EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

FIRST CHAMBER

Application No. 25941/94

Roger Michael Smith

against

the United Kingdom

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

(adopted on 4 March 1998)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION

(paras. 1-15) 1

A. The application

(paras. 2-4) 1

B. The proceedings

(paras. 5-10) 1

C. The present Report

(paras. 11-15) 2

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

(paras. 16-58) 3

A. The particular circumstances of the case

(paras. 16-27) 3

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

(paras. 28-58 ) 4

III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

(paras. 59-75) 10

A. Complaints declared admissible

(para. 59) 10

B. Points at issue

(para. 60) 10

C. As regards Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention

(paras. 61-73) 10

(a) Applicability of Article 6 para. 1

of the Convention

(para. 63) 10

(b) The independence and impartiality

of the court-martial

(paras. 64-69) 10

CONCLUSION

(para. 70) 12

(c) Remaining points at issue

(paras. 71-72) 12

CONCLUSION

(para. 73) 12

D. Recapitulation

(paras. 74-75) 12

APPENDIX: DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION 13

I.INTRODUCTION

1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European

Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.

A. The application

2. The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1958 and resident  in

Southampton. He was represented before the Commission by Mr Gilbert Blades, a

solicitor practising in Lincoln.

3. The application is directed against the United Kingdom. The respondent

Government were represented by Mr Eaton, Agent, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

4. The case raises issues under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention and

mainly concerns the independence and impartiality of the court-martial convened

to try charges against the applicant. The applicant also argues that the court-

martial proceedings were unfair and not public and that the court-martial was

not "established by law" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention.

B. The proceedings

5. The application was introduced on 25 November 1994 and registered on 14

December 1994.

6. On 28 February 1995 the Commission (First Chamber) decided, pursuant to

Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application

to the respondent Government and to adjourn the application pending the outcome

of similar cases before the Commission. The Commission adopted its Reports in

those cases in September 1995 and June 1996, respectively (Eur. Court HR,

Findlay v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports of Judgments

and Decisions 1997-I, Comm. Report dated 5 September 1995 and Coyne v. the

United Kingdom judgment of 24 September 1997, to be published in Reports of

Judgments and Decision 1997, Comm. Report dated 25 June 1996). Accordingly, on 2

July 1996 the Commission decided to invite the parties to submit written

observations on the admissibility and merits of the applicant's complaints under

Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention and those observations were requested by

letter dated 12 July 1996.

7. By letter dated 31 October 1996 the Government stated that they did not

wish to submit observations on the admissibility of the application and that,

should the application be admissible, they would wish to have the opportunity to

submit any observations on the merits they considered necessary. On 4 March 1997

the Commission decided to grant legal aid to the applicant.

8. Further to the judgment of the Court in the Findlay case (Eur. Court HR,

Findlay v. the United Kingdom judgment, loc. cit.), the Commission declared the

application admissible on 9 April 1997.

9. The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent to the

parties on 24 April 1997 and they were invited to submit such further

information or observations on the merits as they wished. No such further

submissions were made by either party.

10. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance

with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the

disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement. In the

light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis

on which such a settlement can be effected.

C. The present Report

11. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission (First Chamber) in

pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the

following members being present:

MM M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, President

N. BRATZA

E. BUSUTTIL

A. WEITZEL

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs J. LIDDY

MM L. LOUCAIDES

B. CONFORTI

I. BÉKÉS

G. RESS

A. PERENI?

C. BÃŽRSAN

K. HERNDL

M. VILA AMIGÓ

Mrs M. HION

Mr R. NICOLINI

12. The text of this Report was adopted on 4 March 1998 by the Commission and

is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in

accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.

13. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:

(i) to establish the facts, and

(ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a breach

by the State concerned of its obligations under the Convention.

14. The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application is

annexed hereto.

15. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents

lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

A. The particular circumstances of the case

16. On 19 and 20 October 1992 the applicant (who was at the time a flight

lieutenant in the Royal Air Force stationed in Germany) was informed by his

superior officers that there had been complaints made about certain incidents

involving his behaviour towards some aircraftwomen.

17. By letter dated 21 October 1992 the applicant was given a written warning

which detailed the complaints made and stated that the applicant was developing

a reputation as a man who was a nuisance to females and went on to point out

that:

"This foolish behaviour will not be tolerated and you are to ensure that

no further occurrences take place. If you fail to heed this advice you are

warned that the consequences of your actions may be either investigation of

these and any future incidents by HQ P&SS staff

and or raising of a special report under QR 1021 for consideration by a higher

authority. ... This written warning will be placed on your personal file and

will be reviewed, providing no further incidents occur, in six months time."

18. The applicant submits that during the discussions with his superior, who

gave him the warning letter, the applicant was told that there would be no

further action in relation to these matters (including court-martial

proceedings) provided there were no further such occurrences. The applicant was

then invited to make a statement in response to the warning. The applicant then

made a statement to his superior giving his version of the incidents as he saw

them.

19. Subsequently, the mother of one of the aircraftwomen (who had made a

number of complaints) contacted a Member of Parliament about the incidents and a

parliamentary inquiry ensued. The aircraftwoman in question made a statement to

that inquiry on 20 November 1992 to the effect that, although she had previously

stated to the air force authorities on three occasions that she was satisfied

that there should be no police involvement in this matter, she had changed her

mind.

20. Police investigations were then initiated including interviews with the

aircraftwomen who had already complained and other female members of the air

force where the applicant was stationed.

21. As a result, complaints by an additional two female members of the air

force were made to the police against the applicant. The applicant submits that

the police had access to the statement made by the applicant in response to the

warning letter and used this statement to subsequently question the applicant.

22. In May 1993 the applicant was charged on five counts of conduct to the

prejudice of good order and air force discipline contrary to section 69 of the

Air Force Act 1955 in relation to his having allegedly behaved with "undue

familiarity" towards certain aircraftwomen.

23. He was also charged on three counts of indecent assault (a civilian

criminal offence) of one of the above-mentioned aircraftwomen and another

aircraftwoman. All charges related to a period of time before the written

warning.

24. The Convening Officer, by order dated 1 June 1993, convened a general

court-martial to be held in Rheindahlen, Germany. The court martial took place

on 14 - 17 June 1993. The Judge Advocate found, inter alia, that no promise was

made to the applicant that proceedings would not issue against him.

25. On 17 June 1993 the applicant was found guilty on four of the charges of

conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline and not guilty on all

remaining charges. He was sentenced to dismissal from the air force.

26. The applicant petitioned the Confirming Officer and, by letter dated 9

September 1993, the applicant's representative was informed that the Confirming

Officer had confirmed the applicant's conviction and sentence. On 14 September

1993 the applicant petitioned the Defence Council. By letter dated 10 January

1994 the applicant's representative was informed of the decision, taken by the

Air Force Board, to reject this petition.

27. The applicant was subsequently granted leave by a single judge of the

Courts-Martial Appeal Court for leave to appeal to that court. On 15 November

1994 the full Courts-Martial Appeal Court rejected the applicant's appeal.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

28. Any person subject to air force law who is guilty of any conduct or

neglect to the prejudice of good order and air force discipline shall, on

conviction by court-martial, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding

two years or any less punishment provided by this Act (section 69 of the 1955

Act).

29. The principal law and procedures applicable are contained in the Air Force

Act 1955 ("the 1955 Act") prior to its amendment by the Armed Forces Act 1996

("the 1996 Act"), which latter Act came into force on 1 April 1997. Accordingly,

and apart from section (g) below, the following is an outline of the pre-1996

Act law and practice.

(a) General

30. Many civilian offences are also offences under the 1955 Act (section

70(1)).  Although the final decision on jurisdiction lay with the civilian

authorities, air force personnel who were accused of such offences were usually

tried by the air force authorities unless, for example, civilians had been in

some way involved.

31. Depending on their gravity, charges under the 1955 Act could be tried by

district, field or general court-martial. These were not standing courts: they

came into existence in order to try a single offence or group of offences.

32. At the time of the events in question, a general court-martial consisted

of a President (not under the rank of Flight Lieutenant) appointed by name by

the Convening Officer, and at least four other officers, either appointed by

name by the Convening Officer or, at the latter's request, by their commanding

officer.

33. Each member of the court-martial had to swear the following oath:

"I swear by almighty God that I will well and truly try the accused before

the court according to the evidence, and that I will duly administer justice

according to the Air Force Act 1955, without partiality, favour or affection,

and I do further swear that I will not on any account at any time whatsoever

disclose or discover the vote or opinion of the president or any member of this

court-martial, unless thereunto required in the due course of law."

(b) The Convening Officer

34. Before the coming into force of the 1996 Act, a Convening Officer of a

general court-martial had to be a "qualified officer" or an officer not below

the rank of Group Captain to whom the qualified officer had delegated his or her

powers. To be a "qualified officer", an officer had to be not below the rank of

Squadron Leader or corresponding rank who was in command of a body of the

regular air force or of the command within which a body of the regular air force

was serving.

35. The Convening Officer assumed responsibility for every case to be tried by

court-martial. He or she would decide upon the nature and detail of the charges

to be brought and was responsible for convening the court-martial.

36. He would draw up a convening order, which would specify, inter alia, the

date, place and time of the trial, the name of the President and the details of

the other members all of whom he could appoint. He ensured that a judge advocate

was appointed by the Judge Advocate General's Office and failing such

appointment, could appoint one. He also appointed, or directed a commanding

officer to appoint, the prosecuting officer.

37. Prior to the hearing, the Convening Officer was responsible for sending an

abstract of the evidence to the prosecuting officer and to the judge advocate,

and could indicate the passages which might be inadmissible. He procured the

attendance at trial of all witnesses to be called for the prosecution. When

charges were withdrawn, the Convening Officer's consent was normally obtained,

although it was not necessary in all cases, and a plea to a lesser charge could

not be accepted from the accused without it. He had also to ensure that the

accused had a proper opportunity to prepare his defence, legal representation if

required and the opportunity to contact the defence witnesses, and he was

responsible for ordering the attendance at the hearing of all witnesses

"reasonably requested" by the defence.

38. The Convening Officer could dissolve the court-martial either before or

during the trial, when required in the interests of the administration of

justice (section 95 of the 1955 Act). The Convening Officer usually also acted

as Confirming Officer.

(c) The Judge Advocate General and judge advocates

39. The Judge Advocate General was appointed by the Queen in February 1991 for

five years. He was answerable to the Queen and was removable from office by her

for inability or misbehaviour. He had the role of adviser to the Secretary of

State for Defence on all matters touching and concerning the office of Judge

Advocate General, including advice on air force law and the procedures and

conduct of the court-martial system. He was also responsible for advising the

confirming and reviewing authorities following a court-martial.

40. Judge advocates are appointed to the Judge Advocate General's Office by

the Lord Chancellor. They must have at least seven and five years experience

respectively as an advocate or barrister.

41. At the time of the events in question, a judge advocate was appointed to

each court-martial, either by the Judge Advocate General's Office or by the

Convening Officer. He or she was responsible for advising the court-martial on

all questions of law and procedure arising during the hearing and the court had

to accept this advice unless there were weighty reasons for not doing so. In

addition, in conjunction with the President, he was under a duty to ensure that

the accused did not suffer any disadvantage during the hearing. At the close of

the hearing, the judge advocate would sum up the relevant law and evidence.

42. Prior to the coming into force of the 1996 Act, the judge advocate did not

take part in the court-martial's deliberations on conviction or acquittal,

although he could advise it in private on general principles in relation to

sentencing. He was not a member of the court-martial and had no vote in the

decision on conviction or sentence.

(d) The court-martial hearing

43. At the commencement of the trial, the accused could object to individual

members of the court-martial, such objection being considered in closed court.

44. The accused was then asked to plead in respect of the charge. If a plea of

not guilty was entered the procedure was similar to that followed in the

(civilian) Crown Court. After the prosecution had made its case, the defence

could enter a submission of no case to answer. If this submission was not

accepted, the judge advocate would advise the accused on the alternatives open

to him and the defence would proceed with its case. Witnesses could be called

for the prosecution and the defence and both sides could make a closing

submission, the defence submission being the last. During the trial the court-

martial could adjourn to consult the Convening Officer on points of law; the

latter then had to take legal advice from the Judge Advocate General. The

members of the court-martial retired (without the judge advocate) to deliberate

on their findings, returned and pronounced those findings. Their votes and

opinions were private and it was not disclosed whether the decision had been by

a majority.

45. In the event of a conviction or a plea of guilty, the prosecuting officer

put in evidence the defendant's service record and other evidence having a

bearing on the sentence to be imposed. The defence made a plea in mitigation and

could call witnesses in support. The members of the court-martial then retired

(with the judge advocate) to consider the sentence. The sentence was announced

in open court. There was no provision for the giving of reasons by the court-

martial for its decision on guilt or sentence.

(e) Confirmation and post-hearing reviews

46. Until the amendments introduced by the 1996 Act, the findings of a court-

martial were not effective until confirmed by a "Confirming Officer". Prior to

confirmation, the Confirming Officer used to seek the advice of the Judge

Advocate General's Office, where a judge advocate different from the one who

acted at the hearing would be appointed. The Confirming Officer could withhold

confirmation or substitute, postpone or remit in whole or in part any sentence.

47. Once the sentence had been confirmed, the defendant could present a

petition of appeal against conviction and/or sentence to the "reviewing

authority", which was usually the Air Force Board in cases involving air force

personnel. It had the power to quash a finding and to exercise the same powers

as the Confirming Officer in relation to substituting, remitting or commuting

the sentence.

48. A petitioner was not informed of the identity of the Confirming Officer or

of the reviewing authority. No statutory or formalised procedures were laid down

for the conduct of the post-hearing reviews and no reasons were given for

decisions delivered subsequent to them. Neither the fact that advice had been

received from the Judge Advocate General's Office nor the nature of that advice

was disclosed.

(f) Courts-Martial Appeal Court

49. The Courts-Martial Appeal Court ("CMAC") was established by the Courts-

Martial (Appeals) Act 1951 and was confirmed by the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act

1968. The CMAC had the same status and, in essence, the same procedure as the

(civilian) Court of Appeal, Criminal Division. Its judges included ordinary and

ex officio judges of the Court of Appeal and judges of the High Court nominated

by the Lord Chief Justice.

50. If an appeal petition was rejected by the Air Force Board, an appellant

could apply to a single judge of the CMAC (and, if necessary, also to the full

court) for leave to appeal against conviction. There was no provision for an

appeal against sentence only, although certain powers of revising sentences,

pursuant to an appeal against conviction, were available to the CMAC.

51. The hearing of the substantive appeal did not constitute a full rehearing

on all points of fact and law. However, the CMAC was empowered to consider any

question required for the doing of justice and could order a retrial. It also

had power, inter alia, to order the production of documents or exhibits

connected with the proceedings, order the attendance of witnesses, receive

evidence, obtain reports from members of the court-martial or from the judge

advocate and order a reference of any question to a special commissioner for

inquiry.

52. The CMAC had to allow an appeal against conviction if it considered that

the finding of the court-martial was, in all the circumstances, unsafe or

unsatisfactory or involved a wrong decision on a question of law. The appeal had

also to be allowed if there was a material irregularity in the course of the

trial. In any other case, the appeal had to be dismissed.

53. An appellant required the leave of the CMAC to attend any hearing in

relation to the appeal. Leave would only be granted where the CMAC considered

that his presence would serve some useful purpose or was necessary in the

interests of justice. Legal aid for an appeal to the CMAC was available under

certain conditions and the appellant could obtain an order for costs in his

favour if his appeal was allowed.

54. A further appeal, on a point of law of general public importance, could be

made to the House of Lords with the leave of the CMAC or of the House of Lords

itself.

(g) The Armed Forces Act 1996

55. Under the 1996 Act, the role of the Convening Officer ceases to exist and

its functions are split among three different bodies: the higher authority, the

prosecuting authority and court administration officers (Schedule I to the 1996

Act).

56. The higher authority, a senior officer, decides whether any case referred

to him by the accused's commanding officer should be dealt with summarily,

referred to the new prosecuting authority, or dropped. Once the higher authority

has taken this decision, he has no further involvement in the case. The

prosecuting authority is the legal branch of the relevant Service. Following the

higher authority's decision to refer a case to it, the prosecuting authority has

an absolute discretion, applying similar criteria to those applied in civilian

cases by the Crown Prosecution Service, to decide whether or not to prosecute,

what type of court-martial would be appropriate and what charges should be

brought. It also conducts the prosecution (the 1996 Act, Schedule I, Part II).

Under the new legislation, court administration officers have been appointed in

each Service. They are independent of both the higher and the prosecuting

authorities and are responsible for making the arrangements for courts-martial,

including arranging venue and timing, ensuring that a judge advocate and any

court officials required are available, securing the attendance of witnesses and

selection of members. Officers under the command of the higher authority will

not be selected as members of the court-martial (the 1996 Act, Schedule I, Part

III).

57. Each court-martial now includes a judge advocate as a member. His advice

on points of law is binding on the court and he has a vote on sentence (but not

on conviction). The casting vote, if needed, rests with the president of the

court-martial, who gives reasons for the sentence in open court. The Judge

Advocate General no longer provides general legal advice to the Secretary of

State for Defence (the 1996 Act, Schedule I, Part III, sections 35, 41 and 43).

58. Findings by a court-martial are no longer subject to confirmation or

revision by a Confirming Officer (whose role is abolished). A reviewing

authority has been established in each Service to conduct a single review of

each case. Reasons are now given for the decision of the reviewing authority. As

part of this process, post-trial advice received by the reviewing authority from

a judge advocate (different from the one who officiated at the court-martial) is

disclosed to the accused. A right of appeal against sentence to the CMAC has

been added to the existing right of appeal against conviction (the 1996 Act,

section 17 and Schedule V).

III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

A. Complaints declared admissible

59. The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaints that, in

respect of the court-martial proceedings against him, he did not have a fair and

public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.

B. Points at issue

60. Accordingly, the points at issue in the present case are:

- whether the applicant was given a fair hearing before an independent and

impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention; and

- whether the applicant was afforded a "public" hearing by a tribunal

"established by law" and whether the proceedings in other specific respects

complied with the requirement of fairness in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

C. As regards Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

61. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads

as follows:

"1. In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone

is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an

independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ..."

62. The Government made no observations on the applicant's complaints.

(a) Applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

63. The Commission notes, in particular, the context in which the charges were

brought and the potential penalty (two years detention) for the charges of which

the applicant was found guilty. Accordingly, the Commission considers that the

proceedings involved the determination of criminal charges within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (Eur. Court HR, Garyfallou AEBE

v. Greece judgment of 24 September 1997, to be published in Reports of Judgments

and Decisions 1997, paras. 32-33, with further references).

(b) The independence and impartiality of the court-martial

64. The main complaint of the applicant is that the court-martial was neither

independent nor impartial within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of

the Convention mainly because of the role of the Convening Officer. In

particular, the applicant points to, inter alia, that officer's connection with

the members of the court-martial and with the prosecution of the case.

65. The Commission recalls that, in the Findlay judgment (Eur. Court HR,

Findlay v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports of Judgments

and Decisions 1997-I), the Court found that a general court-martial convened

pursuant to the Army Act 1955 did not meet the requirements of independence and

impartiality set down by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in view,

in particular, of the central part played in its organisation by the Convening

Officer. In this latter respect, the Court considered that the Convening Officer

was central to the applicant's prosecution and was closely linked to the

prosecution authorities; the Court expressed some concern that the members of

the court-martial were subordinate (either directly or indirectly) to the

Convening Officer; and the Court found it significant that the Convening Officer

also acted as Confirming officer.

66. The Court has also found a district court-martial convened pursuant to the

Air Force Act 1955 to have similar deficiencies (Eur. Court HR, Coyne v. the

United Kingdom judgment of 24 September 1997, to be published in Reports of

Judgments and Decisions 1997). In particular, it considered that there were no

significant differences between the part played by the Convening Officer in Mr

Coyne's court-martial, under the Air Force Act 1955, and in that of Mr Findlay,

under the Army Act 1955. While an appeal to the Courts-Martial Appeal Court was

open to Mr Coyne, the Court concluded that the organisational defects in the

court-martial could not be corrected by any subsequent review procedure because

an accused faced with a serious criminal charge is entitled to a first instance

tribunal which meets the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

67. The Commission recalls that in the present case a general air force court-

martial was convened pursuant to the Air Force Act 1955 to try the applicant on

the charges. The Commission is of the view that there were no significant

differences between the part played by the Convening Officer in the organisation

of the applicant's court-martial and Mr Coyne's or Mr Findlay's courts-martial.

Accordingly, the Commission considers that the applicant's court-martial did not

meet the independence and impartiality requirements of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention. The Commission also considers that, since the

applicant was faced with serious charges of a criminal nature and was therefore

entitled to a first instance tribunal complying with the requirements of Article

6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), such organisational defects in his court-martial could not

be corrected by any subsequent review procedure including an appeal to the

Courts-Martial Appeal Court.

68. Accordingly, and for the reasons expressed in detail in the above-cited

judgment of the Court in Mr Findlay's case, the Commission concludes that the

court-martial which dealt with the applicant's case was not independent and

impartial within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

69. The Commission is further of the opinion that since the court-martial has

been found to lack independence and impartiality, it could not guarantee a fair

trial to the applicant (Eur. Court HR, Findlay v. the United Kingdom judgment,

loc. cit., Comm. Report, para. 108).

CONCLUSION

70. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has

been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in that the

applicant was not given a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.

(c) Remaining points at issue

71. The applicant also makes specific complaints of the unfairness of the

court-martial proceedings on the grounds, inter alia, that he was denied a trial

by jury; that he had no right to an appeal against sentence only to the Courts-

Martial Appeal Court; that his court-martial was an abuse of process because it

took place as result of interference by a member of parliament in the process;

that the court-martial gave no reasons for its decision against him; and that

the advice of the judge advocate to the court-martial members on sentencing and

of the Judge Advocate General's office to the reviewing authority was given in

private. The applicant further complains that the court-martial proceedings were

not "public" and that the court-martial was not "established by law" within the

meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

72. In view of its conclusion above, the Commission finds that it is

unnecessary to examine further these complaints of the applicant.

CONCLUSION

73. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case it is not

necessary to examine the applicant's complaints that he was not afforded a

"public" hearing by a tribunal "established by law" and that in other specific

respects the proceedings did not comply with the requirement of fairness in

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

D. Recapitulation

74. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has

been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in that the

applicant was not given a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal

(para. 70).

75. The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case it is not

necessary to examine the applicant's complaints that he was not afforded a

"public" hearing by a tribunal "established by law" and that in other specific

respects the proceedings did not comply with the requirement of fairness in

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (para. 73).

M.F. BUQUICCHIO    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

   Secretary President

   to the First Chamber of the First Chamber