40      Yet other directives require the Member States to obtain very precise and specific results after a certain period (see, in that regard, Case C‑56/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR I-4109, paragraphs 42 to 44; Case C‑268/00 Commission v Netherlands [2002] ECR I‑2995, paragraphs 12 to 14; and Case C‑60/01 Commission v France, paragraph 28).

14 It is clear from Article 4(1) of the Directive that Member States are required to take the necessary measures to ensure that, within 10 years following its notification, the quality of bathing water conforms to the limit values set in accordance with Article 3 of that Directive. The Directive therefore requires the Member States to ensure that certain results are achieved and, apart from the derogations provided for, does not allow them to rely on particular circumstances to justify a failure to fulfil that obligation (see Case C-56/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR I-4109, paragraphs 42 to 44, and Case C-307/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-3933, paragraphs 48 and 49).

12 As regards the poor quality of bathing waters, the Commission argues that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice (Case C-56/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR I-4109, paragraph 43, Case C-198/97 Commission v Germany [1999] ECR I-3257, paragraph 35, and Case C-307/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-3933, paragraphs 48 and 49), Article 4(1) of the Directive is not to be understood as meaning that the Member States need only endeavour to adopt all reasonably feasible measures. On the contrary, that provision imposes upon Member States an obligation to achieve a particular result, requiring them to do whatever is necessary to ensure that the quality of bathing water within their territory actually conforms to the limit values by no later than 10 years after notification of the Directive, that period being longer than the two-year period laid down generally for implementation of the Directive in order to give the Member States time to satisfy the requirement.

28 It must be borne in mind that, according to the second indent of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 76/160, bathing water means all running or still fresh waters, or parts thereof, and sea water in which bathing is not prohibited and is traditionally practised by a large number of bathers. That definition must be interpreted in the light of the directive's underlying purpose as set out in the first two recitals in the preamble thereto, which state that, in order to protect the environment and public health, it is necessary to reduce the pollution of bathing water and to protect such water against further deterioration and that surveillance of bathing water is necessary in order to attain, within the framework of the operation of the common market, the Community's objectives as regards the improvement of living conditions, the harmonious development of economic activities throughout the Community and continuous and balanced expansion (Case C-56/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR I-4109, paragraph 33).

30 The German Government claims that, in the case of seven of the 85 bathing areas, more extensive purification measures are not possible and would be incompatible with the principle of proportionality. It observes that five of those seven bathing areas have a catchment area extending beyond German territory and that, despite the measures implemented by Germany, the waters do not conform to the limit values. These cases therefore involve absolute physical impossibility within the meaning of the case-law of the Court (Case C-56/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR I-4109, paragraph 46). In another of the seven areas, Riedsee Leeheim, aquatic birds were the main cause of the breaches of the Directive's limit values, and in the last of the seven, Hausen, Donau beim Campingplatz, the cause was connected with geographical conditions in respect of which Article 8(a) provides that the Directive may be waived. In this last case, however, in response to a question raised by the Court, the German Government offered the view that the parameter which had been exceeded, resulting in the failure to comply with the Directive's limit value in 1995, was not one of the parameters to which the exceptional circumstances set out in Article 8(a) apply, and it therefore maintained its initial position with regard only to the other six areas.

28 Furthermore, the only derogations from the obligation laid down in Article 4(1) of the directive are those provided for in Articles 4(3), 5(2) and 8, whose provisions are summarised above. It follows that the directive requires the Member States to take steps to ensure that certain results are attained, and that, apart from those derogations, they cannot rely on particular circumstances to justify a failure to fulfil that obligation (see, to that effect, Case C-56/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR I-4109, paragraph 43).