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UN Regulation No 157 – Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regards to Automated Lane Keeping Systems [2021/389]
• 42021X0389
- Inbound citations: 0
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- Cited paragraphs: 0
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- Outbound citations: 2
UN Regulation No 157 – Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regards to Automated Lane Keeping Systems [2021/389]
• 42021X0389
Cited paragraphs only
9.3.2021
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 82/75
Only the original UN/ECE texts have legal effect under international public law. The status and date of entry into force of this Regulation should be checked in the latest version of the UN/ECE status document TRANS/WP.29/343, available at:http://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/wp29wgs/wp29gen/wp29fdocstts.html
UN Regulation No 157 – Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regards to Automated Lane Keeping Systems [2021/389]
Date of entry into force: 22 January 2021
This document is meant purely as documentation tool. The authentic and legally binding text is: ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2020/81.
CONTENTS
REGULATION
Introduction
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.ANNEXES
1
2
3
4
5INTRODUCTION
The intention of the Regulation is to establish uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regard to Automated Lane Keeping Systems (ALKS).
ALKS controls the lateral and longitudinal movement of the vehicle for extended periods without further driver command. ALKS is a system whereby the activated system is in primary control of the vehicle.
This Regulation is the first regulatory step for an automated driving system (as defined in ECE/TRANS/WP.29/1140) in traffic and it therefore provides innovative provisions aimed at addressing the complexity related to the evaluation of the system safety. It contains administrative provisions suitable for type approval, technical requirements, audit and reporting provisions and testing provisions.
ALKS can be activated under certain conditions on roads where pedestrians and cyclists are prohibited and which, by design, are equipped with a physical separation that divides the traffic moving in opposite directions and prevent traffic from cutting across the path of the vehicle. In a first step, the original text of this Regulation limits the operational speed to 60 km/h maximum and passenger cars (M1 vehicles).
This Regulation includes general requirements regarding the system safety and the failsafe response. When the ALKS is activated, it shall perform the driving task instead of the driver, i.e. manage all situations including failures, and shall not endanger the safety of the vehicle occupants or any other road users. There is however always the possibility for the driver to override the system, at any time.
The Regulation also lays down requirements on how the driving task shall be safely handed over from the ALKS to the driver including the capability for the system to come to a stop in case the driver does not reply appropriately.
Finally, the Regulation includes requirements on the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) to prevent misunderstanding or misuse by the driver. The Regulation for instance requires that on-board displays used by the driver for other activities than driving when the ALKS is activated, shall be automatically suspended as soon as the system issues a transition demand. These measures are without prejudice to driver behaviour rules on how to use these systems in the Contracting Parties as currently being discussed by the Global Forum for Road Traffic Safety (WP.1) at the time of drafting this document (See e.g. Informal Document 4 Revision 1 of the seventy-eighth session of WP.1).
1. SCOPE AND PURPOSE
1.1.
2. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Regulation:
2.1.
Within this Regulation, ALKS is also referred to as ‘the system’.
2.1.1.
(a)
Vehicle features which significantly influence the performances of ALKS;
(b)
The system characteristics and design of ALKS.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
2.6.
2.7.
2.8.
2.9.
2.9.1.
2.9.2.
2.9.3.
2.10.
2.11.
2.11.1.
2.11.2.
2.11.3.
2.11.4.
2.12.
2.13.
2.14.
2.15.
2.16.
2.17.
2.18.
2.19.
2.20.
3. APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL
3.1.
3.2.
3.2.1.
3.3.
4. APPROVAL
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
4.4.1.
4.4.2.
4.5.
4.6.
4.7.
5. SYSTEM SAFETY AND FAIL-SAFE RESPONSE
5.1.
The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 (in particular for conditions not tested under Annex 5) and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.
5.1.1.
The activated system shall not cause any collisions that are reasonably foreseeable and preventable. If a collision can be safely avoided without causing another one, it shall be avoided. When the vehicle is involved in a detectable collision, the vehicle shall be brought to a standstill.
5.1.2.
5.1.3.
5.1.4.
5.1.5.
5.1.6.
5.1.7.
5.1.8.
5.1.9.
The manufacturer shall declare and implement a process to manage the safety and continued compliance of the ALKS system over lifetime.
5.2.
The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 (in particular for conditions not tested under Annex 5) and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.
5.2.1.
5.2.2.
5.2.3.
5.2.3.1.
5.2.3.2.
5.2.3.3.
While the ALKS vehicle is not at standstill, the system shall adapt the speed to adjust the distance to a vehicle in front in the same lane to be equal or greater than the minimum following distance.
In case the minimum time gap cannot be respected temporarily because of other road users (e.g. vehicle is cutting in, decelerating lead vehicle, etc.), the vehicle shall readjust the minimum following distance at the next available opportunity without any harsh braking unless an emergency manoeuvre would become necessary.
The minimum following distance shall be calculated using the formula:
dmin= vALKS* tfront
Where:
dmin
=
the minimum following distance
vALKS
=
the present speed of the ALKS vehicle in m/s
tfront
=
minimum time gap in seconds between the ALKS vehicle and a leading vehicle in front as per the table below:
Present speed of the ALKS vehicle
Minimum time gap
Minimum following distance
(km/h)
(m/s)
(s)
(m)
7,2
2,0
1,0
2,0
10
2,78
1,1
3,1
20
5,56
1,2
6,7
30
8,33
1,3
10,8
40
11,11
1,4
15,6
50
13,89
1,5
20,8
60
16,67
1,6
26,7
For speed values not mentioned in the table, linear interpolation shall be applied.
Notwithstanding the result of the formula above for present speeds below 2 m/s the minimum following distance shall never be less than 2 m.
5.2.4.
5.2.5.
For conditions not specified in paragraphs 5.2.4, 5.2.5 or its subparagraphs, this shall be ensured at least to the level at which a competent and careful human driver could minimize the risks. This shall be demonstrated in the assessment carried out under Annex 4 and by taking guidance from Appendix 3 to Annex 4.
5.2.5.1.
5.2.5.2.
(a)
Provided the cutting in vehicle maintains its longitudinal speed which is lower than the longitudinal speed of the ALKS vehicle; and
(b)
Provided that the lateral movement of the cutting in vehicle has been visible for a time of at least 0,72 seconds before the reference point for TTCLaneIntrusion is reached;
(c)
When the distance between the vehicle’s front and the cutting in vehicle’s rear corresponds to a TTC calculated by the following equation:
Where:
Vrel
=
relative velocity between both vehicles, positive for vehicle being faster than the cutting in vehicle
TTCLaneIntrusion
=
The TTC value, when the outside of the tyre of the intruding vehicle’s front wheel closest to the lane markings crosses a line 0,3 m beyond the outside edge of the visible lane marking to which the intruding vehicle is being drifted.
5.2.5.3.
In a scenario with an unobstructed pedestrian crossing with a lateral speed component of not more than 5 km/h where the anticipated impact point is displaced by not more than 0,2 m compared to the vehicle longitudinal plane, the activated ALKS shall avoid a collision up to the maximum operational speed of the system.
5.2.5.4.
5.3.
The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.
5.3.1.
5.3.1.1.
5.3.2.
If failures are affecting the braking or steering performance of the system, the manoeuvre shall be carried out with consideration for the remaining performance.
During the evasive manoeuvre the ALKS vehicle shall not cross the lane marking (outer edge of the front tyre to outer edge of the lane marking).
After the evasive manoeuvre the vehicle shall aim at resuming a stable position.
5.3.3.
5.3.3.1.
5.3.3.2.
5.3.4.
5.4.
The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 (in particular for conditions not tested under Annex 5) and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.
5.4.1.
Types of situations in which the vehicle will generate a transition demand to the driver shall be declared by the vehicle manufacturer and included in the documentation package required in Annex 4.
5.4.2.
5.4.2.1.
5.4.2.2.
5.4.2.3
5.4.3.
5.4.3.1.
5.4.3.2.
5.4.4.
5.4.4.1.
5.4.4.1.1.
In case of a severe ALKS or vehicle failure the ALKS may no longer be capable of fulfilling the requirements of this Regulation, but it shall aim at enabling a safe transition of control back to the driver.
5.4.4.1.2.
5.5.
The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 (in particular for conditions not tested under Annex 5) and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.
5.5.1.
Higher deceleration demand values are permissible for very short durations, e.g. as haptic warning to stimulate the driver’s attention, or in case of a severe ALKS or severe vehicle failure.
Additionally, the signal to activate the hazard warning lights shall be generated with the start of the minimum risk manoeuvre.
5.5.2.
5.5.3.
5.5.4.
The hazard warning lights shall remain activated unless deactivated manually and the vehicle shall not move away after standstill without manual input.
5.5.5.
6. HUMAN-MACHINE INTERFACE/OPERATOR INFORMATION
6.1.
The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.
6.1.1.
The driver availability recognition system shall detect if the driver is present in a driving position, if the safety belt of the driver is fastened and if the driver is available to take over the driving task.
6.1.2.
A transition demand shall be initiated according to paragraph 5.4 if any of the following conditions is met:
(a)
When the driver is detected not to be in the seat for a period of more than one second; or
(b)
When the driver’s safety belt is unbuckled.
The second level warning of the safety-belt reminder according to UN-R16 may be used instead of an acoustic warning of the Transition Demand.
6.1.3.
The system shall detect if the driver is available and in an appropriate driving position to respond to a transition demand by monitoring the driver.
The manufacturer shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the technical service the vehicle’s capability to detect that the driver is available to take over the driving task.
6.1.3.1.
The driver shall be deemed to be unavailable unless at least two availability criteria (e.g. input to driver-exclusive vehicle control, eye blinking, eye closure, conscious head or body movement) have individually determined that the driver is available in the last 30 seconds.
At any time, the system may deem the driver unavailable.
As soon as the driver is deemed to be unavailable, or fewer than two availability criteria can be monitored, the system shall immediately provide a distinctive warning until appropriate actions of the driver are detected or until a transition demand is initiated. At the latest, a transition demand shall be initiated according to paragraph 5.4 if this warning continues for 15s.
Justification for the number and combination of availability criteria, in particular with regard to the corresponding time interval, shall be provided by the manufacturer by documented evidence. However, the time interval required for any availability criteria shall not exceed 30 seconds. This shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer and assessed by the technical service according to Annex 4.
6.1.4.
6.2.
The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.
6.2.1.
6.2.2.
This requirement does not apply when a new engine start/run cycle is performed automatically, e.g. by the operation of a stop/start system.
6.2.3.
(a)
The driver is in the driver seat and the driver’s safety belt is fastened according to paragraphs 6.1.1 and 6.1.2;
(b)
The driver is available to take over control of the DDT according to paragraph 6.1.3;
(c)
No failure affecting the safe operation or the functionality of the ALKS is present;
(d)
DSSAD is operational;
(e)
The environmental and infrastructural conditions allow the operation;
(f)
Positive confirmation of system self-check; and
(g)
The vehicle is on roads where pedestrians and cyclists are prohibited and which, by design, are equipped with a physical separation that divides the traffic moving in opposite directions.
If any of the above conditions is no longer fulfilled, the system shall immediately initiate a transition demand unless specified differently in this Regulation.
6.2.4
The means of deactivating shall provide protection against unintentional manual deactivation for example by requiring a single input exceeding a certain threshold of time or a double press, or two separate but simultaneous inputs.
Additionally, it shall be ensured the driver is in lateral control of the vehicle at the time of the deactivation, by e.g. placing the deactivation means on the steering control or confirming the driver is holding the steering control.
6.2.5.
6.2.5.1.
The system shall be deactivated when at least one of the following conditions is met:
(a)
The driver overrides the system by steering while holding the steering control and this override is not suppressed, as specified in paragraph 6.3; or
(b)
The driver is holding the steering control and overrides the system by braking or accelerating, as specified in paragraph 6.3.1 below.
6.2.5.2.
In case a transition demand or a minimum risk manoeuvre is on-going, the system shall only be deactivated:
(a)
As defined in paragraph 6.2.5.1; or
(b)
Upon detection that the driver has taken hold of the steering control as a response to the transition demand or the minimum risk manoeuvre and provided the system confirms the driver is attentive as defined in paragraph 6.3.1.1.
6.2.5.3.
In case of an ongoing emergency manoeuvre, the deactivation of the system may be delayed until the imminent collision risk disappeared.
6.2.5.4.
In case of a severe vehicle failure or a severe ALKS failure the ALKS may employ different strategies with regard to deactivation.
These different strategies shall be declared by the manufacturer and their effectiveness shall be assessed by the Technical Service with regard to ensuring a safe transition of control from the system to the human driver according to Annex 4.
6.2.6.
After deactivation, Corrective Steering Function (CSF) may be active with the aim at accustoming the driver to execute the lateral control task by gradually reducing lateral support.
Notwithstanding both paragraphs above, any other safety system delivering longitudinal or lateral support in imminent collision situations (e.g. Advanced Emergency Braking System (AEBS), Electronic Stability Control (ESC), Brake Assist System (BAS) or Emergency Steering Function (ESF)) shall not be deactivated in case of deactivation of ALKS.
6.2.7.
6.3.
6.3.1.
This threshold shall include a specified force and duration and shall vary depending on parameters that include criteria used for driver attentiveness to be checked during the drivers input as defined in paragraph 6.3.1.1.
These thresholds and the rational for any variation shall be demonstrated to the Technical Service during the assessment according to Annex 4.
6.3.1.1.
The system shall detect if the driver is attentive. The driver is deemed to be attentive when at least one of the following criteria is met:
(a)
Driver gaze direction is confirmed as primarily looking at the road ahead;
(b)
Driver gaze direction is being confirmed as looking at the rear-view mirrors; or,
(c)
Driver head movement is confirmed as primarily directed towards the driving task.
The specification for confirming these or equally safe criteria must be declared by the manufacturer and supported by documented evidence. This shall be assessed by the technical service according to Annex 4.
6.3.2.
6.3.3.
6.3.4.
6.3.5.
6.3.6.
6.3.7.
6.4.
6.4.1.
(a)
The system status as defined in paragraph 6.4.2;
(b)
Any failure affecting the operation of the system with at least an optical signal unless the system is deactivated (off mode);
(c)
Transition demand by at least an optical and in addition an acoustic and/or haptic warning signal.
At the latest 4 s after the initiation of the transition demand, the transition demand shall:
(i)
Contain a constant or intermittent haptic warning unless the vehicle is at standstill; and
(ii)
Be escalated and remain escalated until the transition demand ends;
(d)
Minimum risk manoeuvre by at least an optical signal and in addition an acoustic and/or a haptic warning signal; and
(e)
Emergency manoeuvre by an optical signal.
The optical signals above shall be adequate in size and contrast. The acoustic signals above shall be loud and clear.
6.4.2.
6.4.2.1.
In case activation of the system following the deliberate action of the driver is denied by the system due to system unavailability, this shall be at least visually displayed to the driver.
6.4.2.2.
Upon activation the system status (active mode) shall be displayed by a dedicated optical signal to the driver.
The optical signal shall contain an unambiguous indication including:
(a)
A steering control or a vehicle, with an additional ‘A’ or ‘AUTO,’ or the standardized symbols in accordance with UN Regulation No 121; and additionally
(b)
An easily perceptible indication in the peripheral field of vision and located near the direct line of driver’s sight to the outside in front of the vehicle, e.g. prominent indication in the instrument cluster or on the steering control covering part of the outer rim perimeter facing towards the driver.
The optical signal shall indicate the active system state until the system is deactivated (off mode).
The optical signal shall be constant while the system is in regular operation and with the initiation of a transition demand at least the indication according to (b) shall change its characteristics, e.g. to an intermittent signal or a different colour.
When an intermittent signal is used, a low frequency shall be used in order to not unreasonably alert the driver.
During the transition phase and minimum risk manoeuvre, the indication according to (a) may be replaced by the instruction to take over manual control according to paragraph 6.4.3.
6.4.2.3.
Upon deactivation when the system status changes from active mode to off mode this shall be indicated to the driver by at least an optical warning signal. This optical signal shall be realized by non-displaying the optical signal used to indicate the active mode or non-displaying the instruction to take over manual control.
Additionally, an acoustic warning signal shall be provided unless the system is deactivated following a transition demand which contained an acoustic signal.
6.4.3.
During the transition phase and the Minimum Risk Manoeuvre, the system shall instruct the driver in an intuitive and unambiguous way to take over manual control of the vehicle. The instruction shall include a pictorial information showing hands and the steering control and may be accompanied by additional explanatory text or warning symbols, as shown in the example below.
6.4.3.2.
6.4.4.
6.4.5.
The warnings of an ALKS during a transition phase, a Minimal Risk Manoeuvre or an Emergency Manoeuvre may be prioritized over other warnings in the vehicle.
The prioritization of different acoustic and optical warnings during the ALKS operation shall be declared by the manufacturer to the Technical Service during Type Approval.
7. OBJECT AND EVENT DETECTION AND RESPONSE (OEDR)
7.1.
The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.
The ALKS vehicle shall be equipped with a sensing system such that, it can at least determine the driving environment (e.g. road geometry ahead, lane markings) and the traffic dynamics:
(a)
Across the full width of its own traffic lane, the full width of the traffic lanes immediately to its left and to its right, up to the limit of the forward detection range;
(b)
Along the full length of the vehicle and up to the limit of the lateral detection range.
The requirements of this paragraph are without prejudice to other requirements in this Regulation, most notably paragraph 5.1.1.
7.1.1.
The manufacturer shall declare the forward detection range measured from the forward most point of the vehicle. This declared value shall be at least 46 metres.
The Technical Service shall verify that the distance at which the vehicle sensing system detects a road user during the relevant test in Annex 5 is equal or greater than the declared value.
7.1.2.
The manufacturer shall declare the lateral detection range. The declared range shall be sufficient to cover the full width of the lane immediately to the left and of the lane immediately to the right of the vehicle.
The Technical Service shall verify that the vehicle sensing system detects vehicles during the relevant test in Annex 5. This range shall be equal or greater than the declared range.
7.1.3.
7.1.4.
7.1.5.
7.1.6.
8. DATA STORAGE SYSTEM FOR AUTOMATED DRIVING
8.1.
This Regulation is without prejudice to national and regional laws governing access to data, privacy and data protection.
8.2.
8.2.1.
(a)
Activation of the system.
(b)
Deactivation of the system, due to:
(i)
Use of dedicated means for the driver to deactivate the system;
(ii)
Override on steering control;
(iii)
Override by accelerator control while holding steering control;
(iv)
Override by braking control while holding steering control.
(c)
Transition Demand by the system, due to:
(i)
Planned event;
(ii)
Unplanned event;
(iii)
Driver unavailability (as per para. 6.1.3);
(iv)
Driver not present or unbuckled (as per para. 6.1.2);
(v)
System failure;
(vi)
System override by braking input;
(vii)
System override by accelerator input.
(d)
Reduction or suppression of driver input;
(e)
Start of Emergency Manoeuvre;
(f)
End of Emergency Manoeuvre;
(g)
Event Data Recorder (EDR) trigger input;
(h)
Involved in a detected collision;
(i)
Minimum Risk Manoeuvre engagement by the system;
(j)
Severe ALKS failure;
(k)
Severe vehicle failure.
8.3.
8.3.1.
(a)
The occurrence flag, as listed in paragraph 8.2;
(b)
Reason for the occurrence, as appropriate, and listed in paragraph 8.2;
(c)
Date (Resolution: yyyy/mm/dd);
(d)
Timestamp:
(i)
Resolution: hh/mm/ss timezone e.g. 12:59:59 UTC;
(ii)
Accuracy: +/- 1,0 s.
8.3.2.
8.3.3.
8.4.
8.4.1.
8.4.2.
Documented evidence regarding the storage capacity shall be provided by the vehicle manufacturer.
8.4.3.
8.4.4.
8.4.5.
8.5.
8.5.1.
8.6.
8.6.1.
9. CYBERSECURITY AND SOFTWARE UPDATES
9.1.
9.2.
9.3.
9.3.1.
9.3.2.
9.3.2.1.
9.3.2.2.
(a)
The R157SWIN;
(b)
How to read the R157SWIN or software version(s) in case the R157SWIN is not held on the vehicle.
9.3.2.3.
9.3.3.
10. MODIFICATION OF VEHICLE TYPE AND EXTENSION OF TYPE APPROVAL
10.1.
The Authority shall then either:
(a)
Decide, in consultation with the manufacturer, that a new type-approval is to be granted; or
(b)
Apply the procedure contained in paragraph 10.1.1 (Revision) and, if applicable, the procedure contained in paragraph 10.1.2 (Extension).
10.1.1.
When particulars recorded in the information documents have changed and the Type Approval Authority considers that the modifications made are unlikely to have appreciable adverse effects and that in any case the foot controls still meet the requirements, the modification shall be designated a ‘revision’.
In such a case, the Type Approval Authority shall issue the revised pages of the information documents as necessary, marking each revised page to show clearly the nature of the modification and the date of re-issue.
A consolidated, updated version of the information documents, accompanied by a detailed description of the modification, shall be deemed to meet this requirement.
10.1.2.
The modification shall be designated an ‘extension’ if, in addition to the change of the particulars recorded in the information documents,
(a)
Further inspections or tests are required; or
(b)
Any information on the communication document (with the exception of its attachments) has changed; or
(c)
Approval to a later series of amendments is requested after its entry into force.
10.2.
10.3.
11. CONFORMITY OF PRODUCTION
11.1.
11.2.
11.3.
12. PENALTIES FOR NON-CONFORMITY OF PRODUCTION
12.1.
12.2.
13. PRODUCTION DEFINITIVELY DISCONTINUED
13.1.
13.2.
14. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF TECHNICAL SERIES RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING APPROVAL TESTS AND OF TYPE APPROVAL AUTHORITIES
The Contracting Parties to the Agreement applying this Regulation shall communicate to the United Nations Secretariat (4) the names and addresses of the Technical Services responsible for conducting approval tests and of the Type Approval Authorities which grant approval and to which forms certifying approval or extension or refusal or withdrawal of approval are to be sent.
(1) As defined in the Consolidated Resolution on the Construction of Vehicles (R.E.3.), document ECE/TRANS/WP.29/78/Rev.6, para. 2 –www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/wp29wgs/wp29gen/wp29resolutions.html
(2) The distinguishing numbers of the Contracting Parties to the 1958 Agreement are reproduced in Annex 3 to the Consolidated Resolution on the Construction of Vehicles (R.E.3), document ECE/TRANS/WP.29/78/Rev. 6 – www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/wp29wgs/wp29gen/wp29resolutions.html
(3) Note: based on a recent quantitative study of a Contracting Party, GRVA is considering that the text specifies several timestamps specifications of 2 500 timestamps to correspond with a period of 6 months of use.
(4) Through the online platform (‘/343 Application’) provided by UNECE and dedicated to the exchange of such information:https://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/datasharing.html
ANNEX 1
Communication
(Maximum format: A4 (210 × 297 mm)
issued by:
Name of administration:
…
…
…
Concerning (2):
Approval granted
Approval extended
Approval refused
Approval withdrawn
Production definitively discontinued
of a vehicle type with regard to Automated Lane Keeping System pursuant to UN Regulation No 157
Approval No …
Reason for extension or revision: …
1.Trade name or mark of vehicle …
2.Vehicle type …
3.Manufacturer's name and address …
4.If applicable, name and address of manufacturer’s representative …
5.General construction characteristics of the vehicle:
5.1.
Photographs and/or drawings of a representative vehicle: …
6.Description and/or drawing of the ALKS including:
6.1.
Specified maximum speed of the ALKS declared by the manufacturer: …
6.2
Sensing system (incl. components): …
6.3.
Installation of the ALKS sensing system: …
6.4.
Software Identification of the ALKS (if applicable): …
7.Written description and/or drawing of the ALKS Human-Machine Interface including:
7.1.
Methods to detect driver availability …
7.2.
Means to activate, deactivate and override the system …
7.3.
Methods to determine driver attentiveness …
7.4.
Any system limitations due to environmental or road conditions…
8.Written description and/or drawing of the information given to the driver including:
8.1.
System status: …
8.2.
Transition demand: …
8.3.
Minimum Risk Manoeuvre: …
8.4.
Emergency Manoeuvre: …
9.Data Storage System for Automated Driving (DSSAD):
9.1.
DSSAD performance verified after the tests performed according to Annex 5: …yes/no
9.2.
DSSAD documentation concerning data retrievability, data integrity self-check and protection against manipulation of stored data verified: yes/no
10.Cyber Security and Software updates
10.1.
Cyber Security Type Approval Number (if applicable): …
10.2.
Software Update Type approval number (if applicable): …
11.Special requirements to be applied to the safety aspects of electronic control systems (Annex 4)
11.1.
Manufacturers document reference for Annex 4 (including version number): …
11.2.
Information document form (Appendix 2 of Annex 4) …
12.Technical Service responsible for conducting approval tests…
12.1.
Date of report issued by that service…
12.2.
(Reference) Number of the report issued by that service…
13.Approval granted/extended/revised/refused/withdrawn2
14.Position of approval mark on vehicle…
15.Place…
16.Date…
17.Signature…
18.Annexed to this communication is a list of documents in the approval file deposited at the administration services having delivered the approval and which can be obtained upon request.
Additional information
19.R157SWIN: …
19.1.
Information on how to read the R157SWIN or software version(s) in case the R157SWIN is not held on the vehicle: …
19.2.
If applicable, list the relevant parameters that will allow the identification of those vehicles that can be updated with the software represented by the R157SWIN under item 19.1: …
(1) Distinguishing number of the country which has granted/extended/refused/withdrawn approval (see approval provisions in UN Regulation No 157).
(2) Strike out what does not apply.
Appendix
Addendum to Type approval Communication No … concerning the type approval of a vehicle type with regard to ALKS pursuant to Regulation No 157
Additional information
Contracting Party regions where the vehicle manufacturer has declared that the ALKS had been assessed to comply with local traffic rules:
Country
Assessed
Comments on any restrictions
E 1 Germany
Yes/No
E 2 France
E 3 Italy
E 4 Netherlands
E 5 Sweden
E 6 Belgium
E 7 Hungary
E 8 Czech Republic
E 9 Spain
E 10 Serbia
E 11 United Kingdom
E 12 Austria
E 13 Luxembourg
E 14 Switzerland
E 16 Norway
E 17 Finland
E 18 Denmark
E 19 Romania
E 20 Poland
E 21 Portugal
E 22 Russian Federation
E 23 Greece
E 24 Ireland
E 25 Croatia
E 26 Slovenia
E 27 Slovakia
E 28 Belarus
E 29 Estonia
E 30 Republic of Moldova
E 31 Bosnia and Herzegovina
E 32 Latvia
E 34 Bulgaria
E 35 Kazakhstan
E 36 Lithuania
E 37 Turkey
E 39 Azerbaijan
E 40 North Macedonia
E 43 Japan
E 45 Australia
E 46 Ukraine
E 47 South Africa
E 48 New Zealand
E 49 Cyprus
E 50 Malta
E 51 Republic of Korea
E 52 Malaysia
E 53 Thailand
E 54 Albania
E 55 Armenia
E 56 Montenegro
E 57 San Marino
E 58 Tunisia
E 60 Georgia
E 62 Egypt
E 63 Nigeria
[E 64 Pakistan]
(*)
(*) The list of Contracting Parties applying UN Regulation No 157 is available online:https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XI-B-16-15[X]&chapter=11&clang=_en
ANNEX 2
Arrangements of approval marks
MODEL A
(See paragraph 4.4 of this Regulation)
a = 8 mm min
The above approval mark affixed to a vehicle shows that the vehicle type concerned has, with regard to ALKS, been approved in the Netherlands (E 4) pursuant to UN Regulation No 157 under approval No 002439. The approval number indicates that the approval was granted in accordance with the requirements of UN Regulation No 157 in its original version.
MODEL B
(See paragraph 4.5 of this Regulation)
a = 8 mm min
The above approval mark affixed to a vehicle shows that the vehicle type concerned has been approved in the Netherlands (E 4) pursuant to Regulations Nos 157 and 31. (1) The approval numbers indicate that, at the dates when the respective approvals were given, UN Regulation No 157 was in its original version and UN Regulation No 31 included the 02 series of amendments.
(1) The second number is given merely as an example.
ANNEX 3
(Reserved)
ANNEX 4
Special requirements to be applied to the functional and operational safety aspects of Automated Lane Keeping Systems (ALKS)
1. GENERAL
This annex is intended to ensure that an acceptable thorough consideration of functional and operational safety for the automated system that provides the function(s) regulated by the ALKS Regulation has been performed by the manufacturer during the design and development processes and will continue to be done throughout the vehicle type lifecycle (design, development, production, field operation, decommissioning).
It covers the documentation which must be disclosed by the manufacturer to the type-approval authority or the technical Service acting on its behalf (hereafter referred as type-approval authority), for type approval purposes.
This documentation shall demonstrate that automated lane keeping system meets the performance requirements specified in this UN Regulation, that it is designed and developed to operate in such a way that it is free of unreasonable safety risks to the driver, passengers and other road users.
The type approval authority granting the approval shall verify through targeted spot checks and tests that the argumentation provided by the documentation is strong enough and that the design and processes described in documentation are actually implemented by the manufacturer.
While based on the provided documentation, evidence and process audits/product assessments carried out to the satisfaction of the type approval authority concerning this Regulation, the residual level of risk of the assessed automated lane keeping system is deemed to be acceptable for the entry into service of the vehicle type, the overall vehicle safety during the automated lane keeping system lifetime in accordance with the requirements of this regulation remains the responsibility of the manufacturer requesting the type-approval.
2. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this annex,
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
2.6.
2.7.
2.8.
2.9.
2.10.
2.11.
2.12.
2.13.
2.14.
2.15.
2.16.
3. DOCUMENTATION
3.1.
The manufacturer shall provide a documentation package which gives access to the basic design of ‘The System’ and the means by which it is linked to other vehicle systems or by which it directly controls output variables.
The function(s) of ‘The System’, including the control strategies, and the safety concept, as laid down by the manufacturer, shall be explained.
Documentation shall be brief, yet provide evidence that the design and development has had the benefit of expertise from all the system fields which are involved.
For periodic technical inspections, the documentation shall describe how the current operational status of ‘The System’ can be checked.
Information about how the software version(s) and the failure warning signal status can be readable in a standardized way via the use of an electronic communication interface, at least be the standard interface (OBD port).
The Type-approval authority shall assess the documentation package to show that ‘The System’:
(a)
Is designed and was developed to operate in such a way that it is free from unreasonable risks for the driver, passengers and other road users within the declared ODD and boundaries;
(b)
Respects, under the performance requirements specified elsewhere in this UN Regulation;
(c)
Was developed according to the development process/method declared by the manufacturer and that this includes at least the steps listed in paragraph 3.4.4.
3.1.1.
(a)
Application for type approval: The information document which is submitted to the type approval authority at the time of type approval application shall contain brief information on the items listed in Appendix 2. It will become part of the approval.
(b)
The formal documentation package for the approval, containing the material listed in this paragraph 3 (with the exception of that of paragraph 3.4.4) which shall be supplied to the Type Approval Authority for the purpose of conducting the product assessment / process audit. This documentation package shall be used by the Type Approval Authority as the basic reference for the verification process set out in paragraph 4 of this annex. The Type Approval Authority shall ensure that this documentation package remains available for a period determined of at least 10 years counted from the time when production of the vehicle type is definitely discontinued.
(c)
Additional confidential material and analysis data (intellectual property) of paragraph 3.4.4 which shall be retained by the manufacturer, but made open for inspection (e.g. on-site in the engineering facilities of the manufacturer) at the time of the product assessment / process audit. The manufacturer shall ensure that this material and analysis data remains available for a period of 10 years counted from the time when production of the vehicle type is definitely discontinued.
3.2.
A description shall be provided which gives a simple explanation of all the functions including control strategies of ‘The System’ and the methods employed to perform the dynamic driving tasks within the ODD and the boundaries under which the automated lane keeping system is designed to operate, including a statement of the mechanism(s) by which control is exercised. The manufacturer shall describe the interactions expected between the system and the driver, vehicle occupants and other road users as well as Human-Machine Interface (HMI).
Any enabled or disabled automated driving functions for which the hardware and software are present in the vehicle at the time of production, shall be declared and are subject to the requirements of this annex, prior to their use in the vehicle. The manufacturer shall also document the data processing in case of continuous learning algorithms are implemented.
3.2.1.
3.2.2.
3.2.3.
3.2.4.
3.2.5.
3.3.
3.3.1.
A list shall be provided, collating all the units of ‘The System’ and mentioning the other vehicle systems which are needed to achieve the control function in question.
An outline schematic showing these units in combination, shall be provided with both the equipment distribution and the interconnections made clear.
This outline shall include:
(a)
Perception and objects detection including mapping and positioning;
(b)
Characterization of Decision-making;
(c)
Remote supervision and remote monitoring by a remote supervision centre (if applicable);
(d)
The data storage system (DSSAD).
3.3.2.
The function of each unit of ‘The System’ shall be outlined and the signals linking it with other units or with other vehicle systems shall be shown. This may be provided by a labelled block diagram or other schematic, or by a description aided by such a diagram.
3.3.3.
3.3.4.
3.3.5.
Each unit shall be clearly and unambiguously identifiable (e.g. by marking for hardware, and by marking or software output for software content) to provide corresponding hardware and documentation association. Where software version can be changed without requiring replacement of the marking or component, the software identification must be by software output only.
Where functions are combined within a single unit or indeed within a single computer, but shown in multiple blocks in the block diagram for clarity and ease of explanation, only a single hardware identification marking shall be used. The manufacturer shall, by the use of this identification, affirm that the equipment supplied conforms to the corresponding document.
3.3.5.1.
3.3.6.
The manufacturer shall provide information regarding the installation options that will be employed for the individual components that comprise the sensing system. These options shall include, but are not limited to, the location of the component in/on the vehicle, the material(s) surrounding the component, the dimensioning and geometry of the material surrounding the component, and the surface finish of the materials surrounding the component, once installed in the vehicle. The information shall also include installation specifications that are critical to the system’s performance, e.g. tolerances on installation angle.
Changes to the individual components of the sensing system, or the installation options, shall be notified to the Type Approval Authority and be subject to further assessment.
3.4.
3.4.1.
3.4.2.
3.4.3.
(a)
Fall-back to operation using a partial system.
(b)
Redundancy with a separate system.
(c)
Removal of the automated driving function(s).
3.4.3.1.
3.4.3.2.
3.4.3.3.
3.4.4.
The chosen analytical approach(es) shall be established and maintained by the manufacturer and shall be made open for inspection by the Type Approval Authority at the time of the type approval.
The Type Approval Authority shall perform an assessment of the application of the analytical approach(es):
(a)
Inspection of the safety approach at the concept (vehicle) level.
This approach shall be based on a Hazard / Risk analysis appropriate to system safety.
(b)
Inspection of the safety approach at the system level including a top down (from possible hazard to design) and bottom up approach (from design to possible hazards). The safety approach may be based on a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and a System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) or any similar process appropriate to system functional and operational safety.
(c)
Inspection of the validation/verification plans and results including appropriate acceptance criteria. This shall include validation testing appropriate for validation, for example, Hardware in the Loop (HIL) testing, vehicle on-road operational testing, testing with real end users, or any other testing appropriate for validation/verification. Results of validation and verification may be assessed by analysing coverage of the different tests and setting coverage minimal thresholds for various metrics.
The inspection shall confirm that at least each of the following items is covered where applicable under (a)-(c):
(i)
Issues linked to interactions with other vehicle systems (e.g. braking, steering);
(ii)
Failures of the automated lane keeping system and system risk mitigation reactions;
(iii)
Situations within the ODD when a system may create unreasonable safety risks for the driver, passengers and other road users due to operational disturbances (e.g. lack of or wrong comprehension of the vehicle environment, lack of understanding of the reaction from the driver, passenger or other road users, inadequate control, challenging scenarios);
(iv)
Identification of the relevant scenarios within the boundary conditions and management method used to select scenarios and validation tool chosen;
(v)
Decision making process resulting in the performance of the dynamic driving tasks (e.g. emergency manoeuvres), for the interaction with other road users and in compliance with traffic rules;
(vi)
Reasonably foreseeable misuse by the driver (e.g. driver availability recognition system and an explanation on how the availability criteria were established), mistakes or misunderstanding by the driver (e.g. unintentional override) and intentional tampering of the system;
(vii)
Cyberattacks having an impact on the safety of the vehicle (can be done through the analysis done under the UN Regulation No 155 on Cyber Security and Cyber Security Management System).
The assessment by the approval authority shall consist of spot checks of selected hazards (or cyber threats) to establish that argumentation supporting the safety concept is understandable and logical and implemented in the different functions of the systems. The assessment shall also check that validation plans are robust enough to demonstrate safety (e.g. reasonable coverage of chosen scenarios testing by the validation tool chosen) and have been completed.
It shall demonstrate that the vehicle is free from unreasonable risks for the driver; vehicle occupants and other road users in the operational design domain, i.e. through:
(a)
an overall validation target (i.e., validation acceptance criteria) supported by validation results, demonstrating that the entry into service of the automated lane keeping system will overall not increase the level of risk for the driver, vehicle occupants, and other road users compared to a manually driven vehicles; and
(b)
A scenario specific approach showing that the system will overall not increase the level of risk for the driver, passengers and other road users compared to a manually driven vehicles for each of the safety relevant scenarios; and
The Type Approval Authority shall perform or shall require performing tests as specified in paragraph 4 to verify the safety concept.
3.4.4.1.
3.4.4.2.
3.5.
3.5.1.
3.5.2.
3.5.3.
3.5.4.
3.5.5.
3.5.6.
4. VERIFICATION AND TESTS
4.1.
4.1.1.
The Type approval authority shall verify ‘The System’ under non-failure conditions by testing on a track a number of selected functions from those described by the manufacturer in paragraph 3.2 above, and by checking the overall behaviour of the system in real driving conditions including the compliance with traffic rules.
These tests shall include scenarios whereby the system is overridden by the driver.
Tests according to this Annex shall take into account tests already conducted in Annex 5 of this Regulation.
4.1.1.1.
4.1.2.
The reaction of ‘The System’ shall be checked under the influence of a faults in any individual unit by applying corresponding output signals to electrical units or mechanical elements in order to simulate the effects of internal failure within the unit. The Type approval authority shall conduct this check for at least one individual unit, but shall not check the reaction of ‘The System’ to multiple simultaneous failures of individual units.
The Type Approval Authority shall verify that these tests include aspects that may have an impact on vehicle controllability and user information (HMI aspects e.g. transition scenarios).
4.1.2.1.
4.1.2.2.
4.2.
5. REPORTING
Reporting of the assessment shall be performed in such a manner that allows traceability, e.g. versions of documents inspected are coded and listed in the records of the Technical Service.
An example of a possible layout for the assessment form from the Technical Service to the Type Approval Authority is given in Appendix 1 to this Annex. The listed items in this Appendix are outlined as minimum set of items which need to be covered.
6. COMMUNICATION TO OTHER TYPE APPROVAL AUTHORITIES (Appendix 2) containing:
(a)
Description of the ODD and the high-level functional architecture focusing on the functions available to the driver, vehicle occupants and other road users.
(b)
Test results during the verification process by the type approval authorities.
7. COMPETENCE OF THE AUDITORS/ASSESSORS
The assessments under this Annex shall only be conducted by auditors/assessors with the technical and administrative knowledge necessary for such purposes. They shall in particular be competent as auditor/assessor for ISO 26262-2018 (Functional Safety – Road Vehicles), and ISO/PAS 21448 (Safety of the Intended Functionality of road vehicles); and shall be able to make the necessary link with cybersecurity aspects in accordance with UN Regulation No 155 and ISO/SAE 21434). This competence should be demonstrated by appropriate qualifications or other equivalent training records.
Appendix 1
Model assessment form for Automated Lane Keeping System
Test report No: …
1.Identification
1.1.
Make: …
1.2.
Vehicle Type: …
1.3.
Means of system identification on the vehicle: …
1.4.
Location of that marking: …
1.5.
Manufacturer’s name and address: …
1.6.
If applicable, name and address of manufacturer’s representative: …
1.7.
Documentation reference No: …
Date of original issue: …
Date of latest update: …
2.Test vehicle(s)/system(s) description
2.1.
General description: …
2.2.
Description of all the control functions of ‘The System’, and methods of operation: …
2.3.
Description of the components and diagrams of the interconnections within ‘The System’:
3.Manufacturer’s safety concept
3.1.
Description of signal flow and operating data and their priorities: …
3.2.
The manufacturer(s) … affirm(s) that the ‘The System’ is free from unreasonable risks for the driver, vehicle occupants and other road users.
3.3.
Software outline architecture and the design methods and tools used: …
3.4.
Explanation of the safety concept of ‘The System’: …
3.5.
Documented analyses of the behaviour of ‘The System’ under individual hazard or fault conditions: …
3.6.
Description of the measures in place for environmental conditions: …
3.7.
Provisions for the periodic technical inspection of ‘The System’: …
3.8.
Results of ‘The System’ verification test, as per para. 4.1.1 of Annex 4 to UN Regulation No 157: …
3.9.
Results of safety concept verification test, as per para. 4.1.2 of Annex 4 to UN Regulation No 157: …
3.10.
Date of test(s): …
3.11.
Technical Service carrying out the test
Signed: … Date: …
3.12.
Comments: …
Appendix 2
Information document form for automated lane keeping systems to be provided by the manufacturer for the approval
1. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AUTOMATED LANE KEEPING SYSTEM
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF ‘THE SYSTEM’ INCLUDING CONTROL STRATEGIES
2.1.
2.1.1.
2.1.2.
3. OVERVIEW MAJOR COMPONENTS (UNITS) OF ‘THE SYSTEM’
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
4. SYSTEM LAYOUT AND SCHEMATICS
4.1.
4.2.
5. SPECIFICATIONS
5.1.
5.2.
6. SAFETY CONCEPT
6.1.
6.2.
6.3.
6.4.
6.5.
6.6.
6.7.
7. VERIFICATION AND TEST BY THE AUTHORITIES
7.1.
7.2.
8. DATA STORAGE SYSTEM
8.1.
8.2.
8.3.
8.4.
9. CYBERSECURITY (CROSS REFERENCE TO THE CYBER REGULATION IS POSSIBLE)
9.1.
9.2.
9.3.
10. INFORMATION PROVISIONS TO USERS
10.1.
10.2.
Appendix 3
Guidance on Traffic disturbance critical scenarios for ALKS
1. GENERAL
1.1
2. TRAFFIC CRITICAL SCENARIOS
2.1.
2.2.
(a)
Cut-in: the ‘other vehicle’ suddenly merges in front of the ‘ego vehicle’;
(b)
Cut-out: the ‘other vehicle’ suddenly exits the lane of the ‘ego vehicle’;
(c)
Deceleration: the ‘other vehicle’ suddenly decelerates in front of the ‘ego vehicle’;
2.3.
(a)
Road geometry;
(b)
Other vehicles’ behaviour/ manoeuvre.
3. PERFORMANCE MODEL OF ALKS
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
Table 1
Performance model factors for vehicles
Factors
Risk perception point
Lane change (cutting in, cutting out)
Deviation of the centre of a vehicle over 0,375m from the centre of the driving lane
(derived from research by Japan)
Deceleration
Deceleration ratio of preceding vehicle and following distance of ego vehicle
Risk evaluation time
0,4 seconds
(from research by Japan)
Time duration from having finished perception until starting deceleration
0,75 seconds
(common data in Japan)
Jerking time to full deceleration (road friction 1,0)
0,6 seconds to 0,774G
(from experiments by NHTSA and Japan)
Jerking time to full deceleration (after full wrap of ego vehicle and cut-in vehicle, road friction 1,0)
0,6 seconds to 0,85G
(derived from UN Regulation No 152 on AEBS)
3.4.
3.4.1.
The lateral wandering distance the vehicle will normally wander within the lane is 0,375 m.
The perceived boundary for cut-in occurs when the vehicle exceeds the normal lateral wandering distance (possibly prior to actual lane change)
The distance a. is the perception distance based on the perception time [a]. It defines the lateral distance required to perceive that a vehicle is executing a cut-in manoeuvre a. is obtained from the following formula;
a.= lateral movement speed × Risk perception time [a] (0,4sec)
The risk perception time begins when the leading vehicle exceeds the cut-in boundary threshold.
Max lateral movement speed is real world data in Japan.
Risk perception time [a] is driving simulator data in Japan.
2sec* is specified as the maximum Time To Collision (TTC) below which it was concluded that there is a danger of collision in the longitudinal direction.
Note:
3.4.2.
The lateral wandering distance the vehicle will normally wander within the lane is 0,375 m.
The perceived boundary for cut-out occurs when the vehicle exceeds the normal lateral wandering distance (possibly prior to actual lane change)
The risk perception time [a] is 0,4 seconds and begins when the leading vehicle exceeds the cut-out boundary threshold.
The time 2 seconds is specified as the maximum Time Head Way (THW) for which it was concluded that there is a danger in longitudinal direction.
Note:
3.4.3.
The risk perception time [a] is 0,4 seconds. The risk perception time [a] begins when the leading vehicle exceeds a deceleration threshold 5m/s2.
4. PARAMETERS
4.1.
4.2.
Table 2
Additional parameters
Operating conditions
Roadway
Number of lanes = The number of parallel and adjacent lanes in the same direction of travel
Lane Width = The width of each lane
Roadway grade = The grade of the roadway in the area of test
Roadway condition = the condition of the roadway (dry, wet, icy, snow, new, worn) including coefficient of friction
Lane markings = the type, colour, width, visibility of lane markings
Environmental conditions
Lighting conditions = The amount of light and direction (i.e., day, night, sunny, cloudy)
Weather conditions = The amount, type and intensity of wind, rain, snow etc.
Initial condition
Initial velocity
Ve0 = Ego vehicle
Vo0 = Leading vehicle in lane or in adjacent lane
Vf0 = Vehicle in front of leading vehicle in lane
Initial distance
dx0 = Distance in Longitudinal direction between the front end of the ego vehicle and the rear end of the leading vehicle in ego vehicle’s lane or in adjacent lane
dy0 = Inside Lateral distance between outside edge line of ego vehicle in parallel to the vehicle's median longitudinal plane within lanes and outside edge line of leading vehicle in parallel to the vehicle's median longitudinal plane in adjacent lines.
dy0_f = Inside Lateral distance between outside edge line of leading vehicle in parallel to the vehicle's median longitudinal plane within lanes and outside edge line of vehicle in front of the leading vehicle in parallel to the vehicle's median longitudinal plane in adjacent lines.
dx0_f = Distance in longitudinal direction between front end of leading vehicle and rear end of vehicle in front of leading vehicle
dfy = Width of vehicle in front of leading vehicle
doy = Width of leading vehicle
dox = Length of the leading vehicle
Vehicle motion
Lateral motion
Vy =Leading vehicle lateral velocity
Deceleration
Gx_max = Maximum deceleration of the leading vehicle in G
dG/dt = Deceleration rate (Jerk) of the leading vehicle
4.3.
5. REFERENCE
Following data sheets are pictorial examples of simulations which determines conditions under which ALKS shall avoid a collision, taking into account the combination of every parameter, at and below the maximum permitted ALKS vehicle speed.
5.1.
(Data sheets image)
5.2.
It is possible to avoid all the deceleration (stop) vehicles ahead of the preceding vehicle cut-out in the following running condition at THW 2,0 sec.
(Data sheets image)
5.3.
It is possible to avoid sudden deceleration of -1,0G or less in the follow-up driving situation at THW 2,0 sec.
(Data sheet image)
(Data sheets image)
ANNEX 5
Test Specifications for ALKS
1. INTRODUCTION
This annex defines tests with the purpose to verify the technical requirements on ALKS.
Until such time that specific test provisions have been agreed, the Technical Service shall ensure that the ALKS is subject to at least the tests outlined in Annex 5. The specific test parameters for each test shall be selected by the Technical Service and shall be recorded in the test report in such a manner that allows traceability and repeatability of the test setup.
Pass- and Fail-Criteria for tests are derived solely from the technical requirements in paragraphs 5 to 7 of the Regulation. These requirements are worded in a way that they allow the derivation of pass-fail-criteria not only for a given set of test parameters, but for any combination of parameters in which the system is designed to work (e.g. operating speed range, operating lateral acceleration range, curvature range as contained in the system boundaries).
The test specifications in this document are meant to be a minimum set of tests, the technical service authorities may perform any other test within the system boundaries and may then compare the measured results against the requirements (concrete: expected test outcome).
2. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Annex,
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
3.1.
3.1.1.
3.1.2.
3.1.3.
3.1.4.
3.1.4.1.
3.1.4.2.
3.1.4.3.
3.1.4.4.
3.2.
The manufacturer shall declare the system boundaries to the Technical Service. The Technical Service shall define different combinations of test parameters (e.g. present speed of the ALKS vehicle, type and offset of target, curvature of lane) in order to cover scenarios in which a collision shall be avoided by the system as well as those in which a collision is not expected to be avoided, where applicable.
If this is deemed justified, the Technical Service may test additionally any other combination of parameters.
If a collision cannot be avoided for some test parameters, the manufacturer shall demonstrate either by documentation or, if possible, by verification/testing that the system doesn’t unreasonably switch its control strategy.
4. TEST SCENARIOS TO ASSESS THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM WITH REGARD TO THE DYNAMIC DRIVING TASK
4.1.
4.1.1.
4.1.2.
(a)
With a minimum test duration of 5 minutes;
(b)
With a passenger car target as well as a PTW target as the lead vehicle / other vehicle;
(c)
With a lead vehicle swerving in the lane; and
(d)
With another vehicle driving close beside in the adjacent lane.
4.2.
4.2.1.
4.2.2.
(a)
With a stationary passenger car target;
(b)
With a stationary powered two-wheeler target;
(c)
With a stationary pedestrian target;
(d)
With a pedestrian target crossing the lane with a speed of 5 km/h;
(e)
With a target representing a blocked lane;
(f)
With a target partially within the lane;
(g)
With multiple consecutive obstacles blocking the lane (e.g. in the following order: ego-vehicle -motorcycle - car);
(h)
On a curved section of road.
4.3.
4.3.1.
4.3.2.
(a)
Across the entire speed range of the ALKS;
(b)
For a passenger car target as well as a PTW target as lead vehicle, provided standardized PTW targets suitable to safely perform the test are available;
(c)
For constant and varying lead vehicle velocities (e.g. following a realistic speed profile from existing driving database);
(d)
For straight and curved sections of road;
(e)
For different lateral positions of lead vehicle in the lane;
(f)
With a deceleration of the lead vehicle of at least 6 m/s2 mean fully developed deceleration until standstill.
4.4.
4.4.1.
4.4.2.
4.4.3.
(a)
For different TTC, distance and relative velocity values of the cut-in manoeuvre, covering types of cut-in scenarios in which a collision can be avoided and those in which a collision cannot be avoided;
(b)
For cutting-in vehicles travelling at constant longitudinal speed, accelerating and decelerating;
(c)
For different lateral velocities, lateral accelerations of the cut-in vehicle;
(d)
For passenger car as well as PTW targets as the cutting-in vehicle, provided standardized PTW targets suitable to safely perform the test are available.
4.5.
4.5.1.
4.5.2.
(a)
With a stationary passenger car target centred in lane;
(b)
With a powered two-wheeler target centred in lane;
(c)
With a stationary pedestrian target centred in lane;
(d)
With a target representing a blocked lane centred in lane;
(e)
With multiple consecutive obstacles blocking the lane (e.g. in the following order: ego-vehicle – lane change vehicle – motorcycle – car).
4.6.
4.6.1.
4.6.2.
(a)
When approaching a motorcycle target positioned at the outer edge of each adjacent lane;
(b)
When approaching a stationary pedestrian target positioned at the outer edge of each adjacent lane;
(c)
When approaching a stationary motorcycle target positioned within the ego lane;
(d)
When approaching a stationary pedestrian target positioned within the ego lane.
4.6.3.
(a)
With a motorcycle target approaching the ALKS vehicle from the left adjacent lane;
(b)
With a motorcycle target approaching the ALKS vehicle from the right adjacent lane.
5. ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION
5.1.
5.2.
Test/Check
6.2.2.
Off mode after new engine start/run
6.2.3
System can only be activated if
(a)
The driver is in driver seat & belt is fastened
(b)
The driver is available
(c)
No failures
(d)
DSSAD operational
(e)
Conditions are within system limits
6.2.1
6.2.4
6.2.5
6.2.6
Means of deactivating
Dedicated means to activate and deactivate
protected against unintentional action
Steering
(a)
Holding wheel and brake/accelerate
(b)
Driver holds steering wheel in response to transition and MRM
(c)
After deactivation
6.3
Means to override the system
(a)
Steering control
(b)
Braking input higher than system
(c)
Accelerating to speed within system limits
6.1.3.1.
Criteria for deeming driver available
5.1.3
Driver support systems active
6.3.1.1.
Driver attentiveness
5.5
System behaviour during a Minimal Risk Manoeuvre
(a)
Driver take over
(b)
Standstill (harzard lights)
(c)
Re-activation disabled if reached standstill
5.1.4
5.1.5
5.4
Transition demand & behaviour/escalation
Driver resumes control
Without driver response (MRM)
(a)
Planned transition
(b)
Unplanned transition
6.1.2
6.1.3
5.4.
Transition demand during operation
Exceed system parameters
Failure
(a)
Detectable collision
(b)
Driver not present
5.3
System behaviour for Emergency Manoeuvre
(a)
Resulting in standstill
(b)
Not resulting in standstill
7.1
7.1.1
7.1.2
System detection areas
Front
Sides
7.1.3
Visibility
5.3.
(a)
Y-split of highway lanes
(b)
Vehicles entering or exiting the highway
(c)
Partially blocked ego lane, tunnel
(d)
Traffic lights
(e)
Emergency vehicles
(f)
Construction zones
(g)
Faded/erased/hidden lane markings
(h)
Emergency/Service personnel directing traffic
(i)
Change in road characteristics (no longer divided, pedestrians permitted, roundabout, intersection)
(j)
Normal traffic flow resumed (i.e. all vehicles moving > 60km/h).
5.4.
The Technical Service shall conduct, or shall witness, an assessment of the system, in a fault-free condition, in the presence of traffic (a ‘real-world’ test). The purpose of this test is to support the Technical Service in understanding the functionality of the system in its operating environment and to complement the assessment of the documentation provided under Annex 4.
Together, the assessment of Annex 4 and the real-world test shall enable the Technical Service to identify areas of system performance that may require further assessment, either through testing or further review of Annex 4.
During the real-world assessment, the Technical Service shall assess at least:
(a)
Prevention of activation when the system is outside of its technical boundaries/requirements for ALKS
(b)
No violation of traffic rules
(c)
Response to a planned event
(d)
Response to an unplanned event
(e)
Detection of the presence of other road users within the frontal and lateral detection ranges
(f)
Vehicle behaviour in response to other road users (following distance, cut-in scenario, cut-out scenario, etc.).
(g)
System override
The location and selection of the test route, time-of-day and environmental conditions shall be determined by the Technical Service.
The test drive shall be recorded and the test vehicle instrumented with non-perturbing equipment. The Technical Service may log, or request logs of any data channels used or generated by the system as deemed necessary for post-test evaluation.
It is recommended that the real-world test is undertaken once the system has passed all of the other tests outlined in this Annex and upon completion of a risk assessment by the Technical Service.
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https://eur-lex.europa.eu, 1998 - 2026
