31 With regard to the requirement for a prima facie case, that condition is satisfied if, at the stage of the proceedings for interim relief, there is a major legal or factual disagreement whose resolution is not immediately obvious, so that the action is not prima facie without reasonable substance (see, to that effect, orders of the President of the Court of 13 June 1989, Publishers Association v Commission, 56/89 R, EU:C:1989:238, paragraph 31, and of 8 May 2003, Commission v Artegodan and Others, C‑39/03 P-R, EU:C:2003:269, paragraph 40; as well as the order of the Vice-President of the Court of 3 December 2014, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P-R, EU:C:2014:2418, paragraph 20).

20 As regards the requirement of a prima facie case, it is satisfied if, at the stage of the proceedings for interim relief, there is a major legal or factual disagreement whose resolution is not immediately obvious, so that the action is not prima facie without reasonable substance (see, to that effect, orders of the President of the Court in Publishers Association v Commission, 56/89 R, EU:C:1989:238, paragraph 31, and Commission v Artegodan and Others, C‑39/03 P-R, EU:C:2003:269, paragraph 40). Since the purpose of the interim proceedings is to guarantee that the final decision to be taken is fully effective, in order to avoid a lacuna in the legal protection ensured by the Court, the judge hearing the application for interim relief must restrict himself to assessing ‘prima facie’ the merits of the grounds put forward in the main proceedings in order to ascertain whether the action has a sufficiently probable chance of success (order of the Vice-President of the Court in Commission v Germany, C‑426/13 P(R), EU:C:2013:848, paragraph 41).

15 The requirement that prima facie case must be established is satisfied where there is, at the stage of the interlocutory proceedings, a major legal disagreement whose resolution is not immediately obvious, so that the appeal is not prima facie without reasonable substance (see to that effect orders of the President of the Court of Justice in Publishers Association v Commission, 56/89 R, EU:C:1989:238, paragraph 31, and Commission v Artegodan and Others, C‑39/03 P-R, EU:C:2003:269, paragraph 40). Since the purpose of the interim proceedings is to guarantee that the final decision to be taken is fully effective, in order to avoid a lacuna in the legal protection ensured by the Court, the court hearing the application for interim relief must restrict itself to assessing ‘prima facie’ the merits of the grounds put forward in the main proceedings in order to ascertain whether there is a sufficiently large probability of success of the action (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice in Commission v Germany, C‑426/13 P(R), EU:C:2013:848, paragraph 41).

15      S’agissant de la condition relative à l’existence d’un fumus boni juris, il y a lieu de rappeler qu’il est satisfait à celle-ci dès lors qu’il existe, au stade de la procédure de référé, une controverse juridique importante dont la solution ne s’impose pas d’emblée, de sorte que, à première vue, le pourvoi n’est pas dépourvu de fondement sérieux (voir, en ce sens, ordonnances du président de la Cour Publishers Association/Commission, 56/89 R, EU:C:1989:238, point 31, ainsi que Commission/Artegodan e.a., C‑39/03 P‑R, EU:C:2003:269, point 40). En effet, la finalité de la procédure de référé étant de garantir la pleine efficacité de la décision définitive à intervenir, afin d’éviter une lacune dans la protection juridique assurée par la Cour, le juge des référés doit se borner à apprécier «à première vue» le bien-fondé des moyens invoqués dans le cadre du litige au fond afin d’établir s’il existe une probabilité de succès du recours suffisamment grande [ordonnance du vice-président de la Cour Commission/Allemagne, C‑426/13 P(R), EU:C:2013:848, point 41].