the Court that they had now reached agreement on the procedural aspects

of obtaining a medical expert opinion. The Court adjourned the case,

until 7 November 1991, in order to allow the parties to proceed as

agreed. Further adjournments for this reason were decided on

19 December 1991, 20 February, 12 March and 4 June 1992.

46.   On 6 August 1992 the parties informed the Court that they had

agreed on who could be appointed as experts and also on the issues upon

which the experts were supposed to express themselves. The Court then

appointed the experts as requested and adjourned the case, until

10 December 1992, pending the submission of the expert opinion.

47.   On 9 August 1992 the son of the applicants G/G1 died. The

applicant F died on 9 September 1992. On that day the High Court was

informed that an application had been lodged with the European

Commission of Human Rights in which the plaintiffs' representatives

invoked Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention referring to the length of

the proceedings. Further, it appears that certain additional problems

arose in respect of the material which should be sent to the appointed

experts for evaluation.

48.   In the light of this the presiding judge decided, on

13 October 1992, to add to the records as follows:

      (translation)

      "The presiding judge noted that during the preparatory

      stage up till now the case has been adjourned each time in

      accordance with the requests made jointly by the parties'

      counsels, the most recent adjournment being from

      6 August 1992 until 10 December 1992 pending the submission

      of the experts' report.

      The presiding judge urged the defendants' counsels to

      submit their reply to (the plaintiffs' counsel's)

      submission of 9 September 1992 to the Court and counsel

      (for the plaintiffs) before 1 November 1992.

      The presiding judge added that any additional exhibits

      which were to be presented to the experts, should first be

      presented in court."

49.   The above developments resulted in a meeting, on

11 November 1992, between the Minister of Health and the parties'

representatives during which the possibilities of accelerating the case

were considered. The defendants argued in particular that, although the

purpose of the lawsuit in their opinion was to obtain damages, the

plaintiffs had not yet presented any specific claim in this respect.

The plaintiffs argued that the purpose of the lawsuit was not only to

secure damages but also to place liability for the alleged wrongdoings.

50.   During the following court session on 10 December 1992 the

parties agreed to adjourn the case as the expert opinion was not yet

available. The Court adjourned the case until 11 February 1993.

51.   The experts' opinion became available on 17 December 1992

following which the parties commenced discussions on putting

supplementary questions to the experts. At the court session on

11 February 1993 the case was adjourned until 18 March 1993 in order

to allow the parties to state their views thereon.

52.   From the court transcript of 18 March 1993 it appears that the

parties had still not reached agreement on the question of obtaining

further replies from the experts. The transcript reads as follows:

      (translation)

      "(Counsel for the defendants 1, 2 and 4) remarked that the

      Minister of Health wishes this case pursued as quickly as

      possible.

      The presiding judge repeated what was added to the court

      transcripts of 13 October 1992, i.e. that during the

      preparatory stage up till now the case has been adjourned

      each time in accordance with the requests made jointly by

      the parties' counsels and (he) added that in civil

      proceedings it is firstly the responsibility of the parties

      to pursue the case.

      In accordance with (the parties') joint request the case

      was adjourned pending the outcome of their continuing

      discussion on the formulation of additional questions to be

      put to the experts, the parties agreeing that at present

      there was no need for a preliminary court hearing pursuant

      to section 355 of the Administration of Justice Act."

53.   The case was adjourned until 1 April 1993 on which date the

parties informed the Court of the supplementary questions to be put to

the experts. The case was then adjourned until 13 May 1993 pending the

experts' supplementary opinion. On that date the case was adjourned

until 17 June 1993 as the expert opinion was not yet available.

54.   During the court session on 17 June 1993 the plaintiffs submitted

a preliminary request for damages in the amount of 1,000,000 DKK in

respect of the applicants A to F and in respect of G/G1's son.

Furthermore, a claim of 750,000 DKK was made in respect of the

applicant K. No preliminary claim for damages was made for the

applicant L. The case was hereafter adjourned until 2 September 1993

as the supplementary expert opinion was not yet available. On that date

the parties agreed to request another adjournment until

4 November 1993, which the Court granted, as the expert opinion was

still not available. Part I of the experts' supplementary report became

available on 9 September 1993.

55.   On 14 September 1993 the applicant C died.

56.   Part II of the experts' supplementary report became available on

22 October 1993.

57.   During the following court session held on 4 November 1993

specific claims for compensation were presented by seven plaintiffs

(the applicants A to D, F, G/G1's son and K). The applicant L did not

claim damages and the applicant E announced that he withdrew from the

case. The plaintiffs claimed damages in respect of incapacity of work,

medical invalidity, loss of supporter and funeral costs in amounts up

to 1,090,000 DKK. During two court sessions held on 16 December 1993

and 13 January 1994 further documents relevant to the question of

damages were produced. At the request of the defendants it was also

discussed whether or not to present the plaintiffs' claims to the

Industrial Injury Board (Arbejdsskadestyrelsen) for evaluation. It was

agreed, however, not to pursue this any further.

58.   During a court session on 3 March 1994 pursuant to section 355

of the Administration of Justice Act the question of fixing the dates

for themain hearing was discussed. In consultation with the parties the

High Court fixed the dates for the main hearing to be 24 October until

22 November 1994. This was subsequently changed at the request of the

applicants to 28 November 1994 until 17 January 1995. The case was

adjourned until then.

59.   The main hearing took place on the dates fixed. The remaining

plaintiffs dropped all claims against the National Serum Institute

(defendant 4). Furthermore, the applicants B to D, F and L dropped all

claims against the company Novo-Nordisk Limited (defendant 3). With

these changes the applicants, except E who had withdrawn from the case,

maintained that the defendants had acted negligently and thereby caused

the HIV infections. The plaintiffs furthermore claimed that the

defendants were liable to pay damages. In respect of the latter the

applicants maintained their claims in amounts from 24,630.24 DKK to

1,090,000 DKK. L did not claim damages.

60.   By judgment of 14 February 1995 the High Court of Eastern Denmark

rejected all remaining claims directed against the company Novo-Nordisk

Limited. The Court concluded, however, that the Ministry of Health and

the National Health Board (defendants 1 and 2) had acted negligently

in respect of a certain period of time but that only G/G1's son had

been affected thereby. Accordingly, all claims for damages were

rejected except the claim presented on behalf of G/G1's son. This claim

in the amount of 24,630.24 DKK was reduced on an equitable basis to

18,718.24 DKK plus interest as from 17 June 1993, i.e. from the date

the request for compensation was first submitted (cf. para. 54).

61.   Following the above judgment of the High Court of Eastern Denmark

Parliament discussed its political consequences. On 22 February 1995

the Minister of Health issued the following press release:

      (translation)

      "The political consequences of the haemophiliacs' action

      for compensation

      Today the Minister for Health, Mrs. Yvonne Herløv Andersen

      concluded her negotiations with representatives of the

      Parties of the Parliament regarding the political

      consequences of the haemophiliacs' action for compensation

      and hereby declares as follows:

      The Parties of the Parliament and the Government sympathise

      with the HIV-infected haemophiliacs and regret the profound

      tragedy that 89 haemophiliacs at the end of the 1970's and

      in the following years were infected with HIV via their

      factor preparations before sufficient knowledge and useful

      methods of stopping the transmission of the infection were

      available.

      The Parties of the Parliament and the Government

      acknowledge and regret that arrangements and measures were

      taken in 1985 and 1986 which - based on the knowledge

      available today - on some points must be characterised as

      insufficient.

      The Parties of the Parliament and the Government respect

      that the High Court of Eastern Denmark in its judgment

      concerning the claim for compensation concurs with the

      authorities that they did not act negligently by not

      demanding heat treatment of the factor preparations until

      1 October 1985, and by not demanding screening of all donor

      blood until 1 January 1986.

      The Parties of the Parliament and the Government consider

      it their moral duty to show great flexibility in order to

      reach a politically acceptable solution to the situation of

      the 89 HIV-infected haemophiliacs.

      The Parties of the Parliament and the Government are of the

      opinion that the total indemnification already given to the

      HIV-infected haemophiliacs and their surviving relatives is

      a clear manifestation of the sympathy which the Parties of

      the Parliament have for the particularly difficult

      situation of all the HIV-infected haemophiliacs.

      As a further contribution to a human solution, the Parties

      of the Parliament and the Government agree to the

      initiative to create as soon as possible a fund with a

      total amount of DKK 20 million which, within a certain

      framework, is to be administered by the Danish Association

      of Haemophiliacs. This is done in order to ensure that the

      special and individual needs of the haemophiliacs - now and

      in the years to come - can be better met than has been the

      case with the compensation paid so far.

      Furthermore, the Government will initiate as soon as

      possible - through special legislation - a medicine

      insurance scheme to cover the medical drugs in broad terms,

      and to ensure easier access to compensation than provided

      by the Act on Product Liability.

      Finally, the Government will take the initiative to offer

      the Danish Association of Haemophiliacs representation in

      the Blood Product Committee of the National Health Board.

      The Blood Product Committee is entrusted inter alia with

      the task of proposing measures to ensure the best possible

      use of donor blood and to ensure to the greatest possible

      extent self-sufficiency in products deriving therefrom.

      This declaration from the Parties of the Parliament and the

      Government was delivered today to the Danish Association of

      Haemophiliacs."

62.   On 15 March 1995 the Danish Association of Haemophiliacs issued

the following press release:

      (translation)

      "Regardless of the fact that the Danish Association of

      Haemophiliacs must maintain its criticism of the judgment

      of the High Court of Eastern Denmark, its Board has decided

      that it can no longer recommend that the judgment is

      appealed against to the Supreme Court (Højesteret).

      This is based on Parliament's and the Government's

      statement of 22 February 1995 where the circumstances on

      which the case is based are regretted. At the same time a

      number of initiatives are presented to the HIV infected

      haemophiliacs and the Association which will ease some of

      the consequences this case has had for the group, and a

      promise is made to make arrangements, including a medicine

      insurance scheme, which could improve the patients'

      position in the future.

      The Association presumes that this statement made by a

      unanimous Parliament and the Government is quite an

      extraordinary step which should be seen as such and with

      due respect for the considerations and intentions

      Parliament and the Government wanted to express. Therefore,

      the Association finds that this statement is a sufficient

      basis for a request to let the case come to an end. This

      has been a great wish of the Association which finds that

      human considerations as well as the Association's resources

      for a long time have preferred a quick and honourable

      solution to the case.

      Nevertheless, the Association wishes to state that it would

      have been more appropriate if the formulation of the public

      regret had expressed a more unreserved recognition to the

      effect that the haemophiliacs' risk of HIV infection was

      not dealt with adequately in 1984-86. Furthermore, it would

      have been preferable if the formulations had reflected the

      High Court's judgment in a better way, including the fact

      that the judges concluded that the State is found liable in

      one of the cases.

      At least three of the eight plaintiffs whom the Association

      has represented find that there is no basis for letting the

      case come to an end and have therefore decided, regardless

      of the Association's recommendations, to appeal against the

      judgment.

      Although the Association would have preferred that the case

      could have been brought to a final conclusion the

      Association's Board respects this choice, but as a

      consequence of the above the Association will no longer act

      as representative for those of the haemophiliacs who choose

      to appeal to the Supreme Court.

      The Association notes that the case pending before the

      European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg is not

      mentioned in the public statement. Accordingly, no regrets

      have been expressed in respect of the unreasonably lengthy

      court proceedings - proceedings which have lasted more than

      seven years. The Association finds that there is still a

      violation of the haemophiliacs' human rights. Therefore the

      human rights case is maintained."

63.   The applicants A, B and K have appealed against the High Court's

judgment to the Supreme Court. This case is at present pending there.

As regards the applicants C, D, F, G/G1 and L the case ended with the

judgment of the High Court of Eastern Denmark on 14 February 1995.

B.    Relevant domestic law

64.   In civil lawsuits the court acts at the request of the parties.

Civil proceedings are instituted by one of the parties submitting a

writ of summons to the court concerned (cf. section 348 of the

Administration of Justice Act). Certain lawsuits, like the present one,

are brought before the High Court as the court of first instance

(cf. sections 224 to 226 of the Administration of Justice Act). Legal

proceedings are considered to be instituted when the court receives the

writ of summons. The court is responsible for the service of the writ

of summons. The lawsuit then falls into two parts - a preparatory phase

and a hearing phase.

65.   Two procedures may be followed in respect of the preparation.

Pursuant to section 351 of the Administration of Justice Act, the

preparation of a case may be carried out by the parties appearing at

preliminary hearings either personally or through a representative

entitled to appear for the person concerned. This is called oral

preparation. Pleadings are exchanged and formally submitted to the

court during a session. Pursuant to section 352 of the Administration

of Justice Act the court may decide that the case is to be prepared

without the parties appearing in court at preliminary hearings. This

is called written preparation. In the case of written preparation the

parties forward their pleadings to the court which records the

documents and sees to it that the opponent receives a copy of them.

66.   The purpose of preparing a case is to establish the facts and the

legal issues of the case, to make sure that the case is elucidated in

the best possible way, and to establish what the parties disagree on.

67.   In addition to the normal preparatory court hearings during the

preparation phase the court may hold preliminary hearings pursuant to

section 355 of the Administration of Justice Act. The court may summon

the parties to such preliminary hearings for the purpose of gaining

sufficient clarity of the extent of the evidence and the points at

issue when the court finds this expedient. During such preliminary

hearings, the court may also decide on disputes between the parties

relating to the preparation and actual organisation of the case.

68.   According to the Administration of Justice Act, the parties in

a civil lawsuit have competence as regards the substance of the case,

i.e. the problems to be considered by the court. On the other hand the

court has the final competence as regards the judicial procedure. A

stay of proceedings requires that there are reasonable grounds for such

a stay. The relevant provision in section 345 of the Administration of

Justice Act reads as follows:

      (translation)

      "The court may adjourn proceedings, if this is found

      expedient, also in order to await an administrative or

      legal decision which may influence the outcome of the case.

      The court shall notify all parties concerned regarding the

      stay of proceedings as soon as possible."

69.   Accordingly, a stay of proceedings requires that the court finds

such a step expedient. Proceedings may for instance be stayed in order

for the parties to produce evidence of relevance to the case, to

conduct friendly settlement negotiations, to procure expert opinions,

to clarify the positions of the parties etc. Moreover, proceedings will

normally be adjourned if one of the parties submits a pleading in order

to allow the other party to comment on it. Proceedings will usually

also be adjourned when an expert opinion has been submitted, enabling

the parties to review the result and decide whether the expert opinion

necessitates further questions to the expert.

70.   In civil lawsuits the case is elucidated by the parties and takes

the form of a negotiation between them. The parties decide the

questions to be considered by the court, and it is the parties who

present the material to the court. As a starting point, the parties

thus decide themselves how much or how little the court is to be

presented with and consider. The court ensures that continuous progress

is made in the case, and that the case is not allowed to be neglected.

The court intervenes in situations where one of the parties professes

misgivings concerning a stay of proceedings, or when the court feels

that a stay does not serve any real purpose. Finalising the preparation

of the case and fixing it for hearing involve a restriction on the new

material to be presented by a party, cf. section 357 and section 363

of the Administration of Justice Act.

71.   Following the finalisation of the preparation of the case it is

for the court to fix the date for the hearing of the case, cf.

section 356, subsection 2, of the Administration of Justice Act. The

court may if necessary summon the parties for this purpose.

III.  OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

A.    Complaint declared admissible

72.   The Commission has declared admissible the applicants' complaint

that their case has not been determined within a reasonable time.

B.    Point at issue

73.   Accordingly, the only point at issue is whether the length of the

proceedings exceeded the "reasonable time" referred to in

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

C.    As regards Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

74.   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, in so far

as relevant, as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

      ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a

      reasonable time by a ... tribunal."

75.   It is undisputed that the proceedings in question involve a

determination of a "civil right" and thus fall within the scope of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      1)   Period to be taken into consideration

76.   The applicants maintain their view that the period to be taken

into consideration began when the Danish Association of Haemophiliacs

raised the issue of awarding compensation to its members. They also

refer to a memorandum issued by the Association in April 1987 and the

Association's letter of 15 October 1987 addressed to the Parliamentary

Health Committee.

77.   The Government have not submitted further observations on this

particular point.

78.   The Commission recalls from its decision on the admissibility of

the application that the court proceedings in the High Court of Eastern

Denmark commenced on 14 December 1987 and are at present still pending

in the Supreme Court. These proceedings have thus already lasted seven

years and five months.

79.   However, the Commission notes that the case did not at its

commencement in the High Court of Eastern Denmark in December 1987

involve any of the applicants of the present case. The domestic lawsuit

was brought by the Danish Association of Haemophiliacs but changed,

following extensive negotiations between the parties, to the effect

that the Association was acting as representative (mandatar) for a

number of identified persons, including the applicants. In this respect

the Commission rejects the argument advanced by the applicants that

this change of plaintiffs was forced upon them either by the High Court

or by the defendants or both. The Commission has not found any evidence

which could support this view. Thus, the applicants A to G/G1, joined

the case on 23 November 1989 and the applicants K and L joined it on

22 March 1990.

80.   The Commission does not consider that the applicants could

arguably claim to be victims of an alleged violation of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention due to the length of the

proceedings before they had decided to join these proceedings

themselves. Although the outcome of a civil suit brought by the

Association alone might have been of importance to the individual

members' legal position in the future, the Commission does not consider

this to be sufficient to find that the individual members in such a

case could claim to be victims of an alleged violation of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in respect of such

proceedings. Under this provision an applicant is entitled to a fair

hearing of his case within a reasonable time and it was only when the

applicants joined the proceedings that the High Court was called upon

to determine their civil rights and obligations (cf. for example

No. 11290/84, Dec. 16.7.87, D.R. 53 p. 62).

81.   In these circumstances the Commission finds that the period of

time, the reasonableness of which is to be examined by the Commission

commenced on 23 November 1989 as far as the applicants A to G/G1 are

concerned and on 22 March 1990 as far as K and L are concerned.

82.   The Commission notes that the civil case is still pending in

Denmark. However, this is so only in respect of the applicants A, B and

K who have appealed against the judgment of the High Court of Eastern

Denmark to the Supreme Court. As far as the applicant E is concerned

the dispute between him and the authorities involved came to an end on

4 November 1993 when he decided to withdraw from the case. As far as

the applicants C, D, F, G/G1 and L are concerned the proceedings ended

on 14 February 1995 when the High Court judgment was pronounced.

83.   It follows that the periods to be assessed in respect of the nine

applicants are as follows:

A:     23 November 1989 - still pending, i.e. approximately five years

       and six months,

B:     23 November 1989 - still pending, i.e. approximately five years

       and six months,

C:     23 November 1989 until 14 February 1995, i.e. approximately

       five years and three months,

D:     23 November 1989 until 14 February 1995, i.e. approximately

       five years and three months,

E:     23 November 1989 until 4 November 1993, i.e. approximately

       four years,

F:     23 November 1989 until 14 February 1995, i.e. approximately

       five years and three months,

G/G1:  23 November 1989 until 14 February 1995, i.e. approximately

       five years and three months,

K:     22 March 1990 - still pending, i.e. approximately five years

       and two months,

L:     22 March 1990 until 14 February 1995, i.e. approximately

       four years and eleven months.

       2)  The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings

84.    From a general point of view the Commission recalls that the

reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed with

reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the

conduct of the parties and that of the authorities before which the

case is brought. Furthermore, the special circumstances of the case,

in particular what is at stake for the applicant in the litigation,

must be taken into account and may call for an overall assessment

(cf. Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A

no. 198, p. 12, para. 30 and X v. France judgment of 31 March 1992,

Series A no. 234-C, p. 90, para. 32). The Commission also recalls that

in civil cases the exercise of the right to a hearing within a

reasonable time is subject to diligence being shown by the party

concerned (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Pretto and Others judgment of 8

December 1983, Series A no. 71, pp. 14 et seq., paras. 33 et seq.).

Nonetheless this principle cannot absolve the courts from securing that

the case progresses within a reasonable time (cf. Eur. Court H.R.,

Martins Moreira judgment of 26 October 1988, Series A no. 143, p. 17,

para. 46).

       a) Complexity of the case

85.    In the light of these general criteria the applicants submit

that the case was of some complexity as it was necessary to produce

medical expert opinions and other evidence in order to allow the High

Court to assess the case properly. They maintain, however, that the

factual situation of the haemophiliacs ought to have been clarified

much earlier which would have simplified the proceedings of this case.

86.    The Government submit that the case involved a number of

difficult legal questions and was time-consuming also from the point

of view of producing relevant documentary evidence.

87.    As to its complexity the Commission recalls that the case

concerns an action for damages brought by the applicants in respect of

the prejudice they allegedly suffered as a result of blood transfusions

received, or the use of particular blood products, during a particular

period of time, and also the question of liability of the State on

account of the allegedly culpable delay of the authorities in

regulating the administration of blood products. The Commission notes

that there were undoubtedly difficult questions to answer in respect

of the use of donor blood. However, these questions appear to have been

answered by 13 November 1987 when the National Health Board, based on

the scientific material available, prohibited the use of unscreened

blood products. Furthermore, the questions relating to the use of

unscreened blood products after screening had been introduced was the

subject of a judicial inquiry, the findings of which were available in

May 1988. Having regard to this the Commission finds that the legal

questions involved did not appear to have been particularly difficult.

Furthermore, although it has been established that the production of

evidence turned out to be time-consuming the Commission does not

consider that the proceedings themselves have been particularly complex

so far. Thus, the Commission finds that the complexity of the case

cannot justify the periods of time involved.

       b) The applicants' conduct

88.    The applicants acknowledge that a limited number of delays were

due to their behaviour but they contend that these delays were

insignificant when compared with the total length of the proceedings.

In particular, they stress that it is a legal right for everyone to

have a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 (art. 6) of the

Convention which entails that everyone is treated with respect and

within a reasonable time in the court system irrespective of requests

for or protests against adjournments. Therefore, they consider that

requests referring to the urgency of the case were unnecessary, and

that, furthermore, their lack of opposition to the defendants' pleas

for adjournments should be seen in the light of the "esprit collégial"

between lawyers in civil cases.

89.    The Government maintain that the regrettable period of time it

took to prepare the case was essentially due to the applicants'

conduct. In particular the Government point out that substantial delays

were caused by the fact that the applicants did not produce the

relevant documentary evidence and did not submit any claims for damages

until June 1993. Furthermore, the Government stress that the applicants

did not at any moment during the preparation of the case request the

High Court to accelerate the case, or emphasise the urgency of it.

90.    As regards the applicants' conduct the Commission notes that the

individual plaintiffs, applicants in the present case, do not appear

to have been very much involved themselves in the proceedings

concerned. However, it follows from the case-law of the Commission and

the Court of Human Rights that they nevertheless are to be held

responsible for the delays caused by their representatives (cf. for

example Eur. Court H.R., Capuano judgment of 25 June 1987, Series A

no. 119, p. 12, para. 28).

91.    As already indicated above the Commission and the Court have

consistently considered that in civil suits where, as in the present

case, the proceedings unfold at the initiative of the parties, the

reasonableness of the length of these proceedings must be assessed by

reference to the diligence shown by the party concerned (cf. the

above-mentioned Pretto and Others judgment, paras. 33 et seq.). What

is required is "due diligence" which in the present circumstances in

particular should be seen in the light of what was, or is, at stake for

the individuals concerned. In this regard the Commission finds that the

applicants' representatives appear to have shown very little concern

for the applicants' situation. In particular the Commission points out

that as from 22 March 1990, when the applicants K and L joined the

case, it took until 6 August 1992, i.e. a period of more than two

years, before the parties were in a position to and had reached

agreement on the appointment of medical experts. All adjournments

requested during this period of time were agreed upon by the parties

involved.

92.    Furthermore, the applicants' claims for damages were not

submitted until 17 June 1993, i.e. after more than three years had

passed. Having regard to the individual applicants' situation the

Commission has not found any relevant circumstance which could justify

such a delay. Nor have any relevant facts been submitted which could

explain why the applicants did not present their claims, or otherwise

clarify their position in this respect, at a much earlier date.

93.    Thus, the Commission finds that the applicants are to be held

responsible to a certain degree for the prolongation of the proceedings

in that their representatives did not act with the necessary diligence.

       c) Conduct of the administrative and judicial authorities

94.    The applicants maintain that the reasons for the excessive

length of the proceedings lie in the conduct of both the administrative

authorities and the judicial authorities. In respect of the former the

applicants point out in particular that they may be criticised for

allowing the proceedings to stagnate, refraining from taking any

substantial procedural measures for considerable periods of time and

for failing to actively expedite already delayed proceedings by

neutralising dilatory tactics. By not assisting the applicants in their

task of providing documentary evidence the authorities neglected their

obligation to act with diligence. In respect of the judicial

authorities the applicants recall that the Contracting States are

obliged to organise their legal systems in such a way that their courts

can meet the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) to secure to everyone

a final decision within a reasonable time. However, the High Court of

Eastern Denmark did not act with the exceptional diligence which was

called for in this unique case, and did not use its powers under the

Administration of Justice Act to accelerate the proceedings in order

to ensure a speedy determination of the issues in question.

95.    The Government contend that regardless of the length of the

proceedings no shortcomings have been established in respect of the

behaviour of the High Court or the Danish authorities which were

parties to the case. The Government point out that unlike other legal

systems the Danish system in civil cases is not of an inquisitorial

type. The proceedings are governed by the Administration of Justice Act

and the conduct of the case is left almost exclusively to the diligence

of the parties.  The preparation of the case progressed without periods

of inactivity and the Government stress that no adjournments were

granted without the agreement of both parties. Moreover, they maintain

that considering the complexity and gravity of the issue it would have

been unfortunate had the preparation of the case been unduly forced.

The Government also stress that the Danish authorities parties to the

case repeatedly requested the applicants to state their claims and

submit the relevant documentary evidence. Thus, the Government are of

the opinion that the length of the proceedings, in the light of an

overall assessment, was reasonable and that the delays were

attributable in particular to the complexity of the case and the

applicants' conduct.

96.    As regards the conduct of the national authorities the

Commission recalls that the civil suit was directed against the

Ministry of Health, the National Health Board, the National Serum

Institute and a private company. Whereas all claims against the

National Serum Institute and certain claims against the private company

were subsequently dropped (para. 59 above) it remains a fact that

delays caused by the Ministry of Health and the National Health Board

are attributable to the State (cf. mutatis mutandis Eur. Court H.R.,

Guincho judgment of 10 July 1984, Series A no. 81, p. 16, para. 38).

97.    The Commission considers that it is incumbent on the

administrative authorities, when they are the defendants in court

proceedings, to take every necessary measure not only to comply with

the time-limits laid down, but also to ensure that the dispute is

speedily concluded. That was not the case in this instance. The

Commission refers, once more, to the regrettable period of time it took

to prepare for the medical expert opinions. Thus, the Commission finds

that the national administrative authorities, defendants in the case,

also contributed to prolonging the case.

98.    As regards the conduct of the judicial authorities the

Commission recalls that the Danish legal system in civil cases is not

of an inquisitorial type, but the lawsuit is elucidated by the parties

and takes the form of a negotiation between them. However, according

to the Administration of Justice Act it is nevertheless the Court which

ensures that continuous progress is made in the case and that the case

is not allowed to be neglected.

99.    In the present case the Commission finds that what was at stake

in the contested proceedings was of great importance for those of the

applicants who are, or were, suffering from the incurable disease, in

particular in the light of their reduced life expectancy which follows

therefrom. Thus, an exceptional diligence was called for in view of the

seriousness which ought to have been obvious to the Court.

100.   Yet, even following the death of G/G1's son and F, in August and

September 1992 respectively, and even after the application had been

lodged with the Commission following which a need for a speedy

procedure must have been clear, the Court did not use its powers to

make orders for the speeding up of the progress of the proceedings, but

limited itself to pointing out that all adjournments had been granted

on the basis of joint requests from the parties. This is, in the

Commission's view, not sufficient in order to fulfil the requirement

of exceptional diligence.

101.   Furthermore, the Commission finds that, regardless of counsel's

views on the dates fixed for hearing the case, the Court did not act

with the exceptional diligence required vis-à-vis those of the

applicants suffering from the incurable disease when it fixed, in

March 1994, the main hearing for November 1994, thereby allowing the

case to lie idle for another eight months.

       3)  Overall assessment of the case

102.   The Commission finds that none of the parties involved in the

present case acted with the necessary diligence required and all of

them therefore contributed to the delays which have occurred. When

reaching a conclusion in such circumstances the Commission must place

emphasis on the particular facts of the case and on what was at stake

for the individual applicants.

       a) The applicants A to G/G1

103.   The Commission recalls that the applicants A to F and G/G1's son

all suffer, or suffered, from the HIV infection and were all alive when

they joined the court proceedings. C, F and  G/G1's son died during the

proceedings which with all clarity exemplifies the urgency which was

called for in view of their situation.

104.   The Commission considers that the High Court in such

circumstances ought to have intervened in accordance with its powers

under the Administration of Justice Act in order to ensure proper

progress in the proceedings. Before the applicants joined the case the

Court had already experienced the passing of approximately two years

during which the parties argued on questions of formality, which

indicated their lack of understanding for the need for a speedy

conclusion. Nevertheless, the High Court did nothing in order to avoid

that the parties argued for another two years - from September 1990

until August 1992 - on who to appoint as experts in the case; nor did

the Court at any other moment act adequately when it became clear that

the parties were unable to do so themselves. In respect of the

applicants A to F and G/G1's son  who were, or are, suffering from the

HIV the reasonable time had, in the Commission's view, already been

exceeded at the time when E decided to withdraw from the case on

4 November 1993, approximately four years after its commencement. In

view of these plaintiffs' particular situation the Commission considers

that the High Court was called upon to secure actively a speedy

determination regardless of the parties' conduct. However, in this the

High Court failed. Accordingly, the dispute between the applicants A

to G/G1 and the defendants in the case was not determined within a

reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of

the Convention.

CONCLUSION

105.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been a

violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in respect

of the applicants A to G/G1.

       b) The applicants K and L

106.   When applying the same criteria to the applicants K and L the

Commission recalls that they do not suffer from the HIV infection and

their situation is accordingly not comparable to that of the other

applicants. K's husband and L's son died of AIDS on 10 August 1987 and

27 August 1986 respectively, i.e. before the proceedings in Denmark

commenced and several years before K and L joined the proceedings

themselves. As regrettable as this may be it follows therefrom that

what was at stake for K and L when they joined the case was of a

different character in that the element of speed was not of the same

importance for them as for the other applicants.

107.   As set out above (para. 41) both K and L joined the proceedings

on 22 March 1990 and in respect of L, they lasted approximately

four years and eleven months. As regards K the proceedings are still

pending and have accordingly lasted approximately five years and

two months until now. During these periods the Commission recalls from

above (paras. 90-92) that the applicants caused delays which prolonged

the case unnecessarily. Furthermore, K and L agreed, through their

representatives, to all adjournments throughout the entire period of

time involved for which reason the conduct of the national authorities,

defendants in the case, cannot be invoked successfully by them in

support of their allegation of an unreasonable length of the

proceedings.

108.   As regards the conduct of the judicial authorities the

exceptional diligence called for in respect of the applicants A to G/G1

is not apparent. K and L do not suffer from the HIV infection and

accordingly, there was no risk that a delay might render the question

to be resolved by the Court devoid of purpose. Thus, in respect of K

and L the Commission does not consider that the High Court failed to

act with the necessary diligence required.

109.   Consequently, having regard to the circumstances relating to the

situation of K and L, and in particular to their conduct during the

proceedings in question, the Commission does not consider that the

reasonable time requirement of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention has been violated in respect of them.

CONCLUSION

110.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been no

violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in respect

of the applicants K and L.

D.     Recapitulation

111.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been a

violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in respect

of the applicants A to G/G1. (para. 105)

112.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been no

violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in respect

of the applicants K and L. (para. 110)

Secretary to the Second Chamber       President of the Second Chamber

      (M.-T. SCHOEPFER)                        (H. DANELIUS)